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Christ T. Troupis, ISB # 4549 
TROUPIS LAW OFFICE 
1299 E. Iron Eagle, Ste 130 
PO Box 2408 
Eagle, Idaho 83616 
Telephone: 208/938-5584 
Facsimile: 208/938-5482 
Email: ctroupis@troupislaw.com 
Co-counsel for Plaintiffs/Counter-defendants 
SEP :: ~. 2Cifi
 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
 
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an 
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G. 
MAILE, IV. and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE, 
husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants, 
v. 
CONNIE WRIGHT l'AYLOR, flk/a 
CONNIE TAYLOR, an individual; DALLAN 
TAYLOR, an individual; R. JOHN 
TAYLOR, an individual; CLARK and 
FEENEY, a partnership; PAUL T. CLARK, 
an individual; THEODORE L. JOHNSON 
REVOCABLE TRUST, an Idaho revocable 
trust; JOHN DOES I -JOHN DOES X; AND 
ALL PERSONS IN POSSESSION OR 
CLAIMING ANY RIGHT TO 
POSSESSION. 
Defendants/Counter-Claimants. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss: 
County of Ada ) 
Case No. CV-OC-0723232 
AFFIDAVIT OF CHRIST TROUPIS 
IN SUPPORT OF 
PLAINTIFFS/COUNTER­
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO 
RECONSIDER 
AFFIDAVIT OF CHRIST TROUPIS IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS/COUNTER­
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO RECONSIDER- Pg 1 
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CHRIST T. TROUPIS, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says: 
1.	 Your Affiant is co-counsel of record in this matter and the Ada County Case No. CV DC 
04-00473D. Your Affiant makes this Affidavit in support of Plaintiffs/Counter-
Defendants' Motion to Reconsider. That the information and facts set forth herein are 
based upon your affiant's personal knowledge and/or observations and can testify as to 
the truth of the matters asserted herein if called upon as a witness at the trial of this 
matter. 
2.	 Attached hereto as Exhibit "A" is a true and correct copy ofthe initial Complaint and 
Demand for Jury Trial filed in Ada County Case No. CV OC 04-00473D, Taylor vs Maile 
filed January 23, 2004 and the same is made part hereof as if set forth in full herein. 
3.	 Attached hereto as Exhibit "B" is a true and correct copy ofthe Verified Answer and 
Counter-claim filed in Ada County Case No. CV OC 04-00473D, Taylor vs Maile filed 
February 23, 2004 and the same is made part hereof as if set forth in full herein. 
4.	 Attached hereto as Exhibit "C" is a true and correct copy of the Answer and Counter 
Claim re: Plaintiffs Amended Complaint by Beneficiaries filed in Ada County Case No. 
CV OC 04-00473D, Taylor vs Maile filed March 21, 2006 and the same is made part 
hereof as if set forth in full herein. 
5.	 Attached hereto as Exhibit "D" is a true and correct copy of the Order Regarding 
Plaintiffs' Motion f()r Summary Judgment filed in Ada County Case No. CV OC 04­
00473D, Taylor vs M~aile filed February 13,2006 and the same is made part hereof as if 
set forth in full herein. 
AFFIDAVIT OF CHRIST TROUPIS IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS/COUNTER­
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO RECONSIDER- Pg 2 
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6.	 Attached hereto as Exhibit "E" is a true and correct copy of the Plaintiff Beneficiaries' 
Motion for Summary Judgment executed on filed in Ada County Case No. CV DC 04­
00473D, Taylor vs A/aile filed February 13, 2006 and the same is made part hereof as if 
set forth in full herein. 
7.	 Attached hereto as Exhibit "F" is a true and correct copy of the Registry of Actions in the 
Matter of the Registration ofTrust ofTheodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust in Ada 
County Case No. CV TR-2004-2218 and the same is made part hereof as ifset forth in 
full herein. 
DATED thisd:_~dayof ~~~~y' ,2010. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORJ\J TO BEFORE ME, a Notary Public in and for said State, 
thisz..YJ day ofXP.-\ . ,2010. 
it~~Notary Public fi r Idaho
 
Residing at G:P-§~ Ill)
 
My Commission Expires 1\~ ll-\~
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CHRIST TROUPIS, o-counsel for Plaintiffsl 
Counter-defendants 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on this 28th day of September, I caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing (1) PLAINTIFFS/COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO 
RECONSIDER, (2) AFFIDAVIT OF CHRIST TROUPIS IN SUPPORT 
PLAINTIFFS/COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO RECONSIDER, together with (3) 
MEMORANDUM BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS/COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' 
MOTION TO RECONSIDER, to be delivered, addressed as follows: 
r-- .. 
Connie W. Taylor 
CLARK and FEENEY 
P.O. Drawer 785 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
Facsimile: (208) 746-9160 
Thomas G. Maile, IV. 
380 W. State Street 
Eagle, Idaho 83616 
Facsimile: (208) 939-1001 
(X) u. S. Mail 
( ) Facsimile Transmission 
( ) Hand Delivery I I 
I ( ) Overnight Delivery I 
I 
u. S. Mail 
Facsimile Transmission i
I 
Hand Delivery 
Overnight Delivery I 
I 
&;:i)~ .
 
CHRIST T. TRO~
 
Co-Counsel for Plaintiffs/Counter-­

Defendants
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CONNIE W. TAYLOR 
• t .. CLARK and FEENEY 
4 
6 
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8 
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.....
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
1229 Main Street 
P. O. Drawer 285 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
Telephone: (208)743-9516 
ISB No. 4837 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COlJNTY OF ADA 
('\I DC 04004730 Case~.REED TAYLOR,DALLANTAYLOR,
 )
)
) 
)
)
)
)
 
_ 
and R. JOHN TAYLOR, 
Plaintiffs, 
Ys. 
COMPLAINT
 
AND DEMAND FOR 
JURY TRlAL 
14 THOMAS MAlLE, IV and COLLEEN 
MAILE, husband and wife, THOMAS 
) 
) 
Fee Category: A.l. 
Fee Amount: $77 
MAILE REAL ESTATE COMPANY, ) 
and BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, ) 
16 
Defendants. 
) 
) 
17 
18 
19 
21 
22 
23 
24 
c:6 
COME NOW the Plaintiffs by and through their undersigned counsel of record, Cormie 
W. Taylor of the Law Offices of Clark and Feeney, and for a cause of action and claim for relief 
against the Defendants, complain, state, and allege as follows: 
1. PARTIES 
1.1 Reed and R. John Taylor are residents ofNez Perce County, Idaho; Dallan Taylor 
is a resident ofAda Coun1y Idaho. All ofthe plaintiffs are residual beneficiaries of the Theodore 
COMPLAINT AND DEMAND 
FOR JURY TRIAL -1­ COpy 
001707
 
 
 
 
 
t:
  
_.- I 'r" .• 
 
 
r l O _____  
VS  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I
.1
 
  
 
            
-
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
L6 
L. Johnson Trust. They bring this action on their own behalfand also as assignees ofcertain other 
beneficiaries or residual beneficiaries of said trust. 
1.2 Thomas Maile, IV (herein after Thomas Maile) is engaged in the practice of law 
at 380 W. State Street, Eagle, Ada County, Idaho. Defendant Thomas Maile is a licensed real 
estate broker D/B/A Thomas Maile Real Estate Company. Thomas Maile and Colleen Maile are 
husband and wife and a.ll acts complained ofherein were for the benefit ofthe marital community. 
They were at all times relevant hereto believed to be residents of Ada County, Idaho. 
1.3 The Defendant Berkshire Investments, LLC is an Idaho limited liability company 
which was forn1ed by the Defendant Thomas G. Maile. 
II. JURISDICTION AND VENUE 
2.1 This court has jurisdiction over the person and subject matter of the above-
captioned matter by virtue ofthe fact that all ofthe acts and/or omissions complained ofoccurred 
within Ada County, Idaho and relate to real property located in Ada County. 
III. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS 
3.1. The Defendant Thomas Maile, acting in his capacity as an attorney with offices in 
Eagle, Idaho, represented Theodore Johnson on a variety ofmatters for a period ofrnany years. 
The attorney client relationship continued until Mr. Johnson's death on September 14,2002. 
After Mr. Johnson's death, the Defendant Thomas Maile continued to act as the attorney for the 
Theodore L. Johnson Trust and the Theodore L. Johnson Estate. 
3.2. During the course ofthe attorney client relationship, Thomas Maile represented and 
advised Mr. Johnson in relation to the potential sale of 40 acres of property near Eagle, Idaho. 
Mr. Maile advised Mr. Johnson not to accept an offer to purchase the property, then within 
approximately two months Thomas and Colleen Maile entered into an earnest money agreement 
to purchase the 40 acre.; for the price of $400,000.00. 
COMPLAINT AND DEMAND 
FOR JURY TRIAL -2­
LAW OFFICES OF 
CLARK AND FEEN EY 
LEWISTON, IDAHO 83~;Ol 
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3.3 The Defendants Maile formed a limited liability company, Berkshire Investments, 
LLC, and assigned their rights under the eamest money agreement to Berkshire Investments, LLC, 
which subsequently purchased the property from the Johnson Trust. 
IV. COUNT ONE - BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY, SELF-DEALING 
4.1. By virtue of the attorney client relationship, the Defendant Thomas Maile was 
required to fully disclose his interest in the transaction, to deal fairly with Theodore Johnson, and 
to advise Theodore Johnson to consult independent counsel before entering into the transaction. 
4.2. The Defendant breached his fiduciary duty to Theodore Jolmson and the Theodore 
Jolmson Trust by self dealing which included but is not necessarily limited to: 
(a) Paying less than the fair market value for the purchase of the property 
(c) Offering to purchase the property on terms which were unfavorable and inappropriate 
given Mr. Johnson's advanced age and the fact that he had cancer which was known to be 
tem1inal 
(d) Failing to deal fairly with Mr. Johnson 
(e) Failing to advise Mr. Johnson to consult independent counsel before entering into the 
transacti on 
4.3. As a direct and proximate result ofthat breach, the Johnson Trust and beneficiaries 
of that trust were dam2.ged in an amount which will be proved at trial, but which exceeds the 
jurisdiction of the Magistrate Court. Plaintiffs are informed and believe, and on the basis of that 
information and belief allege that these damages will be not less than $600,000. 
V. COUNT T\VO
 
BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY OF REALTOR / BROKER
 
5.1. By virtue of his position as a real estate broker and the relationship between the 
parties, the Defendant Thomas Maile had an ethical obligation and a fiduciary duty t8 treat Mr. 
Jolmson honestly. That duty was breached by the Defendants' purchase of Mr. Johnson's 
COMPLAINT AND DEMAND 
FOR JURY TRIAL -3­
LAW OFFICES OF 
CLARK AND FEEN EY 
LEWISTON, IDAHO 83501 
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propeliy for an amount which was considerably less than fair market value for the highest and 
best use of that property. 
5.2. As a direct and proximate result of said breach, the Jolmson Trust and the 
beneficiaries of that trust were damaged in an amount which will be proved at trial but which 
exceeds the jurisdiction ofthe magistrate court. 
VI. COUNT THREE - NEGLIGENCE 
6.1. Defendant Thomas Maile, in his capacities as an attorney and as a real estate 
broker, had a duty to exercise reasonable care, skill, and diligence on Mr. Jolmson's behalf. 
6.2. The Defendant breached that duty, which breach included but is not necessarily 
limited to the following acts: 
6.2.1. Failure to inform Mr. Johnson ofa conflict of interest; 
6.2.2. Failure to advise Mr. Johnson to obtain an appraisal of the real property 
for development, its highest and best use, rather than as agricultural property; 
6.2.3. Advising Mr. Johnson to reject an existing offer for the property, then 
personally making an offer for purchase which was substantially the same as the prior offer; 
6.2.4. Failure to inform Mr. Jolmson that he should seek independent legal 
counsel before entering into the transaction with the Defendants; 
6.2.5. Failure to advise Mr. Johnson that the $400,000 purchase price was less 
than the fair market value of the property; 
6.2.6. Failure to advise Mr. Johnson to retain the property in the tms:: until after 
his death to avoid taxation of the capital gain. 
6.2.7. Failure to comply with the Idaho State Bar Rules ofProfessional Conduct 
and the Code of Ethics ofthe National Association of Realtors. 
COMPLAINT AND DEMAND 
-4­FOR JURY TRIAL 
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6.3. As a result of said Defendant's negligence, the plaintiffs, as beneficiaries of the 
Johnson Trust were da::naged in an amount which will be proved at trial but which exceeds the 
jurisdiction of the magistrate court. 
VII. 
The Defendants should take notice that the Plaintiffs may file a pretrial motion pursuant 
to statute to amend the: complaint to include a prayer for punitive damages. The Defendants 
should conduct their trial preparation accordingly. 
VIII.
 
ATTORNEY FEES
 
As a direct result of the Defendants' actions, the Plaintiffs have been required to institute 
and prosecute this action and has incurred costs and attorney fees. The Plaintiffs have employed 
the law firn1 of Clark and Feeney and have agreed to pay said firm a reasonable attom~ys fee and 
are entitled to be reimbursed for said fees under the statutes and case law of the state ofIdaho, 
specifically Idaho Code 12-120(3), 12-121 and 12-123, as well as under the terms of the contract 
for purchase of the real property which is at issue in this matter. 
The sum of $5,000.00 is a reasonable attorney fee for instituting and prosecuting this 
action in the event of default and no appearance by Defendants, and no other complications. In 
the event this matter is contested, a greater sum would be reasonable for such attorney's fees. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray for relief and for judgment, order and decree ofthis court 
against Defendants as follows: 
1. For compensatory damages for the difference between the $400,000 paid and the fair 
market value of the property purchased by Defendants; 
2. For the disgorgement of any profits derived from the use of said real property; 
3. For recision of the real property transaction and the return of said real property to the 
beneficiaries of the Theodore Johnson Trust; 
COMPLAINT AND DEMAND 
FOR JURY TRIAL -5­
LAW OFFICES OF 
CLARK AND FEEN EY 
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4. For the imposition of a constructive trust on the real property pending a resolution of 
this matter; 
5. For an order quieting title to the real propeliy in the name of the Theodore L. Jolmson 
Revocable Trust; 
6. For pre ancj post judgment interest at the statutory rate until fully paid; 
7. For all costs of this action; 
8. For attorneys fees incurred by the plaintiffs in prosecuting this action under Idaho 
Code 12-120,12-121, 12-123; 
9. For attorneys fees under the Earnest Money Offer and Acceptance contract dated July 
27,2002; 
10. For such ether and further relief as the court deems just and equitable. 
DATED this r-J-day of January, 2004.
 
CLARK and FEENEY
 
'''1
B -----­
_ Y_~::--:~~----':"'------..L...,-~---::--:~~::---·_--
rotcConnie W. 
Atto for Plaintiffs. 
ylor, a member of1h 
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DEMAND FOR JURY TRlAL 
1 Plaintiffs demand a jury trial of all issues in this cause and state pursuant to Rule 38(b) 
2 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure; that said plaintiffs will not stipulate to a jury ofless than 
3 twelve (12) persons in number. 
4 DATED this 1~day of January, 2004. 
CLARK. and FEENEY 
By__--==~..e:...:--~-::..----b-----.----
JOr-Connie W. ylor, a member of e firm 7 Attorn 
8
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STATE OF IDAHO ) 
)ss. 
County of Nez Perce ) 
I, Reed 1. Taylor, being first duly swom on oath, deposes and says: 
That I am one of the Plaintiffs in the above-entitled action; that I have read the foregoing 
Complaint and lmow the contents thereof and believe the same to be true. 
COMPLAINT AND DEMAND 
FOR JURY TRIAL -8­
LAW OFFICES OF 
CLARK AND FEEN EY 
LEWISTON, IDAHO 83501 001714
 
Notary Pub /)n ~pd for the State ofI.daho 
Residing at JIJtl h. I (V~. . 
My Commission expires: 123 / eJk r ) 
therein. 
-
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Samuel A. HoaglaIlld, Esq. FEB ~~ 3 2004 
HOAGLAND, DOMThTICK & HICKS 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW, PLLC 
Shoreline Center, Suite 100 
1471 Shoreline Drive 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Telephone (208) 343-9111 
Facsimile (208) 386-9944 
ISB No.: 2985 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR ADA COUNTY 
REED TAYLOR, DALLAN TAYLOR, 
and R. JOHN TAYLOR, 
Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants, 
versus 
THOMAS MAILE, IV and COLLEEN MAILE, 
husband and wife, THOMAS MAILE REAL 
ESTATE COI\1PANY, and BERKSHIRE 
INVESTiv1ENTS, LLC, 
Defendants/Counter-Claimants. 
Case No.: Case No. CV OC 04-00473D 
VERIFIED ANSWER and 
COUNTER-CLAIM 
The Defendants/Counter-Claimants, THOMAS G. MAILE and COLLEEN MAILE, husband 
and wife, and BERKSHIRE INVESTlv1ENTS, L.L.c., by and through their attorney, SAMUEL A. 
HOAGLAND of Hoagland, Dominick & Hicks, Attorneys at Law, PLLC, hereby answer and respond 
to the Plaintiffs' Complaint and, as a Counter-Claim against the Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants, and 
each of them, complain and aJ]ege as follows 
VERIFIED ANSWER AND COUNTER-CLAIM 
Pag'2 I 
001716
!
 
 
  
!
  
 
i
ll
NON-WAIVER OF MOTIONS FOR CHANGE OF VENUEI MOTION TO DIS]\,IISSI
 
MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION ORDERIMOTION TO STRIKE PLAINTIFFS'
 
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL FILED CONCURRENTLY HEREWITH
 
The Defendants have filed concurrently herewith certain Motions, to wit: Motion for Change 
of Venue, Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to LR.C.P. Rules 12 & 17, Motion To Compel Arbitration 
Order, and Motion to Strike Plaintiffs' Demand for Jury Trial. The following pleadings are asserted 
herein for purposes of fulfliling the Defendants' obligations to file responsive pleadings to the 
Plaintiffs' Complaint, and are not to be construed nor are the pleadings considered a waiver of the 
Defendants' Motions filed concurrently herein. The allegations contained in both the Verified Answer 
and Counter-Claim are asser1ed without waiving the rights and defenses in the accompanying Motions 
nor the Affirmative Defenses set forrh herein. The aforementioned Motions are incorporated by 
reference herein as if set forrh in nIlI. 
ANSWER TO COMPLAINT 
The Defendants, by and through their attorney, SAMUEL A. HOAGLAND, in response to 
Plaintiffs' Complaint, hereby admit, deny an affirmative allege, as follows: 
1. Defendants' deny each and every allegation of Plaintiffs' Complaint which IS not 
specifically admitted herein. 
2. Defendants' admit the allegations contained in paragraphs 1.2, with the exception that 
Defendants' deny the actions complained of were for the benefit of the marital community, and 
fuliher admit paragraph 1.3 of Plaintiffs' Complaint. 
3. Defendants deny the allegations contained in paragraphs 1.1, 2.1, 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 4.1,4.2, 
43,5.1,5.2,6.1,6.2 (and all sub-paragraphs thereunder), and paragraphs VII & VIII., of Plaintiffs' 
Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial. 
FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Plaintiffs' Complaint fails to state a cause ofaction against Defendants upon which reliefmay 
be granted. 
VERIFIED ANSWER AND COUNTER-CLAIM
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SECOND AFFIRlVIATIVE DEFENSE 
Defendants affirmatively allege that the proper Venue for the current action is Canyon 
County, Idaho, based upon Exhibits "A" & Exhibit "B" which are attached hereto and incorporated 
herein as if set forth in fijI!. 
THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Defendants affirmatively allege that the Plaintiffs have no standing to bring this action and are 
not the "Real Parties In Interest" pursuant to Rule 17, of the Idaho Rules ofCivil Procedure and the 
current Complaint should be summarily dismissed. 
FOURTH AFFIRlVIATIVE DEFENSE 
Defendants affirmatively allege that the claims alleged set forth in the Plaintiffs' Complaint 
arise from a certain Earnest Money Agreement to Purchase Real Property, dated July 25, 2002, by 
and between Defendants Thomas Maile & Colleen Maile, husband and wife, as buyer, and the 
Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust, as seller, which is annexed hereto as Exhibit "A" and made a 
part hereof as if set forth in full herein. The terms and conditions of said Agreement require the 
parties to submit any controversy to binding arbitration, to wit "the parties agree to submit to binding 
arbitration in lieu ofcourt proceedings concerning the terms and conditions herein, consistent with the 
American Arbitration Association." The current proceedings should be suspended in light of the of 
the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and thereafter, if necessary, the parties should be ordered to 
binding arbitration consistent with the terms and conditions of the Agreement above referenced. 
FIFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Defendants affirmatively allege that the Plaintiffs are barred from requesting a jury trial as the 
same was waived by the parties to the Earnest Money Agreement to Purchase Real Property, dated 
July 25, 2002, by and between Defendants Thomas Maile & Colleen Maile, husband and wife, as 
buyer, and the Trustee of the Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust, as seller, which is annexed 
hereto as Exhibit "A" and made a part hereof as if set forth in full herein. Thus, the Plaintiffs' 
VERlFIED ANSWER AND COUNTER-CLAIM 
P"oe 3,., 
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Demand for Jury Trial should be stricken. 
SLXTH AFFIRlVIATIVE DEFENSE 
Defendants affirmatively allege that the Plaintiffs claims are barred due to lack of 
consideration as between the Plaintiffs and the Defendants. 
SEVENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Defendants affirmatively allege that the Plaintiffs claims are barred due to lack of contractual 
privity with the Defendants as required by law. 
EIGTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Defendants affirmatively allege that the Plaintiffs claims are barred based upon the doctrine of 
"Latches" to wit: The Plaintiffs were provided all information and facts relating to that certain Eamest 
Money Agreement to Purchase Real Property, dated July 25, 2002, by and between Defendants 
Thomas Maile & Colleen Maile, husband and wife, as buyer, and the Trustee of the Theodore L. 
Johnson Revocable Trust, as seller. In addition the Plaintiffs had knowledge of a subsequent 
assignment of interests fJ-om the MaiJes to Berkshire Investments, L.L.c., captioned "Assignment of 
Earnest Money Agreement to Purchase Real Property," dated August 20, 2002, and specifically 
approved to by the Trustee of the Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust, as seller. Said assignment 
is annexed hereto as Exhibit "B" and made a part hereof as if set forth in fuJI herein. Thereafter the 
Plaintiffs', individually and/or through their attorney Connie Taylor, obtained information that 
indicated that Berkshire Investments L.L.c., was undertaking to acquire new construction financing 
for the subject real property which would result in paying off the Deed of Trust, payable to the 
Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust That Plaintiffs chose not to pursue any litigation until the 
Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust was paid in full on or about January 4, 2004 and thereafter in 
attempt to seek leverage and "cloud title" to Berkshire Investments' legal ownership to the real 
property, filed the present litigation and caused to be filed a Lis Pendens affecting the real property 
The Plaintiffs have plead for a res::ission of the contract and imposition ofa constructive trust on the 
VERIFIED ANSWER AND COUNTER-CLAIM
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real property. That Plaintiffs actions in delaying the fIling of their Complaint and the Lis Pendens 
after the purchase price was paid in full constitutes "Laches." 
NINTH AFFIIDvIATIVE DEFENSE 
Defendants affirmatively allege that the Plaintiffs claims are barred based upon the doctrines of 
Equitable Estoppel and/or Quasi-Estoppel, based upon the allegations herein set forth. 
TENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Defendants affinnatively allege that the Plaintiffs failed to take reasonable steps to mitigate 
their claimed or alleged damages, if any. 
ELEVENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Defendants affirmatively allege that the Plaintiffs claims are barred based upon the doctrine of 
"Unclean Hands" and Plaintiffs herein should forfeit any rights to monies alleged owing The 
allegations relating to the requested rescission of the contract and the restoration of the title to the 
Plaintiffs and/or the Theodore Johnson Revocable Trust constitute "Unclean Hands," any al1eged 
damages due and owing to Plaintiffs should be offset by Defendants/Counter-Claimants' damages set 
forth hereinafter. 
TIVELFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Defendants affirmatively allege that the Plaintiffs claims are barred because there is a binding 
Release & Reconveyance whereby the Defendants/Counter-Claimants and Trustee of the Theodore 
Johnson Revocable Trust released one another from any and all claims and demands, which is binding 
upon the Plaintiffs. 
THIRTEENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Defendants affirmatively all ege that the Plaintiffs claims are barred because there is an Accord 
and Satisfaction by and between the Defendants and the Trustee of the Theodore Johnson Revocable, 
VERIFIED ANSWER ANI> COUNTER-CLAIM
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which is binding upon the Plaintiffs. 
REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES 
As a result of the filing ofPlaintiffs' Complaint, Defendants have been required to retain legal 
counsel to defend said action, and are entitled to recover attorneys fees and costs by reason of the 
provisions contained in Idaho Code §§ 12-120, 12-121, and 12-123 and Rule 11 of the Idaho Rules 
of Civil Procedure. Also, Defendants are entitled to recover attorneys fees and costs by reasons of 
the provisions contained in Exhibits "A" and "B" and Idaho Code § 45-600, et. seq. The sum of 
$7,500.00 is a reasonable amount for attorneys fees if this matter is uncontested and a greater 
reasonable fee is warranted if contested. 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
WHEREFORE, rhese answering Defendants pray that Plaintiffs' Complaint be dismissed with 
prejudice, that Plaintiffs take nothing hereby, that Defendants be awarded their costs and attorney's 
fees incurred, and for such other and further relief as the Coun deems just and equitable in the 
premIses. 
COUNTER-CLAIM 
The Defendants, THOMAS G. MAILE and COLLEEN MAILE, husband and wife, and 
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, L.L.c. (hereinafter referred to as "Counter-Claimants"), by and 
through their attorney, SAMUEL A. HOAGLAND of Hoagland, Dominick & Hicks, Attomeys at 
Law, PLLC, without waiving their right/or the Court to consider the Motionsfiled concurrently 
herewith, and as and for a Counter-Claim against Counter-Defendants, and each of them, complains 
and alleges as follows: 
All allegations offactual matters of the Answer are included herein as additional facts support 
for the all egations herein set fonh. 
VERIFIED ANSWER A;'\fD COUNTER-CLAIM
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COUNT ONE
 
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE WITH CONTRACT
 
]. Counter-Claimants fe-allege the allegations contained in all of the paragra:~hs of above 
referenced Verified Answer herein. 
2. Counter-Claimants, Thomas Maile and Colleen Maile, and Berkshire Investments, LLC., 
and Theodore Johnson, as Trustee of the Theodore Johnson Revocable Trust, entered into a certain 
real estate contract, and subsequent assignment wherein the Counter-Claimants were to receive 
certain real property and Theodore Johnson Revocable Trust, was to receive payment from the sale of 
the subject property. 
:3. At all relevant times herein, the Trustee ofthe Theodore Johnson Revocable Trust knew that 
the Counter-Claimants intended to purchase the real property for the purposes ofestablishing a home­
site for Thomas Maile and Colleen Maile, and the children of the Mailes, and further knew that to do 
so, would require that the subject real property be developed consistent with Ada County zoning law 
and other regulatory rules and laws for the creation of a subdivision. That all such facts were known 
to the Tnlstee prior to closing the real estate transaction. 
4. The Counter-Defendants, individually, and/or through their attorney undertook a course of 
action to interfere with and an attempt to cause a breach ofcontract between the Counter-Claimants 
and the Theodore Johnson Revocable Trust relating to the subject property and/or attempt to cause a 
breach ofcontract between the Counter-Claimants and Counter-Claimants' new lending institution. 
5. The Counter-Defendants, individually, and/or through their attorney, were informed that the 
Counter-Claimants would be re-financing the loans on the subject real property and w.::)Uld pay the 
balance of the Deed of TnJst due and owing to the Theodore Johnson Revocable Trust The 
Counter-Claimants informed the Trustee of the Theodore Johnson Revocable Trust, that the Counter-
VERIFIED ANSWER AND COUNTER-CLAIM
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Claimants would be re-financing, unless the Theodore Johnson Revocable Trust would like to 
maintain the loan and release lots in the seven (7) lot subdivision as sales developed. That in orderto 
do so, the Counter-Defendants knew or with reasonable diligence should have known, that the 
Counter-Claimants would enter into a commercial loan with another lender, for the purposes of 
fulfilling the Counter-Claimants' obligation with the Theodore Johnson Revocable Tf1lst and woulrj 
be acquiring a new commercial loan to continue to develop a subdivision on the subject real property. 
6. The Counter-Cla.imants incurred expenses and costs associated with securing financing on the 
subject real property to pay offthe obligation to the Theodore Johnson Revocable Trust, on or about 
January 4, 2004. The loan requires Counter-Claimants to avoid the placement of any liens or 
encumbrances on the subject real property to convey clear title to potential purchasers, and as a result 
of the filing of the Complaint and the Lis Pendens, the Counter-Claimants are unable to proceed with 
the improvement of the subject property and will default under the terms and conditions ofthe current 
} . 
real estate commercial loan. 
7. The Counter-Defendants, individually, and/or through their agent, and acting in concert and 
conspiring with each other, maliciously and intentionally undertook a course ofaction in the filing of 
the Complaint and the "Lis Pendens" that was calculated and determined to adversely affect the 
interests of the Counter-Claimants and to tortiously interfere with the contract between the Counter­
Claimants and the new commercial lender, and/or the contract between Counter-Claimants and the 
Theodore Johnson Revocable Trust. 
8. The action and the wrongful conduct on the part of the Counter-Defendants' and/or the 
Counter-Defendants 1 agent demonstrates an intentional course ofaction to seek to increase profits 
and/or income to the Counter-Defendants' individually and/or to obtain the real property at a 
foreclosure sale based upon wrongful motives and design, including but not limited to the following: 
a. wrongfully pursuing a course ofconduct between the beneficiaries and/or the 
residual beneficiaries of the Theodore Johnson Revocable Trust, to cause the 
VERIFIED ANSWER AND COUNTER-CLAIM
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filing of the present action and filing of the "Lis Pendens;" 
b. Undertaking a course of action to cause a breach by the Counter-Claimants 
with the commercial lender on the subject real property, for personal gain and/or 
benefit of the individual Counter-Defendants; 
c. wrongfully conspiring to circumvent the Counter-Claimants' rights to future 
profits and share in the future gains associated with the real property in which 
Theodore Johnson Revocable Trust previously had an interest; 
d. using their position as residual beneficiaries and/or assignees of other 
beneficiaries of the Theodore Johnson Revocable Trust to promote self dealing 
and profiting at the expense of the Counter-Claimants. 
9. The acts of the Counter-Defendants, having devised such scheme, motive or artifice to cause a 
default and foreclosure of the contract between the Counter-Claimants and the new commercial 
lender and/or the interfi~rence of the contract between the Counter-Claimants and the Theodore 
Johnson Revocable Trust, which would cause irreparable damage to the Counterclaimants and unjust 
enrichment to the Counter-Defendants, to wit: In addition to having caused the Counter-Claimants to 
lose their equity in the subject property, the Counter-Claimants will be damaged with other costs and 
fees associated with the development of the real property and the ultimate profits from the sale of 
subject real property, while the Counter-Defendants seek to unjustly benefit from the Counter­
Claimants' labor and efforts. 
10. That Counter-Claimants, as a sole, direct and proximate result of the action above alleged, 
sustained damages and will sustain damages in the following manner: 
a. The expected loss of the subject real property in which Counter-Claimants are 
obligated to pay the new commercial lender for and/or preventing the Counter­
Claimants from continued marketing of the property which has now been cloJded 
by the Counter-Defendants' action; the Counter-Claimants' loss of equity in the 
real property thereon; 
VERIFIED ANSWER AND COUNTER-CLAIM 
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b. The Counter-Claimants' loss of oppoI1unity to obtain revenues and profits 
associated with the real property and loss income, 
c. The Counter-Claimants' expenses incurred and/or paid to date for 
engineering, architectural fees, fees and costs associated with vanous 
governmental agencies, professional services, materials purchased for the 
construction to date on the property, labor paid to date on the subject real 
property, assessment fees, taxes, cost of interest paid to the Theodore Johnson 
Revocable Trust and other institutions and entities; the cost of appraisals, title 
reports, closing fees, attorneys fees etc. 
d. The Counter-Claimants loss of the opportunity to retain portions of the 
subject to allow the Counter-Claimant Mailes and theMailes.children to build 
their homes on the subject property and to the enjoy the peace and enjoyment of 
the subject real property; 
e. The Counter-Claimants' incurring costs and attorneys fees to defend against 
the Complaint and the Lis Pendens filed by the Counter-Defendants and the costs 
and attorney fees to quiet title to the subject real property; 
f The Counter-Claimants' loss of income and/or profits associated with the time 
taken for the development of the property and the loss of opportunity to obtain 
revenues and profits associated with the real property. 
11. As a result of the aforementioned, Counter-Claimants have sustained such losses and have 
been damaged in a princi:Jal sum which exceeds the jurisdictional limits ofthe District Court, together 
with interest at the rate of twelve (12) percent per annum from the date of loss to the date of 
Judgment, as set forth herein. 
12. Counter-Claimarts have been forced to retain the professional services of Samuel Hoagland, 
to prosecute this claim and are entitled to reasonable costs and attorneys fees incurred pursuant to 
Exhibits "A" & "8" annexed hereto and pursuant to Idaho Code, Sections 12-120 and 12-121, 12­
VERIFIED ANSWER AND COUNTER-CLAIM 
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123, Rule 11 ofthe Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. That the sum of$7,500. 00 is a reasonable sum if 
this matter is uncontested, and a greater sum if contested. 
COUNT TWO
 
TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE OF PROSPECTIVE ECONOMIC:
 
ADVANTAGE AND/OR OPPORTUNITY
 
1. The Counter-Claimants re··allege the allegations of all the Paragraphs, of Count One as if set 
forth in filII herein. 
2. The Counter-Defendants set upon a course of conduct and intentionally interfered with a 
prospective economic advantage of the Counter-Claimants to secure profits and income relating to 
the real estate contract between the Counter-Claimants and the Theodore Johnson Revocable Trust 
and/or the Counter-Claimants and the new commercial lender of the subject real property 
3. The Counter-Defendants maliciously, deliberately and intentionally interfered with the 
Counter-Claimants' rights set forth in paragraph 2 herein. 
The Counter-Defendants knew of the existence of the Defendants/Counter-Claimants' 
economic expectancy related to the development of the subdivision of the subject rea: property. 
5. The conduct on the part of the Counter-Defendants is intentionally interfering and inducing 
termination of the Counter-Claimants' prospective economic advantage and/or opportunity .. 
6. The Counter-Defendants are interfering for an improper purpose and/or for improper means. 
7. That Counter-Claimants have sustained damages and will continue to sustain damages due to 
the Counter-Defendants' intentional interference with the Counter-Claimants prospec(ve economic 
advantage and/or opportunity as herein set forth. 
VERTIFIED ANSWER AND COUNTER-CLAIM 
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COUNT THREE
 
SLANDER OF TITLE
 
1. The Counter-Claimants re-allege the allegations of all the Paragraphs 0 f Count Two herein as 
if set forth in full herein. 
2. The Counter-Defendants caused a "Lis Pendens" against the subject real property to be 
recorded and published in the Ada County Recorder's Office based upon allegations which are false 
and frivolous and in violation of Counter-Claimants' rights. 
J. The Counter-Defendants recorded the "Lis Pendens" with malice and/or reckless disregard for 
the truth, which Counter-Defendants knew or should have known with reasonable diligence that such 
statements were false and frivolous, because attached hereto as Exhibit "C" is a true and correct copy 
of a certain letter transmitted from the Theodore Johnson Revocable Trust, by Beth Rogers, trustee, 
instructing the agent for the Counter-Defendants that the trust was carrying out the wishes of the 
trustor in selling the subject real property to the Counter-Claimants, that there was no merit to the 
claims of the Counter-Defendants, and the Trustee did not desire to pursue any c1airr:s against the 
Counter-Claimants. Said letter is incorporated by reference herein as if set forth in fuJI herein. 
4. The Defendants/Counter-Claimants have been damaged as herein set forth. 
COUNT FOUR
 
WRONGFUL CLOUD ON TITLE
 
PRELIMD'lARY INJUNCTION - QUIET TITLE
 
1. The Counter-Claimant BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS L.L.c., re-alleges the allegations ofall 
the Paragraphs of Count Three herein as if set forth in full herein. 
'7 The actions of the Counter-Defendants in filing the Complaint and the recording of the "Lis 
VEHIFIED ANSWER AND COllNTER-CLAIM
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Pendens" amount to a wrongful "cloud on the title" on the title held by Berkshire Investments LLC 
3. By virtue of the tiling of the Complaint and recording of the "Lis Pendens," the Counter­
Defendants have alleged that the property is subject to litigation and/or the potential ofre-classifying 
the legal title holder to the real property is in litigation. By virtue of the same, the Counter­
Defendants claim an interest in and to the subject property, and that any right, title, claim or interest 
of Counter-Claimants and/or potential subsequent purchasers (or any other interested party or person 
claiming and interest in and/or to the subject property), may be junior and/or subservient to the 
interests of Counter-Defendants in the subject property. 
4. The Counter-Claimants have no adequate remedy at law. 
5. The Court should enter a Preliminary Injunction to strike the "Lis Pendens" and enjoining the 
Counter-Defendants from filing another or defining the legitimate rights and interests ofthe Counter­
Claimants and/or the Counter-Defendants in the subject property and establishing that Counter­
Defendants, and each of them, have no interest in the property 
6. The Court should enter a declaratory judgment affirming and quieting the title to the subject 
real property to Counter-Claimant Berkshire Investments L.L.c., establishing its' title and ownership, 
and enter an Order that Counter-Defendants, and each of them, have no right, title or interest in said 
real property. 
COUNT FIVE 
CIVIL CONSPIRACY 
1. The Counter-Claimants re-allege the allegations ofall the Paragraphs of Count Four herein as 
if set forth in full herein 
The Trustee of the Theodore Johnson Revocable Trust denounced the attempts by the 
Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants to pursue the current action, as shown in Exhibit "c." 
VEIUFIED ANSWER AND COUNTER-CLAIM
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3. The Counter-Defendants and not the Real Parties in Interest," and lack standing to pursue the 
remedies which they allege are available. 
4. The Counter-Defendants' wrongful conduct in opposition to the wished of the Trustee 
demonstrate an improper purpose and unjust proceeding. 
5. The actions of the Counter-Defendants constitute a civil corispiracy against the rights and 
interests of the Counter-Claimants, which demonstrate that an agreement between two or more ofthe 
Counter-Defendants, and/or the Counter-Defendants' agent and/or assignors, etisted to accomplish 
an unlawful objective and/or an attempt to accomplish a lawful objective in an unlawful manner. 
6. The Counter-Claimants have incurred damages, as previously alleged, as a result of the civil 
conspiracy and concerted action of the Counter-Defendants, and each of them, and their agents and 
assignors, resulting in joint and several liability ofeach Counter-Defendant, their agents and assignors, 
for the whole of the damages caused. 
COUNT SLX
 
BREACH OF CONTRACT
 
1. The Counter-Claimants re-allege the allegations ofall the Paragraphs ofCount Five herein as 
if set forth in full herein. 
2. The conduct of Counter-Detendants above-alleged constitutes a breach of contract as to the 
terms and conditions contained in Exhibits "A" and "B." 
3. Counter-Defendants breached the terms of the contracts and have failed to allow the terms and 
conditions of the contracts to be final as agreed and/or implied in law and the such conduct 
constitutes a breach of contract. 
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COUNT SEVEN
 
EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL
 
1. The Counter-Claimants re-allege the allegations of all the Paragraphs of Count Six herein as ifset 
forth in fi.I11 herein. 
2. The conduct of Counter-Defendants was a course of conduct to induce Counter··Claimants to 
enter into a contractual relationship with a new commercial lender to pay otfthe amour.t owed to the 
Trust, which the Counter-Claimants have now done. 
3. Counter-Defendants should be equitably estopped from asserting rights inconsistent therewith 
and for not allowing the title to the real property to remain in the legal holder, Berkshire Investments 
L.L.c. 
COUNT EIGHT
 
QUASI ESTOPPEL
 
1. The Counter-Claimants re-allege the allegations ofall the Paragraphs ofCount Seven herein as if 
set forth in full herein. 
The Counter-Defendants have engaged in a course of conduct that is inconsistent with the 
intention of the Counter··C1aimants and the Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust. 
3. In entering into the contractual relationship with the Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust 
and/or entering into a contractual relationship with a new commercial lender, the Counter-Claimants 
relied to their detemlent upon such assurances ofthe sanctity ofthe contractual terms and conditions, 
and the Counter-Defendants should be estopped from asserting rights inconsistent therewith. 
COUNT NINE
 
BREACH OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING
 
VERTIFfED ANSWER AND COUNTER-CLAIM 
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1. The Counter-Claimants re-allege the allegations ofall the Paragraphs ofCount Eight herein as if 
set forth in full herein. 
2. The conduct of Counler-Defl~ndants,above-referenced constitute a breach of the covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing which is implied, as a matter oflaw, in every contract. 
RESERVATION TO AMEND PLEADINGS 
That by reason of the acts complained herein of Counter-Claimants, leave of COUli will be 
requested pursuant to Idaho Code section 6-1604, for the Court's ruling on the a:leged issue of 
exemplary/punitive damages in light of the pleadings, affIdavits, depositions, etc., filed ofrecord or as 
may hereinafter be provided to the Court. 
PRAYER ]FOR RELIEF ON COVNTERCLATlVIS 
WHEREFORE. Counter-Claimants pray for Judgment against the Counter-Defendants, and 
each of them, as follows: 
1. For damages in excess oftile jurisdictional amount of the District Court for items ofdamages set 
forth above, together with twelve (12) percent interest from the date of loss to the date ofJudgment, 
and thereafter at a highest legal ra1 e until paid in full, or such additional sums as may later be proved, 
and leave of Court is requested to amend said Complaint as soon as the same becomes known to 
Counter-Claimants. 
2. That a Declaratory Judgment be entered by this Court quieting the title as to the legitimate rights 
and interests of Counter-Claimant Berkshire Investments LLC. in the subject property and that 
Counter-Defendants, and each of them, have no interest in said real property. 
For an Interim Order and/or c. Preliminary Injunction affirming Berkshire Investments LLC '5 
VJEHllFIED ANSWER AND COUNTER-CLAIM 
Pa!.:1: 16 
3 
001731
  
-Defl~ndants, 
0  
      il     
 l
J[
   
             
 
s
title and ownership of the above-referenced real property and affirming that Counter-Defendants. and 
eJch of them, have no interest in said real property. 
4. For Counter-Claimants' reasonable attorneys fees in the amount of $7,500.00 jf this matter is 
uncontested, pursuant '~o I.C §§ 12-] 20, ]2-121, 12-123, I.RCP. Rule 11, and further pursuant to 
Exhibits "A" and "B" attached hereto, and a further amount as may be awarded by the Court if this 
matter is contested, together with such costs as may be awarded by the Court pursuant to Rule 54(e) 
of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
5. For such other and further reliefin law or equity that the Court may deemjust and proper under 
/
/the clrcumstances. 
!
/
! ' " 
/ f I 
-, iZ.% ~/ _----~ j IDATED this "L-::,L::>/day of February, 2004. 
"'/!. i/~I 'I 
__.....r I i / 
C /."",: / ;n~- ''-----1~\ 
.,.--" / . , 
SAMUEL... OA'GLAND
--- . --".'. 
'--Attorney for Defendants/Co'unter-Claimants 
\ 
VERIFICATION 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss: 
County of Ada ) 
THOMAS MAILE AND COLLEEN MAILE, husband and wife, being first duly sworn upon 
oath, depose and state that they are the Defendants/Counter-Claimants in the above-entitled action, 
they have read the foregoing AN'SWER AND COUNTER-CLAIM, know the contents thereof, and 
believe the same to be true and correct to the best of their knowledge and belief. 
DATED This ~~ day of FebruarY, 2004. 
THOMAS MAILE 
VERIFIED ANSWEH A~[) COlfNTEH-CLUM 
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/COLLEEN MAILE 
/
;' 
S~~_CRlBED Al'W SWORN TO BEFORE IvlE, a Notary/Public in and for said State, 
this --'Z2)<'9~-?~,Fe_bcuary, 2004. '(~! { /1 
/~{(~'~~:~~~>T ~1'~».\~,_:~,:,,-----'-------------~/~~~:::/:~\--~' 
:! l )-0-,. ·':-';r'::.~·~\:·~__ ~ __._. ~gi~D'Y~licfor1dahD, "­
: I, \ A\, / .' Residing at Boise, Idaho, 
.' ;, '! ~- t' , 
\: '\ t_i~ L ~< ../' My Commission Expires:',04115/05 
'.. -"' ", \-
VERIFICATION 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss: 
County of Ada ) 
BERKSHIRE I1'fVESTIvlENTS, LLC., an Idaho limited liability company, by and through 
it's manager, THOMAS MAlLE, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and states that it is one of 
the Defendants/Counter-Claimants in the above-entitled action, that the undersigned as manager has 
read the foregoing Al\JSWER AND COUNTER-CLAIM, knows the contents thereof and believes 
the same to be true and correct to the best of his knowledge and belief. 
/ 
Sl)BSCBJBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE .ME, a Jotary Public in and for said State, thjs~~aY of February, 2004, I (' 
----------.. \ 
\,' I~ i 
.' .' - ", I' \ '" \ , /;.~ , ,-.---------e.,- I \ ----;{,i{~:·',',~~,. .~, --'.~._------.- \\1)v~t~,,~ \ 
!' ',', ,) fi ;.; .: \ / "~-______
.;/<:,' ,.,'.... Notar] Public for Idaho -~----.
 
, _I~)._. --..--.Restai~Q at Boise Idaho /

--.' , /,1 /' 
... ' My Commission Expires: 4-/" (/ (: ", 
, 
;' 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the .2/-~/JJ-·-dayof February, 2004, Tserved the foregoing 
ANSWER AND COUNTER-CLAIM by having a true and complete copy personally delivered or by 
facsimile and/or by depositing the same in the United States Mail, postage prepaid thereon, and 
addressed to: 
Mr. Jonathan David Hally, Esq 
Ms. Connie W. Taylor, ESt] 
CLARK AND FEENEY 
1229 Main Street 
Post Office Drawer 285 
Lewiston, Idaho 8350] 
.---------­
-----. 
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EARNEST l\IONEY AGREEMENT TO PURCHASE REAL Pl\OPEHTY 
THIS AGREElv[ENT TO PURCHASE REAL PROPERTY ("Agreement") is made as cf 
this day of July, 2002, by and between by and between Thomas G. Maile IV & CoJ/een Maile, 
husband and wife, and/or t11eir assigns hereinafter referred to as ("Buyer") and Theodore L. 
Jolll1son Revocable Trust, whose office address is 12601 West Hope Road, Star, IdallJ, 
hereinafter referrcd to as ("Seller"); 
I. Consideration: In consideration of the acceptance of this Agreement, 
Buyer shall deposit the sum of£2,500.00 with designated escrow agent in said agent's trust 
account, all in accordance with the terms and conditions hereinafter set forth. 
2. Terms & Conditions: The property located in Ada County, Idaho 
gcnerally described as a 40 Jcre parcel located immediJtely east of Linder ROJd, Eagle, Idaho and 
Jpproximately 1/4 mile north of Beacon Light ROad, Eagle, Idaho, and as funher described in 
Exhibit "A" annexed hereto and incorporated by reference herein as ifset forth in fulj herein. 
(A) Seller shall assign and transfer any and all mineral, and water rights relative to the 
above described property and covenants to execute any and all documents necessary to effectuate 
sai d transfer. 
2. Purchase Price. The sum 0 f£400,000.00 subject to the terms and conditions set 
forth in the attached Exhibit "A", which is annexed hereto and made a part hereof as if set forth in 
full herein. 
3. Convevim! Documents. Title and Title Insurance. 
(a) The Pro~erty shall be conveyed by a General Warranty Deed in a form reasonably 
acceptable to Buyer subject only to those certain exceptions, easements, and restrictions approved 
Ernest Money Offer and Acceptance Page 1 
001735
l :  
ll
llJ l1  I 
e
e
a Ul1h
l
),
by Buyer prior to closing. 
(b) The Seller shall pay for title insurance policy il1 the amount of the sell ir g price 
showing mar:(etable titlc in Seller's Dame. That immediately upon the execution of the current 
Ag:-eement, Seller shall direct title insurer to issue a preliminary title repori, naming the Buyers as 
the prospective insured, showing the purchase price as the policy amount. 
4. Closim! Date & Possession Date. see Exhibit "A"for terms and conditions_ 
Possession will be granted to Buyer upon closing of real property_ 
5. Occupancy and Leases. See Exhibit "A"for terms and conditions. 
6. Time of Essence. Time is of the essence of this Agreement. Any reference he~ein 
to time periods of less than six (6) days shall in the computation thereof exclude Saturdays, 
Sundays and legal hoi idays, and any time period provided for herein \'.'hich shall end on a 
Saturday, Sunday or legal hol:day shall extend to 5:00 p.m. on the next full business day. 
7. Documents for Closing. Seller shall provide marketable title at closing. 
8. Anornev Fees and Costs. All matters pertaining to this Agreement (including its 
interpretation, application, validity, performance and breach), shall be governed by, construed and 
enforced in accordance with the laws of the State of/daho. The parties herein waive trial by jury 
and agree to submit to the ~JersonaJ jurisdiction and venue of a court of subject maner jurisdiction 
located in Canyon County, State of Idaho. In the event that litigation results from or arises out of 
this Agreement or the performance thereof, the non prevailing party shall reimburse the prevailing 
party's reasonable attorney's fees, court costs, and all other expenses, whether or not taxable by the 
court as costs, in addition to any other relief to \vhich the prevailing party may be entitled, 
including at1orney's fees and costs associated with any appeal. In such event, no action shall be 
Ernest Money Offer and Acceptance Page 2 
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entertoilled by SJid court or any COLnt of competent jurisdiction if filed morc tlun Olle )'cJr 
su bseqLie nt to the date the cJLlse(s) of 3cti on 3etually accrued re g3rd Jess 0 f whether dall1ages we I"e 
otherwise as of said time calculable. The parties agree to submit to binding arbitration in lieu of 
court proceedings concerning the terms and conditions herein, consistent with the Arrerican 
Arbitration Association. 
9. Def3ult. If Buyer fails to perform this Agreement \vithin the time specified, the 
deposits paid by the Buyer aforesaid may be retained by or for the 3ccount of Seller as liquidated 
damages (subject to Buyer's due diligence provisions), consideration for the execution of this 
Agreement and in full sct1lement of any claims; whereupon all parties shall be relieved of all 
obligations under this .Agreement, subject to the conditions set forth in Exhibit "A", 
If, for any reason other than failure of Seller to render his title marketable after diligent 
eflOl1, Seller fails, neglects or refuses to perlorm this Agreemcnt, the Buyer may seck specific 
performance or elect to receive the return of their deposits without thereby waiving any action lor 
damages resulting from Seller's breach. 
J 0 Convevance. Seller shall convey title to the property by statutory warranty deed 
subject only to mat1ers contained in Paragraph 3 hereof and those otherwise 3ccepled by Buyer. 
Personal property shall, at the request of the Buyer, be conveyed by an absolute bil] of sale with 
warranty of title, subject to such liens as may be otherwise provided for herein. 
J 1. Other AQ'reements. No prior agreements or representations shall be binding upon 
any of the panies hereto t.:~nless incorporated in this Agreement. No modifications or changes in 
this Agreement shall be valid or binding upon the panies hereto unless in writing, executed by the 
panies to be bound thereby. 
Ernest Money Offer and Acceptance Page 3 
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12. Binding Ao reel1lEnt. The pJrtiEs hereto agree thJt this Zlgrccmel1t:;h::lil be bindillg 
upon tll(~ parties, thetr heirs, devisees, assignees, transferees, etc. 
The parties acknowledge that Thomas Maile d/b/aJ Thomas Maile Real Est::te Company, is 
a licensed Real Estate Broker and is representing himselfand Colleen Birch Maile, husband and 
wife, and/or their assigns in this transaction, (hereinafter referred to col!ectively as Buyer). 
Dated this ~7/~d1y20fJuly, 2002 
/;--- . 
THEODORE L. JOHNSON REVOCABLE 
TRUST, by: 
c;I)jp, c.:=zi2r->-'2- :l ~i's-;C'GL~ 
THEODORE L. JOHNSO~, Trustee, SELtER 
<2 l.- ..Dated this ____ day of July, 20021/
// ~"--:=J..... / // /;J 
~v('-:v~k~L
BUYER ~ 
Dated this ~_ day of July, 2002. 
Ernest Money Offer and Acceptance Page 4 
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ADDENDUM TO REAL ESTATE AGREENIENT
 
BETWEEN THOMAS & COLLEEN MAllE AND JOHNSON REVOCABl E TRUST
 
Undersigned parties agree to the additional terms to the above referenced and attached 
Ernest Money Agreement as follows: 
(1) The parties acknowledge that the real property located in Ada County, Idallo 
generally described as a 40 acre parcel located immediately east of Linder F~oad, Eagle, 
Idaho and approximately 1/4 mile north of Beacon Light Road, Eagle, Idaho with a legal 
description of "Northwest 1/4 of the Southwest 1/4, Section 36, Township 5 North, Range 
1 West, Boise, Meridian, Ada County, Idaho. 
(2). The parti,~s shall equally pay all the expenses of closing costs and escrow, 
however, Seller shall pay for the CCJst of title insurance. 
(3) The parties acknowledge that the property is subject to a currer,t year crop 
lease and the Seller warrants that no other lease or agreements affect the real property, 
past the current crop ~(ear(V;lrlC!\"?-D03}~) [" !Jh" j.£[}c(. Q'\./ .--h-,J/2,
vI((-SV~..,., 7:OJ.:v r {rv ~ Zr 
(4) The purchase price of $400,000,00 will be paid as foIl00s:' . 
(a) Buyer to provide immediate earnest money payment of $2,500.00; at 
closing Buyer to provide the sum of S97,500.00, as additional down-payment. 
(b) As to the balance of the purchase price, to wit: $300,000.00, Eluyer shall 
be obligated to Seller for said principal outstanding balance, together with 7% percent 
interest per annum thereon from the date of closing until paid in full, amortized over fifteen 
(15) years. Buyer shall ,~e obligated to Seller for a minimum payment of $32,357.00 (which 
would include principal and interest), payable each year from the anniversary date of 
closing, and each year thereafter, until the 5th anniversary of the closing date, at which the 
full remaining principal and interest shall be paid in full, subject to the following terms and 
conditions. VVith each payment, the parties acknowledge interest to be paid first and the 
balance to be applied to principal. Buyer is entitled to pay the entire balance or such 
additional sums at any time without pre-payment penalty. 
(c) Buyer and Seller acknowledge that payment from the Buyer to Seller for 
the balance of the purer-,ase price of the property shall be secured by Buyer executing a 
standard Deed of Trust, incorporating the terms herein, to be placed if! escrow at Alliance 
Title, of Boise, Idaho, with both parties sharing evenly in the cost of the escrow charges. 
Seller agrees to the assignment of interests in the real property by Buyer (legal entity 
established by Buyer) before or after closing and further to the assjgnmen'~ of the 
obligation under the Buyer above referenced, conditioned upon Seller's written approval, 
REAL ESTATE PURCHASE EXHIBIT "A"oj 
G\WPJATA'H\lII~D::R\E:ARr'H:ST.CI_1 
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which approval shal' not be unreasonably withheld. A true and correct cop)' of the Deed 
of Trust form is annexed hereto as Exhibit "A-2" and incorporated by referel-Ice hereili as 
if set forth in full herein. 
(d) The Buyer agrees that the failure to abide by above performance requirements 
shall constitute a de:'ault, entitling the Seller to foreclosure. 
(4) The Parties acknowledge that this agreement, together with Buyer's obligations 
are conditioned upon Buyer undertaking "due diligence" review within the next thirty (30) 
days after the Buyer receives Seller's preliminary title report, prepared by Alliance Title, 
for purposes of determining the financial feasibility of the project, including but not limited 
to research involving development costs, engineering, water feasibility, water rights with 
the Department of Water Resources, electrical costs, road costs, developmerlt costs, site 
review, all governmental entities approval and issuance of all necessary permits to allow 
the Buyer's development, by any governmental agencies, including but limited to the City 
of Eagle, Ada County Highway District, and County of Ada approving Buyer's proposed 
development, and the potential of granting to Buyer all necessary perr:lits for the 
commencement of said project. The contract is also contingent upon i:he Buyer's 
verification that the proP2rty is not subject to any other encumbrances or restfction which 
would prohibit the Buyers plans, etc. 
The contract is also contingent upon the Buyer's verification that the property is not 
in any designated wetlands, fiood plain and/or flood way. etc. In addition after the 
execution of this real estate purchase agreement the Buyer shall be afforded the right to 
have certain tests periormed with the aid of construction equipment to determine the 
existence of bedrock and/or determination of sewer depths, ground water, and/or irrigation 
requirements, which may impair the construction of certain improvements. 
Said testing and "due diligence" shall be performed within thirty (30) days after the 
receipt of the preliminary title report and if determined that any impairment exists will 
impair Buyer's development. buyer in buyer's sole discretion, shall have the right to cancel 
this agreement and the parties agree to the return of the earnest money deposited to the 
Buyer, with each party bearing their own costs and fees. 
Buyers' testing for the existence of groundwater or bedrock that may impair 
construction, described herein, shall be accomplished in such manner as to cause the 
least practicable amount of disruption of the surface of the land, and all holes shall be 
remled and leveled at E\uyers' expense promptly upon completion of the testing. All entry 
upon the lands of Sellers by Buyers or Buyers' agents and contractors for such purposes, 
and all testing activities, shall be done solely' at the risk of Buyers and Sellers shall have 
no duty to warn of possible dangers or to make the premises safe for carryin~~ on such 
testing activities. Buyers shall be solely liable for payment of all claims for worker's 
compensation made by parties who enter upon the lands of the Sellers in connection with 
ReAL ESTATe PURCHASE EXHIBIT "A"-2 
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such testing and/or surveying activities. 
Said testing and "due diligence" shall be performed within thiliy (30) days after the 
receipt of the preliminary title report and if determined that any impairment exists Will 
impair Buyer's develDpment, buyer in buyer's sole discretion, shall have the right to carleel 
this agreement and the parties agree to the return of the earnest money deposited to the 
Buyer, with each paliy bearing their own costs and fees. 
(5) Buyer covenants to utilize Buyer's best efforts to seek all governmental 
approval on the subject property by all governmental agencies. Buyer to be solely 
responsible for all costs associated with governmental approval of said development and 
will not incur any exr:;ense in vvhich seller shall be responsible. 
(6) Closing and possession shall occur on or before September 15, 2002. The 
Buyer shall be obligated for insurance and real estate taxes pro-rated after closing and all 
such insurance payments, taxes, water assessments, etc, thereafter. 
(8) The currerlt offer to purchase shall expire if not accepted by 5:00 :J'clock pm. 
on July 25, 2002. 
(9) The Buyer has the right to waive any of the above conditions and cl:Jse the real 
property under the terms above referenced, regardless of any grant or denial of the 
proposed zoning changes by the governmental authmities. 
(10) The parties [Iereto agree that this agreement shall be binding upon the parties, 
their heirs, devisees, assignees, transferees, etc. 
(11) The pariies acknowledge that Thomas Maile d/b/a/ Thomas Maile F\eal Estate 
is a licensed Real Estate Broker and is representing himself and his wife. 
The parties agree that all terms contained in the purchase agreement above 
referenced are incorporated by reference herein as if set forth in fuJI herein. 
Dated this ~=- day of July, 2002, 
THEODORE L. JOHNSON REVOCABLE 
TRUST, by: 
~(L~ i/kJ~ 
tHEODORE L. JOHr;JSON, Trustee, SELLER 
REAL EST/<.TE PURCHASE EXHIBiT ·'A"·3 
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Dated this ~Z:2--- day of July, 2002 
Dated this day of July, 2002. 
REAL ESTAE PURCHASE EXHIBIT "A"-4 
GIW?DATAI.YI!.JNDER'EARNEST.CL1 
001742
_____ 
I. \!...I I  
DEED OF TRUST 
THIS DEED OF TRUST, made and entered into this__ day ofS,~ptember, 2002, by and 
between THOMAS G. MAILE, IV and COLLEEN MAILE, husb,:md a.nd wife, ClndJcr their assigns, 
whose address is 885 Rush Lane, Eagle, Idaho, hereinafter called "Grantor", and Alliance Title of 
Id3.ho, hercin3fter called "Trustee", and Theodore L. JolU1son Revoc3ble Trust, whose office 3ddress 
is 1260 I West I-rope Road, Star, Idaho, hereinafter called "Beneticiary". 
"WITNESSETH 
Grantor does hereby irrevocably GRANT, BARGAIN, SELL AND CONVEY TO 
TRUSTEE, IN TRUST, WITH POWER OF SALE, that cerlain properly located il~ Ada Counly, 
Slale ofldaJlO, more pal1icularly described on Exhibit "A", att3ched herelO and incorporoled herein 
by this reterence as if set forth in full herein, which property is loc3led either within an incorpor3ted 
city or village at the date hereof. 
If all or part of the subject real property or any interest thereill is sold, transferred, or 
contracted to be sold or transrerred in the (uture by agreement without the Beneliciary's prior written 
consent, excluding a transfer by devise, descent or operation of low upon the death o:'the Grantor, 
then the Beneticiary may, at Beneticiary's option, declare all sums secured by this Deed of Trust to 
be immediately due and payable. Irthe Beneliciary shall waive the option to acceler3te as provided 
by accepting in \\Titing an aSsWllption agreement of the successor-in-interest, Geneliciary shojI then 
release Grantor under this Deed of Trust and the Promissory Note, TOGETHER \VITH the rents, 
issues and profits thereof SUBJECT, HOWEVER, to the right, power and authority hereinafter given 
to and conJerred upon Beneticiary to collect and apply such rents, issues and prolits, fOJ the purpose 
of securing payment of the indebtedness evidenced by a Promissory Note of even date herewith 
executed by Grantor in the sum of THREE HUNDRED THOUSAND HUNDRED DOLLARS 
(1300,000.00), with lina! payment due thereon on September 17,2007, and to secure pc:yment of all 
such further SWllS as may hereafter be loaned or advanced by the Beneficiary herein to G:~antor herein 
while record ovmer of present interest, tor any purpose, and of any notes, drafts or other instruments 
representing such further loans, advances or expenditures together with interest on all such sums at 
the rate therein provided. Provided, however, that the making of such further Joans, advances or 
expenditure shall be optional with the Beneficiary, and provided, further that it is the express intention 
of the parties to this Deed of Trust that it shall stand as continuing security until paid for all such 
advances together with interest thereon. Said assignment of rents to Beneticiary by Grantor is an 
ABSOLUTE ASSIGNMENT OF RENTS AND PROFITS. 
Request is hereby made that a copy orany Notice of Default and a copy of any Notice ofSak 
hereunder be mailed to the Grantor as his address hereinbefore set forth. 
r"VTTTDY' "A .,,, nr.r.n nv TDT lC. 1 
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DATED This __ cay of September, 2002. 
GRANTOR: 
THOMAS G. MAILE, IV
 
COLLEEN MAILE
 
STA TE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss: 
County o( Adil 
On this __ day of September, 2002, before me, a Notary Public in and for said State, 
personally appeared THOMAS G. MAILE, IV, and COLLEEN MAILE, husband and \vife, known 
to me to be the person(s) whose name(s) is/are attached to the foregoing instrument, and 
acknowledged to me th~y executed the same. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and atfixed my of1icial seal the day 
and year in this certiticate tirst above written. 
Not3l)' Public for Idaho 
Residing at 
My Commission Expires _ 
001744
   
 
 
OUIlIY a
ary
- - ------ - - - - -------- -
____________________ 
.·\SStCN:-'IE\iT OF EARNEST l\10NEY AGREEMENT 
TO PURCHASE REAL pnOPERTY 
.-\ssie:>,nors:	 rr1GillJ.S Cj. rvrdc, iV, and
 
Colkcl: ~\l;ji1e.lIusb~llld and wife
 
Assignee:	 Berkshire: ]mestments, LLC.,
 
an Idaho Limited LiJbility Company
 
; ,- i il) .\SSlC!'< ~.i :~,)-.JT OF L:!\R~[ST t'-.10NE'r' .-\GREEMENl TO PURCHASE RLA.L 
PROrLKTY, made aj:(; ':::l[cred into this di1Y at' do.y of August, 2002, by zlild between 
11 IU;\lAS G, ~1.'\ILE. IV, J.nu COLLEEN I'vlAILE, husbo.nd illld wife, of EJgle, Ado. County. IdJJlO. 
I1cr;:in,dic-r relerred 10 as "Assignors" and BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC., 0. limited JiZibility 
comp:1l1Y \\ilh its rrincip;d plJce of business in Ado. County, Idl1ho, hereimfler referred to as 
".·\ssignc-e": ;JI1J lI-lEODORr-: f.. JOHNSON REVOCABLE TRUST, hereinLlflcr refen'ed to JS 
"Sci kr", 
\VITNCSSETH: 
WH UZ I~!\.s, f\_ssi~~nors are f1urchasing cCI1o.in real property from TH EO DO RE L. .I 0 HNSO N 
R]::V()C.·\FlLl~ nn:ST 1~ILlrSL!:.1nt [0 the terms ofJn ··[o.mest Money Agreement [0 Purchase Re31 
Jlro;:cny" ~lI1J the ",\JdeTlcLm [0 Real EsIJte Agreement Between Thomo.s o.nd Colken Mo.ik .:mcl 
lhc\lc!orc 1.. .l()hl~St)1l Re\'\'c;lok Trust" dJ\cd July 25. 2002 and mode 0. pJrt hereof (IS if set forth in 
1-1I11 herein. ;(11' th:.1! Cerl~l:n I'c:ll rrl'jJCrty consisting of 40 acn:s alld described as: 
The \:":1h\\(':,l I/-1 of the South\\"est J /4. Section :;6, Township 5 
0unh. ~Z:ll~e I \\/e:;1. Buise. f\'kridian, AdJ County, Ido.ho. 
WI-llRE.AS. Ass;~~n(Jrs. Thum3s G.& Colleen Maile, Llrc willing to assign all Iheir right. title 
l1nd interest in c\lld to s~,icl C(1nlrac[ :md the real property therein described proviJed the Assignee 
o.ssumc the cntin: biJ1c.Jr.cc of said contract payable to Seller, subject to the following terms and 
conditions. 
CONS]DERATION: For and in consideration of the po.yment by Mailes to Assignee of S J ,00 and 
other good Jnd \'aluahJe consideration, the Assignors do hereby assign, grant, convey and set over 
lilltu Assigilce Llll of Assignors' right. rille and interest in nnd to the real eSlnte COl1lro.ct aoove 
identified (lnd the rCJ.l pwperty therein descrihed, Slioj~ct to the following terms nnd conditiom, 
Thi~: Assign111t:!lt tuge·ther with the dEed from Seiler to Assignee sho.ll be fileci with the escrow 
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holder who Ivill thcrcJlkr trC:.lt Assigncc JS h:.lving succeeded to Assignors' right. tit>: llnd int(:rcst 
in zlnd to s~lid re:.ll estJtc cOlltrJct JS though they h2d origin:lIly c\ecuted the SZl!l1C JS the [JllrcJn;cr 
tll\::rein IL.1I11CU. Assignee J~'rees to JSSUl11e the iuentificd contrJct and will pJy the unpJid bZlbnce of 
the purchJsc price in Jccorcbnce v\'lth the terms of said contrJct and perform all of the othu terms 
required of the Buyers therein. 
TAXES: TJ,\cs, including 10C:11 improvements and other special assessments, shall be prorJted as set 
forth ht:reJfter. the Assignor paying any such ta.'\es and assessments levied, Jssessed, becoming due 
or JttributJble to Zlny p':riod of time prioc to the promtion dJte, and the Assignee p3)!ing any such 
Ll.'\es ::md 3ssessmcnts levied, Zlsscssed, becoming due, or 3t1ribut3ble to, Jny period of time :.d'ter sZlid 
dJte. promplly Jnu before the S::lmc become delinquent. Assignee sldl be oblig::ltcd to mJKe lllJ 
fJ~1)n1ents 011 311 l:.l:\cs during the terlll of the contrJct herein. QS is set forth hereafter iJnd fllnher 
cOI'enJnts TO prol'ide the escrow holuer with proof of payment of said tJ.'\es as e:lch and every tJX 
heCClJ' :cs due :.lIlU p~Y:..Ibie. lInd furthl..T co\cn;JJllS to provide said proof ofpJyment ofsQic! ta.';es within 
[\.'11 (10) dJys at"1er the [,1.'\ h,,::coilles due. 
r:scrzo\\': The origillJI of this ,\ssignmcnt sh:..I11 be p!:lceJ ill escrolV with f\LLI/.\NCE TITLE & 
r::SCFO\\'. The rQrtics spcCitiCZllly JlHhorize. empower and designJ!e ALLIANCE llTLE. Ihe 
escrol\' hl1luL'r hercQrtcr. or cO:1Currcntly, ZlgrecJ UpOIl by the pJnies, ZlS e\'iuenced by C.\cclltioll by 
the r~lrties o(e~cr()\\ ins:ruclions. to substitute Assignee as buyer under the deed of trust under thc 
l:..:rms of th~ JL'O\e rcl~'renced rCQ! est:..Ite COlllrJCl. THEODORE L. JOHNSON REVQCABL[ 
ll<' LIST :..Iut]wri7es s~lil~ escrow hold':r to convey by WJrrJnty Deed to Assignee, and further 
JCK!Hl\llccl.~L's :\c;si~n:..:e lIill be ohligJlc'd under the Deeu on'rust Zlnne\cd III the rczll csute conlr:lct 
ill;)te~J of the .I\S::ii~n0r, 
DF:TAULl :\~D ~OTIC[: The [xlrtics further J~ree thJt Assignee shall bc rcsponsiblc 10 p:l)' :..III 
sums due unJcr the f)L'Cc! o(Trust ,mJ pay thcreon. pllrSU<lIllIO the terms set tanh therein. 
I\(j R.U':f\lf\ T TO :\SSIG~':\l[;\T A\'D NOVATION: The pJrties funher agree thJ( the 
undcrsigncc.1 THEOL)OI\E L. JOJli<SON IZEVOCAGLE TRUST agrees to releJse Assignors from 
JIII'L1lur(' li:1bility lIn(h the reI! estJte contrJct substituting Assignees lor SJid obligz.llions J.nd rUr1h~r 
'.[lllb<r;lT;,J 11);]t A.::~i:;'leD'; 5h:~I! b~ !('~r(\!:si)le:o pJ;' all Sl~!m due l,,,Je, the D':~d (lfTr'.!5 1. 3r~!1::':~'d 
10 the rCJI c.c;tJte COlllrJCI am] puy thereon, purSllnntto the terms set forth therein as ifset tonh in full 
herein. 
ENTIRE AGREEMEl'\T: Except as otherwise expressly noted in this Assignment, this \\Tittcn 
,'\ssignl11t.'nt contains the entire agreement between the pLlrties and all prior oral (lnd written 
l:lgrcements 3re mergccJ krein. 
G[;\;DING ON HEIRS, ETC.: This Assignment shall be binding on, and inure to the benefit of, the 
heirs, assigns, Ir,lllsferce, successo;-s in interest and persona) representZltives oflhe parties. 
IN WIl:'!ESS \VHEREOF, the pm1ies hJve e:.:ecuted this Assignment the day and year first 
ASSIGNi\IE;\T - 2 r',\\I',)\TA 'jl'''IlI.R,\S."c;·,\1I:V''I'Il·\u~u'',.\ cO()~ 
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THOMAS G. MAltE, IV 
~/i~;~cl <­
COLLEEN tvlAILE 
ASS[C;NEE: 
Brr~\KSHIRE LLC.INVEST~'lENTS~ 
13\.· ~)l' :/ ,') 0;2 f/"} " ~I(~ •.---­
. THOMAS G. K'!.'\IL -.. I\.j;j~oger IJ 
!\PPROVEO: 
T1JEODORE L. JOlf~SON REVOCAFlU~ TRUST 
STATE Or- lD.\HO 
COUlll)' or ALb ) 
On this -.is dJ) of &qtt.J.;[:2002. before me, the undersigned. a Notary Public in and 
Cor s:lid SWlC. pcrsc)I1~]ly arpcarcdl:{HOMAS G. MAILE, IV, and COLLEEN MAILE, husb:md and 
wi fe. kllown or OClllO\\ lcd,=~eJ to me to bc the person(s) whose nome(s) is/are subscribed to the 
within and foregoing inc;tn:mc:lt and acknowledged to me that they executed the same. 
l~ WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my official seal the dJy 
J:lJ )'l'L}!" in this cel1ificJte lirst :lbove \\Tilten. 
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" , h~p ~~--f{C-c-.t-'99 -1-0'--------­I-lOId-'::a1Z-1
RCSldll1g at: ~dV , 
My Commission Expires: / () ",it:} -()t',;:, 
_r-~_.' 
: ] ; tl ;: ~' . 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ::is: 
County of :"-cia ) 
On [his jj- CLlY o.t'Z(ti!Ut2002. before me, the undersih'lled, a Not:Jry Public in :lnd 
lor SJiJ St3[e:. persomlIy ClPPc'arc&tHOtvL.3..S G.. !vLL\ILE. IV, known or ackJlovvledged to me to be 
,hi.: \~:"iI~:':~ 01·3;::?JS;j;~.:::: :>:VEST\-rE~~TS. I-~C .. Ut; [udilo limi(eu jiaDtji[; cornpJllY. and lhe 
pc::r:,on(s) whose: n::une(s) !s/:.lJc subscribe:d to Ulc wilhjn and foregoing instrument and acknowledged 
to ille' lh~[ he e\cculed [he SJi11c on behalf of such limited )jabiliry comp:l1lY 
1>1 V/lTNESS \\'HEREOF, 1have hereunto set my h:l1ld 3lld affixed my official seal the day 
il:ld \ car in this c~r1itica[e ti!'sl :lbove \\Tinen. 
, 'j " 
... It· 
STATE OF IDAHO 
(oum!' of .-\da 
j 5S: 
StJlte of Idaho 
County of Ada 
On this ZO~ 
s.s. 
day of'--':~=;~C+"':'-d--\-t-------:' in(~ :wOf ,before me, DaneUe M. 
Green, a notary pubiic, personally a 
proved to me on the basis of satisfa ry evid:nc:: to bl: the pmon(s) wh e nam::(s) is/are subsc"ibed TO 
the v.ithin insrrum~. . wledgl:d that he/she exe::ured the same, 
l:~ ~jRE$-t ~J V71~f~:tl' '~Y~ _W i~

€~: :2'<').' (; N ' .. PUblic '. ~ 
: c.: ' tI' , ...... 2 ReSIding at: Balfe;.; ill 
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~  "-, :::sl Lfe; ID 
July 22,2003 
Connie Taylor 
C!J.sk md Feeney 
1229 Main 5t 
Lewiston. Idaho 8350 I 
Re: Theodore L. Johmon Trust 
Deaf Connie, 
Andy	 md I, acting a.s the trustees of the Theodore L. Johnson Trust, wish to wilhdr:lw [rofT} all 
proceedings of the law ~rm o[C/:1[k;md Feeney against Thomas G. tvbile. Colleen fvla.ile. and 
Berkshire Investments, LLC. !t is our judgement that this suit hJ.S not the merit to benefit the 
trust.	 We desire to let tle purcha.se of the Linder property proceed as in the currenl contract \vith 
Maile/ Berkshire Develo[Jment until SJiJ property is paid orr in fuJl. 
We know we ha\e J liduciJry duty (0 the beneJiciJries of the {rust to Jct in their oest behJIf. 
Oul \ve J1so kel we hJ\'[: J nHlr:11 obligJtion to Jollo'" Unclt: Ted's wishes in the \VJY in which he 
entrusted us to do. 
I(you	 un Cl)nle to Guise in the n\.'Jr futun.:, give us a call. Jnd we \\.. ill schedule a I'Jmil:' 
meeting having:ll leJSl one rerresentJlive from each ol'the five bcneficiJries in 3ltcndmce. 
Sincerely. 
/l II 
( ,.. ,""1/ '. ~'--V 
. I 7 
, /.' . 'J! / ,)~c.:.CL ~_.A- (; I ~ (>L. -!---'" . 
Andrew T. Rogers 
[3cth J, Rogers 
Co-Trustees oflhe Theodore L. Johnson Trust 
cc:	 Helen TQylor 
Ha.zel fisher 
Joyce Seely 
Garth Fisher 
Dallan Taylor 
Ruth Stephens 
Scott Johnson 
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EXHIBIT "C" TO AFFIDAVIT OF CHRIST TROUPIS IN SUPPORT OF
 
PLAINTIFFS/COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO RECONSIDER
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Tl-IOI\'1AS G. MAILE, IV 
Atlorney at Law 
380 West StaLe Street 
Eagle, Idaho 83616 
Telephone: (208) 939-1000 
Facsimile: (208) 939-1001 
Idaho State Bar No. 2378 
Attorney for Colleen Maile and Berkshire Investments 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF TI-IE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR TI-IE COUNTY OF ADA 
REED TAYLOR, an individual; DALLAN ) 
TAYLOR, an individual; R. JOHN TAYLOR,) 
an individual; THEODORE L. JOHNSON ) 
REVOCABLE TRUST, ) 
Plaintiffs/Counter·-Defendants. 
vs. 
THOMAS MAILE IV. and COLLEEN 
MAILE, husband and wil~~, and 
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC., 
Defendants/Counter-Claimants. 
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
 
Case No. CV OC 04-05656D 
ANSWER AND COUNTER CLAIM
 
RE: PLAINTIFFS AMENDED 
COMPLAINT BY BENEFICIARIES 
._----) 
COMES NOW the Defendant/Counter-Claimants, Berkshire Investments, L.L.C., and 
Colleen Maile, and Thomas Maile as and for their answer and counter-claim by and through their 
aHomey of record, hereby incorporate by reference all answers and counter-claims previously 
ANSWER AND COUNTER CLAIM RE: PLAINTIFFS' AMENDED COMPLAINT BY 
BENEFICIARIES - 1 
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asselied in their Verified Amended Answer and Amended Counter-Claim filed of record herein as 
if set forth in full herein. That the Verified Answer to the Amended Complaint dated January 18, 
2006 which filed by Jack Gjording on behalf of Defendant Thomas Maile, is incorporaled by 
reference herein, and should be considered an answer by the remaining Defendants and the Amended 
Answer and Amended Counter-Claim previously of record is incorporated by referenceberein as if 
set 1'orth in full herein. 
DATED this 2J _day of March, 20 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the ~) day of March, 2006, I served the foregoing 
ANSWER AND COUNTER CLAIM RE: PLAINTIFFS AMENDED COMPLAINT BY 
BENEFICIAIUES by having a true and complete copy personally delivered or by facsimile and/or 
by depositing the same in the United States Mail, postage prepaid thereon, and addressed as follows: 
Dennis M. Charney (X) U. S. Mail 
Attorney at Law ( ) Facsimile Transmission 
951 East Plaza Drive, Suite 140 ( ) I-land Delivery 
Eagle, Idaho 83616 ( ) Ovemight DelivelY 
Fax # (208) 938-9504 
Paul T. Clark (X) U. S. Mail 
ANSWER AND COUNTER CLAIM RE: PLAINTIFFS' AMENDED COMPLAINT BY 
BENKFICIARIES - 2 
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E, IV 
Attorney for Colleen aIle & Berkshire 
Investments, LLC 
!
H
Clark and Feeney 
1229 Main Street 
Post Office Drawer 285 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
Fax # (208) 746··9160 
Mr. Jack S. Gjording 
Gjording and Fouser 
509 West Hays Street 
Post Office Box 2837 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Fax # (208) 336-9177 
( ) Facsimile Transmission 
( ) Hand Delivery 
( ) Overnight Delivery 
(X) U. S. Mail 
( ) Facsimile Transmission 
( ) Hand Delivery 
( ) Overnight DeliveJy 
ANSWER AND COUNTER CLAIM RE: PLAINTIFFS' AMENDED COMrLAINT BY 
BENEFICIARIES - 3 
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AM FILED, d 
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FEB 13 2006
 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JlJDICIAL D 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY 0 
REED TAYLOR, DALLAN TAYLOR, 
and R. JOHN TAYLOR, 
Case No. CVOC0400473D Plaintiffs/ Counter-Defendants, 
ORDER REGARDING PLAINTIFFS' vs. 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
THOMAS MAILE, IV and COLLEEN 
MAILE, husband and wife, THOMAS 
MAILE REAL ESTATE COMPANY, and 
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, 
Defendants/ Counter-Claimants. 
THEODORE 1. JOHNSON 
RECOYABLE TRUST, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
THOMAS MAILE, IV and COLLEEN 
MAILE, husband and wife, THOMAS 
MAlLE REAL ESTATE COMPANY, and 
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENT, LLC, 
Defendants. 
This matter came before the Court on Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment. The
 
motion was argued before the Court on November 10, 2005. On December 23, 2005 the Idaho
 
Supreme Court issued its decision in the companion case of Taylor v. Maile (2205 Opinion No.
 
135) and remanded that case. On the same day, this Court ordered the parties to submit
 
ORDER REGARDING PLAJNTlFFS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - Page 1
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supplemental briefing on the effect of the remanded case on the entire litigation. On January 23, 
2006 the parties filed supplemental briefing. The Court considered the matter fully under 
advisement on that date. The defendants/counterclaimants ("Defendants") take the position that the 
remand has no effect on the issues pending before the Court in the instant case. The 
plaintiffs/counterdefendants ("Plaintiffs") have now moved to amend their Complaint in this case 
so as to conform it to the Supreme Court decision. 
After considering the briefs and arguments of the parties, Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary 
Judgment is hereby granted in part and denied in part. 
I. BACKGROUND 
Thomas Maile, IV was Theodore L. Johnson's attorney. Maile's representation included 
drafting the trust agreement for the Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust and overseeing the 
administration of the trust. After Johnson's death, Maile represented Johnson's estate. The 
underlying transaction in this case is a land sale between Johnson, then trustee and settlor of the 
Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust, and Maile. Maile and Johnson entered into an earnest 
money agreement for the purch~se of 40 acres in Eagle, Idaho. 
On January 23, 2004, Plaintiffs, certain residual beneficiaries of the Theodore L. Johnson 
Trust, filed a lawsuit, alleging three causes of action and seeking damages and/or rescission of the 
sale. On April 23, 2004, this Court dismissed the claims of the Plaintiffs based upon a lack of 
standing. That case was remanded by the Idaho Supreme Court as mentioned above. 
On July 22, 2004, Plaintiffs filed a new action against Defendants after the original trustees 
purportedly transferred their status as trustees to the Plaintiffs. On November 10, 2005, this Court 
heard oral arguments on Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, in which Plaintiffs sought to 
summary judgment on all of Defendants' counterclaims and affirmative defenses. 
ORDER REGARDING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - Pag~ 2 001756
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II. -FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) provides that summary judgment is "rendered forthwith 
if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that 
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment 
as a matter of law." See also First Sec. Bank of Idaho, NA. v. Murphy, 131 Idaho 787, 790, 964
 
P.2d 654, 657 (1998). I.R.C.P. 56(e) provides that an adverse party may not simply rely upon mere
 
allegations in the pleadings, but must set forth in affidavits specific facts showing there is a genuine 
issue for trial. See Rhodehouse V. Stults, 125 Idaho 208, 211,868 P.2d 1224, 1227 (1994). The
 
affidavits either supporting or opposing the motion must set forth facts that would be admissible in 
evidence and show that the affiant is competent to testify. See id.; LR. C.P. 56(e). 
To withstand a motion for summary judgment, the non-moving party's case must be
 
anchored in something more than speculation; a mere scintilla of evidence is not enough to create a
 
genuine issue. Zimmerman v. Volkswagon ojAmerica, Inc., 128 Idaho 851, 854, 920 P.2d 67, 69
 
(1996). Liberal construction of the facts in favor of the non-moving party requires the court to draw
 
all reasonable factual inferences in favor of the non-moving party. See Williams v. Blakley, 114
 
Idaho 323,324,757 P.2d 186,187 (1988); Blake v. Cruz, 108 Idaho 253, 255, 698 P.2d 315,317
 
(1985).
 
A. Counterclaim I - Tortious Interference 
with Contract 
The Idaho Supreme Court in Idaho First National Bank v. Bliss Valley Foods, Inc. set forth 
the elements for tortious interference with contract: (1) the existence of a contract; (2) knowledge of 
the contract on the part of the defendant; (3) intentional interference causing a breach of the 
contract; and (4) injury to the plaintiff resulting from the breach. 121 Idaho 266, 283-284, 824 P.2d
 
ORDER REGARDING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - Page 3
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841,858-859 (1991). After the plaintiff has established a prima facie case, "the burden is on the 
defendant to prove justification." Id. 
In regard to the land sale contract between Defendants and the Trust, the Court finds that the 
Defendants have failed to set forth any evidence that the land sale contract was breached. 
Therefore, the motion for summary judgment is granted with respect to that portion of 
Counterclaim L 
In regard to the commercial loan contract between Defendants and their lending institution, 
the Court finds there remains a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the Plaintiffs interfered 
with this loan contract. Therefore, the motion for summary judgment is denied with respect to that 
portion of Counterclaim 1. 
Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment on Counterclaim I is granted in part and denied in 
part. 
B.	 Counterclaim II - Tortious Interference with Prospective Economic Advantage 
The Idaho Supreme Court in Idaho First National Bank v. Bliss Valley Foods, Inc. defined 
the elements of the tort of interference with a prospective economic advantage as follows: 
A plaintiff, in order to establish a prima facie case, must show that any claimed 
intentional interference with a prospective economic advantage resulting in injury to 
the plaintiff "is wrongful by some measure beyond the fact of the interfi:rence 
itself." The plaintiff must establish that the intentional interference resulting in 
injury was wrongful, which may be shown by proof that either: (1) the defe:ndant 
had an improper objective or purpose to hann the plaintiff; or (2) the defendant used 
a wrongful means to cause injury to the prospective business relationship. 
121 Idaho 266, 286,824 P.2d 841, 861 (1991) (citations omitted). 
The Court finds that the Defendants have failed to set forth more than a scintilla ofevidence 
that Plaintiffs' conduct in this case was "wrongful," and therefore, summary judgment on 
Counterclaim II is granted. 
ORDER REGARDING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - Page 4 
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E. Counterclaim V - Civil Conspiracy 
The Court finds that civil conspiracy is not itself a claim for relief. See McPheters v. Maile, 
138 Idaho 391,395,64 P.3d 317,321 (2003) ("Civil conspiracy is not, by itself, a claim for relief.") 
(citations omitted). Summary judgment on Defendants' Counterclaim V is therefore granted. 
F. Counterclaim VI - Breach of Contract 
Defendants have failed to set forth even a scintilla of evidence that Plaintiffs have breached 
the terms of the land sale contract, and therefore, swnmary judgment on Defendants' Counterclaim 
VI is granted. 
G. Counterdaim VII and VIII - Equitable Estoppel and Quasi-Estoppel 
Consistent with its earlier findings in its Memorandum Decision & Order addressing 
Defendants' motion for partial summary judgment, the Court finds that there remains a genuine 
issue of fact as to the availability of the equitable claims brought in Counterclaims VII and VIII. 
H. Counterclaim IX - Good Faith and Fair Dealing 
The covenant of good faith and fair dealing is implied into every contract. Luzar v. W
 
Surety, 107 Idaho 693, 696, 692 P.2d 337, 340 (1984). However, "[a] violation of the implied
 
covenant is a breach of the contract. It does not result in a cause of action separate from the breach
 
of contract claims." Idaho First Nat 'I Bank v. Bliss Valley Foods, Inc., 121 Idaho 266, 289, 824
 
P.2d 841, 864 (1991 ) (citations omitted).
 
Accordingly, sumrnary judgment on Counterclaim IX is granted. 
I. Counterclaim X - Fraudulent Transfer 
Counterclaim X alleges that Plaintiffs fraudulently distributed the corpus of the Theodore 
Johnson Trust in order to subvert any award that Defendants may ultimately receive in this dispute. 
See generally I.C. § 55-913.
 
ORDER REGARDING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - Page 6
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The Court finds that the Defendants, as tort claimants, are "creditors" ofthe Trust as defined 
under Idaho's Unifonn Fraudulent Transfer Act. See I.e. § 55-910(3), (4) (stating that a person has 
a "claim" if they have any "right to payment, whether or not the right is reduced to judgment"). The 
Court finds further that there remains a genuine issue of material fact regarding Plaintiffs' alleged 
fraudulent intent. See I.e. § 55-908 (stating that the question of fraudulent intent "is one of fact, and 
not oflaw"). Accordingly, summary judgment on Counterclaim X is denied. 
J. Counterclaim XI - Uniust Enrichment 
Count XI of the Defendants' counterclaims alleges unjust enrichment. Defendants claim that 
if the Plaintiffs prevail in this lawsuit entitling them to recover the Linder Road Property, it would 
be inequitable to allow Plaintiffs to retain the benefits of Defendants labor, time, and expenses 
spent to enhance the value of the Property. 
The Court finds that there remains a genuine issue of material fact with respect to this 
counterclaim, and therefore, summary judgment is denied. 
K Counterclaim XII - Indemnification Agreement 
Counterclaim xn challenges the tenus of the Disclaimer, Release and Indemnification 
Agreement in which the Plaintiffs agreed to indemnify all the trust beneficiaries from any and all 
claims or damages that might arise from this litigation. 
The Court finds that this issue is not ripe for judicial intervention, and therefore, summary 
judgment on Counterclaim XII is granted. 
L. Counterclaim XIII- Breach of Peace and Quiet Enjoyment 
Defendants have failed to set forth even a scintilla of evidence that Plaintiffs have interfered 
with their right to use their property; instead, Defendants allege only that they have not been able to 
ORDER REGARDING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - Page 7
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sell the property or build on it. The Court finds that this is not the kind of interference that amounts 
to a nuisance. Summary Judgment on Counterclaim XIII is therefore granted. 
M. Counterclaim XIV - Breach of Warranty Deed 
The Idaho Supreme Court in Koelker v. Turnbull described the nature of an action for breach 
of covenants of title as follows:
 
[I]t is axiomatic that the plaintiff in an action for breach of covenants of title has
 
the burden of proving that he was evicted or prevented from using the conveyed
 
property by a person asserting title paramount to that of the plaintiffs.... "[A]
 
covenant of warranty of title does not extend to apparent or unfounded titles in
 
land, but only against hostile titles, superior in fact to those of the grantor."
 
127 Idaho 262, 265, 899 P.2d 972, 975 (1995) (citations omitted).
 
The Court finds that Defendants have failed to set forth even a scintilla of evidence that 
Plaintiffs have asserted a claim of superior title, and therefore, summary judgment on Counterclaim 
XIV is granted. 
N. Counterclaim XV - Continuing Tort 
The Court finds that there is no separate cause of action for a "continued tort," and 
therefore, summary judgment on Counterclaim XV is granted. 
O. Affirmative Defenses 
In addition to the above counterclaims, Plaintiffs also seek rulings on the following 
affirmative defenses asserted by Defendants. 
i. Failure to Join Indispensable Parties 
The burden of demonstrating the indispensability of a party rests on the moving party. 
Jolley v. Puregro Co., 94 Idaho 702, 705, 496 P.2d 939, 942 (1972). Defendants initially asserted
 
this affirmative defense in the original lawsuit, arguing that the Trust was an indispensable party in 
the litigation. 
ORDER REGARDING PLA)INTIFFS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - Page 8
 
001761
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
II
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
I  
510
15
20
25
2 
3 
4 
6 
7 
8 
9 
11 
12 
13 
14 
16 
17 
18 
19 
21 
22 
23 
24 
26 
Because the Trust is a party in the second lawsuit, which has been consolidated with the 
original lawsuit, the Court finds that Defendants have failed to set forth even a scintilla of evidence 
that an indispensable party has not been joined in this litigation. Plaintiffs' motion to strike this 
affirmative defense is therefore granted. 
ii. Laches 
The necessary elements of a laches claim are: 
(l) defendant's invasion of plaintiffs rights, (2) delay in asserting plaintiffs rights, 
the plaintiff having had notice and an opportunity to institute a suit, (3) lack of 
knowledge by defendant that plaintiff would assert his rights, and (4) injury or 
prejudice to defendant in event relief is accorded to plaintiff or the suit is not held to 
be barred. 
Finucane v. Village ofllayden, 86 Idaho 199,206,384 P.2d 236, 240 (1963). 
The Court finds there remains a genuine issue of fact on the issue of laches, and therefore, 
the motion to strike this affirmative defense is denied. 
iii. Failure to Mitigate 
The Court finds that there remains a genuine issue of fact on the affinnative defense of 
failure to mitigate damages; the motion to strike is therefore denied. 
v. Unclean Hands
 
The motion to stJike this affirmative defense is denied.
 
vi. Release and Reconveyance/Accord and Satisfaction 
Defendants assert that the Accord and Satisfaction and the Release of Reconveyance 
provisions of the Linder Road Property purchase agreement bar's any tort claims brought by or on 
behalf of the Trust. 
ORDER REGARDING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - Page 9 001762
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In accordance with the Idaho Supreme Court's recent decision in this litigation, this Court 
finds that the terms of the purchase agreement do not bar Plaintiffs' fiduciary duty cl aim as a matter 
of law. 
III. CONCLUSION 
The Court finds that genuine issues of material fact exist with respect to some of the 
Defendants' counterclaims; therefore, Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment is denied in part. 
With respect to several other counterclaims, the Court finds that there are not genuine issues of 
material fact and that Plaintiffs are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
~r--
Dated this 1.3 day of February 2006. 
ORDER REGARDING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - Page 10
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
r, HEREBY CERTIFY that on the ~day of February, 2006, I caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing ORDER REGARDING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT to be served by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Paul Thomas Clark (~S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
CLARK & FEENEY ( ) Hand Delivered 
P.O. Drawer 285 ( ) Overnight Mail
 
Lewiston, ID 83501
 (0'U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid Phillip 1. Collaer 
( ) Hand Delivered ANDERSON, JULIAN & HULL LLP 
( ) Overnight Mail P.O. Box 7426
 
Boise, ID 83707-7426
 
(~U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid Thomas G. Maile
 
ATTORNEY AT LAW ( ) Hand Delivered
 
380 W. State Street ( ) Overnight Mail
 
Eagle, ID 83616
 
Jack S. Gjording (--{u.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
GIORDING & FOUSER ( ) Hand Delivered 
PO Box 2837 ( ) Overnight Mail 
Boise, ID 83702 ( ) Facsimile 
J. DAYID NAYARRO _/ 
Clerk of the District COI~~ 
Ada County, Idah 
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PAUL THOMAS CLARK
 
CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR
 
1 CLARK and FEENEY
 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
 
2 The Train Station, Suite 201 
J3th and Main Streets 
3 P. O. Drawer 285
 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
4 Telephone: (208)743-9516 
ISB# 1329 5 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 6 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
7 
REED TA YLOR, DALLAN TAYLOR,	 ) Case No. CV OC 0400473D 
8 and R. JOHN TAYLOR,	 )
 
)

9 Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants,	 )
 
)
10 
vs.	 ) 
)11 
THOMAS MAILE, TV and COLLEEN )
 
MAILE, husband and wife, THOMAS ) MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
12 
MAILE REAL ESTATE COMPANY, ) ON BENEFICIARIES' CLAIM
 
13
 and BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC,	 )
 
)
 
14 Defendants/Counter-Claimants.	 )
 
)

15 )
 
THEODORE 1. JOHNSON REVOCABLE )
16 TRUST,	 )
 
)
17 Plaintiff,	 )
 
)
18 
vs. )
 
19
 )
 
THOMAS MAILE, TV and COLLEEN, )
 
20 MAILE, husband and wife, and )
 
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, )
 
21 )
 
Defendants. )

22 ) 
23 COME NOW Plaintiffs Reed, Dallan, and John Taylor (hereafter referred to as "the 
24 
Beneficiary Plaintiffs"), by and through their attorney of record, Paul Thomas Clark of the firm of 
25 
"LA INTIFFS' MOTION FOR SUMMA R\' JUDGM ENT 
_6 ON BENEFICIARIES' CLAIM 
LEWISTON. IDAHO 83501 001766
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Clark & Feeney and, pursuant to l.R.c.P. 56(b), move this Court for an order granting summary 
judgment in favor of the Beneficiary Plaintiffs on their claim against the Defendants. 
1
 
This motion is made upon the pleadings and records of the above-entitled action and2
 
3 Memorandum in Support ofPlaintiffs , Motion for Summary Judgment filed concurrently herewith.
 
4
 Oral argument is requested. 
()"5
 
DATED this __f_ day of February, 200~;/_ ,(' ! 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the ~ day of February, 2006, I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of this document by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
~ U.S. Mail 
Thomas Maile o Hand Delivered 
Attorney at Law o Overnight Mail 
380 W. State o Telecopy (FAX) 
Eagle, ID 83616 
t2( U.S. Mail Jack S. Gjording Hand Delivered oGjording & FOllster Overnight Mail oP.O. Box 2837 
o Telecopy (FAX) Boise, ID 83702 
U.S. Mail 
Dennis Charney ( Hand Delivered 
Attorney at Law o Overnight Mail 951 E. Plaza Dr. Ste. 140 o TelecoJY(~AX)Eagle, ID 83616 
t j //' / I • J/// ' 
,/ J' . j/tk~__/V'-"'~ V/ --I 
aul Thom'as Clark 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
ON BENEFICIARIES' CLAIM 
J 
LAW OFFICES OF 
CLARK AND FEENEY 
LEWISTON. IDAHO 83501 
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Christ T. Troupis, ISB # 4549::ia CQUI 
TROUPIS LAW OFFICE 
1299 E. Iron Eagle, Ste 130 
PO Box 2408 
Eagle, Idaho 83616 
Telephone: 208/938-5584 
Facsimile: 208/938-5482 
Email: ctroupis@troupislaw.com 
Co-Counsel for Plaintiffs 
; D/-\V1D i li).:/·' ilC, Ci·~, 
By ::~. ,_~:,I(~>!.'iE~;1 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
 
~ERKSHlREINVESTME~TS,LLC, an 
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G. 
MAILE, IV. and COLLEEN BIRCH­
MAILE, husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants, 
v. 
CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, f/k/a
 
CONNIE TAYLOR, an individual; DALLAN
 
TAYLOR, an individual; R. JOHN
 
TAYLOR, an individual; CLARK and
 
FEENEY, a partnership; PAUL T. CLARK,
 
an individual; THEODORE L. JOHNSON
 
REVOCABLE TRUST, an Idaho revocable
 
trust; JOHN DOES I -JOHN DOES X; AND
 
ALL PERSONS IN POSSESSION OR
 
CLAIMING ANY RIGHT TO
 
. POSSESSION. 
Defendants/Collilter-Claimants.L.....- ---J--­
-------·-·1 
Case No. CV-OC-0723232 
MEMORANDUM BRIEF IN 
SUPPORT OF 
PLAINTIFFS/COUNTER­
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO 
RECONSIDER 
_ 
COMES NOW tht: Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants by and through their undersigned 
counsel of record, Christ T. Troupis, and provides this Honorable Court with the following 
memorandum brief in support of Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants' Motion to Reconsider, as 
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follows. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
The Plaintiffs/Counter-defendants are requesting that this court reconsider the following 
interlocutory Orders and Judgments: (1) Memorandum Decision & Order entered July 2,2009, 
(2) Order Denying Plaintiffs Summary Judgment entered July 20, 2009, (3) the Judgment 
Dismissing Plaintiffs Claims entered 07/20/2009, together with (4) the Order Denying Plaintiffs' 
Motion for Summary Judgment on the Defendants' Counterclaims entered on 06/23/2009. 
This motion for reconsideration is based on the recent decision rendered in the: Idaho 
Supreme Court case captioned, Taylor v. McNichols, 36130, 36131 (lDSCCI), decided on 
September 3, 2010, which established new law with respect to when claims may first be brought, 
that are based on the conduct of parties and their attorneys in litigation. 
Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants submit that the recent Supreme Court ruling conflicts with 
this Court's prior interlocutory Orders and Judgment. When considering a motion to reconsider 
under I.R.C.P. II(a)(2), the district court "should take into account any new facts presented by 
the moving party that bear on the correctness ofthe interlocutory order." Coeur d'Alene Mining 
Co. v. First Nat'l Bank ofN. Idaho, 118 Idaho 812, 823, 800 P.2d 1026, 1037 (1990). Spur 
Products Corp. v. Stoel Rives LLP, 143 Idaho 812,153 P.3d 1158 (Idaho 2007). It is the 
position ofthe Plaintiffs/Counter-defendants the legal positions ofthe parties to this action have 
significantly been altered based upon this new Law, and, in the interests of justice and judicial 
economy, these issues should be addressed and resolved by this Court prior to trial. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The decision to grant or deny a request for reconsideration generally rests in the sound discretion 
MEMORANDUM BRIl~F IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS/COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' 
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of the trial court. Campbell v. Reagan, 144 Idaho 254,258, 159 P.3d 891, 895 (2007); Carnell v. 
Barker Mgmt. Inc., 137 Idaho 322, 329,48 P.3d 651, 658 (2002). I.R.C.P. Rule 11(a)(2) 
provides: 
Successive applications for orders or writs - Motions for reconsideration. 
(A) Successiv{: Applications.... Nothing in this rule shall prevent a party or the 
attorney from renewing a motion or an application to the same judge, or a newly 
appointed judge, in an action after such motion or application was originally 
denied; but this provision and this rule shall not create the right to file a motion 
for reconsideration except as provided in subsection (B) of this rule. Nothing in 
this rule shall prevent a party or an attorney from renewing a motion or an 
application for a constitutional writ to the same judge, or a newly appointed 
judge, in an action after such motion or application was originally denied. 
(B) Motion For Reconsideration. A motion for reconsideration of any 
interlocutory orders of the trial court may be made at any time before the entry of 
final judgment but not later than fourteen (14) days after the entry of the final 
judgment. A motion for reconsideration of any order of the trial court made after 
entry of final judgment may be filed within fourteen (14) days from the entry of 
such order; provided, there shall be no motion for reconsideration of an order of 
the trial court entered on any motion filed under Rules 50(a), 52(b), 55(c), 59(a), 
59(e), 59.1, 60(a), or 60(b). 
The purpose of a motion for reconsideration is similar to a Rule 59(e) motion to alter or 
amend a judgment. It affords "the trial court the opportunity to correct errors both of Hlct or law 
that had occurred in its proceedings; [and] thereby provides a mechanism for corrective action 
short of an appeal." Lowe v. Lym, 103 Idaho 259, 263, 646 P.2d 1030, 1034 (Ct. App.1982) 
(discussing Rule 59(e) motions). The court further held that new or additional information is not 
necessary for a motion for reconsideration. "[A] rule requiring new evidence on a motion for 
reconsideration would be a cause for concern. It would prevent a party from drawing the trial 
court's attention to errors of law or fact in the initial decision, precluding correction of even 
flagrant errors except through an appeal." Johnson v. Lambros, 143 Idaho 468, 473, 147 P.3d 
100, 105 (Ct.App. 2006) Since a final judgment has not been entered in this case, the court's 
MEMORANDUM BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS/COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' 
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orders granting summary judgment to Taylors' with respect to the Plaintiffs' claims is an 
'interlocutory order' subject to a motion for reconsideration. See, e.g., Barmore v. Perrone, 145 
Idaho 340, 179 P.3d 303 (2008). 
LEGAL ARGUMENT 
The Claims ofthe Plaintiffi are not ba"ed by Res Judicata. 
This Court previously ruled that the claims set forth in the multiple count amended 
complaint asserted against the Defendants should have been raised in the prior litigation known 
as Taylor v. Maile, and because they were not, the Plaintiffs' present claims were barred by the 
doctrine of Res Judicata. The September 3, 2010 decision ofthe Idaho Supreme Court in Taylor 
v. McNichols, 36130, 36131 (IDSCCI) (2010), is contrary to this Court's ruling. 
The Taylor v. McNichols decision states: 
"As in cases for legal malpractice based on conduct occurring during the 
course of a trial, in order to bring a malicious prosecution claim there must be 
damages and it must be determined that the suit was groundless, neither ofwhich 
is possible prior to resolution ofthe case. 
The theme in our analyses in these two comparative causes of action is 
that Idaho courts take into consideration the significant complexities involved in 
application of law, such as trial strategies and negotiation tactics, and wait until 
all those complexities have resolved themselves prior to hearing a claim. Only 
when a case has been concluded may one truly identify whether or not a 
prosecution has be(~n malicious, whether an attorney has committed malpractice, 
or, in the case at hand, whether an attorney has actedfraudulently or solelyfor 
his own benefit. Therefore, we conclude that a cause ofaction against one 
party's opponent's attorney in litigation, based on conduct the attorney 
committed in the course ofthat litigation, may not be properly institutedprior to 
the resolution ofthat litigation, even where the allegedly aggrievedparty 
believes that the attorney in question has been acting outside the legitimate 
scope ofrepresent,rtion and solelyfor his own benefit. Under this same 
reasoning, the allegations of aiding and abetting in the commission of tortious 
acts, although marginally pled, must await resolution of the Underlying Case. 
Until the Underlying Case is resolved a court cannot determine whether any 
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tortious act was committed, let alone acts constituting the aiding and abetting of 
those alleged tortious acts." 
Based on the Supreme Court's holding in Taylor v. McNichols, res judicata did not apply 
to bar the Plaintiffs' claims in this case. The Plaintiffs' claims, that Taylors committed perjury 
and a fraud on the court in the prior litigation, were not ripe for judicial determination in that 
action. As the Court held in Taylor v. McNichols, no cause of action could be filed until after that 
lawsuit was ended, and the Plaintiffs sustained damages. In the present matter, the plaintiffs 
sustained damages directly related to the tortious conduct of the defendants. 
The Plaintiffs' claims were based solely on the conduct of Taylors during the prior 
litigation. In essence there are ten (l0) key components alleged against the defendants in the 
present matter that are proved by the defendants' own admissions. The following list sets out 
these key components. 
1. The Taylors in their individual capacity of beneficiaries of the trust filed their lawsuit 
in January 2004 against Berkshire Investments, LLC, Thomas G. Maile, IV., and Colleen Birch-
Maile. On April 23, 2004" the Honorable Judge Ronald Wilper entered his Order Granting 
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. The Taylors and the Rogers (successor trustees) and the 
beneficiaries entered into a global "Disclaimer, Release & Indemnification Agreement" which 
was dated July 15,2004. Under the terms of the Agreement the Taylors released the trustees 
Beth and Andy Rogers from all liability relating to the administration of the trust. The 
Agreement further provide:d that the Taylors would be appointed as successor trustees. 
(Affidavit of Thomas Maile Part 2 Exhibit "B" referencing Agreement). 
2. Defendant Connie Taylor authored a letter to Bart Harwood on April 14, 2004 which 
MEMORANDUM BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS/COUNTER­
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stated, "The Taylors are not willing to give up theft rights as beneficiaries of the trust unless Beth 
will affinn her prior factual statements in the fonn of an affidavit and agree to cooperate in the 
action against Mr. Maile. If we aren't able to reach an agreement on that, they will see:k a full 
accounting of the trust and a copy of the trust and estate tax returns" (Affidavit ofThomas Maile 
Part One deposition ofBeth Rogers Exhibit "B" referencing deposition exhibit 39). 
3. Anned with the "Disclaimer, Release & Indemnification Agreement", the Taylors 
acting as trustee of the Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust filed a second lawsuit on July 19th, 
2004. Berkshire Investment and the Mailes filed their motion to dismiss/motion for summary 
judgment on October 20, 2004 alleging that the Taylors had not properly obtained jud:icial 
appointment as successor trustees. In response to the motion before Judge Wilper, the: Taylors 
filed their verified petition in the probate court on November 12, 2004, requesting the probate 
court to appoint them as successor trustees of the Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust. The 
petition was executed by R. John Taylor as a verification of the facts contained in the petition. 
Page 2 of the verified petition stated under oath, "the petitioner's 88-year-old mother., Helen 
Taylor, is the sole remaining benefICiary ofthis trust by virtue ofthe terms ofa Dis(~laimer, 
Release and Indemnity Agreement." The pleading was prepared by Connie Taylor, attorney for 
the plaintiffs. (Affidavit ofThomas Maile Part Two Exhibit "I") (emphasis added). 
4. At the probate hearing on May 2, 2005 before the Honorable Judge Beiter, Mr. R. 
John Taylor was sworn under oath and provided testimony before the Honorable Judge Beiter on 
May 2,2005 and testified: page 14, In 4: Q. Will you explain to the court just briefly why it is 
that you want to serve? 6 A. "Well, primarily, to pursue the claim for the trust. We have 
MEMORANDUM BRU:F IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS/COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' 
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always thought it was a valid claim because I think that, for the benefit -- my mother is the 
beneficiary of the trust, and we expect that we will eventually win on this claim." During that 
same hearing Mr. Clark provided in his closing argument before Judge Beiter on June 5, 2005 
provided: page 17, In 12: MR. CLARK: "Yes. Just briefly, Judge. It seems to me that, based 
upon, first, the agreement of the beneficiaries -- they have all indicated that the Taylors should 
serve as co-trustees. The Taylors, pursuant to that same agreement, have a guarantee in the 
disclaimer. So they have some interest in the proceeding. Their mother stands to gain and, 
thereby, they have an interest in the proceeding." (Affidavit of Thomas Maile Part One transcript 
of probate court hearing Exhibit "A"). 
5. The Honorable Judge Wilper entered his order granting in part and denying in part the 
Berkshire Investments and the Mailes' Motion to Dismiss/Summary Judgment. The district 
court entered its Memorandum Decision and Order on July 28, 2005 allowing the trust to amend 
its complaint after the successor trustees received the required appointment by the probate court. 
The district court did grant Berkshire Investments' and Mailes' motion in part ruling that the 
Taylors and the trust had waived rights to rescind the contract as "once a party treats a contract 
as valid after the appearance of facts giving rise to a right of recision, the right of recision is 
waived." The District Court further found that the "Plaintiffs (Theodore L. Johnson Revocable 
Trust and the Taylors), now with standing as trustees, did not act promptly to pursue rescission 
once the grounds for it arose. Therefore, the Court hereby grants Defendants' motion with 
respect to this claim" (Affidavit of Thomas Maile Part Two Memorandum Decision arld Order 
on July 28,2005 Exhibit "K"). 
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6. The Idaho Supreme Court issued its decision in Taylor v. Maile I on December 23, 
2005. 
7. On March 9,2006, the Verified Amended Complaint was filed by the Taylors, and 
prepared by the co-defendant attorneys. Page 1 of the Verified Amended Complaint stated under 
oath, "Reed and R. John Taylor are residents of Nez Perce County, Idaho; DaHan Taylor is a 
resident of Ada County Idaho. All ofthe plaintiffs are residual benefICiaries ofthe Theodore 
L Johnson Trust." (The verified Amended Complaint is annexed to Amended Complaint and 
Demand for Jury Trial as Exhibit "B") (emphasis added) . 
8. The Taylors acting with and through their attorneys on February 13,2006, filed their 
Motion For Summary Judgment On Beneficiaries' Claim. The first sentence of the motion 
states, "Come Now Plaintiffs Reed, Dallan, and John Taylor hereafter referred to as "the 
BenefICiary Plaintiffs". The Taylors again referring to themselves as plaintiffbenefidaries filed 
the Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment on Beneficiaries' 
Claim on February 13,2006. 
9. Ultimately the district court entered the" Judgment on Beneficiaries' Claim" on 
June 7, 2006 (emphasis added) (The Judgment is annexed to Amended Complaint and Demand 
for Jury Trial as Exhibit "C"). 
1O. The individual Taylors and their counsel of record acting in unison as co-defendants 
attempted to take advantage of Taylor v. Maile (1) by wrongfully asserting the Taylors were still 
beneficiaries of the trust. The reason why the Taylors misrepresented their status as 
beneficiaries is clear. Judge Wilper had declared "Once a party treats a contract as valid after the 
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appearance of facts giving rise to a right of rescission, the right of rescission is waived". The 
District Court further found that the "Plaintiffs (Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust and the 
Taylors), now with standing as trustees, did not act promptly to pursue rescission once: the 
grounds for it arose. The trust could not have rescinded the contract. 
Berkshire and Mailes filed the complaint in this action alleging claims based on the 
conduct of Taylors' and their counsel in the prior litigation. This Court granted the Taylors' 
motion to dismiss those claims on the basis that res judicata applied and barred the plaintiffs' 
claims. The Court's holding in Taylor v. McNichols stands for the proposition that res judicata 
does not bar a suit against prior adversaries and their attorneys of record for conduct that 
occurred in the prior litigation. The plaintiffs have alleged sufficient allegations that Connie 
Taylor and Clark & Feene:y Law Firm were not attorneys who were acting within the scope of 
their representation of their clients, but were acting for their sole benefit. They actively 
participated and/or encouraged a "fraud upon a court", perjury and subordination ofperjury. 
The district court (~ntered its "Judgment on Beneficiaries' Claim", solely upon the direct 
material misrepresentations of the Taylors and their counsel of record. There is no dispute that 
Connie Taylor's office, notarized her husband's signature on November 14th 2004, wherein her 
then husband stated under oath in the verified petition before the probate court, at page two "the 
petitioner's 88-year-old mother, Helen Taylor, is the sole remaining beneficiary of this trust by 
virtue of the terms of a Disclaimer, Release and Indemnity Agreement"( attached as Exhibit "B" 
to Affidavit of Thomas Maile). All defendants had actual knowledge of the true facts as to who 
was the beneficiary of the trust. 
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The amended complaint alleges that defendants, Connie Wright Taylor, f/k/a Connie 
Taylor, and Paul T. Clark, and Clark and Feeney, a partnership participated, directly or 
indirectly, and engaged in multiple instances of "theft", "false pretense", and "peIjury"in 
violation of Idaho Law. Specifically, the allegations of the complaint assert the defendants 
engaged in multiple instances of "false pretense", "theft" and "peIjury" in violation ofIdaho 
Code Sections 18-2403 arId 19-2116. Idaho Code Sections 18-2401, 18-2403, 18­
2407(l)(a)(2)(3)(b)(l), 18-7803, 18-5401, 18-5410, 18-5406, 18-5408, I.C. 19-1430, 19-1431 
(peIjury) and Idaho Code Sections 18-3401 18-2403,18-2407(l)(a)(2)(3)(b)(l), and Section 19­
2116 (theft-obtaining property by false pretense) Code Sections 18-2403. 
The contention is simple; that the Taylors and their counsel of record committed multiple 
criminal acts and committed fraud in representing the Taylors' status as beneficiaries which was 
the very foundation'to the ultimate "Judgment on Beneficiaries' Claims". The Taylors' 
counsel was not acting in a "legitimate representation" role of their clients when they actively 
participated in the illegal activity alleged in the present matter. As stated in Taylor, supra, "an 
attorney engaging in fraud is likewise acting in a manner foreign to his duties as an attorney" 
(Taylor v. McNichols" supra @p. 13). 
Moreover, the attorney co-defendants were acting for their own benefit and not in their 
client's interests in perpetrating this fraud. They had entered into a contingent fee agreement 
with the Taylors to share in the proceeds of any settlement, judgment or proceeds. (Affidavit of 
Thomas Maile Part 4 filecl February 2,2009). The attorneys attempted to increase their potential 
recovery by perpetrating the fraud. The defendants in the underlying case were advancing the 
MEMORANDUM BRII~F IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS/COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' 
MOTION TO RECONSIDER- Pg 10 
001781
 
l
-
1 )(1
, - 07(1 )( )(1 -
 
d
theory for damages that the 40 acre parcel was valued at $800,000.00 instead of the $400,000.00 
valuation arrived at by an independent real estate appraiser. The property in 2006 allegedly was 
worth $1,800,000.00 in value. What would be better to obtain a 1/3 interest in property allegedly 
valued at $1,800,000.00 or a 1/3 interest in $400,000.00? 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the re<;ent ruling of the Idaho Supreme Court in Taylor v. McNichols, the 
Plaintiffs' claims in this case were not barred by res judicata, and could properly be asserted. 
Further, there can be no abuse of process or tortious interference of prospective business 
advantage in light of the filct that the Plaintiffs' claims were viable, and legally recognizable 
claims against the defendEmts at the time that they were brought. 
Therefore, the Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants respectively request the Court to reconsider 
(1) Memorandum Decision & Order entered July 2, 2009, (2) Order Denying Plaintiff's 
Summary Judgment entered July 20,2009, (3) the Judgment Dismissing Plaintiffs Claims 
entered 07/20/2009, together with (4) the Order Denying Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary 
Judgment on the Defendants' Counterclaims entered on 06/23/2009 in light of the new Law 
rendered in the Idaho Supreme Court case captioned, Taylor v. McNichols, 36130, 36131 
(IDSCCI), decided on September 3, 2010 
DATED this 28th clay of September, 2010. 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
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RECONSIDER, (2) AFFIDAVII OF CHRIST TROUPIS IN SUPPORT 
PLAINTIFFS/COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO RECONSIDER, together with (3) 
MEMORANDUM BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS/COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' 
MOTION TO RECONSIDER, to be delivered, addressed as follows: 
i Connie W. Taylor 
I 
! CLARK and FEENEY 
P.O. Drawer 785 
I Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
I Facsimile: (208) 746-9160 
Thomas G. Maile, IV.
 
380 W. State Street
 
Eagle, Idaho 83616
 
~imile: (208) 939-1001 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
 
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an 
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G. 
MAILE, IV, and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE, 
husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, fka CONNIE 
TAYLOR, an individual; DALLAN 
TAYLOR, an individual; R. JOHN TAYLOR, 
an individual; CLARK and FEENEY, a 
partnership; PAUL 1. CLARK, an individual; 
THEODORE L. JOHNSON REVOCABLE 
TRUST, an Idaho revocable trust; JOHN 
DOES I-JOHN DOES X; AND ALL 
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Defendants. 
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Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants filed a motion to reconsider this Court's 
Memorandum Decision and Order of July 2,2009, and other associated orders and judgments 
denying plaintiffs' summary judgment motion and dismissing plaintiffs' claims. The basis for 
the motion to reconsider is one paragraph of the 31-page Idaho Supreme Court opinion in Taylor 
v. McNichols, filed September 3,2010. Plaintiffs argue that this Court's finding that resjudicaro 
ban-ed their claims was incon-ect because, according to the Taylor v. McNichols, opinion, their 
claims could not have been raised in the case decided by Judge Wilper. 
The Court's Memorandum Decision and Order was correct. Taylor v. McNichols 
and other recent Idaho Supreme Court cases actually provide additional support for this Court's 
decision. 
ARGUMENT 
I. TAYLOR V. A-fCNICHOLS DOES NOT AFFECT THE ANALYSIS OF THIS
 
COURT'S SUMMARY DECISION.
 
Plaintiffs' brief can be summed up by the following quotation: 
The Court's holding in Taylor v. McNichols stands for the 
proposition that that res judicata does not bar a suit against prior 
adversaries and their attorneys of record for conduct that occurred 
in the prior litigation. The plaintiffs have alleged sufficient 
allegations that Connie Taylor and Clark & Feeney Law Firm were 
not attorneys who were acting within the scope of their 
representatLon of their clients, but were acting for their sole benefit. 
They actively participated and/or encouraged a "fraud upon a 
court", perjury and subordination of perjury." 
Memorandum Briefin Support of Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants' Motion to Reconsid~r, p. 9. 
Taylor v. lvlcNichols did not stand for the proposition that plaintiffs espouse. 
Rather, the Supreme Court did not address whether the claims were barred by resjlldicata 
because they were premature. Instead, the court went on to rule that the complaints in that case 
MEMORANDUM IN O]~POSITIONTO MOTION TO RECONSIDER - 2 Client: 1797020.1 
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were barred by the litigation privilege, failed to state a claim of malpractice because of a lack of 
standing and failed to state a claim of fraud against the attomey defendants. Of the four reasons 
identified in the court's conclusion for dismissal of the lawsuit, only the fourth reason, that the 
claims were not ripe for litigation, remotely related to a res judicata analysis. 
This Court's Memorandum Decision and Order is surprisingly consistent with the 
Tavlor v. McNichols decision that came along more than a year later. Page 9 of the 
Memorandum Decision and Order accurately pointed out to plaintiffs that it was not the legal 
theory espoused that controlled the claim preclusion analysis. Yet, plaintiffs continue to rename 
their standing issues in an attempt to claim that they have not had the opportunity to litigate the 
issues. As this Court stated on page 10 of the Decision, a comparison of the facts alleged in the 
present case to the facts alleged in the prior cases, "leaves no doubt that these claims relate to the 
same transaction that gave rise to the first cases." The issues regarding the beneficiaries of the 
trust were extensively litigated in the prior cases. 
Plaintiffs' argument raised in their motion to reconsider is the same argument 
raised previously, as shown by the following quotation from page 11 of the Court's 
Memorandum Decision and Order: 
Although the argument is not always easy to follow, Berkshire's 
claims presented here all hinge on the assertion that the Taylors 
and their counsel committed a fraud on Judge Beiter by filing a 
petition for appointment as Trustees that contained a false 
statement. This statement somehow led Judge Beiter to appoint 
the Taylors as Trustees, giving them standing to bring the suit 
which ultimately led to Judge Wilper's determination that the 
underlying real estate transaction was void. This led to the loss of 
the property. The loss of the property, in tum is what caused the 
damages in this case. Since those damages only arose after Judge 
WiJper's final judgment, this action could not have been brought 
earlier. Therefore, it is not barred by res judicata. In other words, 
the loss ofthe prior suit gives rise to the cause of action in this 
case. 
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Now, the Taylor v. McNichols case simply provides plaintiffs with another 
citation for their argument that, "the loss of the prior suit gives rise to the cause of action in this 
case. " 
The Court's decision correctly concluded that the plaintiffs' claims in this case 
involve the same transaction that was conclusively decided in the prior lawsuits. An attempt to 
avoid the application of res judicata by alleging "fraud on the court" is exactly the type of evil 
that this Court and the Idaho Supreme Court in Compton v. Compton feared. 
The independent action in equity is a most unusual remedy, 
available only rarely and under the most exceptional 
circumstances. It is most certainly not its function to relitigate the 
issues determined in another action between the same parties, or to 
remedy the inadvertence or oversight of one of the parties to the 
original action. It will lie only the presence of an extreme degree 
of fraud. 
COlllptonv. Compton, 101 Idaho 328, 335, 612 P.2d 1175,1182(1980).
 
The same issues, disguised only slightly, were raised and litigated in Judge Wilper's court. This
 
Court should not relitigate them.
 
II. TAYLOR V. AfCNICHOLS SUPPORTS THIS COURT'S DECISION. 
The Idaho Supreme Court in Taylor v. McNichols contained a lengthy discussion 
ofjudicial notice and invited error before it broke new ground concerning the law on the 
litigation privilege. In doing so, the court discussed the same tactics that plaintiffs in this case 
are attempting. The court was concerned about protecting attorneys from actions by their 
opposing parties, whose real purpose may be to deter the effective representation of the adverse 
party. The Supreme Court, at page 18 of its Opinion, adopted the litigation privilege as an 
absolute privilege that only applied to an attorney acting within the scope of his or her 
employment and not solely for the attorney's personal interest. 
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Plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration alleges, without any factual support, that the 
attorneys were not acting within the scope of their representation of their clients, but were acting 
for their sole benefit. They cite the contingent fee agreement and conclude their argument with 
the following question: 
What would be better to obtain a one-third interest in property 
allegedly valued at $1,800,000 or a one-third interest in $400,000? 
If this question was an attempt at an argument, the argument would be that an attorney with a 
contingent fee agreement is acting solely for his or her own benefit, rather than the benefit of the 
client. It ignores the fact that the client would receive the other two-thirds 0 f the recovery and 
thus would be twice as interested in a large recovery. The "argument" also implies that a 
plaintiff has no interest in increasing the size of a judgment. Plaintiffs lack support for their 
argument and actually support the opposite conclusion. Attorneys on contingent fees share the 
same interest as their clients. Maximizing a recovery not only benefits the attorney, bLlt also 
benefits the client. The litigation privilege adopted by the Idaho Supreme Court in Taylor v. 
McNichols supports this Court's Memorandum Decision and Order granting summary judgment. 
The majority of the court in Taylor v. McNichols addressed several other issues 
that Judge Hosack deemed unnecessary in his concurring opinion. The court held that a legal 
malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty claim could not be brought by someone who did not 
have an attorney-client relationship with the defendants. The court also found that Reed Taylor 
had failed to adequately plead the nine elements of fraud. Berkshire also attempts to bring a 
legal malpractice and fraud claim against attorneys who did not represent Berkshire. Berkshire 
has failed to allege or support several of the nine fraud elements. In fact, after repeatedly 
pointing out the alleged inconsistency concerning the trust beneficiaries, there is no possibility 
that Berkshire could prove that it was ignorant of the falsity of the statement, that it relied upon 
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the statement, or that its reliance was justifiable. Even without applying res judicata principles, 
this Court should have dismissed Berkshire's claims of fraud for failure to state them with 
particularity. 
III. RECENT CASES PROVIDE ADDITIONAL SUPPORT FOR THE COURT'S
 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER.
 
In two recent cases, the Idaho Supreme Court has dealt with "fraud upon the 
court" allegations. Waller v. State, 146 Idaho 234, 192 P.3d 1058 (2008); Rae v. Bunce, 145 
Idaho 798, 186 P.3d 654 (2008). Both cases involve independent actions to reverse earlier 
decisions. Both cases cited Compton v. Compton and affim1ed dismissals of the actions. In 
Waller, the court held that Waller was not entitled to equitable relief because his failure to 
present a defense was the result of his own neglect. 146 Idaho at 240. In Rae, the COlift held that 
there was no factual basis for the allegations of fraud upon the court. The court went on to state 
that the allegedly wrongful conduct was known by Rae prior to the adverse decision, could have 
been contested by affidavits setting forth her version ofwhat occurred, and could have been the 
subject of a motion to amend the findings or a motion to reopen the case to take additional 
evidence. Finally, the court stated that: 
An independent action to set aside a judgment based upon alleged 
fraud upon the court is not a substitute for actions that could have 
been taken in the trial court to correct prejudice from allegedly 
wrongful conduct. 
145 Idaho at 805. 
Berkshire is simply attempting to substitute an independent action for fraud for 
arguments that it raised or could have raised in Judge Wilper's court. Berkshire's request that 
this Court substitute its opinion for Judge Wilper's opinion should once again be rejected. 
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IV. CONCLUSION
 
Taylor v. A1cNichois does not invalidate the Memorandum Decision aI:id Order, 
but supports it. Additional cases also support the decision. Therefore, plaintiffs' motion for 
reconsideration should be denied. 
DATED this -.I'M day of October, 2010. 
MOFFATT, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK & 
FIELDS, CHARTERED 
/~ 
,-" " (l.' / 
, I I/./1 ./
By v-2// 
Mark . Prusynski - of the r~l 
Attorn ys for Defendants Con l1ie Wright 
Taylor fka Connie Taylor, Clark and 
Feeney, and Paul T. Clark 
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Thomas G. Maile IV (;)U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
LA W OFFICES OF THOMAS G MAILE IV, P.A. ( ) Hand Delivered 
380 W. State St. ( ) Overnight Mail 
Eagle, ID 83616-4902 ( ) Facsimile 
Facsimi Ie (208) 939-1001 
Christ T. Troupis (.1U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
TROUPIS LAW OFFICE, PA ( ) Hand Delivered 
P.O. Box 2408 ( ) Overnight Mail 
Eagle,ID 83616 ( ) Facsimile 
Facsimile (208) 938-5482 
Connie W. Taylor ( ?,U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
CLARK & FEENEY ( ) Hand Delivered 
1229 Main St., Suite 201 ( ) Overnight Mail 
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OCT 212010 NO. rJA.M"X:V- FI~~.M. . -.
Christ T. Troupis, ISB # 4549 fda county CIerI, 
----­
TROUPIS LAW OFFICE ' OCT 21201101299 E. Iron Eagle, Ste 130 
PO Box 2408 J. DAVID NAVARRO, Clerk 
Eagle, Idaho 83616 By J. RANDALL 
DEPUTYTelephone: 208/938-5584 
Facsimile: 208/938-5482 
Email: ctroupis@troupislaw.com 
Co-Counsel for Plaintiffs 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
,-- ---------,--------------_._--­
I BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an 
· Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G. 
MAILE, IV. and COLLEEN BIRCH­
MAILE, husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants, 
· v. 
CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, f/k/a 
I CONNIE TAYLOR, an individual; DALLAN 
TAYLOR, an individual; R. JOHN 
TAYLOR, an individual; CLARK and 
FEENEY, a partnership; PAUL T. CLARK, 
an individual; THEODORE L. JOHNSON 
· REVOCABLE TRUST, ~m Idaho revocable 
trust; JOHN DOES I -J01-IN DOES X; AND 
ALL PERSONS IN POSSESSION OR 
, CLAIMING ANY RIGHT TO 
POSSESSION. 
Defendants/Counter-Claimants. 
Case No. CV-OC-0723232 
REPLY MEMORANDUM BRIEF 
IN SUPPORT OF 
PLAINTIFFS/COUNTER­
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO 
RECONSIDER 
'-----------------~--------------------
COMES NOW the Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants by and through their undersigned co­
counsel of record, Christ T. Troupis, and provides this Honorable Court with the following reply 
memorandum brief in support of Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants' Motion to Reconsider" as 
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follows. 
LEGAL ARGUMENT 
The Taylor v. McNichols decision held that a cause ofaction based upon the 
fraudulent condut:t ofopposing counsel during litigation accrues only after the 
underlying litigation is concluded. 
In their opposition, Taylors miss the entire point ofthe Taylor ruling. They compare 
inconsequential factual differences from that case to ours in an attempt to obfuscate the fact that 
the Taylor decision is controlling law here. The Defendants assert (1) that Berkshire and Mailes' 
dismissed claims were for legal malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty, and (2) that the only 
basis for the contention that Taylors acted for "their sole benefit" was their contingent fee 
interest. The Defendants' contentions entirely misconstrue the basis for this motion to reconsider. 
The Plaintiffs claims are based on the fact that (1) Taylors' and their counsel perpetrated 
a fraud upon the court during the prior litigation and obtained their judgment on the basis of that 
fraud, (2) that their fraudulent misconduct could not in any way be considered proper 
representation of the client, Helen Taylor, the sole beneficiary of the trust, and (3) Berkshire and 
Mailes' claims for this misconduct could only be brought in a subsequent lawsuit. The: 
contingent fee simply provides additional evidence of the Defendants' personal interest in 
perpetrating the fraud in order to obtain a judgment. 
The Court in Taylor refers to an underlying case brought by Reed Taylor against AlA 
Services and other individual defendants. The Taylor suit was a second lawsuit that alIeged 
misconduct of opposing counsel in the underlying lawsuit. Reed Taylor brought this second 
lawsuit while the Underlying lawsuit was pending. The Court noted: 
REPLY MEMORANDUM BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS/COUNTER· 
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"Reed asserted claims against Respondents for: (1) aiding and abetting or 
assisting others in the commission of tortious acts in the Underlying Case; (2) 
conversion and misappropriation of the AlA Entities' corporate assets; (3) 
violations of Idaho's Consumer Protection Act, I.e. § 48-601 et seq.; and (4) 
professional negligence and/or breach of fiduciary duties." 
The Defendants argue that this Court correctly concluded that the Plaintiffs' claims about 
the Defendants' misconduct during the prior litigation "involved the same transaction," Def. 
Memo, p. 4, and therefore should have been brought in that litigation. They also argue that this 
Court's ruling is consistent with the Court's holding in Taylor v. McNichols. 
For the Supreme Court's decision in Taylor to be consistent with this Court's 
Memorandum Decision, the Supreme Court would have held that Reed Taylor was required to 
bring his claims for litigation misconduct against opposing counsel in the Underlying lawsuit. 
That was not the Court's ruling. Contrary to the Defendants' analysis, the Taylor decision 
created new law not only on the scope oflitigation privilege, but also on where and when a 
lawsuit may be brought against an attorney for misconduct during litigation. The Taylor decision 
delineates clearly that a cause of action based on an attorney's misconduct during litigation does 
not accrue until the underlying case is concluded, because that is when damages are incurred. 
Therefore, a claim for litigation misconduct cannot be brought either in the underlying litigation, 
or prior to the time that litigation is concluded. The Court noted: 
The circumst,mces of this case raise an important question. Where the 
conduct of opposing counsel falls outside the protection of the litigation privilege, 
when may a cause of action be instituted against that attorney? As we apply the 
modern litigation privilege for the first time in this case we have no precedent 
directly on point, and instead consider analogous actions -- those for legal 
malpractice and malicious prosecution. 
The Taylor Court spent a considerable time analyzing prior cases that it found analogous 
REPLY MEMORANDUM BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS/COUNTER­
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to the Taylor's claims. It discussed legal malpractice for guidance, but held that the same 
principles also applied to malicious prosecution, or any fraudulent conduct by an attorney during 
the course oflitigation. The Taylor Court stated: 
We have previously indicated, in a case dealing with legal malpractice, that, as 
objective proof in support of actual damages is required for recovery, the statute 
of limitations for a legal malpractice claim does not begin to run until the 
litigation forming the basis of that claim has concluded. City ofMcCall v. Buxton, 
146 Idaho 656, 661, 201 P.3d 629, 634 (2009). The clear reasoning behind this 
decision was that the cause of action cannot arise until damages are incurred, and 
the attorney's conduct can be reviewed under the totality ofthe case. See id. 
The elements that must be shown to recover on the basis of malicious prosecution 
are found in Badell v. Beeks, specifically: "(1) That there was a prosecution; (2) 
That it terminated in favor of the plaintiff; (3) That the defendant was the 
prosecutor; (4) Malice; (5) Lack of probable cause; and (6) Damages sustained by 
the plaintiff." 115 Idaho 101, 102, 765 P.2d 126, 127 (1988) (emphases added). 
As in cases for legal malpractice based on conduct occurring during the course of 
a trial, in order to bring a malicious prosecution claim there must be damages ,md 
it must be determined that the suit was groundless, neither of which is possible 
prior to resolution of the case. 
The theme in our analyses in these two comparative causes of action is that Idaho 
courts take into consideration the significant complexities involved in application 
of law, such as trial strategies and negotiation tactics, and wait until all those 
complexities have resolved themselves prior to hearing a claim. Only when a case 
has been concluded may one truly identify whether or not a prosecution has been 
malicious, whether an attorney has committed malpractice, or, in the case at hand, 
whether an attorney has acted fraudulently!l!. solely for his own benefit (emphasis 
added). 
The plaintiffs in the present case have alleged a claim of abuse of process against the 
Taylors and their attorneys in affirmatively making false statements under oath to obtain the 
"Judgment on Beneficiariles' Claims". The defendants are alleged to be joint tortfeasors, 
improperly using the judieial system by perpetuating false verified pleadings and submitting 
other pleadings before judicial tribunals that were materially false in light of the judicial 
REPLY MEMORANDUM BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS/COUNTER­
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admissions of both the defendant attorneys and their clients. 
1 Am. Jur. 2d Abuse of Process § 21 Attorneys provides: 
A non-client may bring a cause of action against an attorney for abuse of process. 
The absolute privilege that protects attorneys from liability for defamation 
occurring in the course of a judicial proceeding does not provide an attorney with 
an absolute defense to liability for abuse ofprocess. Thus, an attorney may be 
liable for damages for abuse ofprocess where the acts complained of are personal 
acts, or are the acts of others wholly instigated and carried on by the attorney. 
Observation: The scope of an attorney's implied authority as an agent should not, 
as a matter oflaw, extend to acts which constitute an abuse oflegal process. In 
order to state a claim for abuse ofprocess against an attorney, a plaintiff must 
establish that the alleged misconduct resulted primarily from the attorney's 
ulterior motive or malice. However, the mere institution of legal action by an 
attorney does not constitute abuse of process, even where it is purportedly done 
with an improper purpose or motive; there must be a showing that the attorney 
performed some additional act in the use of the legal process that is not proper in 
the regular prosecution of the proceedings. 
The facts of record establish that the defendant attorneys participated before the probate 
court in submitting a verified petition that judicially admitted that Helen Taylor was the "sole 
beneficiary ofthe trust". Judge Wilper would not have entered the Judgment but for the 
affirmative perjured statements that" All of the plaintiffs are residual beneficiaries of the 
Theodore L. Johnson Trust." The Taylors acting with and through their attorneys on February 
13,2006, filed their Motion For Summary Judgment On Beneficiaries' Claim. The first sentence 
of the motion states, "Come Now Plaintiffs Reed, Dallan, and John Taylor hereafter referred to 
as "the Beneficiary Plaintiffs". Those statements based upon their prior verified petition and 
other declarations against interest, amount to perjury, subordination ofperjury, and obtaining 
property by false pretenses, which is more than fraud. It constitutes criminal conduct. 
The global "Disclaimer, Release & Indemnification Agreement, provides: "1.2 
REPLY MEMORANDUM BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS/COUNTER­
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Disclaimer ofAll Other Interests.... 1.2.3 : Reed Taylor, Dallan 1. Taylor..., R. John Taylor.. .. , 
compromising all of the children of Helen Taylor, hereby disclaim all interests whatsoever in the 
Trust, in favor of their mother, Helen Taylor, and hereby approve immediate distribution to 
Helen Taylor." The Agreement further provided that the Taylors would be appointed as 
successor trustees and that they disclaimed any and all rights as beneficiaries. 
Prior to the Taylors executing the Disclaimer agreement abdicating any and aU rights as 
beneficiaries, Defendant Connie Taylor authored a letter to Bart Harwood on April 14, 2004 
which stated, "The Taylors are not willing to give up their rights as beneficiaries of th,e trust 
unless Beth will affirm her prior factual statements in the form of an affidavit and agree to 
cooperate in the action against Mr. Maile. If we aren't able to reach an agreement on that, they 
will seek a full accounting of the trust and a copy of the trust and estate tax returns". The letter of 
Connie Taylor ofApril 14, 2004 is critical in understanding how the Taylors truly disclaimed 
their interest as residual heneficiaries of the trust. 
The allegations set forth in the amended complaint show that peIjury and subornation of 
peIjury was committed in obtaining the "Judgment on Beneficiaries' Claims". The verified 
pleading in probate prepared by the defendant attorneys, executed by co-defendant R. John 
Taylor and notarized by the co-defendants' employees established that Helen Taylor is the sole 
beneficiary of the trust. Some 14 months later, the verified amended complaint filed before 
Judge Wilper's district court prepared by the defendant attorneys, executed by co-defe:ndant R. 
John Taylor and notarized by the co-defendants' employees asserted the Taylors are residual 
beneficiaries of the trust. The judicial admissions and declarations against interest establish that 
REPLY MEMORANDUM BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS/COUNTER­
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there is a showing that the: attorneys performed "some additional act in the use of the legal 
process that is not proper in the regular prosecution of the proceedings". Perjury and/or 
subornation of perjury is an improper purpose in the regular prosecution of the proceedings. 
Perjury and/or subordination ofper;u" is not an act performed in the proper course of 
legitimate representation ofa client. (Taylor v. McNichols). 
The Defendants argue that the Court's holding on litigation privilege in Taylor v. 
McNichols supports this Court's Memorandum Decision. That is not correct. If, as we have 
alleged and the facts show, the Defendants acted fraudulently during the prior litigation, that 
conduct is clearly not protected by the litigation privilege. Moreover, that conduct gives rise to a 
claim that, per the Taylor v. McNichols holding, can only be brought in a second subsequent 
action. 
As noted above, the Plaintiffs' claims were not for legal malpractice, but abust: of process 
and fraud. Moreover, the same conduct gives rise to causes of action under other legal theories, 
including negligence. Generally, one owes a duty to every person in our society to use 
reasonable care to avoid injury to the other person in any situation in which it could be 
reasonably anticipated or foreseen that a failure to use such care might result in such injury. Doe 
v. Garcia, 131 Idaho 578, 581, 961 P.2d 1181, 1184 (1998) (quoting Alegria v. Payonk, 101 
Idaho 617, 619, 619 P.2d 135, 137 (1980)) (emphasis in original). There is a "general rule that 
each person has a duty of care to prevent unreasonable, foreseeable risks of harm to others." Id. 
(quoting Sharp v. WH Moore, Inc., 118 Idaho 297,300,796 P.2d 506, 509 (1990). This 
principle of law is independent of any allegation of legal malpractice. 
REPLY MEMORANDUM BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS/COUNTER­
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In addition, the Plaintiffs alleged that the Defendants' fraudulent conduct in thi~ prior 
litigation violated the Idaho Racketeering Statute. The Idaho Racketeering Statue sets forth 
remedies that specifically provide that property may be restored to anyone that has been 
subjected to violations ofTitle 18, Chapter 78 of the Idaho Code. The facts establish that an 
enterprise was created by the co-defendants to obtain an interest in real property (Affidavit Part 4 
Exhibit "W" Contingent Fee Agreement between the attorneys, Clark and Feeney, and Taylors). 
The activities of the defendants in committing perjury, suborning perjury, obtaining money by 
false pretenses, and filing false pleadings to the courts, asserting the Taylors as residual 
beneficiaries, amounts to violations ofIdaho Law and racketeering activity. I.C. 18-7804 
provides that is it is unlawful "for any person who has received any proceeds derived directly or 
indirectly from a pattern of racketeering activity in which the person has participated, to use or 
invest, directly or indirectly, any part of the proceeds or the proceeds derived from the 
investment or use thereof in the acquisition of any interest in, or the establishment or operation 
of, any enterprise or real property". Through the combined efforts of the co-defendants, can be 
no dispute that real properlty was acquired as a result of the alleged criminal activity. 
The Plaintiffs in this case did not sustain damages until the "Judgment on Beneficiaries' 
Claim" was entered and re'corded in the prior action. The cause of action they alleged in the 
present case did not exist until those damages had accrued, which was after the prior case was 
concluded. So, it was impossible for the Plaintiffs here to bring these claims in the prior case. 
Claim preclusion does not bar causes of action that were not ripe for judicial determination. 
Idaho First Nat!' Bankv. Bliss Valley Foods, Inc., 121 Idaho 266, 283-84,824 P.2d 841,858-59 
REPLY MEMORANDUM BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS/COUNTER­
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The plaintiffs nevt::r had a cause of action against the defendants until the wrongful 
actions of the defendants resulted in the loss of the real property. The time of taking occurs, and 
hence the cause of action accrues, as of the time that the full extent of the plaintiffs loss of use 
and enjoyment of the property becomes apparent. McCuskey v. Canyon County Commissioners 
128 Id. 213,128 Idaho 213 (1996). In the present case, the doctrine of res judicata does not 
apply, since the plaintiffs had no cause of action that stemmed from the same operative facts of 
the 2002 real estate transaction. See generally Sagewillow, Inc., v. Idaho Dept. o/Water 
Resources, 138 Idaho 83 t, 835-36, 70 P.3d 669, 673-74 (2003). The plaintiffs were damaged 
solely by the wrongful conduct of the defendants in 2006 during the prior litigation. The 
plaintiffs' claims for relief are unrelated to the real estate closing in 2002. The operative facts 
involved in the prior litigation were an alleged breach of fiduciary duty by the property 
purchaser, and whether tht:: successor trustee's alleged conflict of interest gave rise to a 
requirement of notice in 2002 to beneficiaries of the trust. The present action is based upon the 
wrongful conduct of the ddendants in the misuse of the judicial process itself which occurred in 
2006. 
CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court held in Taylor v. McNichols that a claim for litigation misconduct 
against opposing counsel cannot be brought in the underlying lawsuit because of litigation 
privilege, and cannot be brought until the prior action is concluded because damages have not 
accrued until the underlying action is concluded. The Defendants have not advanced any 
REPLY MEMORANDUM BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS/COUNTER­
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argument or presented any authority to show that the Plaintiffs' claims do not fit within this 
ruling. The Plaintiffs hav~: set forth various claims for relief for damages in addition to the 
equitable relief requested based upon fraudulent misconduct by the Defendants and their counsel. 
The defendants have not argued in opposition to any of the claims of damages asserted by the 
plaintiffs. There needs to be a substantive analysis of the claims in light of the Idaho Supreme 
Court case captioned, Taylor v. McNichols, 36130, 36131 (lDSCCI), decided on September 3, 
2010. It is respectfully submitted that the Court's prior Memorandum Decision should and 
Judgment should be withdrawn based upon these facts. 
DATED this 20th day of October, 2010. 
tJ0)~ 
CHRIST T. TRo~o-eounsel for 
Plaintiffs/Counter-defendants 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on this 20th day of October, 2010, I caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing REPLY MEMORANDUM BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF 
PLAINTIFFS/COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO RECONSIDER, to be delivered, to 
be delivered, addressed as follows:iMark Stephen Prusynski 
, PO Box 829 
-----r 
I 
( ) 
(X) 
u. S. Mail 
Facsimile Transmission 
'--1 
: Boise, ID 83701 I ( ) Hand Delivery I 
" Phone: (208) 345-2000 
! Facsimile: (208) 385-5384 
! ( ) Overnight Delivery I 
I 
I, 
----1 
• Connie W. Taylor I ( ) u. S. Mail i 
i CLARK and FEENEY i (X) Facsimile Transmission 
P.O. Drawer 785 ( ) Hand Delivery 'I 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 ( ) Overnight Delivery 
, Facsimile: (208) 746-9160 
i Thomas G. Maile, IV. ( ) U. S. Mail 
I 380 W. State Street (X) Facsimile Transmission 
Eagle, Idaho 83616 ( ) Hand Delivery 
Facsimile: (208) 939-1001 Overnight Delivery I ( ) 
__J 
.__1 
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CHRIST T. TRg., co-counsel for 
Plaintiffs/Counter-defendants 
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J. DAVID NAVARRO, Clerk 
Christ T. Troupis, 1SB # 4549 BVL.AMES 
DePUTYTROUPIS LAW OFFICE 
1299 E. Iron Eagle, Ste 130 
PO Box 2408 
Eagle, Idaho 83616 
Telephone: 208/938-5584 
Facsimile: 208/938-5482 
Email: ctroupis@troupislaw.com 
Co-Counsel for Plaintiffs 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
I BE~SHI~ INVm;-Th-IE~-TS-,-LL-C-,-an---.--·---------------­
. Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G. Case No. CV-OC-0723232 
MAILE, IV. and COLLEEN BIRCH­
. MAILE, husband and wife, CORRECTION TO REPLY 
MEMORANDUM BRIEF IN' 
Plaintiffs/Counte:r-Defendants, SUPPORT OF 
PLAINTIFFS/COUNTER­
v. DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO 
RECONSIDER 
CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, £'k/a
 
CONNIE TAYLOR, an individual; DALLAN
 
TAYLOR, an individual;, R. JOHN
 
TAYLOR, an individual:, CLARK and
 
FEENEY, a partnership; PAUL T. CLARK,
 
, an individual; THEODORE L. JOHNSON 
REVOCABLE TRUST, an Idaho revocable 
trust; JOHN DOES I -JOHN DOES X; AND 
ALL PERSONS IN POSSESSION OR 
CLAIMING ANY RIGHT TO 
, POSSESSION. 
II Defendants/Counter-Claimants. ----J. .__• _ 
COMES NOW the Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants by and through their undersigned co­
counsel of record, Christ T. Troupis, and submits the following correction to the Reply 
Memorandum Brief in support of Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants' Motion to Reconsider, as 
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Plaintiffsi t
p.3 208-938-5482Oct 26 10 09:12a Christ Troupis 
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follows. 
In their Reply Memorandum, Plaintiffs incorrectly stated that Helen Taylor, the sole 
beneficiary of the trust, w.as the client of the Defendant attorneys in the prior lawsuit. As the 
Court is aware, the Defendant attorneys did not represent Helen Taylor in the prior action. The 
mistake in making that statement was inadvertent and due to counsel's drafting error. 
DATED this 26th day of October, 2010. 
~ /!L/}~ /.. /' . 
Cl-OOST T. TRO~ co-counse:l for 
Plaintiffs/Counter-defendants 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on this 26th day of October, 2010, I caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing REPLY MEMORANDUM BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF 
PLAINTIFFS/COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO RECONSIDER, to be delivered, to 
be delivered. addressed as follows: 
Ircark Step~en Prusynski .------.-(-) -U-..~. Mail PO Box 829 (X) Facsimile Transmission l Boise, ID 83701 () Hand Delivery
 
Phone: (208) 345-2000 () Overnight Delivery
 
Facsimile: (208) 385-5384
 
Connie \V. Taylor , ( ) U. S. Mail
 
CLARK and FEENEY (X) Facsimile Transmission
 
( ) Hand Delivery
 
Lewiston, Idaho 8350 I
 
P.O. Drawer 785 
( ) Overnight Delivery 
. Facsimile: (208) 746-9160 
. Thomas G. Maile, IV. U. S. Mail
 
380 W. State Street
 Facsimile Transmission
 
Eagle, Idaho 83616
 Hand Delivery
 
Facsimile: (208) 939-1001 Overnight Delivery
 
~".~--p 
CHRIST T. TRiUPiS, co-counsel for 
Plaintiffs/ColIDter-defendants 
CORRECTION TO REPLY MEMORANDUM BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF 
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Christ T. Troupis, ISB # 4549 
TROUPIS LAW OFFICE 
1299 E. Iron Eagle, Ste 130 
PO Box 2408 
Eagle, Idaho 83616 
Telephone: 208/938-5584 
Facsimile: 208/938-5482 
Email: ctroupis@troupislaw.com 
Co-counsel for Plaintiffs/Counter-defendants 
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OCT 29 2010 
J. DAVID NAVARI~O, Clerk 
ByJ. RANDAU 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
 
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an 
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G. 
MAILE, IV. and COLLEEN BIRCH­
MAILE, husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs/Count~~r-Defendants, 
v. 
CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, f/k/a 
CONNIE TAYLOR, an individual; DALLAN 
TAYLOR, an individual; R. JOHN 
TAYLOR, an individual; CLARK and 
FEENEY, a partnership; PAUL T. CLARK, 
an individual; THEODORE L. JOHNSON 
REVOCABLE TRUST, an Idaho revocable 
: trust; JOHN DOES I -JOHN DOES X; AND 
. ALL PERSONS IN POSSESSION OR 
CLAIMn"fG ANY RIGHT TO 
POSSESSION. 
Defendants/Counter-Claimants. 
Case No. CV-OC-0723232 
PLAINTIFFS/COUNTER­
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO 
REPLY TO COUNTERCLAIM AND 
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 
COMES NOW the Plaintiffs/Counter-defendant by and through their undersigned co­
counsel of record, Christ T. Troupis, and pursuant to Rule 15 of the Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure, moves this Court for an Order allowing Plaintiffs to amend their Reply to 
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Counterclaim and Demand for Jury Trial to assert additional affirmative defenses, to clarify 
certain defenses in light of the recent decision rendered in the Idaho Supreme Court case 
captioned, Taylor v. McNichols, 36130, 36131 (lDSCCI), decided on September 3,2010, which 
established new law with respect to claims that are based on the conduct of parties and their 
attorneys in litigation and for other reasons. 
This Motion is supported by the Affidavit of Christ Troupis, filed concurrently herewith, 
and upon the file and record in this matter. 
ORAL ARGUMENT is requested upon the motion. 
DATED this 29th day of October, 2010. 
C~R:?-=IS=--'-----­
Co-Counsel for Plaintiffs/Counter­
Defendants 
PLAINTIFFS/COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO REPLY TO COUNTERCLAIM 
AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL- Pg 2 
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~~ 
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on this ~day ofOctober, I caused a true and COITect copy 
of the foregoing (1) PLAINTIFFS/COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO REPLY TO 
COUNTERCLAIM, together with the (2) AFFIDAVIT OF CHRIST TROUPIS IN SUPPORT 
OF PLAINTIFFS/COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO REPLY TO COUNTERCLAIM 
AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL, to be delivered, to be delivered, addressed as follows: 
i Mark Stephen Prusynski I (X) u. S. Mail 
PO Box 829 I () Facsimile Transmission 
Boise, ID 83701 I () Hand Delivery 
Phone: (208) 345-2000 () Overnight Delivery 
Facsimile: (208) 385-5384 
Connie W. Taylor 
CLARK and FEENEY 
P.O. Drawer 785 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
Facsimile: (208) 746-9160 
Thomas G. Maile, IV. 
380 W. State Street 
Eagle, Idaho 83616 
Facsimile: (208) 939-1001 
(X) 
( ) 
i ( ) 
i ( ) 
(X) 
! ( ) 
( ) 
( ) 
U. S. Mail 
Facsimile Transmission 
Hand Delivery 
Overnight Delivery 
U. S. Mail 
Facsimile Transmission 
Hand Delivery 
Overnight Delivery 
PLAINTIFFS/COUNTER·DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO REPLY TO COUNTERCLAIM 
AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL- Pg 3 
001808
  l
 
i 
. 
 
 
 
i 
 
 
---------- ---_. 
IS, co-counsel for 
Plaintiffs/Counter-defendants 
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Christ T. Troupis, ISB # 4549 
TROUPIS LAW OFFICE 
1299 E. Iron Eagle, Ste 130 
PO Box 2408 
Eagle, Idaho 83616 
Telephone: 208/938-5584 
Facsimile: 208/938-5482 
Email: ctroupis@troupislaw.com 
Co-counsel for Plaintiffs/Counter-defendants 
~-:--
A.M.:---------- ~-j.-t:.'W= 
-	 - ,- 'H· ••JPM.~· : 
OCT Z92010 
J. DAVID NAVAFtAo CI r1<
 
ByJ. FlANOAll' e
 
DEPUTy • 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
 
,--'---'" .--- --_.._----­
, BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an 
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G. 
MAILE, IV. and COLLEEN BIRCH-
i MAILE, husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants, 
i v. 
I 
i CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, f/k/a 
CONNIE TAYLOR, an individual; DALLAN 
!	 TAYLOR, an individual; R. JOHN 
TAYLOR, an individual; CLARK and 
FEENEY, a partnership; PAUL T. CLARK, 
an individual; THEODORE L. JOHNSON 
REVOCABLE TRUST, an Idaho revocable 
trust; JOHN DOES I -JOHN DOES X; AND 
ALL PERSONS IN POSSESSION OR 
• CLAIMING ANY RIGHT TO 
I POSSESSION. 
Defendants/Counter-Claimants. 
-----,- ...•-. 
Case No. CV-OC-0723232 
AFFIDAVIT OF CHRIST TROUPIS 
IN SUPPORT OF 
PLAINTIFFS/COUNTER­
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO 
REPLY TO COUNTERCLAIM AND 
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss: 
County of Ada) 
CHRIST T. TROUPIS, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says: 
1. Your Affiant is co-·counsel of record in this matter and the Ada County Case No. CV OC 
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04-00473D. Your Affiant makes this Affidavit in support of Plaintiffs/counter­
defendants' Motion to Reply to Counterclaim and Demand for Jury Trial. That the 
information and facts set forth herein are based upon your affiant's personal knowledge 
and/or observations and can testify as to the truth ofthe matters asserted herein if called 
upon as a witness at the trial ofthis matter. 
2.	 Attached hereto as Exhibit "A" is a true and correct copy of the of Plaintiffs' proposed 
Amended Reply to Counterclaim and Demand for Jury Trial regarding Counterclaimants 
Clark & Feeney, is attached hereto as Exhibit "A" and incorporated herein by this 
reference. 
3.	 Attached hereto as Exhibit "B" is a true and correct copy of the of Plaintiffs' proposed 
Amended Reply to Counterclaim and Demand for Jury Trial regarding Counter-claimants 
Taylors is attached hereto as Exhibit "A" and incorporated herein by this reference. 
DATED this 29th day of October, 2010. 
CHRIST TROUPIS(co-counsel for Plaintiffs/ 
Counter-defendants 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME, a Notary Public in and for said State, 
this 29th day of October, 2010. 
~"~~""""""SUE I( '~:,
 ~/:.~~.,'
~ OJ' ~ 
--	 '<': MOt \('~ Notary Public for Idaho ~ ~\ \ (i fn ~~,.~ 11 :- Residing at ~~~.-:9??I -~ l' ­:'7:~ Ie I ~ My Commission Expires Sl \
--, .... ,:., 
~ 0 , 
;"" ~ 'OA"'~\":" 
It" II """ 
AFFIDAVIT OF CHRIST TROUPIS IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS/COUNTER­
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO REPLY TO COUNTERCLAIM AND DEMAND FOR JURY 
TRIAL- Pg 2 
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Christ T. Troupis, ISB # 4549 
TROUPIS LAW OFFICE 
1299 E. Iron Eagle, Ste 130 
PO Box 2408 
Eagle, Idaho 83616 
Telephone: 208/938-5584 
Facsimile: 208/938-5482 
Email: ctroupis@troupislaw.com 
Co-counsel for Plaintiffs/Counter-defendants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
· BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an 
. Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G. 
MAILE, IV. and COLLEEN BIRCH­
: MAILE, husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, f/k/a 
CONNIE TAYLOR, an individual; DALLAN 
TAYLOR, an individual; R. JOHN 
TAYLOR, an individual; CLARK and 
FEENEY, a partnership; PAUL T. CLARK, 
: an individual; THEODORE L. JOHNSON 
REVOCABLE TRUST, fm Idaho revocable 
. trust; JOHN DOES I -JOHN DOES X; AND 
ALL PERSONS IN POSSESSION OR 
CLAIMING ANY RIGHT TO 
POSSESSION. 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-OC-0723232 
PROPOSED AMENDED ro;PLY 
TO AMENDED ANSWER OF 
CONNIE TAYLOR, CLARK AND 
FEENEY AND PAUL T. CLARK 
AND COUNTERCLAIM 
.-1I ________________--1--.--------­
COMES NOW the above named Plaintiffs/Counter-defendant by and through their 
undersigned co-counsel of record, Christ T. Troupis hereby provide their Amended Reply to 
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Defendants' Amended Answer of Connie Wright Taylor, Clark and Feeney and Paul T. Clark 
and Counterclaim and further complain and allege as follows: 
1. Plaintiffs' deny each and every allegation of Defendants' Amended Answer of Connie 
Wright Taylor, Clark and Feeney, and Paul T. Clark Trust and Counterclaim which is 110t 
specifically admitted herein. 
2. Plaintiffs admit the allegations set forth in paragraph I of the Counter-Claim. 
3. That based upon information and belief, plaintiffs admit paragraph 2, that under the 
fee agreement all defendants assert an ownership interest in Linder Road real property. 
4. Plaintiffs specifically deny paragraphs 3, 4,5,6 of the Counter-Claim. 
FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Plaintiffs affirmatively allege that the defendants have been required to return the 
purchase price of $400,000.00 by previous court proceedings. The same remains unpaid, 
including interest thereon ,md the plaintiffs are entitled to a "vendee's lien" on the subject real 
property pursuant to the previous court proceedings and further pursuant to Idaho Codt:~ section 
45-804. That in addition, the plaintiffs herein have previously filed their Lis Pendens in the prior 
proceedings which remains of record with the Ada County Recorder's Office, as further 
protection of the vendee's Jlien. That such liens are superior to the Lis Pendens herein ,md as 
such the Lis Pendens filed herein has not impaired the title to the subject real property ,md as 
such the claims set forth in the counter-claim are barred in the present action. 
SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Plaintiffs have alleged allegations of wrongful conduct in violation of Chapter 18 Title 78 
of the Idaho Code. That plaintiffs are availed of certain remedies set forth below including but 
EXIDBIT "A" PROPOS]~D REPLY TO AMENDED ANSWER OF CONNIE TAYLOR, 
CLARK AND FEENEY AND PAUL T. CLARK AND COUNTERCLAIM - Pg 2 
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not limited to: 
18-7804 PROHIBITED ACTIVITIES -- PENALTIES. 
(a) It is unlawful for any person who has received any proceeds derived 
directly or indirectlly from a pattern of racketeering activity in which the person 
has participated, to use or invest, directly or indirectly, any part of the proceeds or 
the proceeds derived from the investment or use thereof in the acquisition of any 
interest in, or the establishment or operation of, any enterprise or real property. 
Whoever violates this subsection is guilty of a felony. 
18-7805 RACKETEERING -- CIVIL REMEDIES. 
(a) A person who sustains injury to his person, business or property by a 
pattern of racketeering activity may file an action in the district court for the 
recovery of three (3) times the actual damages proved and the cost of the suit, 
including reasonable attorney's fees. 
(c) The district court has jurisdiction to prevent, restrain and remedy 
racketeering after making provisions for the rights of all innocent persons affected 
by such violation and after hearing or trial, as appropriate, by issuing appropriate 
orders. Prior to a d,etermination of liability, such orders may include, but are not 
limited to, entering restraining orders or prohibitions or taking such other actions, 
including the acceptance of satisfactory performance bonds, in connection with 
any property or other interest subject to damages, forfeiture or other restraints 
pursuant to this sec:tion as it deems proper. 
(d) Following a determination ofliability, such orders may include, but are not 
limited to: 
(1) Ordering any person to divest himself of any interest, direct or indirect, in 
any enterprise; 
That such potential remedy, including the request for a constructive trust, authorizes the 
filing a Lis Pendens herein and as such the claims set forth in the counter-claim are barred in the 
present action. 
TIllRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Plaintiffs allege the affirmative defense of equitable estoppel and quasi estoppd. 
FOURTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
EXlllBIT "A" PROPOSED REPLY TO AMENDED ANSWER OF CONNIE TAYLOR, 
CLARK AND FEENEY AND PAUL T. CLARK AND COUNTERCLAIM - Pg 3 
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Defendants failed to take reasonable steps to mitigate the claimed or alleged damages. 
FIFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Defendants are not entitled to all or part of the relief they seek by way of their Counter-
Claim for the reason that the damages alleged in their claim reasonably could have bet;:n avoided 
by the counter-claimants. 
SIXTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants assert the affirmative defense of litigation privilege 
relating to the claims set forth in the Counter-Claim. 
SEVENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants incorporate by reference their allegations in their Amended 
Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial as additional affirmative defenses as if set forth in full 
herein, as affirmative defenses relating to the claims set forth in the Counter-Claim. 
EIGHTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Pursuant to Rule 11 of the IDAHO RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, all possible 
affirmative defenses may not have been alleged and set forth herein because sufficient facts are 
not available at this time to form an adequate factual basis for the defenses, after counter-
defendants have made reasonable inquiry to obtain such facts. Therefore, counter-defendants 
reserves the right to raise additional affirmative defenses as fact-gathering and discovery in this 
matter progresses. 
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 
Plaintiffs demand a jury trial upon all facts triable by ajury. 
EXHIBIT"A" PROPOS:ED REPLY TO AMENDED ANSWER OF CONNIE TAYLOR, 
CLARK AND FEENEY.AND PAUL T. CLARK AND COUNTERCLAIM - Pg 4 
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REQUEST FOR ATTORNEYS FEES AND COSTS 
Plaintiffs have engaged the services of counsel to defend this action and reasonable 
attorney fees plus costs should be ordered against the Defendants and Idaho Code 12··120; 12­
121; 12-123. 
PRAYER 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray for Judgment as follows: 
1 That Defendants' Counterclaim be dismissed against the Plaintiffs. 
2 For Plaintiffs' reasonable attorney fees, plus costs. 
3 For such other and further relief as the Court deems just and equitable in the 
premises. 
DATED this ~day of (jtf/.t.¥' ,2010. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on this rl.-th day of OtJt"W UI 0 , I caused a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing (1) AMENDED REPLY TO COUNfERCLAIM, to be 
delivered, to be delivered, addressed as follows: 
EXlDBIT "A" PROPOSED REPLY TO AMENDED ANSWER OF CONNIE TAYLOR, 
CLARK AND FEENEY AND PAUL T. CLARK AND COUNTERCLAIM - Pg 5 
001815
- -
2frti-day   
CHRIST T. TRO IS, 
Co-Counsel for Plaintiffs/Counter-
Defendants 
-t .!l
 
'­
r-­
I Mark Stephen Prusynski IN U. S. Mail 
I PO Box 829 i ( ) Facsimile Transmission 
I Boise, ID 83701 ( ) Hand Delivery 
I Phone: (208) 345-2000 ( ) Overnight Delivery 
i Facsimile: (208) 385-5384 
, Connie W. Taylor U. S. Mail 
-----1---------­
i (X) 
CLARK and FEENEY II ( ) Facsimile Transmission 
P.O. Drawer 785 ( ) Hand Delivery 
i Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
. Facsimile: (208) 746-9160 I ( ) 
Overnight Delivery 
Thomas G. Maile, IV. (X) u. S. Mail 
380 W. State Street ( ) Facsimile Transmission 
Eagle, Idaho 83616 ( ) Hand Delivery 
Facsimile: (208) 939-1001 ( ) Overnight Delivery 
fJt:1JQ 
CHRIST T. TROOPIS: co-counsell for 
Plaintiffs/Counter-defendants 
EXIllBIT "A" PROPOS]~D REPLY TO AMENDED ANSWER OF CONNIE TAYLOR, 
CLARK AND FEENEY AND PAUL T. CLARK AND COUNTERCLAIM - Pg 6 
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Christ T. Troupis, ISB # 4549 
TROUPIS LAW OFFICE 
1299 E. Iron Eagle, Ste 130 
PO Box 2408 
Eagle, Idaho 83616 
Telephone: 208/938-5584 
Facsimile: 208/938-5482 
Email: ctroupis@troupislaw.com 
Co-counsel for Plaintiffs/Counter-defendants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
~ERKSHlREINVESTMENTS, LLC, an 
! Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G. 
• MAILE, IV. and COLLEEN BlRCH­
. MAILE, husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
i CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, f/k/a 
CONNIE TAYLOR, an individual; DALLAN 
TAYLOR, an individual; R. JOHN 
TAYLOR, an individual; CLARK and 
FEENEY, a partnership; PAUL T. CLARK, 
i an individual; THEODORE L. JOHNSON 
I REVOCABLE TRUST, an Idaho revocable 
i trust; JOHN DOES I -JOHN DOES X; AND 
i ALL PERSONS IN POSSESSION OR 
i CLAIMING ANY RIGHT TO 
POSSESSION. 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-OC-0723232 
PROPOSED AMENDED REPLY 
TO AMENDED ANSWER OF 
JOHN TAYLOR, DALLAN 
TAYLOR, AND JOHN TRUST AND 
COUNTERCLAIM 
COMES NOW the above named Plaintiffs/Counter-defendant by and through their 
undersigned co-counsel of record, Christ T. Troupis hereby provide their Amended Reply to 
001817
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Defendant's Amended Answer of John Taylor, Dallan Taylor, and Johnson Trust and 
Counterclaim and further complain and allege as follows: 
1. Plaintiffs' deny each and every allegation of Defendant's Amended Answer of John 
Taylor, Dallan Taylor, and Johnson Trust and Counterclaim which is not specifically admitted 
herein. 
2. Plaintiffs admit the allegations set forth in paragraph 1 of the Counter-Claim. 
3. Plaintiffs specifically deny paragraphs 2,3,4, and 5 of the Counter-Claim. 
FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Plaintiffs affirmatively allege that the defendants have been required to return the 
purchase price of $400,000.00 by previous court proceedings. The same remains unpaid, 
including interest thereon and the plaintiffs are entitled to a "vendee's lien" on the subject real 
property pursuant to the previous court proceedings and further pursuant to Idaho Cod{~ section 
45-804. That in addition, the plaintiffs herein have previously filed their Lis Pendens in the prior 
proceedings which remains of record with the Ada County Recorder's Office, as furthe:r 
protection of the vendee's lien. That such liens are superior to the Lis Pendens herein ,md as 
such the Lis Pendens filed herein has not impaired the title to the subject real property and as 
such the claims set forth in the counter-claim are barred in the present action. 
SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Plaintiffs have alleged allegations of wrongful conduct in violation of Chapter ]l8 Title 78 
of the Idaho Code. That plaintiffs are availed of certain remedies set forth below including but 
not limited to: 
18-7804 PROHIBITED ACTIVITIES -- PENALTIES. 
EXIDBIT "B: PROPOSI~D AMENDED REPLY TO AMENDED ANSWER OF JOHN 
TAYLOR, DALLAN TAYLOR, AND JOHN TRUST AND COUNTERCLAIM - Pg 2 
001818
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(a) It is unlawful for any person who has received any proceeds derived 
directly or indirectly from a pattern of racketeering activity in which the person 
has participated, to use or invest, directly or indirectly, any part of the proceeds or 
the proceeds derived from the investment or use thereof in the acquisition of any 
interest in, or the e:stablishrnent or operation of, any enterprise or real property. 
Whoever violates this subsection is guilty of a felony. 
18··7805 RACKETEERING -- CIVIL REMEDIES. 
(a) A person who sustains injury to his person, business or property by a 
pattern of racketeering activity may file an action in the district court for the 
recovery of three (3) times the actual damages proved and the cost of the suit, 
including reasonable attorney's fees. 
(c) The district court has jurisdiction to prevent, restrain and remedy 
racketeering after making provisions for the rights of all innocent persons affected 
by such violation and after hearing or trial, as appropriate, by issuing appropriate 
orders. Prior to a determination of liability, such orders may include, but are not 
limited to, entering restraining orders or prohibitions or taking such other actions, 
including the acceptance of satisfactory performance bonds, in connection with 
any property or other interest subject to damages, forfeiture or other restraints 
pursuant to this section as it deems proper. 
(d) Following a determination ofliability, such orders may include, but are not 
limited to: 
(l) Ordering any person to divest himself of any interest, direct or indirect, in 
any enterprise; 
That such potential remedy, including the request for a constructive trust, authorizes the 
filing a Lis Pendens herein and as such the claims set forth in the counter-claim are barred in the 
present action. 
TIllRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Plaintiffs allege the: affirmative defense of equitable estoppel and quasi estoppel. 
FOURTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Defendants failed to take reasonable steps to mitigate the claimed or alleged damages. 
EXlllBIT "B: PROPOSED AMENDED REPLY TO AMENDED ANSWER 
OF JOHN TAYLOR, DALLAN TAYLOR, AND JOHN TRUST AND 
COUNTERCL~"-Pg3 
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FIFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Defendants are not entitled to all or part ofthe relief they seek by way of their Counter-
Claim for the reason that the damages alleged in their claim reasonably could have be{:n avoided 
by the counter-claimants. 
SIXTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants assert the affirmative defense of litigation privilege 
relating to the claims set fi)rth in the Counter-Claim. 
SEVENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants incorporate by reference their allegations in their Amended 
Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial as additional affirmative defenses as if set forth in full 
herein, as affirmative defenses relating to the claims set forth in the Counter-Claim. 
EIGHTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Pursuant to Rule 11 ofthe IDAHO RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, all possible 
affirmative defenses may not have been alleged and set forth herein because sufficient facts are 
not available at this time to form an adequate factual basis for the defenses, after counter-
defendants have made reasonable inquiry to obtain such facts. Therefore, counter-defendants 
reserves the right to raise additional affirmative defenses as fact-gathering and discovery in this 
matter progresses. 
DEMAND FOR JURy TRIAL 
Plaintiffs demand a jury trial upon all facts triable by ajury. 
REQUEST FOR ATTORNEYS FEES AND COSTS 
EXHIBIT "B: PROPOSED AMENDED REPLY TO AMENDED ANSWER OF ~rOHN
 
TAYLOR, DALLAN TAYLOR, AND JOHN TRUST AND COUNTERCLAIM - Pg 4
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Plaintiffs have engaged the services of Thomas G. Maile, IV to defend this action and 
reasonable attorney fees plus costs should be ordered against the Defendants and Idaho Code 
12-120; 12-121; 12-123. 
PRAYER 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray for Judgment as follows: 
1 That Defendants' Counterclaim be dismissed against the Plaintiffs. 
2 For Plaintiffs' reasonable attorney fees, plus costs. 
3 For such other and further relief as the Court deems just and equitable in the 
premIses. 
DATED this J3 _day of Ovf;~'V ,2010. 
Cfd::¥.T~-'----­
Co-Counsel for Plaintiffs/Counter­
Defendants 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on this ~th day of OuI"t£/1 U) 6 , I caused a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing (1) AMENDED REPLY TO COuNTERCLAIM, to be 
delivered, to be delivered, addressed as follows: 
)'1 Mark Stephen Prusynski ~ u. S. Mail 
PO Box 829 Facsimile Transmission I 1 ( ) 
Boise, ID 83701 . ( ) Hand Delivery 
I Phone: (208) 345-2000 I ( ) Overnight Delivery 
I IFacsimile: (208) 385-5384 
I 
EXIllBIT "B: PROPOSI~D AMENDED REPLY TO AMENDED ANSWER OF JOHN
 
TAYLOR, DALLAN TAYLOR, AND JOHN TRUST AND COUNTERCLAIM -Pg 5
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Connie W. Taylor I (X) U. S. Mail 
I CLARK and FEENEY I ( ) Facsimile Transmission 
P.O. Drawer 785 ! ( ) Hand Delivery 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 ,( ) Overnight Delivery 
I Facsimile: (208) 746-9160 II 
, Thomas G. Maile, IV. (X) U. S. Mail 
i 380 W. State Street () Facsimile Transmission 
I Eagle, Idaho 83616 () Hand Delivery 
Facsimile: (208) 939-1001 () Overnight Delivery 
I j 
EXHIBIT "B: PROPOSE~D AMENDED REPLY TO AMENDED ANSWER OF JOHN
 
TAYLOR, DALLAN TAYLOR, AND JOHN TRUST AND COUNTERCLAIM - Pg 6
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NOV 022010Christ T. Troupis, ISB # 4549 
TROUPIS LAW OFFICE ,j. DAvij.} j,,/"\'JMfil-tV, '.;l~~ri' 
By I., AM~;~1299 E. Iron Eagle, Ste 130 t1r-PI J'ty 
PO Box 2408 
Eagle, Idaho 83616 
Telephone: 208/938-5584 
Facsimile: 208/938-5482 
Email: ctroupis@troupislaw.com 
Co-counsel for Plaintiffs 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
-- ---.------------------------­I 
j BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an
 
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G.
 Case No. CV-OC-0723232 
MAILE, IV. and COLLEEN BIRCH­I 
I MAILE, husband and wife, MOTION TO DISMISS PURSUANT 
TO I.R-C.P. RULE 12 (b)(c) &/OR 
Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants, MOTION IN LIMINE RE: 
LITIGATION PRIVILEGE 
v. 
CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, f/k/a
 
CONNIE TAYLOR, an individual; DALLAN
 
TAYLOR, an individual; R. JOHN
 
TAYLOR, an individual; CLARK and
 
FEENEY, a partnership; PAUL T. CLARK,
 
an individual; THEODORE L. JOHNSON
 
, REVOCABLE TRUST, an Idaho revocable 
trust; JOHN DOES I -JOHN DOES X; AND 
I ALL PERSONS IN POSSESSION OR 
I CLAIMING ANY RIGHT TO
 
POSSESSION.
 
Defendants/Counter-Claimants.
---------------_----1-- --__~ ~ _ 
COMES NOW, the;: Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants, by and through their co-counsel of 
record, Christ T. Troupis, and moves this Honorable Court for entry of its Order dismissing the 
Defendants/Counter-Claimants' Amended counter-claims pursuant to I.R.c.P. Rule 12 (b)(c) 
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and/or prohibiting the counter-claimants' attorney and/or witnesses from advancing tf:stimony 
and/or submitting exhibits relating to the Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants conduct relating to the 
claims set forth in the Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial. 
This Motion is made on the grounds and for the reasons that such testimony and/or 
exhibits which may relate to the action and/or conduct of the Plaintiffs/Counter-defendants are 
deemed protected by the litigation privilege in Idaho as most recently determined in the new Law 
rendered in the Idaho Supreme Court case captioned, Taylor v. McNichols, 36130, 36131 
(IDSCCI), decided on September 3, 2010, and is further made pursuant to the Memonmdum 
Brief in Support of Motion in Limine, filed concurrently herewith and the record and :file 
contained herein. This Motion is further made pursuant to I.R.C.P., Rules 12(b)(d) and pursuant 
to 401, 402, and 403 of the Idaho Rules of Evidence. Oral argument is requested. 
DATED this Z, clay of ,J..y~~..,; ,2010. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on this ~ day oftlllj~~ ,2010, I caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing (1) MOTION TO DISMISS PURSUANT TO I.R.C.P. RULE 12 
(b)(c) &/OR MOTION IN LIMINE RE: LITIGATION PRIVILEGE and (2) MEMORANDUM 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS PURSUANT TO LR.C.P. RULE 12 (b)(c) 
&/OR MOTION IN LIMn"l"E RE: LITIGATION PRIVILEGE, to be delivered, addressed as 
follows: 
MOTION TO DISMISS PURSUANT TO I.R.C.P. RULE 12 (b)(c) &/OR MOTION IN 
LIMINE RE: LITIGATION PRIVILEGE - Pg 2 
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..,; 
CHRIST T. TROUPI3', 
Co-counsel for Counter-Defendants 
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i Mark Stephen Prusynski ( ) U. S. Mail 
I PO Box 829 (X) Facsimile Transmission 
. Boise, ID 83701 ( ) Hand Delivery 
I Phone: (208) 345-2000 ( ) Overnight Delivery 
I Facsimile: (208) 385-5384 
I 
! 
i Connie W. Taylor ( ) U. S. Mail 
, CLARK and FEENEY (X) Facsimile Transmission 
I P.O. Drawer 785 ( ) Hand Delivery 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 ( ) Overnight Delivery 
! Facsimile: (208) 746-9160 
Thomas G. Maile, IV. ( ) U. S. Mail 
380 W. State Street (X) Facsimile Transmission 
Eagle, Idaho 83616 ( ) Hand Delivery 
I Facsimile: (208) 939-1001 ( ) Overnight Delivery 
(Jt. ..~~ _ 
CHRIST T. TROMPIS, co-counsel for 
Plaintiffs/Counter-defendants 
\ 
MOTION TO DISMISS PURSUANT TO I.R.C.P. RULE 12 (b)(c) &/OR MOTION IN 
LIMINE RE: LITIGATION PRlVILEGE - Pg 3 
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NOV 0 Z2010 
Christ T. Troupis, ISB # 4549 ;. DAVID NAWI.h:.,V. ""I~(Y 
TROUPIS LAW OFFICE By b.AM!!i 
1299 E. Iron Eagle, Ste 130 DEPU'rv 
PO Box 2408 
Eagle, Idaho 83616 
Telephone: 208/938-5:584 
Facsimile: 208/938-5482 
Email: ctroupis@troupislaw.com 
Co-counsel for Plaintiffs 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
 
--------------- ..-. 
BERKSHIRE UI..JVESTMENTS, LLC, an
 
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G.
 Case No. CV-OC-0723232
 
MAILE, IV. and COLLEEN BIRCH­

MAILE, husband and wife,
 MEMORANDUM BRIEF IN 
SUPPORT OF MOTION TO 
Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants, DISMISS PURSUANT TO l.R.C.P. 
RULE 12 (b)(c) &/OR MOTION IN 
v. LIMINE RE: LITIGATION 
PRIVILEGE 
CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, f/kla 
· CONNIE TAYLOR, an individual; DALLAN 
! TAYLOR, an individual; R. JOHN 
TAYLOR, an individual; CLARK and
 
FEENEY, a partnership; PAUL T. CLARK,
 
an individual; THEODORE L. JOHNSON
 
· REVOCABLE TRUST, im Idaho revocable 
trust; JOHN DOES I -JOHN DOES X; AND 
· ALL PERSONS IN POSSESSION OR 
CLAIMING ANY RIGHT TO 
I 
! POSSESSION. 
I 
Defendants/Counter-Claimants.L.- --J- . 
The counter-defendants by and through their undersigned co-counsel of record, and 
provides this Memorandum Brief in support of their Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to I.R.C.P. 
Rules 12 (b)(c) &/or Motion in Limine Re: Litigation Privilege, as follows: 
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LEGAL ARGUMENT 
The Counter-claimants have failed to allege sufficient facts in their amended 
counter-claim to establish an exception to the litigation privilege. 
I.R.C.P. Rule 12 (c) provides: 
Rule 12(c). Motion for judgment on the pleadings 
1. After the pleadings are closed but within such time as not to delay the trial, any 
party may move for judgment on the pleadings. If on a motion for judgment on 
the pleadings, matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by 
the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed 
of as provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to 
present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56. 
The specific allegations contained in the counter-claimants' amended complaint can be 
summarized as follows: 
1.	 The Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants filed the instant lawsuit in spite of the fact that the 
claims contained therein were totally barred by the doctrine of res judicata. 
2.	 The Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants claims are devoid of factual support or if supportable 
in fact, had no cognizable basis in law. 
3.	 The Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants asserted claims which had previously been rejected by 
the Idaho Supreme Court and misrepresent the decisions of the Supreme Court in 
pleadings. 
4.	 The Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants present false and misleading affidavits and pleadings 
to the district court. 
5.	 The Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants assert claims which were not well grounded in fact, 
warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or 
reversal of existing law. 
6.	 The Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants assert claims which were interposed for a improper 
use, such as to harass, to cause unnecessary delay or to needlessly increase the cost of 
litigation. 
7.	 The Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants assert baseless claims for the purpose of delay. 
8.	 The Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants failed to release the lis pendens filed in Taylor v Maile 
for six months after the Supreme Court decision affirming the district court order quieting 
title in the Linder Road property to the Johnson Trust. 
9.	 The Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants attempt to regain title to the Linder Road property 
through improper means, by seeking to foreclose on a vendee's lien while concurrently 
seeking to set aside the judgment upon which that lien was based. 
10.	 The Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants repeatedly file duplicate motions and/or seek 
MEMORANDUM BRIKF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS PURSUANT TO 
I.R.C.P. RULE 12 (b)(c) &/OR MOTION IN LIMINE RE: LITIGATION PRIVILEGE ­
Pg2 
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reconsideration of the rulings. (Amended Counter-claim filed June 25, 2010) 
There are no allegations that the Plaintiffs/Counter-defendants committed any fraud upon 
the Taylor litigants or the court. There are no allegations that the Plaintiffs/Counter-defendants 
committed any acts of pet:jury or other criminal behavior. The litigation privilege controls in 
Idaho, barring exceptional circumstances. The case, Taylor v. McNichols, 36130, 36131 
(lDSCCI) (2010), has made a determination of the extent of the litigation privilege which is 
available not only to the attorneys of record but to the parties themselves. 
The Taylor, supra, decision provides: 
(1). The litigation privilege is deeply rooted in the common law doctrine that 
attorneys are immune from civil suits for defamation or libel when they arise out 
of communications made in the course ofjudicial proceedings. 
(2). The term judicial proceeding is not restricted to trials, but includes every 
proceeding of a judicial nature before a court or official clothed with judicial or 
quasi judicial power, 53 C.J.S., Libel and Slander, § 104, page 169, and to be 
privileged it is not absolutely essential that the language be spoken in open court 
or contained in a pleading, brief or affidavit. 
(3). The litigation privilege does not provide attorneys with blanket immunity 
against all claims raised against them, merely because they are acting as an 
attorney in litigation. However, where attorneys are being sued by the opponent of 
their client in a current or former lawsuit, and that suit arises out of the attorneys' 
legitimate representation of that client pursuant to that litigation, the privilege 
MEMORANDUM BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS PURSUANT TO 
I.R.C.P. RULE 12 (b)(c) &/ORMOTION IN LIMINE RE: LITIGATION PRIVILEGE­
Pg3 
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does apply.
 
(4). This privileg(~ is predicated on the long established principle that the efficient
 
pursuit ofjustice requires that attorneys and litigants must be permitted to speak
 
and write freely in the course of litigation without the fear of reprisal through a
 
civil suit for defanlation or libel.
 
(4). Application of the litigation privilege varies across jurisdictions, but the
 
common thread found throughout is the idea that an attorney acting within the
 
law, in a legitimate effort to zealously advance the interests of his client, shall be
 
protected from civil claims arising due to that zealous representation.
 
(5). For Idaho, tht: litigation privilege is an absolute privilege, which only applies
 
when a specific condition precedent is met, namely, that an attorney is acting
 
within the scope of his employment, and not solely for his personal interests.
 
It is presumed that an attorney who is acting or communicating in relation to his
 
representation of a client is acting on behalf of that client and for that client's
 
interests.
 
(6). If any circumstances would support a finding that attorney actions are
 
pertinent to litigation then absolute immunity should protect the attorney.
 
(7). Allowing such a divided interest would run contrary to the Idaho Rules of
 
Professional Conduct, because, as noted by the district court judge below:
 
[w]hile attorneys must not knowingly counselor assist a client in committing
 
a crime or fraud, Idaho's Rules of Professional Conduct require an attorney to
 
MEMORANDml BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS 
PURSUANT TO I.R.C.P. RULE 12 (b)(c) &/OR MOTION IN LIMINE RE: 
LITIGATION PIUVILEGE - Pg 4 
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pursue matters on behalf of a client despite opposition, obstruction or personaJl 
inconvenience to the attorney, and require an attorney to take whatever lawful 
and ethical measures are required to vindicate a client's cause or endeavor. 
(8). This Court holds that, as a general rule, where an attorney is sued by the 
current or former adversary of his client, as a result of actions or 
communications that the attorney has taken or made in the course of his 
representation of his client in the course of litigation, the action is presumed to 
be barred by the litigation privilege. An exception to this general rule would 
occur where the plaintiff pleads facts sufficient to show that the attorney has 
engaged in independent acts, that is to say acts outside the scope of his 
representation of his client's interests, or has acted solely for his own interests 
and not his client's. 
The counter-claimants have failed to assert any action or conduct by the counter-
defendants that would amount to an exception to the litigation privilege as fully explained by 
the Taylor case. All the specific allegations contained the amended complaint fail as a matter 
of law to state a claim for relief under I.R.C.P. Rule 12(b)(6). If, upon a motion to dismiss 
filed under Rule 12(b)(6), matters outside the pleading being challenged for failure to state a 
claim upon which relief can be granted are presented to and not excluded by the court, the 
motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56. 
Drennon v. Idaho State Correctional Institution, 181 P.3d 524 (Idaho App. 2007); Hellickson 
v. Jenkins, 118 Idaho 273, 276, 796 P.2d 150, 153 (Ct. App. 1990). 
MEMORANDUM[ BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS 
PURSUANT TO I.R.C.P. RULE 12 (b)(c) &/OR MOTION IN LIMINE RE: 
LITIGATION PRIVILEGE - Pg 5 
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As the Taylor case, makes clear there is a presumption that the litigation privilege exists 
and there must be specific allegations which amount more than actions taken with the 
legitimate interests of litigation. The amended complaint fails to assert any fraudulent action 
or criminal behavior that could limit the litigation privilege from application to the counter-
claimants' claims. 
The counter-defendants advanced a claim to set aside the prior judgment, as well as a 
claim for damages, based upon criminal behavior and fraud in obtaining the judgment. 
Claims brought under I.R.C.P. 60(b) are not barred by res judicata because they are one of 
the recognized "avenues ... for attacking a judgment." Waller v. State, Dept. ofHealth and 
Welfare, 146 Idaho 234,192 P.3d 1058 (Idaho 2008), Davis v. Parrish, 131 Idaho 595, 599, 
961 P.2d 1198, 1202 (1998). The counter-defendants did raise a lack of standing in Taylor v. 
Maile 2. The Idaho Supreme Court found standing based upon the Disclaimer Agreement 
executed by the beneficiaries of the Theodore L. Johnson Trust. However, when an issue of 
standing is raised, the focus is not on the merits of the issues raised, but upon the party who 
is seeking the relief. Miles v. Idaho Power Co., 116 Idaho 635, 641, 778 P.2d 757, 763 
(1989). Scona Inc. v. Grel~n Willow Trust, 133 Idaho 283, 286, 985 P.2d 1145, 1148 (1999). 
As indicated in the Taylor, supra, case, a cause of action for litigation misconduct does 
not accrue until there have: been damages and the underlying litigation is completed. In the 
underlying litigation, Judge Willper ruled in February 2006 (Affidavit of Christ Troupis 
Exhibit "D" which is the copy of the Order Regarding Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary 
Judgment filed in Ada County Case No. CV DC 04-00473D, Taylor vs Maile filed February 
MEMORANDUM BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS PURSUANT TO 
I.R.C.P. RULE 12 (b)(c) &/OR MOTION IN LIMINE RE: LITIGATION PRIVILEGE­
Pg6 
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13,2006 filed in the present matter on September 29,2010), that Berkshire Investment had 
properly asserted a claim of quasi estoppel against the trust. The Taylors misrepresentation 
that they were residual beneficiaries ultimately let to the "Judgement on Beneficiaries' 
Claims". By their misrepresentation and criminal conduct, Berkshire Investment was 
prevented from establishing facts that the trust was estopped from obtaining title to the real 
property. The property was restored to the trust based upon the Taylors and their counsel 
providing false verified amended complaint. Quasi estoppel prevents a party from asserting a 
right, to the detriment of ,mother party, which is inconsistent with a position previously 
taken. Floyd v. Bd. of [75 P.3d 199] Comm'rs of Bonneville County, 137 Idaho 718, 726, 52 
P.3d 863, 871 (2002) (citing E. Idaho Agric. Credit Ass'n. v. Neibaur, 133 Idaho 402, 410, 
987 P.2d 314, 322 (1999)). Quasi estoppel applies when it would be unconscionable to allow 
the party to be estopped to change positions from one they acquiesced in or from one they 
accepted a benefit. Id. For quasi estoppel to apply, the party to be estopped must have either 
gained some advantage against the other party, produced a disadvantage to the other party, or 
the other party must have been induced to change positions. Id. 
Without the Taylors active misrepresentation the Honorable Judge Wilper would not 
have ordered the property restored to the trust. Judge Wi1per's Memorandum Decision and 
Order, on July 28,2005 (attached to the Affidavit of Thomas Maile Part 2-Exhibit K), 
establishes that the trust could not rescind the transaction since the action of the truste(:, Beth 
Rogers demonstrated the trust had waived its right to rescind the sales transaction. Judge 
Wilper had previously rul(:d that Berkshire Investment could pursue its claims for quasi and 
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equitable estoppel and its claim of tortuous interference with contract claim (Judge Wilper's 
Order Regarding Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, on February 13,2006). The trust 
could not have had the property restored as it waived that right to restore the real property to 
the trust. The trust was estopped from rescinding the sale transaction. The unlawful 
objective was committed by the defendants in having the property restored by 
misrepresenting their status as beneficiaries before the court in January 2006. By 
misrepresenting their status as beneficiaries the court restored the property to the trust. The 
plaintiffs were deprived by such actions of the defendants in putting forth their proof of 
equitable issues as allowed by Judge Wilper and defending the monetary claims of the: trust. 
Berkshire Investment had fully paid for the land, the trust fully received the agreed to 
compensation, the prior Trustee, Beth Rogers had written a letter affirmatively telling 
Berkshire Investments that the trust was standing by the contract, and Berkshire Investments 
had invested approximately $260,000.00 in land improvements. Berkshire Investments was 
prevented its day in court. The only trial which took place was the issue of unjust enrichment 
on the improvements. There was no trial on the competing equities between the trust ~md 
Berkshire as to who was entitled to the title to the real property. The misrepresentations by 
the Taylors prevented that from being tried. 
The counter-defendants were properly advancing their theories for equitable relief and 
had established Idaho Law relating to such claims. The criminal actions of the Taylors and 
their counsel prevented Berkshire Investments from having its day in court. 
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The Idaho Supreme Court on April 2, 2010, issued a decision in the case of Weitz v. 
Green, 33696 (IDSCCI) which provided: 
As the finding of slander of title in this case was premised upon a 
statement made in the complaint, a necessary first step in litigation, where 
such statement was related to the underlying claim against Respondents, that 
statement is deemed immune. Therefore, this Court reverses the district 
court"s determination that Appellants committed slander oftitle against 
Respondents. Accordingly, the award of $40,000 in attorney fees as special 
damages under tht~ slander of title claim was improperly granted and is 
reversed (emphasis added). 
The Weitz, supra, cas(~ has important implications in light of the new Law created by the 
Taylor, supra, case. The counter-claimants' contentions relate to an alleged improper filing 
of Lis Pendens and the alleged misuse ofjudicial process relating to allegations contained in 
the amended complaint filed by the plaintiff. As the Weitz & Taylor cases hold such 
statements whether set forth in a lis pendens filed of record or contained in allegations of a 
complaint are judicially immune from liability if they "had a reasonable relation to the cause 
of action of that proceeding". In both cases whether protected under a vendee's lien or a 
claim for a constructive trust, the pleadings and the Lis Pendens were reasonably related to 
the claims for relief in properly pursued litigation in both cases. 
Furthermore, the Honorable Judge Wilper did not find a basis for an award of sanctions 
relating to the filing and/or attempt to enforce the vendee's lien, establishes that the plaintiffs 
did not commit wrongful conduct and such action is immune under the Taylor case, supra. If 
the filing of the Lis Pendens and/or the Vendee's Lien was wrongful as a matter oflaw, 
Judge Wilper would have so found. 
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The case of Living Designs, Inc. v. E.!. Dupont de Nemours and Co., 431 F.3d 353 (9th 
Cir. 2005) examined the litigation privilege in light of allegations of fraud in the preceding 
litigation and held: 
The district court also erroneously dismissed Plaintiffs' non-fraud claims on 
the grounds of the litigation privilege. Matsuura III, 330 F.Supp.2d at 1128. 
In Matsuura II, the Hawai'i Supreme Court stated that "Hawai'i courts have 
applied an absolute litigation privilege in defamation actions for words and 
writings that are material and pertinent to judicial proceedings." 73 P.3d at 
692. The court examined the policy considerations behind the privilege and 
decided not to expand the protection of the privilege to claims outside of 
defamation actions, holding that "[u]nder Hawai'i law, a party is not immune 
from liability for civil damages based upon that party's fraud engaged in 
during prior litigation proceedings." Id. at 700, 706. The court appears to 
emphasize that many of the policies weighing against the application of the 
privilege do so only when fraud was committed in the prior proceedings. Id. at 
693-99. In accordcmce with the Hawai'i Supreme Court's analysis, so long as a 
cause of action for fraud is asserted, the litigation privilege does not protect 
subsequent litigation asserting other causes of action stemming from the fraud 
allegedly committed in prior proceedings. Thus, we hold that Plaintiffs' non­
fraud claims are not barred by the litigation privilege under Hawai'i law. 
The common theme which is important for the court's analysis is the determination of 
whether there is fraud and/or criminal behavior in considering the extent of the litigation 
privilege. The counter-claimants have failed to allege any specific or general theories of 
fraud perpetuated by the plaintiffs in their amended complaint. Just as in the Taylor, supra, 
case, held "Reed's failure to make specific factual pleadings is particularly fatal here. It 
appears most likely that RI~ed is alleging that the goal of the conspiracy was fraudulent, and 
civil conspiracy must therefore be pled with particularity under Wasco Prods., Inc. v. 
Southwall Techs, Inc., 435 F.3d 989, 990-92 (9th Cir. 2006)". 
Without such allegations, the counter-defendants are entitled to the absolute litigation 
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privilege annunciated in the Taylor case. The counter-claim is defective as a matter of law 
and must be dismissed. 
The Court should bar the counter-claimants from introducing testimony 
and/or evidence at trial relating to the actions of the counter-defendants as there are 
no exceptions to the litigation privilege. 
The counter-defendants should be prohibited from introducing testimony and/or 
testimony surrounding any actions of the counter-defendants relating to prior litigation. 
Whether the actions took place before Judge Wilper's proceedings or proceedings before this 
court, the litigation privih::ge bars the counter-claimants from pursuing any testimony or 
exhibits. 
The relevant Idaho Rules of Evidence provide: 
Rule 401. Definition of relevant evidence 
"Relevant Evidence" means evidence having any tendency to make the 
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action 
more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. 
Rule 402. Relevant evidence generally admissible; irrelevant evidence 
inadmissible 
All relevant evidence is admissible except as otherwise provided by these 
rules or by other mles applicable in the courts of this state. Evidence which is 
not relevant is not admissible. 
Rule 403. Exclusion of relevant evidence on grounds ofprejudice, confusion, 
or waste of time 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the 
issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations ofundue delay, waste of 
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. 
Any attempt to introduce testimony or exhibits relating to the prior litigation would 
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fail to yield any admissiblle evidence. The amended counter-claim fails to set forth specific 
allegations which would defeat the litigation privilege, consequently no testimony or exhibits 
should be allowed. 
CONCLUSION 
The amended counter-claim filed by the counter claimants fails to advance any 
legitimate claims in light of the litigation privilege. There are no allegations of fraud or 
criminal conduct on the part of the counter-defendants. Pursuant to LR.C.P. Rule 12, the 
counterclaim has failed to raise any legitimate issues to be tried. 
The court should enter an order prohibiting the counter-claimants from advancing any 
testimony or exhibits without first establishing an exception to the litigation privilege at any 
trial in this matter. 
DATED this) ..t( day ofNovember, 2010. 
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CONNIE W . TAYLOR 
Henderson Law Firm, PLLC j, DAVID NAVARRO, Clerk 
Ely A. GARDEN900 Washington St., Suite 1020 OEPUr( 
Vancouver WA 98660 
360.699.1530 
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ISBA No. 4837 
Attorneys for Defendants John Taylor 
Dallan Taylor and the Johnson Trust 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
 
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an 
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G. 
MAILE, IV, and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE 
husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, et al. 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV OC 0723232 
OBJECTION TO COUNTER­
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR 
LEAVE TO AMEND REPLY TO 
COUNTERCLAIMS 
The Counterclaimants in this matter object to the Motion to Reply to Counterclaims filed 
on behalf of Berkshire Investment LLC, Thomas Maile, and Colleen Maile because (l) the 
proposed amendments fail to state a valid claim, and (2) an amendment filed after the deadlines 
for disclosing witnesses and initiating new discovery substantially prejudices the 
Counterclaimants' ability to address the amendments. 
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1. The Proposed Amendments Fail to State a Valid Claim. 
In detennining whether an amend pleading should be allowed, the court may consider 
whether the new claims proposed to be inserted into the action by the amendment state a valid 
claim. Black Canyon Racquetball Club, Inc. v. Idaho First Nat 'I Bank, 119 Idaho 171, 804 P.2d 
900 (1991). Where the record contains no allegations which, if proven, would entitle the 
proponent to the relief claimed, the refusal to allow an amendment is not an abuse of discretion. 
Wells v. United States L£(e Ins. Co., 119 Idaho 160,804 P.2d 333 (Ct. App. 1991) 
a. Litigation Privilege. 
The new proposed Sixth Affinnative Defense asserts the defense of "litigation privilege." 
Counterclaimants respectfully request that the Court deny this requested amendment, as the 
litigation privilege discussed in the September 3, 2010 Idaho Supreme Court decision in Taylor 
v. McNichols/Hawley Troxell does not apply to a party (who also happens to be an attorney) who 
is defending claims for conduct in his capacity as a party. The litigation privilege also does not 
apply to an attorney who is acting pro se, representing himself, his wife, and/or a limited liability 
company which he and his wife own. This issue is addressed in more detail in the memorandum 
opposing the Counterd<;:fendant's Motion to Dismiss and/or Motion in Limine, which is 
incorporated by reference. 
b. Incorporation of allegations from Amended Complaint. 
The other requested amendment is the addition of a Seventh Affinnative Defense in 
which the Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants "incorporate by reference their allegations in their 
Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial as additional affinnative defenses as if set forth 
in full herein, as affinnative defenses relating to the claims set forth in the Counter-Claim." 
Objection to Motion to Amend 2 
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This is not an aHirmative defense; it is a transparent attempt to get in through the back 
door claims which this Court dismissed in its July 2, 2009 Memorandum Decision and Order. 
The Counterdefendants' Motion to Reconsider that decision was denied, and th;~ request to 
amend their Reply to add those claims as affirmative defenses is simply an effort to try to 
convince a jury to revers(~ this Court's ruling. That is improper, and should not be allowed. 
2. The proposed amendment is untimely and prejudicial. 
The certificate of mailing of this motion indicates that it was mailed on October 28, the 
day before it was signed by Mr. Troupis. Despite being advised of counsel's new address in 
Vancouver, Washington, it was addressed Clark and Feeney, and to Post Office Box 785 rather 
than the correct box number of 285. The motion was first received by fax on November Ist. By 
stipulation of the parties, that is also the deadline for the commencement of discovely as well as 
for the Counterclaimants' witness disclosures. By waiting until those crucial dE:adlines had 
passed to serve this motion, and then scheduling the hearing on the motion for only 60 days 
before the trial, the Counterdefendants have severely prejudiced the ability to address the 
amendments through discovery, expert testimony, and/or a motion for summary judgment. 
This matter has been pending since 2007, and the trial should not be vacated due to these 
dilatory filings. The Plaintiffs' claims were dismissed on July 2, 2009, and the Supreme Court 
decision upon which the Seventh Affirmative Defense claims to be based (Taylor 
v.McNichols/HTEH) was issued on September 3, 20 IO. There is no just cause for waiting so 
long to file this request for leave to amend. 
Objection to Motion to Amend 3 
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CONCLUSION
 
For the reasons stated above, The Johnson Trust, Dallan Taylor, and John Taylor 
respectfully request that the Court deny the motion for leave to amend the Reply to 
counterclaims. 
DATED this J$~ day of November, 2010. 
HENDE FIRM, PLLC 
h . ~ 
Connie . Taylor, a member of the firm. 'Atton~Ys for 
Johnson Trust, DaHan Taylor, and John lor } 
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Johnson Trust. 
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a. Exhibit A: Annual report fonus for Berkshire Investments, LLC for the 
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years 2003 through 20 10, which were printed from the Idaho Secretary of 
State's website on November 10,2010. 
b. Exhibit B: Relevant pages from February 1, 2005 deposition of Thomas 
G. Maile, IV. 
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2. Registered Agent and Office NO PO BOX 
THOMAS G MAlLAt.!Y 
380 W STATE 8T --­
EAGLE. 10 83616 
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.Annua1 Report for W 20194 
No. W 20194 
Return to: 
SECRETARY OF STATE 
700 WEST JEFFERSON 
PO BOX 83720 
BOISE, ID 83720-0080 
NO FILING FEE IF 
RECEIVED BY DUE DATE 
Due no later than Aug 31, 2009
 
Annual Report Form
 
1. M"ilillq Addrt~s5: Conect ill [hi~, II." It :Wt~(kd 
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC 
THOMAS G MAILE, IV 
380 W STATE ST 
EAGLE ID 83616 
Page 1 of 1 
2. Registered Agent and Address 
(NO PO BOX) 
THOMAS G MAILE IV
 
380 W STATE ST
 
EAGLE ID 83616
 
3. New Registered Agent Signature:* 
4. limited Liability Companies: Enter Names and Addresses of at least one Member or Manager. 
Office Held Name Street or PO Address City State Country Postal Code 
MANAGER THOMAS G MAILE IV 380 W STATE ST EAGLE ID USA 83616 
5. Organized Under the Laws of: 6. Annual Report must be signed. * 
ID Signature: Thomas G. Maile, IV Date: 09/09/2009 
W 20194 Name (type or print): Thomas G. Maile, IV Title: Manager 
Processed 09/09/2009 * Electronically provided signatures are accepted as original signatures. 
http://www.sos.idaho.gov/servlet/TransforrnXMLDoc?URL=%5C20090909%5CXMLPO... 11/9/2010 
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No. W 20194 
Return to: 
SECRETARY OF STATE 
700 WEST JEFFERSON 
PO BOX 83720 
BOISE, ID 83720-0080 
NO FILING FEE IF 
RECEIVED BY DUE DATE 
4. Limited Liability Companies: Enter Names and Addresses of at least one Member or Manager. 
Office Held Name 
MANAGER THOMAS 
5. Organized Under the Laws of: 
ID 
W 20194 
Processed 06/09/2010 
Due no later than Aug 31, 2010
 
Annual Report Form
 
] . ""idil.iJl'J ;o'rL'il ,_,~)~;. (or"! t~c·t ! ;! ~ 'I i >' I'" i" f' ( 'l 'C1l -:f 
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC 
THOMAS G MAILE, IV 
380 W STATE ST 
EAGLE ID 83616 
2. Registered Agent and Address 
(NO PO BOX) 
THOMAS G MAILE IV
 
380 W STATE ST
 
EAGLE ID 83616
 
3. New Registered Agent Signature:* 
Street or PO Address City State Country Postal Code 
G MAILE IV 380 W STATE ST EAGLE ID USA 83616 
6.	 Annual Report must be signed. * 
Signature: Thomas G. Maile, IV Date: 06/09/2010 
Name (type or print): Thomas G. Maile, IV Title: Manager 
* Electronically provided signatures are accepted as original signatures. 
http://www.sos.idaho.gov/serv1et/TransfonnXMLDoc?URL=%5C20 100609%5CXMLPO... 11/9/2010 
001854
al  
 
 
 
 
r .... i il.i l, 'rL ! r"1 :z'  ~   .'  cl   
 
 
. .i .goY  let/ ra sf   
Exhibit B
 
001855
 
J 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUN'l'Y OF ADAr" 
I 
I
 REED TAYLOR, DALLAN TAYLOR,
 
and R. JOHN TAYLOR, Case No. CV OC 0400473D 
Plaintiff/Counter- Case No. CV OC 04-05656D 
Defendants, Volume I 
vs. 
THOMAS MAILE, IV and COLLEEN 
MAILE, husband and wife, THOMAS 
I 
I 
MAILE REAL ESTATE COMPANY and 
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, 
I Defendants/Counter­
[
 ... Claimants.
 
. ' 
I Continued ... 
I THE DEPOSITION OF THOMAS G. MAILE, IV 
I FEBRUARY 1, 2005 
I 
I REPORTED BY: MONICA M. ARCHULETA, CSR NO. 471 
I Notary Public 
.: 
SOUTHERN' ~ NORTHERNI
.v. 1·800-234-9611 .. .0 .~,; 1:800-879-1700Court 
Reporting • BOISE, 191... • p.OC.~Oi"l!'"'. h .':;~. ~OElJR p.!ALENE. 10208-345",11 jO,~ . t,; 208-'r55i1·700 
Se.rvicE~, Inc. • TWIN F~LLS, 10 • '~R' 01 .'"' .SpdlA~lf; WA 
I 208.73418700 503-881-1700 /<.)"0 509-455-4515 Since 1970 ~fU1J ..Registered Professio,nal Reporters 001856
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOllt:(TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 1 I -PEARANCES: 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN ANI: " THE COUNTY OF ADA 
2
'­REED TAYLOR, DALLAN TAYLOR, ) and R. JOHN TAYLOR, ) Case No. CV OC 0400473D 3 For the Plaintiff: CLARK and FEENEY 
Plaintiff/Counter­ I Case No. CV OC 04-05656D 4 
Defendant s, ) Volume I BY: Paul Thomas Clark 
vs. ) The Train Station, Suite 201THOMAS MAILE, IV and COLLEEN )~. 5 
MAILE, husband and wi fe, THOW\S ) 6 13th and Main StreetsI MAILE REAL ESTATE COMPANY and I
 BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, )
 7 P.O. Drawer 285 Defendants/Counter­ ) 
)Claimants. 8 Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
I
) 
Continued ... 9 
THE DEPOSITION OF THOMAS G. MAILE, IV 10 For Thomas Maile GJORDING & FOUSTER 
FEBRUARY 1, 2005 
I 
11 as Attorney: BY: Jack S. Gjording 
12 509 West Hays Street 
REPORTED BY: MONICA M. ARCHULETA, CSR NO. 471 13 Post Office box 2837Notary Public 
14 Boise, Idaho 83702 
I 15 16 For Thomas Maile ANDERSON JULIAN & HULL 
17 as Realtor/Broker: BY: Phillip J. Collaer 
I 18 250 So. Fifth Street, Suite 700 
'19 Post office Box 7426 
20 Boise, Idaho 83707-7426I 21 
22 
I 23
 24
 
25
 
------------,------------------~------------------- ------'-----'--Page-F--------------.. -----..-.. 
Page 4 
I 
[ 1 THEODORE L. JOHNSON REVOCABLE ) 1 INDEX 
2 TRUST, ) 2 
3 Plaintiff, ) 3 TESTIMONY OF THOMAS G. MAILE, IV: PAGE 
4 vs. ) 4 Examination by Mr. Clark 5 
5 THOMAS MAILE, IV and COLLEEN ) 5 
I 6 MAILE, husband and wife, and ) 6 EXHIBITS PAGE 7 BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, ) 7 N-O-N-E
 
8 Defendants. ) 8
 
I 9 ) 9 
10 10 
I 11 'II 12 '12 
I 
I 
13 THE DEPOSITION OF THOMAS G. MAILE, IV, '13
 
14 was taken on behalf of the Plaintiff at the law .14
 
15 offices of Anderson, Julian & Hull, 250 South Fifth '15
 
16 Street, Suite 700, Boise, Idaho, commencing at 2:45 '16
 
17 p.m. on February 1,2005, before Monica M. [17
 
18 Archuleta, Certified Shorthand Reporter and Notary 18 
19 Public within and for the State of Idaho, in 19 
1­
 20 the above-entitled matter. 2et:J !•..
 " ; ';. 21 21' i "7' 
22 2'"' 
I~..l .. ~--~L4 '~"'h" - '~L23" U! I' 
t .J ,,-c.5~ 2' . ,"'1' • -"'-~ ., 'i 
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I ,I25 17 25,* (208) 345-9611 M & M COURT REPORTING SERVl<CEtJN(6] i (208) 345·8800 (fax)' E 001857
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1 never taken one. Every two years you are required. 1 Nor do I own a controlling interest in it. But for 
2 to'have a certain number of hou f real estate 2 the sake of tryin~ , understand your question I'll 
3 fundamentals, I think it is callel"-'f3ut there is no 3 include that. And there is a Macchu Pichu limited 
4 appraisal portion of those classes. Training. '4 family partnership. 
5 
6 
7 
Q Going back to your work as an attorney. 5 
Have you handled any litigation that has dealt with 6 
the issue of appraisals? Real estate appraisals? 7 
MR. COLLAER: Can you spell that? 
THE WITNESS: M-a-c-c-h-u P-i-c-h-u. 
those are all of the entities that I can think of. 
So t ~~ "
-'I 
8 A In what sense? 8 Q (BY MR. CLARK) How about Berkshire
 
9 Q Well, why don't you tell me if you have '9 Investments?
 
10 handled any first. And then I will -- 10 A Thank you. I forgot that. That also is
 I11 A Gosh, I have to go through 25 years of 11 owned wholly by my wife and 1.
 
12 practice. I can't think of anything in a broad 12 Q And what type of business is that?
 
13 sense involving an appraisal. I know I have had 13 A Well, it is a limited liability company
 I 
14 cases where there has been appraisals involved in 14 that was formed for development purposes.
 
15 cases. 15 Q When was it formed?
 
16 Q Have you had cases where there have been 16 A Probably 2002. Perhaps July or early
 I 
17 disputes with respect to values e'stablished by one 17 August of 2002.
 
18 appraiser versus another? 18 Q What assets did it have at the time of
 
19 A Now we know why we have computers. I 19 Exhibit 12, the assignment of earnest money
 I 
20 can't think of a case where there have been legal 20 agreement, was executed?
 
21 issues, or contentions, or disputes over appraisals. 21 A The $100,000 either through a line of
 
22 Q In your work as a real estate broker have 22 credit or in cash. Or a portion in cash.
 I 
23 you had the experience in dealing with appraisers? 23 Q Anything else?
 
24 A I would have to say yes. 24 A No.
 I2~.,., Q__H!l.Y.~_YQ!!.1~!lm~g_i!1Jh.t:l._;!.Q::-_~Q}~l~Y~_<lJs .QL_l~~ ._Q__ A~l_~Q.lT~~J iI!_~I!.gerstLl.!1.QiI!~!h~!!Jb.~!_i.L._ 
?age 22 ,Page 24 
1 being a broker in general terms how property is 1 was formed with the idea initially of acquiring the (]

2 appraised? ! 2 property from the Ted Johnson Trust?
 
3 AYes. Sure. 3 A As an assignment from the contract, yes.
 
4 Q And tell me what your unde:rstanding is in 4 Q Was it formed for any other purpose?
 I 
5 that regard? ' 5 A No.
 
6 A Well, with residential property, for ' 6 Q Has it acquired any other assets other
 
7 example, comparables are probably the essential 7 than that land?
 I 
8 approach that appraisers use. With commercial 8 A No. 
9 property, I think, in my opinion, inc:ome approach ' 9 Q And why did you feel it was necessary to 
!0 might be the most widely accepted. Although, 10 have that formed? I 
11 comparables are used in that sense, as well. 11 A Here again, it was tax advice and 
12 Commercial property. You would have to use, here '12 accounting advice to create a separate <entity. I13 again, a combination of comparable:s. And, of i13 Separate legal entity.
 
14 course, if the commercial property generates income i14 Q And what was the benefit of that?
 
\5 you would be able to utilize an income approach. ;I5 A Well, as best as I can understand there
 I 
16 Q Let's go back to your business interests 116 were some benefits for the cost basis. And also 
J7 in addition to your law office and real estate .17 benefits in having an entity that would be in a 
18 company that we have already talked about. '18 joint venture, if you will, with the development I 
19 What other businesses, enterprises, do you ,19 company, Thomas Maile Real Estate Company. 
20 own or own a controlling interest in'? 20 Q So as far as developing the Linder Road 
21 A Own or have a controlling i~&~rest in? We 21 property were you going to do any ofthat I 
I;. {..,22 have talked about Horizon Properties. Thomas Maile 22 personally? Or was it going to be througli these two 
'j'-,-,', ',' 
23 Real Estate, LLC. We have a l(j,w office that is a 23 entities? Developing,sa(eand owner§hiip? oj ,. ; ,; 1 ~
 
24 corporation, Subchapter S. I have Ll family-owned 24 A What do yon iheiaH!l1y'1>ersorla~IY./then~L::
 
25 corporation, Hope Development, w!iich I neither own. '25 Because lam ii1vofVethIVrfH-1bec-rill16'tlsl1erltilties.
 
", '~";'
(208) 345-9611 M ~~ M COURT REPORTING SERVlCEf'mC. (208) 34s-S800'{fax) I'.it.
, , 
, ili ':«.C,: .~,. \/";: 
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1 Q You're involved as an owner of the 1 Southwest District Health applications. Ada County 
2 entities; right? Beyond that are you personally 2 Highway District applications. City of Eagle. 
3 involved? 3 Q And what was the overall plan that was 
4 A Yeah, I'm personally involved. Yes. . 4 being proposed with respect to development of that 
5 Q How is that? . 5 property?
 
6 A I materially participate in those 6 A To who?
I 7 enterprises. . 7 Q Based on your plat?
 8 Q As an owner? 8 A It was a seven unit -- or a seven-lot 
9 A Yes. 9 development with a private road. And an irrigationI 10 Q And as an agent? 10 system in a common lot -- that came from a common 
I
 
11 A At imes.ll lot. There was at one point in time a plan to have
 
12 Q Any other participation? 12 an equestrian trail. I hope that answers your
 
I
 
13 A What would that include? I don't 13 question.
 
14 understand. 14 Q And were any of these improvements placed
 
15 ! Q I don't know. I'm just asking if there 15 on the property?
 
I
 
16 was any. 16 A Sure. The survey is conducted. And then
 
17 A I don't think so. 17 you have the preliminary plat And from that
 
18 Q So my understanding of your testimony is ,18 process you move toward final plat And those are
 
19 that Berkshire Investments was going to own the land19 improvements. The plat is recorded. The road is
 
20 on Linder Road? 20 installed. The infrastructure for the electrical
I 21 A It would be the titled owner ofthe land. 21 and the gas is installed. So, yes.
 
22 And titled owner of the improvements on the land. 22 Q Tell me about the road. What kind of road
 
23 Q And then the develop1er was going to be 23 is it?
 I 24 Thomas Maile Real Estate Company? 24 A It is a paved road. Meets ACHD standards.
 
25 AYes. 25 It's a private road. _ 
Page 26 Page 28 
I
 
t" 1 Q And what would developing consist of? 1 Q And from a developer's standpoint what is
 
2 A Oh, my. Well, you have to undertake a 2 the advantage of a private road versus a public?
 
3 fair amount of effort and work: associated in dealing 3 A Well, in this particular parcel of real
 
4 with the various governmental agencies. Ada County 4 property there was such a concern. over the high
 
5 Developmental Services. Central District Health. 5 water table that the engineering staff, the water
 
I 6 Ada County Highway District. Various irrigation 6 consultant, groundwat~r specialists, and soil
 7 companies. City of Eagle in this case. U.S. 7 conservationists all seemed to provide the opinion
 
8 Department of Geology. Anny Corp of Engineers was 8 that it was high enough that there maybe problems
I 9 even a possibility in this project. There is a lot 9 with ACHD acceptance as a public right-of-way. So I
 
I
 
10 of different hoops to jump through in development. 10 think it was the engineer's choice or call that in
 
11 So it was anticipated that it would be a major J 1 his opinion it would be better developed as a
 
12 undertaking. :12 private road. So that is the advantage.
 
I
 
13 Q Was there a written pla.n of development :13 Q Is the development complete today?
 
14 that was established? 14 A No, I wouldn't say it is complete.
 
15 A Yeah, I would say that you have the 15 Q What needs to be done?
 
16 preliminary plat application process. You have the :16 A There needs to be the finalization of the
 
I 17 Ada County neighborhood contact process. There is a '17 pump in the common lot. The property has been ready 18 lot of written documents relatilllg to the process. :18 to be marketed and there are building lots 
19 Q Have you provided all of those documents 19 available. So in that sense it is done. But in a 
I 20 in discovery? 20 construction sense there is more to be done. 21 A I sure think so. 21 Q Other than installing this final pump what~ 
.. -.22. 
_Q..T'm.SOI"DLthedocnmenl<; thatvou ____ .---22--else_needs_to_bedollefrQo:uuLinf:r~strnctuI"e 001859
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NO.-++-tf"?) FILED ­NOV 22 ,2010 r\.M~_P.M__-­
NOV 22 20'10 
CONNIE W. TAYLOR 
i. DAVID NAVARRO Clelfk.Henderson Law Firm, PLLC By 1\. GARDEN 
900 Washington St., Suite 1020 OEPUTf 
Vancouver WA 98660 
360.699.1530 
Fax 360.693.2911 
ISBA No. 4837 
Attorneys for Defendants John Taylor 
DaHan Taylor and the Johnson Trust 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an 
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G. 
MAILE, IV, and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE 
husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, et al. 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV OC 0723232 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO 
COUNTERDEFENDANTS' MOTION TO 
DISMISS AND/OR MOTION IN LIMINE 
The Counterc1aimants respectfully request that this Court deny the Counterdefendants' 
Motion to Dismiss and/or Motion in Limine which was filed on November 2, 20 IO. This motion 
is nothing more than another request that this Court reconsider its numerous decisions dismissing 
the initial Complaint and denying the requests for summary judgment on the counterclaims. 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO 
MOTION TO DISMISS AND/OR 
MOTION IN LIMINE 
1 
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For clarity, the Counterclaimants will be referred to collectively as "Taylors" and the 
Counterdefendants will be referred to collectively as "Mailes." 
I. Motion to Dismiss 
The basis the Mailes are relying on to support this motion is not clear. The fi.rst sentence 
of the Motion indicates that it is being brought pursuant to "I.R.C.P. Rule l2(b)(c)." The final 
sentence of the Motion states that it is made "Pursuant to I.R.c.P. Rules l2(b)(d)." The motion 
never identifies a specific subparagraph of Rule 12. The Memorandum filed in support of the 
Motion focuses on I.R.C.P. l2(c), but also contains a single reference to I.R.C.P. l2(b)(6). 
The memorandum vacillates between (l) an assertion that Mailes are entitled to absolute 
immunity under the litigation privilege; and (2) repetition of the failed arguments that res 
judicata should not apply, quasi- and equitable estoppel should apply, and "Berkshire was 
prevented its day in court." Because this Court has addressed the second group of arguments 
repeatedly, I this responsive brief will focus on the litigation privilege. 
a.	 The Motion to Dismiss is Moot if the Court Denies
 
the Motion to Amend Reply
 
Under both I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) and l2(c), a motion to dismiss looks only at the pleadings to 
determine whether a claim for relief has been stated. Young v. City ofKetchum, 137 Idaho 102, 
104,44 P.3d 1157, 1159 (2002), I.R.C.P. 12(c). 
I Memorandum Decision and Order, 7/2/09; Order Denying Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, 
7/20/09; second Order Denying Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment on the Defendants' Counterclaims, 
6/23/10; October 29, 20 I0 ruling from the bench denying Motion to Reconsider the July 2, 2009 decision. 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO 
MOTION TO DISMISS AND/OR 
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The pleadings currently at issue do not contain any reference to the ligation privilege which 
Mr. Maile now seeks to assert. The present motion is based solely on the Sixth affirmative 
defense in the amended Repll which the Mailes are seeking leave of the Court to file. Needless 
to say, if that amendment is not allowed, there is no basis in the pleadings for a dismissal under 
either 1.R.C.P. l2(b)(6) or 12(c). 
b. This Motion should be Treated as a Motion for Summary Judgment 
While Mailes have based the Motion to Dismiss on 1.R.C.P. l2(b)(6) and 12(c),an 
understanding of their relationship to the plaintiff known as Berkshire Investment Services LLC 
is absolutely essential to a determination of whether the litigation privilege applies in this case. 
That relationship is demonstrated through the records of the Idaho Secretary of State, which 
show that for each year since its inception in 2003, the Annual Report for that entity shows 
Thomas Maile IV as the manager and as the registered agent.3 In addition, Mr. Maile testified 
in deposition that Berkshire Investments is "wholely owned by my wife and 1.,,4 
Where a motion is captioned as a motion to dismiss but the court looks to evidence 
outside the pleadings, the motion is more properly treated as a motion for summary judgment 
under 1.R.C.P. 56(c). See 1.R.C.P. l2(b) and l2(c); Thomson v. City ofLewiston, 137 Idaho 473, 
476, 50 P.3d 4RR, 491 (2002); Merrifield v. Arave, 12X Idaho 306, 307, 912 P.2d 674, 675 
2 The proposed Sixth Affirmative Defense read in toto "Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants assert the 
affirmative defense oflitigation privilege relating to the claims set forth in the Counter-Claim." 
3 Exhibit A to 11/17/10 Affidavit of Counsel in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss and/or in Limine. 
4 Exhibit B to 11/17/10 Affidavit of Counsel in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss and/or in Limine. 
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(Ct.App.1996). Summary judgment under I.R.C.P. 56(c) is proper only when there is no genuine 
issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. When 
assessing a motion for summary judgment, all controverted facts are to be liberally construed in 
favor of the nonmoving party. Furthermore, the trial court must draw all reasonable inferences in 
favor of the party resisting the motion. G & M Farms v. Funk Irrigation Co., 119 Idaho 514, 517, 
ROR P.2d R51, 854 (1991); Sanders v. Kuna Joint Sch. Dist., J 25 Idaho 872, 874, 876 P.2d 154, 
156 (Ct.App.199 
For the reasons stated below, the Mailes are not entitled to a dismissal of the 
counterclaims as a matter of law. On the contrary, it would be appropriate for this Court to rule 
that the Mailes are not entitled to immunity under the litigation privilege and deny this motion as 
well as the motion for leave to amend to assert the privilege. 
c. Mailes are not entitled to immunity under the litigation privilege 
There is no dispute as to the fact that Thomas Maile is an attorney, and that during the 
almost eight years of litigation over the Johnson Trust real property, he has frequently acted pro 
se in representing himself, his wife, and their solely-owned LLC. He was doing so from the date 
he filed the Complaint in this matter (December 31, 2007) until his present attorney substituted 
and associated on September 11,2008. 
Mailes argue that the litigation privilege discussed in the Taylor v. McNichols5 decision is 
available "not only to the attorneys of record but to the parties themselves.,,6 This is a 
5 IDSCCI 36130, 36131, September 3, 2010.
 
6 Page 3, Memorandum Briefin Support of Motion to Dismiss, etc.
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misreading of the Supreme Court decision. There is absolutely nothing in the Taylor decision to 
indicate that the litigation privilege set forth applies to parties in anything other than the well-
recognized immunity from defamation actions. The Taylor v. McNichols case dealt solely with 
the question of whether and under what circumstances a litigant may bring an action against the 
attorney who represented his opponent. The ruling of the court was "the litigation privilege 
shall be found to protect attorneys against civil actions which arise as a result of their conduct or 
communications in the representation of a client, related to a judicial proceeding.,,7 To accept 
Mailes' reading of Taylor v.McNichols as granting absolute immunity to the parties (as opposed 
to their independent counsel) would completely do away with the tort of abuse of process. 
Mailes do not directly argue, but certainly seem to imply, that because Thomas Maile is 
an attorney, he is entitled to absolute immunity for his conduct as a party in the course of 
litigation. That argument has absolutely no merit. In Taylor v. McNichols, the Court specifically 
ruled that in Idaho, "the litigation privilege is an absolute privilege, which only applies when a 
specific condition precedent is met, namely, that an attorney is acting within the scope of his 
employment, and not solely for his personal interests." 8 The cases discussed by the Supreme 
Curt all dealt with claims against independent attorneys who were separate and distinct from 
their clients; none of the cases involved an attorney who was a party, let alone one who was 
representing himself. The Idaho Court's analysis rested largely on the very valid concern that if 
attorneys are exposed to lawsuits for their actions in representing their clients, it would invite 
7 IDSCCI 36130, 36131, September 3,2010, page 15.
 
8 IDSCCI 36130, 36131, September 3,2010, page 18.
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attorneys to divide their interest between advocating for their client and protecting themselves 
from a retributive suit. The entire analysis is based on the presumption that an attorney who has 
been employed to repres~:nt a client is acting in the client's interest, not his own. 
There can be no doubt that even when Mr. Maile has been acting pro se (on behalf of 
himself and his wife, as well as on behalf of their solely-owned LLC, Berkshire Investments), he 
has been acting solely for his own interests and is therefore not entitled to the immunity of the 
litigation privilege. 
The counterclaim in this case is against the Mailes as individuals and parties, not against 
Thomas Maile in his capacity as an attorney. There is no distinction between the interests of 
Thomas G. Maile, IV, the attorney, and Thomas and Colleen Maile and their LLC, as parties. 
There has been no evidence to indicate that Colleen Maile or Berkshire Investments "employed" 
Thomas Maile to represent them. If Taylor v. McNichols were read to apply in thllS situation, 
there would be absolutely no limit to the havoc an attorney could wreak when he has chosen to 
represent himself. 
This situation would be analogous to Taylor v. McNichols only if the Taylors had filed a 
suit against one of the six independent attorneys who have represented Mailes at various times 
over the last eight years. In contrast, the Mailes' Complaint against Clark and Feeney and its 
attorneys falls squarely within the absolute immunity of the litigation privilege, a fact which 
supports the counterclaim for abuse of process in the filing and continued pursuit of this action. 
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Mailes also appear to argue that the Taylor v. McNichols decision precludes a lawsuit 
against opposing counsel in the absence of a claim of fraud. That is not accurate. After ruling 
on the litigation privilege, the Court simply analyzed each of the claims filed and pointed out the 
reasons why they were not valid. This included an analysis of the fatal defects in the fraud 
claim, which was cited as an additional reason for affirming the lower court's dismissal of the 
suit against the attorneys" There is nothing in the decision to lead to the conclusion that a fraud 
claim is mandatory. 
As always, theMailes.briefing intentionally oversimplifies the counterclaims as being 
based solely on the filing of lis pendens. This has never been the case, no matter how many 
times they say it is so. Their reliance on Weitz v. Green is misplaced, as that case related solely 
to the question of whether assertions during litigation could support a claim of slander of title. 
That argument has no relevance now because the Taylors promptly and voluntarily withdrew 
their counterclaim for slander of title after the Court issued the Weitz decision, which overturned 
long-standing precedence:. 
II. Motion in Limin~ 
The motion in limine: asks the Court to bar the Taylors "from introducing testimony and/or 
evidence at trial relating to the actions of the counter-defendants" relating to prior litigation. 
This argument appears to be based solely on the litigation privilege, and should also be denied 
for the reasons set forth above. If the litigation privilege does not apply, there can be no rational 
argument that Maile's actions in prior litigation are not directly relevant to the claims of abuse of 
process and tortious interference with contract. 
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III. Conclusion 
Under the facts of this case, the litigation privilege set forth in Taylor v. McNichols does not 
apply. Therefore, the Counterdefendants' Motion to Dimiss and/or Motion in Limine should be 
denied. 
DATED this jj~ day ofNovember, 2010. 
LAWFIRM,P 
By 
allan Taylor 
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LR.C.P. Rules 12 (b)(c) &/or Motion in Limine Re: Litigation Privilege, as follows: 
LEGAL ARGUMENT
 
The proposed Amended Reply to Counter-claim properly asserts an additional 
affirmative defens,e, is not untimely, and is not prejudicial. 
As set forth in the in the Memorandum Brief in support of the Counter-defendants' 
Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to LR.C.P. Rules 12 (b)(c) &/or Motion in Limine Re: Litigation 
Privilege and has addressed herein, the affinnative defense of litigation privilege sets for a valid 
defense that has application to the present facts. In addition, the counter-defendants have fully 
complied with the Stipulation for Scheduling and Planning filed December 30,2009. The 
executed stipulation provides, " 90 days before trial is the last day to file a motion to amend the 
claims between the parties to the lawsuit, including to add a claim for punitive damages". In 
addition, on page of the stipulation, the parties agreed, "All other non-dispositive pre-trial 
motions (including, but not limited to motions in limine) must be filed and heard not less than 
twenty-one (21) days before trial". 
LR.C.P. 15(a) provides that leave to amend "shall be freely given when justice so 
requires." Hoskinson v. Hoskinson, 139 Idaho 448,80 P.3d 1049 (Idaho 2003). Other factors 
that our Idaho Appellate Courts have considered when reviewing a trial court's decision to grant a 
motion to amend include: 1) if the amended pleading provides a valid claim; 2) if the opposing 
party would be prejudiced by the delay in adding the new claim; and 3) if the opposing party has 
an available defense such as the statute of limitations, see generally, Black Canyon Racquetball 
Club, Inc, v. Idaho First Nat'l Bank, 119 Id. 171, 175,804 P.2d 900,904 (1991). The purpose 
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behind the rules are to allow claims to be determined on the merits rather than on technicalities, 
and to make pleadings serve the limited role of providing notice of the nature of the claim and 
the facts at issue, Clark v. Olsen, 110 Idaho 323, 326, 715 P.2d 993,996 (1986). 
A complaint is subject to dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) when an affirmative defense 
appears on the face ofthe complaint itself. Stewart v. Arrington Const. Co., supra, 92 Idaho at 
530,446 P.2d 895; 2 A Moore's Federal Practice 8.28, p. 1863 (1974); 5 Wright & Miller, 
Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil §§ 1277, 1357 (1969). If an affirmative defense is not 
disclosed by the complaint itself, the defense may not be raised by motion to dismiss, except 
where 'matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court,' in which case 
'the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment.' LR.C.P. 12(b), Gardner v. Hollifield, 
96 Idaho 609,533 P.2d 730 (Idaho 1975), citing Cook v. Soltman, 96 Idaho 187,525 P.2d 969 
(1974); 2A Moore's, supra:; 5 Wright & Miller, supra; Stewart v. Arrington Const. Co., supra, 92 
Idaho at 531,446 P.2d 895. An affirmative defense may be raised for the first time on a motion 
for summary judgment. Fuhriman v. State, Dept. ofTransp., 143 Idaho 800, 153 P.3d 480 (Idaho 
2007), Bluestone v. Mathewson, 103 Idaho 453, 455, 649 P.2d 1209 1211 (1982). All the parties 
have filed and referenced matters outside the pleadings relating to the current motion. Both 
parties have requested that the court treat the current motion as a motion for summary judgment. 
The defense of litigation privilege is properly before the court even if the court denies the motion 
to amend the reply to the counterclaims as all parties have relied upon matters outside the 
pleadings. 
The motion to amend the Reply to Counter-claim was based on the recent decision 
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rendered in the Idaho Supreme Court case captioned, Taylor v. McNichols, 36130, 36131 
(IDSCCI), decided on September 3, 2010, which established law with respect to the application 
of the litigation privilege. The counter-claimants cannot argue that there is prejudice and/or they 
are harmed by alleged undue delay as the proposed amendment filing was within the stipulated 
times allowed between the parties and is supported by the recent Taylor case. The amendment to 
the Reply should be allow<::d. 
The Counter-claimants have failed to allege sufficient facts in their amendE~d 
counter-claim to establish an exception to the litigation privilege. 
A claim asserting nothing more than an improper motive in properly obtaining process 
does not successfully plead an abuse of process. Dalley v. Dykema Gossett P.L.L.C, 289046 
(MICA) (Michigan 2010), citing, Young v Motor City Apartments Ltd Dividend Housing Ass'n 
No 1 & No 2, 133 Mich. App. 671,681; 350 N.W.2d 790 (1984). The recent case ofWynn v. 
Earin, 163 Wn.2d 361, 181 P.3d 806 (Wash. 2008), examined the application of the litigation 
privilege and held: 
The California Supreme Court explained the purposes of the rule (which is 
codified in that state): 
The principal purpose of the litigation privilege is to afford litigants and witnesses 
the utmost freedom of access to the courts without fear ofbeing harassed 
subsequently by derivative tort actions. 
The rule promotes the effectiveness ofjudicial proceedings by encouraging "open 
channels of communication and the presentation of evidence" in judicial 
proceedings. A further purpose of the privilege "is to assure utmost freedom of 
communication between citizens and public authorities whose responsibility is to 
investigate and remedy wrongdoing." Such open communication is "a 
fundamental right to the right of access to judicial and quasi-judicial proceedings." 
Since the "external threat of liability is destructive of this fundamental right and 
inconsistent with the effective administration ofjustice," courts have applied the 
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privilege to eliminate the threat ofliability for communications made during all 
kinds of truth-seeking proceedings. 
. . . Witnesses should be free from the fear of protracted and costly lawsuits 
which otherwise might cause them either to distort their testimony or refuse to 
testify altogether. 
... In immunizing participants for liability for torts arising from communications 
made during judicial proceedings, the law places upon litigants the burden of 
exposing during trial the bias ofwitnesses and the falsity of evidence, thereby 
enhancing the finality ofjudgments and avoiding an unending roundelay of 
litigation, an evil far worse than an occasional unfair result. 
Silberg v. Anderson, 50 Cal.3d 205, 213-14, 786 P.2d 365, 266 Cal. Rptr. 638 
(1990) (citations omitted) (quoting McClatchy Newspapers, Inc. v. Superior 
Court, 189 Cal. App.3d 961, 970,234 Cal. Rptr. 702 (1987); Imig v. Ferrar, 70 
Cal. App.3d 48,55, 138 Cal. Rptr. 540 (1977); Pettit v. Levy, 28 Cal. App.3d 484, 
490-91, 104 Cal. Rptr. 650 (1972». 
The United States Supreme Court has similarly explained the importance of 
the witness immunity rule. The dictates of public policy ... require that the paths 
which lead to the ascertainment of truth should be left as free and unobstructed as 
possible.' " Briscoe, 460 U.S. at 333, 103 S. Ct. 1108 (quoting Calkins v. Sumner, 
13 Wis. 193, 197 (1860». [163 Wn.2d 378] The Court has also explained: " 
'Controversies sufficiently intense to erupt in litigation are not easily capped by a 
judicial decree. Th(~ loser in one forum will frequently seek another.... Absolute 
immunity is thus necessary to assure that judges, advocates, and witnesses can 
perform their respective functions without harassment or intimidation.' " Butz v. 
Economou, 438 U.S. 478,512,98 S. Ct. 2894, 57 L. Ed.2d 895 (1978), quoted in 
Briscoe, 460 U.S. at 335, 103 S. Ct. 1108. Ultimately, the rule protects litigants., 
whose interests at stake in a case range across the entire spectrum ofproperty, 
family, and individual circumstances, by encouraging the full, truthful, and 
complete testimony of witnesses. 
The immunity afforded to statements made during the course of a judicial proceeding 
extends not only to the parties in a proceeding but to judges, witnesses, and counsel as well. 
Fridovich; Cox v. Klein, 546 So.2d 120 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989). What the above holdings establish 
is that the courts allow the privilege to attorneys advocating on behalf of clients, the litigants 
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themselves, and witnesses involved in pursuing court proceedings. 
The case of Fernandez v. Haber & Ganguzza, LLP, 3D08-3195 (FLCA3) (2010) 
provides: 
In the case before us, the trial court correctly granted summary judgment in favor 
of Ganguzza regarding the tortious interference claim because the undisputed 
evidence in the record shows the existence of litigation privilege. The actions that 
Ganguzza's law finn took, which included preparing and filing the Notice of Lis 
Pendens, were privileged because they occurred during the course of a judicial 
proceeding. 
In Echevarria, McCalla, Raymer, Barrett & Frappier v. Cole, 950 So.2d 380 
(Fla. 2007), the Florida Supreme Court held that absolute immunity applies to any 
act occurring during the course of a judicial proceeding, whether the underlying 
claim constitutes a common law tort or a statutory violation, including tortious 
interference with a business relationship, so long as the act has some relation to 
the proceeding. See also Boca Investors Group, Inc. v. Potash, 835 So.2d 273 (Fla. 
3d DCA 2002). In the case before us, it is undisputed that the lis pendens filed by 
Ganguzza's firm was filed during the course of the judicial proceeding brought by 
the Association against Fernandez. There was undisputed evidence in the record 
that the law firm was directed by the Association to prevent the sale, thus the film 
was privileged in placing the lis pendens in connection with the action for 
injunctive relief Any proceeding based on statements made in connection with a 
judicial proceeding are not actionable. See Levin, Middlebrooks, Mabie, Thomas, 
Mayes & Mitchell, P.A. v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 639 So.2d 606,607-08 (Fla. 1994). 
See also Ross v. Blank, 958 So.2d 437,441 (Fla. 4 DCA 2007). 
Accordingly, the filing ofthe lis pendens together with the action for 
injunctive relief was privileged and cannot be the basis of Fernandez's action for 
tortious interference. The trial court was correct in granting summary judgment in 
favor of Ganguzza's finn. Although we think that the behavior of the Ganguzza 
law finn may have been highly unethical, we must affirm. 
Idaho Law is in accord. Th publication of the notice oflis pendens is not defamatory. It 
merely informs the public that the property is involved in litigation. Vanderford Co., Inc. v. 
Knudson, 144 Idaho 547, 165 P.3d 261 (Idaho 2007). 
The case of Dalley v. Dykema Gossett P.L.L.C, 289046 (MICA) (Michigan 2010) 
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involved a second lawsuit alleging the plaintiff and the attorneys in the first suit improperly 
pursued their litigation. The Dalley, court stated in dismissing the claims of abuse of process and 
tortious interference with a business a business relationship, "In order to succeed under a claim 
of tortious interference with a business relationship, the plaintiffs must allege that the interferer 
did something illegal, unethical or fraudulent. There is nothing illegal, unethical or fraudulent in 
filing a lawsuit, whether groundless or not." Dalley v. Dykema Gossett P.L.L.C, 289046 (MICA) 
(Michigan 2010), citing Early Detection Center, P.C., v. New York Life Ins. Co., 157 Mich. App. 
618 at 631, 403 N.W.2d 830 (Mich. App. 1986). 
The case of Taylor v. McNichols, provides the Idaho Supreme Court's approval of sister 
state's interruption of the l:itigation privilege in light of the theories of the counter-claimants in 
the present case and provides: 
In Kahala Royal Corp. v. Goodsill Anderson Quinn & Stifel. LLP, the Supreme 
Court of Hawai'i took an extensive look at the litigation privilege, and how 
different jurisdictions have applied the privilege as it pertains to claims of tortious 
interference. 151 P.3d 732 (Haw. 2007). The Court noted that generally for a 
claim of tortious interference to be brought against an attorney, where such claim 
arises out ofhis performance as an attorney, it must be established that the 
attorney acted in a manner demonstrating personal malice or a desire to harm, not 
springing from his desire to protect his client. Id. at 750. (discussing Schott v. 
Glover, 440 N.E.2d 376,380 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982) ("A plaintiff can state a cause of 
action for tortious interference with a contract against a third party who is 
conditionally privih;~ged if the plaintiff can set forth factual allegations from which 
actual malice may reasonably be said to exist." (Emphasis added). However, these 
allegations "would necessarily include a desire to harm, which is independent of 
and unrelated to the attorney's desire to protect his client.") (Emphases added)). 
See also Fraidin v. Weitzman, 611 A.2d 1046, 1080 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1992) 
("To remove the qualified privilege, the attorney must possess a desire to harm 
which is independent ofthe desire to protect his client. This would constitute 
actual malice and therefore substantiate a tortious interference with contract 
claim.") (emphases added) (holding that, where the Appellant failed to allege fads 
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constituting actual malice on behalf of the attorney, a motion for summary 
judgment was appropriately granted); Macke Laundry Servo Ltd. P'ship V. Jetz 
Servo Co., 931 S.W.2d 166, 182 (Mo. Ct.App. 1996) ("This court recognizes a 
privilege for attomeys, when acting within the scope of the attorney" client 
relationship, to advise and act for a client even though that advice, ifwrong, may 
cause a client to t0l1iously interfere with another's business relationship or 
expectancy, so long as the attorney does not employ wrongful means and acts with 
good faith to proteet the interests of the client and not for the attorney's self 
interest."); Restatement (Third) of The Law Governing Lawyers § 57(3) (2000) 
("A lawyer who advises or assists a client to make or break a contract, to enter or 
dissolve a legal relationship, or to enter or not enter a contractual relation, is not 
liable to a nonclient for interference with contract or with prospective contractual 
relations or with a legal relationship, if the lawyer acts to advance the client's 
objectives without using wrongful means."). 
The case of State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. CO. V. Singh, 131 F.3d 148 (9th Cir. 1997), 
involved a case similar to the counter-claimants' allegations in the present matter. There State 
Farm brought an action against an opposing law firm and three litigants involved in a plior 
litigated proceeding. State Farm argued that the parties were active in promoting perjury during 
the trial. In ruling that the dismissal of the action was appropriate, the State Farm Court, stated, 
"That privilege is very broad and protects litigants from liability for their assertions or claims in 
lawsuits, so that access to the courts will be facilitated and litigants will not be harassed, [2] See 
Doctors' Co. v. Superior Court, 225 Cal. App.3d 1284, 1293,275 Cal. Rptr. 674, 679 (1991). The 
privilege is: absolute, even if the result is inequitable. See id. at 1294,275 Cal. Rptr. at 679". 
There has been no logical argument advanced by the counter-claimants which addresses 
why pro se litigants should be treated differently in the application of the litigation privilege. In 
fact, pro se litigants are held to the same standards and rules as attorneys and litigants represented 
by attorneys. Everhart v. W'ashington County Road and Bridge Dept., 130 Idaho 273,275,939 
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P.2d 849, 851 (1997), Golay v. Loomis, 118 Idaho 387, 392, 797 P.2d 95, 100 (1990). The 
counter-claimants have not pointed to any legal authority which limits the litigation privilege to 
attorneys as opposed to litigant. Case law above cited does not make such a distinction. In fact 
Taylor v. McNichols holds otherwise and provides: 
In fact, "at common law, the litigation privilege blanketed all participants in the 
court system; private attorneys were treated no differently than judges, 
government lawyers, and witnesses....This privilege is predicated on the long 
established principle that the efficient pursuit ofjustice requires that attorneys and 
litigants must be pf~rmitted to speak and write freely in the course oflitigation
 
without the fear of reprisal through a civil suit for defamation or libel.
 
The litigation privilege based upon the case law cited is presumed to exist. Taylor v.
 
McNichols, also holds that the litigation privilege is presumed. The counter-claimants have 
failed to allege any acts which could be construed as malice, fraud, or criminal behavior which 
may result in the limitation of the litigation privilege. The counterclaims must be dismissed in 
light of the allegations alleged in the amended counter-claims and the law cited in support of the 
motion. 
CONCLUSION 
The amended counter-claim filed by the Taylor counter-claimants fails to advance any 
legitimate claim in light of the litigation privilege. The attorney counter-claimants have failed to 
object to the motion to dismiss and failed to file any brief in opposition to the motion. The 
counter-claims must be dismissed. 
DATED this~cf day of November, 2010. 
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TA '{I.OR, an individual: R. JOHN TA YLOR, 
;111 individuill; CI.,ARK and FEENF~:Y, a 
p:lrtncrship: PAl) I. 'r. Clj\RK. :Ill individual; 
'1'1I[ODORE L. .1()IJNSON REVOCAJJLF 
'['RUST. an Idaho rcv(lcabk Irust; .101 IN 
I)OJ::S .I·JOHN DOES X; ANI) j!.,l.I, 
['[:RSOI'\S TN ['()SSESSTON OR CL\rr'...1JNC 
..\NY RIG]-!'r 'ro P()SSESSICJN, 
l)c fend :ll1 IS . 
.IOINDI,;R IN CO-()EFENl)ANTS' 
oPPOSrrlON '1'0 j\HJTiON TO 
DIS1\lISS AND/OR MOT'ION IN 
LlI\IINE AND OB.WCTlON TO 
IVIO'T'l()N FOR LEAVE '.1"0 AMEND 
I{EPLY TO COUNTEIH:Lf\IMS 
.JOINIWR IN CO-DEFENDANTS' OPPOSrl'ION '1'0 tvlOTION TO 
DIS,I\HSS AND/(m i\'IOTION IN UMINE AND OBJECTION TO 
1\10TION FOR LEAVI': '1'0 AMENT> REPLY '1"0 C'()UNTERCLAIi\IS - 1 
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....", 
Ikl\:::,<I"nls, C\mnie Wright Taylor, P,llil Thomas CI;ll'k and (1,lrk and F<Xlli,,:Y . 
.loin ill their co-del"t'l1lbnts' Ml:morandurll ill ()ppositjol1 to (:ounlerdt,CCfld;mls' .Mutioll 1.0 
l)isrnis~ and/or M()lioll in Liminc alld in co-defendants' ObjcctiolllO Coull'LTtk,lCndnnt~' Molion 
1(11' Le;lve to Anwnd Reply to ())l1rltcrclaill1s. ·file motions arc set for hC:JrilJ!-'. Oll NOVl~mhcr ~:;O, 
201(). PI;linlift"s' incorrectly assumed in their reply IlwI110l'nndum lhalthi,,: allol·ney coulIlcr­
claimants did 110t (\b.icct to the Illotion to dismiss. The attorney eoun"~r-ciailll;IllIS signed a 
stipubtioll to dismiss thdl' (;ounten:lainls bUI only the counterclaims o('thc attorneys. ;1l10 
thcrcl"lln;:, d.id 001 (0cl it was ncccss;lry to lill; allY scparalt, obje~:lion 10 the 11lO\IOn to di~miss. 
MOIT/\IT, TI/OMAS. B;\I.:ru-TT, J~()(K &, 
FIFI.DS. Clli\rnl;I~U) 
··"'·7 
,~y // /,) 1/ (// / I 
t3v MLlr~~ s.l~;~~:l:ki~·( ..;i:~;·f;~~00~;:;'~"··_-_·-
AllOrllCj,S rOI~ ()cfcnd:mls Connie- Wright 
-raylot' tla Connie 'fayIDr, Clnrk and 
Fecncy. ;1l1d Paul 'r·. C'lark 
J01NDER IN CO-DEFENDANTS' OPPOSI'fION TO MOTION '1'0 
DISMISS AND/OR iVI0TlON IN LI!\'JlNE AND OIUECTrON TO 
MOTION FOR LEAVE ·1'0 AJ\'fEND REPLY TO COlJNTERCLAll\lS - 2 
001880
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141  
I 1 n ll e n 10 n'LTtk~lCndnnt~' t
iiI!' (;:II,/(; Ol /rltcrclail s_ ' l ca il 0)) ov,  .
t i,.:pl WlllOI';}I1<ium . 1l01'll n -
, l Tl ~r-clain tnts :J 
l l:Jti l r lc I i lll l l: ~I ld
l ,,;1 l WllS e l'J' f e e ral(.: on to lnot;o
[):\,rr;:I) this 2<)th day oI'NOYClnb(:r, 20l0. 
/\I ' I ;l. . , IU .
.. ····  
.~:::' j ;:.:'>' //(./'.'
y , :ki~·(  : ~00~;:;'~" · --·-
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Clorn FICATE OF SERVIC'E 
I (-II-~f\F.B'{ CI.:XfIFY that on this 2.91h day of NOVl:lnbc[', 2010, I call~l;;d a tru.: 
,1I1d correct copy of"Ihe lon,,~goillg JOINDIUl, IN (:O~DEFENDANTS' OPPOSITION TO 
MOTION '1'0 DISMISS AND/OR MOTION IN LIMINE AND OIUECf.ION TO 
MOTION FOR U::AVE TO A[\'IENO REPLY '1'0 COlii'lTERCLAI!\IS to he scrvl.'d by 1111;: 
IlJcrhod jndic,ltcd he If)\\,o, and addressed 10 the 1()lJ()\V ing: 
Thomas (;.tvlailc TV ) U.S. Mail. Postage I)rcpaid 
1../\ \V 01'1.'1(:1,:::; OF 'fllOMAS (; MA II F IV, P.A. ) Hand D(;~l.j\'cl'cd 
380 W. State St. ( ) Overnight Mai I 
Eagk. II) :-:J(l I (l,,4()()2 (x) Facsimile 
r:(\(;sirnilc (20S) 9Y)- J001 
Christ T. Troupis ( ) tJ.S. Mail. Postag~: I>r\.'paid 
'T'ROUI'IS L.'\ W OFFICI::. PA ( ) Hand Delivered 
P(J. Box 2408 ( ) OVt:rnighlIVl~lil 
Eagle, ID S3(l] (, (x) Facsimile 
Facsimile- (20S) ~)~:-;-)4~2 
.Iohn C. Mirehcll ) U,S, Mall. Postage !)n::p:lid 
CL.;\RK & j;'LJ:NEI' ) I J;l11d Deliv<:n:d 
J 229 Main St.. Suite 201 ( ) Ovcrnight Mail 
p,o, Box 2~5 (Xl F~lCSillli Ie 
Lewiston. II) 83501-0285 
Facsimile (208) 74h-[)!()O 
Connie \Y. 'filylor ) U.S,Mail, Postag(~ Prt'p~lid 
Ilh:\l)hl{,,;()N t.,'\ W ) 1l'lIld I)c,1 ivcred 
()UO Washington. Suite 1020 ( ) OvcmightMail 
V;lllCollver. W:\ ()X(i60 (x) Facsimile 
F;l~:"ll11ik OM») (Ni-2() 11 
."
,/­
./,./--_....._-----_....._-_ ....... 
,JOINDER IN CO-I)Jl:FENDANTS' oPPOSrrlON TO MOTION TO 
DIS.MISS AND/OR MO'fi'I()i\i IN LIl\HNE .,\ND OIUECTION TO 
MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND REP.,Y TO COllNTERCT,AIMS ...1, 
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I ~~Ow:ncH fJI.H 
'! HO"1AS HAl LE 
NO. ._ ••-5...,.-:<:::.,..-.-.-­.. -~.~::-::1lI.~
A.M ...,.....,--.'..  _ 
DEC Ul 2010 
J. DAVID NAVARRO, Clerk 
ByJ.RANDAU 
DEPUlY 
M:lt~, S F'rusyll:>ki. l.sl~ No, :.!349 
M()"~l\n. TliOI\1·\,";, BARRm"!'. RO( 'I-: & 
FIl\1.D;{, ClfM{TEJlF.I" 
)01 $. ClJpjh)lBl~'(I., JO'Ih Fl\,l(ll' 
POfll 0 nice Bo:.; fl29 
l~lJi~r.. h,htho 1:\3 71)'1 
TclL1,hMl: (20:\) :\45w2000 
Pttc~irnile (208) 3S)~~~::I4 
rm:p01"'I(,m.lll,I:I'1I)1 
17JJ('.M06 
Alt(1l.llcy~ for Dcl'cnd,tnl!i (;llIl1lilJ WriHl1l 'l'HyIM Ika 
Connie T:Jylor. CJ,eJr!; :md rc;cllcy. :lIitl PUll! T. Chlrk 
IN THF.: [m)'rn lcr COURT OF n·m FOURTH ,HTDICIA!.. J)ISTrOCI 
OF TH ES'TAT[ or TDAHO.IN ANI') rOR '1'1113 COVNTV OF AD;\ 
DERKSI.fJRf. INVESTMr~Nl·S. 'L1.,C M 
l('!:thrl limil!!d 1l,lhili'y, (tn(1 THOMAS G, 
MAILE. IV. ;md C:OU.'EEN jJIRCH-MAI.U:" 
hllsb,m<J ,1M,] wi l'(;. 
I"·... 
CONNTL: WRiGl,!'!' '1'.'\ VLOR. tl.:::I. C()NNlE 
T." Yt,mt :\1, jlldividtllll~ DALI•.AN 
T/\YJ..OR. lili irldlvidlJal: R. JOHN T1\Y1.()R, 
'Ill illr1ivit!\llll: CLARK Ill'ld FI~I;NF,Y.:J 
1'<lrltlLlr:=hip; 1'.<\1!1. T, CLARK.:-I11 ;r1{]i~'itlll;,I: 
THEOl)ORE L .lO.HNSON REVOCJ\I.~L.IS 
TH'UST, lin tdnh'll\~vocahlt:(luSt; JOHN 
DOES 1·.I0UN D01:~S X; AN!) AU. 
PERSONS IN pO::;Sr:$SlON OR CLAIMING 
ANY PJ(':W1" TO POSSI-3SSION. 
......._-......~--", ...... _ .."._---_._~-
~T ...UJ.,I\l·I()N TO DISMISS 
COLIN Tli:RCI .AIM 01' ('LA IU( ANU 
fif:ENJ~Y O'.":Fl~NrMNTS 
~"'lPtJLi\TrONTO IHSMISS COUNTlmctAIM Of CI..,t\f{J, ANO 
1i'J1:F.Nri:V PEfENJ):,\,NTS. I 
.' 
-...
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THOt--lAS MAILE 
Hfrc!J-M,iilC', by ,11111 Ihrl)lJgh rhcir C<l\tnsr:J. ChriS! T. Troupis. 4'1nd \3c.:r1:.s"il'(~ fl1V\;t.II1'lI~nl~:, Lee:, 
LA'vV CWFlCES or 
Tl-l<:>MA~ n tvl!\l.1... Ji IV, PA, 
l -'] 
£, '::!:;~'it&...... ..-r:?-., " ,.... ~/ ..".,.13 .,.;;'.:::_-'-, . . . ,-,,=. .-.~_ .._-"..".. 
rhl1lnll~ (,. NILIlIi.:, rv, Pro Sf!' and 
Altom!;;y for PI~,jntjff~~! Bc:,.k~lljn~lnYcstnlcnL~ 
and Cnl1ccn 13il'ch·ivlnilo 
j')ATE'I) Ih); '.3~'f{.....d;'Y ()fNowmbor. lOIn, 
STI.PlJl...i\TJON TO »ISMTSS COllNTl~RC1AIM Of CtARK I\N[.l 
n;t':NIW DtFEi'ilMNTS· 2 
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12/82/2818 15:4g
I II • '-'I ._ ... 'v ••• J.... • ••.• I '/u:::l')~nl Ofrl 
DA't/!r> utlr. _ dlly of November. 2010. 
M(')rl'I\TI, TIiOMAS,lJAnltETT, RocY.. & 
Fll3l..os, CHAH'l'I!RP,T) 
Dy•._,_~~ __ 
Mnrk S. 11nl~~Yllski .' Of tht Firm 
Attorneys fur De(cndll,l'ltS Connie Wright 
Taylor tka COlll"lic Tll)llur. Clark ilnd 
Feeney, and Pllul ~r. Clllrk 
$TWULATION TO DISMJSS COUNTERCLAIM OF CLARK ANI> 
FtENEY D~:~~ENDAN'l'$• J 
001884
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12/B2/2810 15:49 
"1 Igl(,,",11,1 \".\-,u ~ .••. THOM?\S MMI..t:.. "­ F't,GE 85/05 
DATED I\li.;. .__,..~_ day uI'Nl1\'cmbcr, 20!O, 
tl y,_. ,,,,_.....,,..,.,_,._.... , ,__._~ 
l\)'I1ni~ Wright '1':1)'),:)1' 
i\lWr'llc:y9 [M .1(~lm 'l':Jylol', l)allrtl) Iilyl,\!' 
and lhe TII(;C)dMc J()hns(11l Tru:;l' 
DATED thi~; I~~ir;'llll' (.1 rNovt1I'l1bcr, 2010.
.--.. ,'....._.. " 
MOF'p,nT. THOMAS, BI\I~I~E'1·t', J~()CK & 
r:ll~l..l)S, Cil/\IrH!lH:n 
ST1~llLATrONTO nl~MlSS COVNTE.RCI.,\lM OF (I.AIU< AND 
Frtrr.NI·;V 1)Kf,"~NDANTS ~ ~~ 
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,. ' r GAHL'l U~TI~OR~ 
sy DEPU1"V 
Mark S. Prusynski, ISB No. 2349 
MOFFATT, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK & 
FIELDS, CHARTERED 
101 S. Capitol Blvd., 10th Floor 
Post Office Box 829 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone (208) 345-2000 
Facsimile (208) 385-5384 
msp@moffatt.com 
17136.0306 
Attorneys for Defendants Connie Wright Taylor fka 
Connie Taylor, Clark and Feeney, and Paul T. Clark 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
 
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an 
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G. 
MAILE, IV, and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE, 
husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
VS. 
COl'n-nE WRIGHT TAYLOR, fka CONNIE 
TAYLOR, an individual; DALLAN 
TAYLOR, an individual; R. JOHN TAYLOR, 
an individual; CLARK. and FEENEY, a 
partnership; PAUL T. CLARK, an individual; 
THEODORE L. JOHNSON REVOCABLE 
TRUST, an Idaho revocable trust; JOHN 
DOES I-JOHN DOES X; AND ALL 
PERSONS IN POSSESSION OR CLAIMING 
ANY RIGHT TO POSSESSION, 
Defl;:ndants. 
Case No. CV-OC-0723232 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
COUNTERCLAIM OF CLARK AND 
FEENEY DEFENDANTS 
NO ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED 
MOTION TO DISMISS COUNTERCLAIM OF CLARK AND 
FEENEY DEFENDANTS - 1 Client: 18530061 
001886
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, 1 
Come now the defendants, Clark and Feeney, Connie Taylor, and Paul Thomas 
Clark (the "Clark and Feeney Defendants") by and through their counsel, Mark S. Prusynski, and 
pursuant to I.R.c.P. 41(a)(2), and move for an order of voluntary dismissal of the Clark and 
Feeney Defendants' count,erclaims in the above matter, with and without fees or costs. 
This motion is made on the grounds and for the reasons that the Clark and Feeney 
Defendants' claims are derivative of the claims of the other defendants, and the only damages 
unique to the Clark and Feeney Defendants are their fees for defending the claims of the 
plaintiff, which can be adequately addressed in a post-trial motion to the court pursuant to 
I.R.C.P.54(d)(1). 
Defendants do not intend to request oral argument or to file a brief. 
DATED this 2nd day of December, 2010. 
MOFFATT, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK & 
FIELDS, CHARTERED 
~ 
By__-+-_--"'-'=~=-=---'-----=--V-c----
Mark . Prusynski - Of the lrm 
Attorneys for Defendants Connie Wright 
Taylor fka Connie Taylor, Clark and 
Feeney, and Paul T. Clark 
MOTION TO DISMISS COUNTERCLAIM OF CLARK AND 
FEENEY DEFENDANTS - 2 Client: 18530061 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 2nd day of December, 2010, I caused a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing MOTION TO DISMISS COUNTERCLAIM OF CLARK 
AND FEENEY DEFENHANTS to be served by the method indicated below, and addressed to 
the following: 
Thomas G. Maile IV ( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
LA W OFFICES OF THOMAS G MAILE IV, P.A. ( ) Hand Delivered 
380 W. State St. ( ) Overnight Mail 
Eagle, ID 83616-4902 (x) Facsimile 
Facsimile (208) 939-1001 
Christ T. Troupis ( ) US. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
TROUPIS LAW OFFICE, PA ( ) Hand Delivered 
P.O. Box 2408 ( ) Overnight Mail 
Eagle, ID 83616 (x) Facsimile 
Facsimile (208) 938-5482 
John C. Mitchell ( ) US. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
CLARK & FEENEY ( ) Hand Delivered 
1229 Main St., Suite 201 ( ) Overnight Mail 
P.O. Box 285 (x) Facsimile 
Lewiston,ID 83501-0285 
Facsimile (208) 746-9160 
COlmie W. Taylor ( ) US. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
HENDERSON LA W ( ) Hand Delivered 
900 Washington, Suite 1020 ( ) Overnight Mail 
Vancouver, WA 98660 (x) Facsimile 
Facsimile (360) 693-2911 
MOTION TO DISMISS COUNTERCLAIM OF CLARK AND 
FEENEY DEFENDANTS - 3 Client: 1853006.1 
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Mark S Prusynski 
REGf: 'lED NO......'i--,-,.,..----==----­
"'" JAN 03 2011 ...., A,M /J15'" _,,~~~.~, .... 
Ada COJ;~ty C:erk JAN 03 2011 
Local Counsel: J. DAViU t\lJWf\rmO, CI~rk 
ny,",.AMIS 
CONNIE W. TAYLOR ~:t'!.J1"V 
Henderson Law Firm, PLLC 
900 Washington Street, Suite 1020 
Vancouver, WA 98660 
Telephone 360.699.1530 
Fax 360.693.2911 
ISBA No. 4837 
Attorneys for Johnson Trust, 
DaHan Taylor, and John Taylor 
Applying counsel: 
PAUL L. HENDERSON 
Henderson Law Firm, PLLC 
900 Washington Street, Suite 1020 
Vancouver, WA 98660 
Telephone 360.699.1530 
Fax 360.693.2911 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an 
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G. Case No. CV OC 0723232 
MAILE, IV, and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE 
husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, MOTION FOR LIMITED ADMISSION 
vs. 
CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, et al. 
Defendants. 
The undersigned local counsel petitions the court for admission of the undersigned 
applying counsel, pursuanlt to Idaho Bar Commission Rule 222, for the purpose of the above-
MOTION FOR LIMITED ADMISSlON 1 
001889
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~ f m ,
1I v 
l i tiffs, 
I
captioned matter. Applying counsel certifies that he is an active member, in good standing, 
of the bar of Washington (certificate attached), that he maintains the regular practice of law at 
the above-noted address, and that he is not a resident of the State of Idaho or licensed Ito practice 
in Idaho. Applying counsel certifies that he has not been admitted under meR 222 previously. 
Both undersigned counsel certify that a copy of this motion has been served on all other 
parties to this matter and that a copy of the motion, accompanied by a $200 fee, has been 
provided to the Idaho State Bar. 
Local counsel certifies that the above is true to the best of her knowledge, after 
reasonable investigation. Local counsel acknowledges that her attendance shall be required at all 
court proceedings in which applying counsel appears, unless specifically excused by the trial 
judge. 
~r-r6 /;AT~D fhi£ day ofDecember, 20 I(L", , " ~"'~:~~'-
Connie W. Taylor U Paul  
MOTION FOR LIMITED ADMISSION 2
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the ~ day of December, 2010 I caused to be served a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed 
to the following: 
Thomas G. Maile, IV 
380 West State Street 
Eagle, 10 83616 
Mr. Christ Troupis
 
Attorney at Law
 
PO Box 2408
 
Eagle, 10 83616
 
Mark Prusynski 
MOFFATT THOMAS 
101 S Capitol Blvd., 10th Floor 
PO Box 829 
Boise, 10 83701 
U.S. Mail 
Hand Delivered 
Overnight Mail 
Telecopy (FAX) (208) 939-1001 
U.S. Mail 
Hand Delivered 
Overnight Mail 
Telecopy (FAX) (208) 938-5482 
U.S. Mail 
Hand Delivered 
Overnight Mail 
Telecopy (FAX) (208) 385-5384 
MOTION FOR LIMITED ADMISSION 3
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RECEIVED 
-- '-­JAN 03 2011 
Ada Cu-.:.;-..'j C:ork 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON 
) 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ADMISSION ) BAR NO. 872:9 
) 
OF ) CERTIFICATE A.S TO 
PAUL LLOYD HENDERSON ) 
) STANDING 
TO PRACTICE IN THE COURTS OF THIS STATE ) 
) 
) 
I, Ronald R. Carpenter, Clerk of the Supreme Court of the State of Washington, hereby certify 
PAUL LLOYD HENDERSON 
was regularly admitted to practice as an Attorney and Counselor at Law in the Supreme Court and all the 
Courts of the State of Washing~on on October 27, 1978, and after that date was continuous in good standing 
until he was suspended on October 13, 1997 for interim suspension per RId 3.1, conviction of a fc;:lony, 
attempted assault in the 2nd degree (2 counts), until reinstament on November 8, 2001. His status is 
currently active. 
IN TESTIMONY WHEREOF, I have 
hereunto set my hand and affixed 
the seal of said Court this 22nd day of 
December, 2010. 
Ronald R. CaI"pent 
Supreme Court Clerk 
Washington State Supreme Court 
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CONNIE W. TAYLOR 
Henderson Law Firm, PLLC 
900 Washington Street, Suite 1020 
Vancouver, WA 98660 
Telephone 360.699.1530 
Fax 360.693.2911 
ISBA No. 4837 
Attorneys for Johnson Trust, 
DaHan Taylor, and John Taylor 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an Idaho 
limited liability, and THOMAS G. MAILE, IV, and 
COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, et al. 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV OC 0723232 
MOTION IN LIMINE WITH SUPPORTING 
AUTHORITY 
TO: THE HONORABLE RICHARD GREENWOOD 
The Counter-defendants' Certification of Witnesses makes it apparent that they plan to 
try to roll the clock back to 2003 and have a trial of all the issues which they raised 
unsuccessfully in the Taylor v. Maile suit. That is improper, and flies in the face of this 
Court's order dismissing the Amended Complaint. The witness disclosure also shows that the 
Counter-defendants plan to call expert witnesses to testify that every court decision against 
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them was wrong, that all the decisions in their favor were right, and that the appellate court is 
going to set the record straight. This, also, is improper. 
Pursuant to IRE 103(c), IRE 402 and IRE 403, The Theodore Johnson Trust, John 
Taylor, and Dallan Taylor respectfully move that this Court enter an order prior to trial 
specifically excluding the testimony set forth below. The matters set out would be inadmissible 
for any purpose. They have no bearing on the counterclaims, which are the only issues being 
tried, or otherwise should be excluded for reasons stated below. 
If the Court reserves ruling on any issues, opposing counsel and all witnesses should 
be instructed to refrain from making any mention, interrogation, or argument, directly or 
indirectly, concerning any of the matters set forth herein, without first approaching the Bench 
and obtaining a ruling of the Court outside the presence and hearing of the jury. 
1.	 Expert le~ testimony. Under IRE 702, a person with specialized knowledge 
may testify as an expert ![that testimony "will assist the trier of fact to understand the 
evidence or to determine a fact in issue." 
Many, if not most, of the opinions which will be expressed by expert witnesses 
John Runft and Thomas G. Maile, IV do not relate to any fact in issue in this case, but 
instead are bIatant attempts to contradict and countermand decisions which were 
made by the trial court and the Supreme Court in Taylor v. Maile, as well as decisions 
which have been made by this Court in the present matter. The objectionable 
testimony which has been disclosed at this juncture includes: 
COUNTERCLAIMANTS'
 
MOTION IN LIMINE 2
 
001894
  
nn
ll t nn
 
 
a.	 Testimony, argument or inference that this Court's rulings in this case 
were in error, such as: 
l. res judicata did not apply to the Plaintiffs' claims in this case, 
II.	 exceptions to the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel 
"were present" in this case, 
111.	 There was "no determination of the merits" III the present 
litigation 
b.	 Testimony, argument, or inference that this Court erred in denying 
Mailes' motions to dismiss and/or for summary judgment on the 
counterclaims 
c.	 Testimony, argument or inference that speculates as to what past courts 
might have done differently or what future courts may do, including: 
l.	 Maile's intention to testify that "there is a high probability that 
the appellate courts will reverse the current court's ruling as res 
judicata does not apply and/or there is an exception based upon 
perjury and/or fraud upon the court." 
II.	 Runft's intention to testify that Judge Wilper "wouId not have 
ordered the property restored to the trust" without the Taylor's active 
COUNTERCLAlMANTS'
 
MOTION IN LlMlNE 3
 
001895
 
1. 
 
 
 
 
1. 
 
1  
onO 1 U 1  
misrepresentation, and if there had been a trial, claims of quasi 
estoppel "would have been considered by the court. " 
iii.	 Runft's intention to testify "if the present case is correct that 
Taylors were no longer beneficiaries" their claim resulted in 
judgment being wrongfully obtained based on fraud and/or criminal 
conduct 
d.	 Testimony relating to the Supreme Court decision in Taylor v. 
McNichols, which is just an attempt to ask the jurors to reverse this Court's 
denial of the Counter-defendants' Motion for Reconsideration of the order 
dismissing the claims against Clark and Feeney and its attorneys: 
I.	 Testimony, argument or inference as to whether the litigation 
privilege established in Taylor v. McNichols should be applied in this 
instance. The applicability of the litigation privilege is a question of 
law which must be decided by the Court, not the jury. Springer v. 
Richardson Law Firm, 239 P.3d 473 (Okla.Civ.App. Div. I, 2010); 
Unarco Material Handling, Inc., v. Liberato, 217 S.W.3d 227 
(Tenn.Ct.App., 2010); See also Lubcke v. Boise City/Ada County 
Housing Authority, 124 Idaho 450, 860 P.2d 653 (1993) (as to 
qualified immunity). 
11.	 Testimony about the existence of a lawsuit between Reed Taylor 
and John and Connie Taylor, and the underlying facts and allegations 
COUNTERCLAIMANTS'
 
MOTION IN LIMINE 4
 
001896
 
 
1  
 
 
 
in Taylor v. McNichols, which have no relevance in this matter, 
would be presented solely to try to get some mileage out of the rift in 
the family, and would be substantially prejudicial and not probative 
of any issue in this case. 
iii.	 Testimony as to "when a claim for litigation misconduct 
accrues" and "the appellate court standards in review of issues on 
appeal which based upon custom and practice and the rules of the 
court, appellate courts will not consider issues that are not ripe for 
judicial determination including the fraud upon the court and the 
allegations of perjury committed by the attorneys and counter-
claimants. " 
e.	 Any argument, inference, or testimony by witnesses, including Mr. 
Runft and Mr. Maile, that the Taylors did not have the legal right to seek the 
return of the Linder Road property. This issue was decided in Taylor t and 
again in Taylor //2, is the law of the case, and it is improper for witnesses or 
counsel to attempt to convince the jurors that their judgment on that issue is 
superior to that of the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho. In essence, 
attempting to argue that issue at this trial amounts to a request that the jurors 
reverse the trial and Supreme Court decisions, and is a perfect example of 
I Taylor v. Maile, 142 Idaho 253, 127 P.3d 156 (2005)
 
2 Taylor v. Maile, 146 Idaho 705, 20 I P.3d 1282 (2009)
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why res judicata is such a fundamental and important principle of our legal 
system. 
f. Testimony which directly misrepresents prior court decisions, such as: 
i.	 Maile's intent to testify that the Supreme Court's decision 10 
Taylor II held that "the Taylors had in fact disclaimed their entire 
interest in the trust" and that "The Taylor's [sic] are not beneficiaries 
of the trust as judicially determined in the January 2009 decision." 
n. Runft's intent to testify that the Taylors retained no beneficial 
interest in the Trust, were trustees only, and committed "an unlawful 
objective in having the property restored by misrepresenting their 
status as beneficiaries. " 
Ill. Runft's intent to testify that the "Supreme Court refused to access 
[sic] sanctions of the filing of the present suit although requested by 
the counterclaimants to so [sic]." This is a total fabrication. No 
request for sanctions was made; on the contrary, the Taylors joined 
in the request for permissive appeal. The Supreme Court rejected the 
request, and has not ruled in any manner on the filing of the present 
suit. 
iv.	 Inferring that the Counter-defendants'claims were not frivolous or 
had merit because this Court has denied a request for fees and/or 
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sanctions. In actuality, the request for fees relating to the Complaint 
was reserved, not denied. 3 
g.	 Testimony as to "the custom and practice of attorneys in the State of 
Idaho" is irrelevant. The conduct required of attorneys is set forth in the 
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure and the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct, 
and that is the only appropriate standard by which to measure the Counter-
defendants' actions. 
h.	 Testimony as to money Berkshire invested in the real property and the 
expression of theories as to why Mailes "were denied the remedy of unjust 
enrichment." The trial court in Taylor v. Maile stated its reasons for that 
decision, which are a matter of record4,and "expert testimony" on that issue 
is not only improper, it is not helpful to any issue pending in this matter. 
1.	 Testimony that Berkshire had paid for the land, the Trust had waived its 
right to rescind the transaction, and Beth Rogers 2003 letter stating the trust 
was "standing by the contract" are all irrelevant in light of the fact that the 
contract was deemed to be void,S and that finding was upheld by the 
Supreme Court. 6 
3 Memorandum Decision and Order, July 2, 2009, paragraph VI, page 14.
 
4 See Ada Co. Case CV OC 04004730, Memorandum Decision and Order Denying Counterclaimant's claim for
 
Damages Grounded on the Theory of Unjust Enrichment, November 29,2006
 
5 Ada Co. Case CV OC 04004730, Order Granting Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment on Beneficiaries'
 
Claim, May 15, 2006.
 
6 Taylor v. Maile, 146 Idaho 705, 201 P.3d 1282 (2009).
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J.	 Testimony as to the applicability of judicial estoppel, which was among 
the claims which were dismissed7 and was not pled as an affirmative 
defense. Failure to plead a defense in the amended answer acts as a waiver of 
the defense and all objections based on it. Ernst v. Hemenway and Moser, 
Co., Inc., 120 Idaho 941,821 P.2d 996 (Ct. App., 1991). 
2.	 Dismissed claims couched as affirmative defenses. The Counter-Defendants' 
Second and Third Affirmative Defenses are, in reality, merely an attempt to raise, 
as affirmative defenses, the very claims that were dismissed. 
a.	 The Second Affirmative Defense sets out the Idaho Code provisions for 
racketeering activity. That was raised as Count Eleven in the Amended 
Compllaint8 , was dismissed, and cannot now be raised as an affirmative 
defense. 
b.	 Claims for equitable estoppel and quasi estoppel, the Third Affirmative 
defense, were also raised in the Amended Complaint9 ,IO and were dismissed, 
barring their being raised as affirmative defenses. 
3. Testimony relating to issues relevant only in Taylor v. Maile, including: 
a. Value of the Linder Road property: 
7 March 25, 2008 Amended Complaint, page 46, Count Twelve, Judicial Estoppel.
 
8 March 25, 2008 Amended Complaint, Count Eleven, pages 30 - 45.
 
9 March 25, 2008 Amended Complaint, Count Nine, page 29.
 
10 March 25, 2008 Amended Complaint, Count Ten, pages 29-30.
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COUNTERCLAIMANTS' 
MOTION IN LIMINE 
In 2002 (erroneously referred to as 2004) (Knipe appraisal, 
witnesses Brooks Potter and/or Bradford Knipe). This is irrelevant 
to the counterclaims, and ultimately was not even relevant in the first 
case. The ruling that the Mailes' purchase was void was based on the 
lack of court approval as required by I.C. 68-108(b), not on whether 
the purchase price was reasonable. Therefore, what the property was 
worth in 2002 at the time of the Knipe appraisal has no bearing on 
any issues in this case. 
In 2004 (Williams appraisal). For the reasons stated above, this 
appraisal is also irrelevant to the issues remaining to be tried in this 
matter. 
In 2006 (Joe Corlett appraisal and trial testimony). Mr. Corlett 
testified at the trial of Mailes' unjust enrichment claim in October of 
2006. His testimony was limited to the value of the property after 
improvements which Mailes had made and is totally irreh~vant in this 
case. In addition, at the court trial Judge Wilper ruled that the 
improvements by Maile did not increase the value of the property. II 
Allowing testimony on that issue would do nothing more than invite 
the jurors to second guess Judge Wilper and the Idaho Supreme 
Court, which affirmed his decision. 
9 
001901
 
ant 
b.	 Testimony by Al Knudson about the construction loan MaiIes obtained 
on the Linder Road property in 2004. This was relevant only to the Mailes' 
counterclaim for tortious interference with contract, which was dismissed by 
Judge Wilper. 12 
c.	 Testimony by Bart Harwood, who represented the Johnson Trust for a 
short time in 2004, or the beneficiaries or Trustees of the Johnson Family 
Trust, Scott Johnson, Beth Rogers, Andrew Rogers, Darren Rogers, Brent 
Johnson, Hazel Fisher. None of these persons has had any involvement 
with the Johnson Trust nor involvement in the lawsuits since the execution 
of the Disclaimer Agreement in July of 2004, and have no knowledge that 
would be relevant to the issues remaining to be tried in the present case. 
d.	 Testimony by David Wishney, whose sole involvement was in August of 
2002 when he reviewed the purchase documents which Mr. Maile drafted. 
e.	 Testimony by Phillip Collaer, who was the attorney hired by Mr. 
Maile's realtor's E&O carrier from 3/23/04 to 8/25/05. Mr. Collaer has had 
no involvement in these matters during any time relevant to the issues 
pending at this point. 
f.	 Testimony by Jack S. Gjording, who was the attorney hired by Mr. 
Maile's legal E&O carrier. Mr. Gjording's involvement ended in 2005; he 
II See Ada Co. Case CY OC 0400473D, Memorandum Decision, November 29,2006, page 6 
12 Ada County Case CYOC 0400473D, February 13,2006 Order Regarding Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary 
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has had no involvement in these matters during any time relevant to the 
issues pending at this point. 
g.	 Testimony by Imajean Hetherington, who was Mr. Johnson's accountant 
prior Ito his death in 2002. Mrs. Heatherington's sole involvement was 
writing a letter to Mr. Johnson in 2002, prior to the Mailes' purchase of the 
Linder Road property for $400,000, indicating that she felt the land might be 
worth close to $1,000,000. Because the value of the property at that point is 
not relevant, her testimony has no conceivable relevance to any pending 
issue. 
4. Attitude and/or opinion of beneficiaries toward initial lawsuit; Joelationship 
with Theodore Johnson. The Counter-defendants should be precluded from presenting any 
evidence whatsoever relating to whether beneficiaries or successor co-trustees to the Theodore 
Johnson Trust approved or disapproved of the filing of the initial lawsuit against 
Mailes/Berkshire. Because the purchase was deemed to be void, such testimony is irrelevant 
and immaterial, and any potential probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of 
unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury. 
In addition, Counter-defendants have in the past attempted to introduce evidence as to 
how frequently beneficiaries (specifically Helen Taylor and her children) visited Ted Johnson. 
Because Mr. Johnson's state of mind has no bearing in this (or even in the preceding) action, 
that line of questioning is also irrelevant and should not be permitted. 
Judgment, page 3-4; Judgment on Beneficiaries' Claims, June 7, 2006, page 2, paragraph 4.A.
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5. Speculation as to Ted Johnson's attitude and/or opinion toward selling the 
Linder Road property to Mailes. The Counter-defendants should also be precluded from 
presenting any argument or evidence which would speculate as to what Ted Johnson's attitude 
might have been about selling the trust property to Mailes. That is totally irrelevant to the 
issues in this case, and indeed had no relevance to the prior lawsuit, which held the purchase to 
be void because the successor trustees had a conflict of interest and had not obtained court 
approval of the sale, as was required by I.C. 68-108(b). 
6. Any communications between trustees and beneficiaries of the Theodore 
Johnson Trust and their attorneys. Counter-defendants have disclosed as fact witnesses 
four attorneys (Bart HarWOOd, Connie Taylor, Paul Thomas Clark, and David Wishney) who 
have represented the Johnson Trust and/or its trustees or beneficiaries. The Counter-defendants 
should be precluded from presenting any evidence relating to communications or documents 
for two reasons: 
a. None of the facts known by Harwood or Wishney are relevant to the 
issues pending in this trial; 
b. All of those communications are protected by the attorney-client or work 
product privilege. 
c. Calling opposing counsel as a witness creates a conflict with I.R.P.C. 
3.7, which precludes an attorney from acting as advocate at a trial where he or she is "a 
necessary witness." There is no testimony which could be obtained from Ms. Taylor that 
COUNTERCLAIMANTS' 
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could not be obtained from other witnesses as well, and the Counter-defendants should be 
precluded from attempting to call her as a witness. 
7. Circumstances surrounding the resignation of Beth and Andy Rogers and 
all communications prior to execution of the Disclaimer Agreement. 
Because the Idaho Supreme Court has ruled that in the Disclaimer Agreement the 
Taylors specifically retained the right to pursue the suit relating to the Linder Road property, 
any questions or argument on the circumstances leading up to that agreement would be nothing 
more than an attempt to get the jurors in this action to in effect overrule the Supreme Court 
decision. 
In addition, all communications preceding the execution of the Disclaimer Agreement 
(including but not limited to the April 14, 2004 letter from Connie Taylor to Bart Harwood) 
are inadmissible under the parol evidence rule, which precludes extrinsic evidence of prior or 
contemporaneous negotiations or conversations to contradict, vary, alter, add to, or detract from 
the terms of an unambiguous contract." Howard v. Perry, 141 Idaho 139, 106 P.3d 465, 467 
(2005). See also Valley Bank v. Christensen, 119 Idaho 496, 498, 808 P.2d 415, 417 (1991). 
Our Supreme Court ruled in Howard that the presence of a merger clause in a written 
contract conclusively establishes that the agreement is integrated and therefore subject to the 
parol evidence rule. The Disclaimer, Release & Indemnity Agreement contains an express 
provision that "all prior or contemporaneous agreements, understandings, representations, 
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warranties and statements, oral or written, are superseded.,,13 "The merger clause is not merely a 
factor to consider in deciding whether the agreement is integrated; it proves the agreement is 
integrated." Howard v. Perry, 141 Idaho 139, 142, 106 P.3d 465, 468 (2005). 
8. Whether Helen Taylor has a will and the provisions thereof. Counter-
defendants have questioned witnesses as to whether Helen Taylor has a will, and if so, what it 
provides. There is no relevance to that issue, and all evidence relating to the issue should be 
excluded. 
9. Testimony l~elen Taylor. Counter-defendants have indicated an intention to 
call Helen Taylor as a witness. That should not be allowed; Mrs. Taylor is nearly 95 years 
old, blind, and extremely hard of hearing even with the use of hearing aids. 
10. Administration, including distributions, of the Johnson Trust has no 
relevance to the issues in this suit. 
11. AdvocacJr.J!y Mr. Maile. I.R.P.C. 3.7 precludes a lawyer from acting as 
advocate at a trial in which the lawyer is likely to be a necessary witness. Because Mr. Maile 
has named himself as an expert witness on the ultimate issues in this matter, he must be 
prohibited from questioning witnesses, addressing the jury, or addressing the Court, 
12. Cumulative Evidence. The Counter-defendants should not be permitted to 
submit cumulative evidence. 
13 Disclaimer, Release & Indemnity Agreement, paragraph 10, page 3, Exhibit A to Reply to Plaintiffs' Opposition 
to Motion for Summary Judgment, filed in the present action and dated April 10,2009. 
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IRE 403 deals with the exclusion of relevant evidence on various grounds. 
Specifically, evidence may be excluded even if probative when considering undue delay, waste 
of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. Idaho courts have stated that 
"cumulative evidence is additional or corroborative evidence that 'goes to prove what has 
already been established by other evidence.' BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, 380 (6th ed. 
1990)." Small v. State, 132 Idaho 327, 971 P.2d 1151 (1998). An accountant's testimony was 
deemed repetitious and excluded as cumulative evidence under IRE 403 when on]y one other 
witness had presented the same data. Reed v. Reed, 137 Idaho 53, 44 P.3d 1108 (2002). 
Based on the assumption that their disclosures are genuine and not merely an attempt to 
harass and obfuscate, it is clear that the trial of this matter will take much longer than the five 
days currently scheduled unless cumulative testimony is prohibited. Counterclaimants ask that 
the Court require the Counter-defendants to select and identify the witnesses they actually plan 
to call to testify, and that the Counter-defendant be limited in the number of persons who can 
be called on any specific issue. 
a.	 The Counter-defendants' disclosure indicates that Thomas Maile is gomg to 
testify "as to the same areas outlined above by Mr. Runft and will provide the 
same opinions as set forth above." This is, by definition, cumulative testimony 
which should be precluded under I.R.E. 403. 
b.	 The disclosure also names "Beneficiaries or Trustees of the Johnson Family 
Trust. " There were originally, prior to entry into the Disclaimer Agreement, 
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27 beneficiaries; of those, only the Taylors have had any involvement in this 
matter since the Disclaimer Agreement was entered into in 2004. 
c.	 Four witnesses (Bradford Knipe, R. Brooks Potter, Tim Williams, and Joe 
Corlett) are designated to testify as to the value of the Linder property. 
d.	 Three witnesses (John Runft, Thomas Maile IV, Dennis Cindell) are designated 
to testify to the effect of a Lis Pendens and/or this litigation on the subject 
property. 
13. Issues relating to real property in Star, Idaho. Counter-defendams should be 
precluded from presenting any evidence relating to the fact that Reed and Dallan Taylor 
purchased real property located in Star, Idaho from the Theodore Johnson Trust. That 
purchase has no relationship to the issues in this case. 
14. Any sugg{~stion that recovery by Counterclaimants would not be subject to 
federal income tax or any other form of taxation. Idaho courts have been clear that 
testimony regarding the presence or lack of taxation pertaining to damage awards is 
inappropriate. lnama v. Brewer, 132 Idaho 377, 973 P.2d 148 (1999). 
15. Requested damage amount. No mention, comment, question, argument or 
other reference whatsoever should be made to the effect that the Counterclaimants' attorneys 
have asked for a greater amount of damages than the Counterclaimants expect to receive. IRE 
408. 
16. Mention of the probable testimony of a witness who will not be or may not 
be testifying at trial. Counsel in voir dire or opening statement, or in questions to any 
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witness, shall not mention the probable testimony of a witness who will not be or may not be 
testifying at trial. 
17. Any reference to the financial status of any party to this suit. The financial 
status of any party to this lawsuit is irrelevant and should not be discussed. 
18. Adverse effect on society. Defense counsel and witnesses should not produce 
argument or testimony to the effect that any award for Counterclaimants would adversely affect 
jurors or society at large, or that awards in other cases have been too high or havt~ an adverse 
impact on society or specific segments of society. 
19. Expert opinions not provided through discovery under CR 26(b)(4). 
Counter-defendants' counsel was requested through interrogatories to provide full opinions of 
their experts to enable Counterclaimants to prepare for trial as allowed in CR 26(b)(4). IRE 
705 then describes the scope of expert testimony, and requires that the underlying facts or data 
have been previously disclosed to Counterclaimants if requested. Counterclaimants did request 
complete disclosure, including the underlying facts or data, and therefore Counter-defendants 
now should be limited in any expert testimony to the specific information provided. 
20. Referenc€~ to motion to exclude evidence. There should be no mention that 
this motion has been presented to or ruled upon by the Court. In this connection, 
Counterclaimants move that defense counsel be instructed not to suggest to the jury, by 
argument or otherwise, that Counterclaimants have sought to exclude from proof any matter 
bearing upon the issues in this cause or the rights of the parties to this suit. 
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CONCLUSION 
Counterclaimants seek a pretrial order and ruling of this court. As to every ruling the 
court makes in limine pursuant to these motions, Counterclaimants request that aU parties and 
their counsel be instructed to specifically advise all witnesses prior to their testimony of the 
court's rulings. 
DATED thi&.;J4ay of December, 2010. 
.,...._._-.-........
 
\, 
By 
Conni W. Taylor, a member ofthec,firm. 
Attorneys for Counterclaimants. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the _;Zt] day of December, 20 I0 I caused to be served a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing documt:nt by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Thomas G. Maile, IV U.S. Mail
 
380 West State Street Hand Delivered
 
Eagle, ID 83616 Overnight Mail
 
Telecopy (FAX) (208) 939-1001 
Mr. Christ Troupis U.S. Mail
 
Attorney at Law Hand Delivered
 
PO Box 2408 Overnight Mail
 
Eagle, ID 83616 Telecopy (FAX) (208) 938-5482
 
~!.~-~ 
Mark Prusynski U.S. Mail
 
MOFFATT THOMAS Hand Delivered
 
101 S Capitol Blvd., 10th Floor Overni8..ht Mail
 
PO Box 829 Telecopy-i(FAX) (208) 385-5384

Boise, ID 83701
 
"\ 
""-,! 
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-. _.......
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Connie W. Taylor 
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Christ T. Troupis, ISB # 4549 
TROUPIS LAW OFFICE 
1299 E. Iron Eagle, Ste 130 
PO Box 2408 
Eagle, Idaho 83616 
Telephone: 208/938-5584 
Facsimile: 208/938-5482r 
Email: ctroupis@troupislaw.com 
Co-counsel for Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants 
JAN 03 2011 
j DAVID i\JAVARRO, Clerk 
By/;.3ARDEN 
JEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
 
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an 
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G. 
MAILE, IV. and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE, 
husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants, 
v. 
CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, f/k/a 
CONNIE TAYLOR, an individual; DALLAN 
TAYLOR, an individual; R. JOHN 
TAYLOR, an individual; CLARK and 
FEENEY, a partnership; PAUL T. CLARK, 
an individual; THEODORE L. JOHNSON 
REVOCABLE TRUST, an Idaho revocable 
trust; JOHN DOES I -JOlIN DOES X; AND 
ALL PERSONS IN POSSESSION OR 
CLAIMING ANY RIGHT TO 
POSSESSION. 
Defendants/Counter-Claimants. 
Case No. CV-OC-0723232 
MOTION TO EXCLUDE EXPERT 
& LAY TESTIMONY RE: ClLAIMS 
AGAINST COUNTER­
DEFENDANTS 
COMES NOW, the Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants, by and through their co-counsel of 
record, Christ T. Troupis, and moves this Honorable Court for entry of its Order prohibiting the 
MOTION TO EXCLUDE EXPERT & LAY TESTIMONY RE: CLAIMS AGAINST 
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS - Pg 1 
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Defendants/Counter-Claimants and/or Counter-Claimants' attorney and/or witnesses from 
referencing whether the conduct ofthe counter-claimants was or was not reasonable, including 
but not limited to voir dire, opening arguments, advancing testimony and/or submitting ,my 
evidentiary items surrounding the jury determination of the issue of reasonableness. 
This Motion is on the grounds and for the reasons that such testimony and/or information 
is irrelevant and immaterial to these proceedings and lacks probative value and is further made 
pursuant to the Memorandum Brief in Support ofMotion in Limine, filed concurrently herewith 
and the record and file contained herein. This Motion further is made pursuant to 401, 402, 403, 
701, 702, 703, & 704 of the: Idaho Rules of Evidence. Oral argument is requested. 
DATED this 31st day of December, 2010. 
CHRIST T. TROUP~,
 
Co-counsel for Coun er-Defendants
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on this 31st day of December, 2010, I caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing (1) MOTION TO EXCLUDE EXPERT & LAY TESTIMONY RE: 
CLAIMS AGAINST COUNTER-DEFENDANTS, (2) MEMORANDUM BRIEF IN SUPPORT 
OF MOTION TO EXCLUDE EXPERT & LAY TESTIMONY RE: CLAIMS AGAINST 
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS, (3) AFFIDAVIT OF CHRIST TROUPIS IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTIONS IN LIMINE, together with (3) NOTICE OF HEARING RE: MOTION TO 
EXCLUDE EXPERT & LAY TESTIMONY RE: CLAIMS AGAINST COUNTER­
DEFENDANTS, to be delivered, addressed as follows: 
Connie W. Taylor ~U.S.Mail 
Henderson Law Firm () Facsimile Transmission 
900 Washington S1. Suite 1020 () Hand Delivery 
Vancouver, Washington 98660 () Overnight Delivery 
Facsimile: (360) 693-2911 
Mark Stephen Prusynski ~ U.S.Mail 
PO Box 829 () Facsimile Transmission 
Boise, ID 83701 () Hand Delivery 
Phone: (208)345-2000 () Overnight Delivery 
Facsimile: (208) 385-5384 
Thomas G. Maile, IV. () u. S. Mail 
380 W. State Street () Facsimile Transmission 
Eagle, Idaho 83616 ~ Hand Delivery 
Facsimile: (208) 939-1001 () Overnight Delivery 
CHRIST T. TROd~'s,
 
Co-counsel for Plaintiffs/Counter-Defend,mts
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Christ 1'. Troupis, ISB # 4549 
TROUPIS LAW OFFICE 
1299 E. Iron Eagle, Ste 130 
POBox 2408 
Eagle, Idaho 83616 
Telephone: 208/938-5584 
Facsimile: 208/938-5482 
Email: ctroupis@troupis1aw.com 
Co-counsel for Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants 
I\jO'J4J!~ FILEOA.M __P.M. .~ . 
JAN 03 2011 
J, DAVID NAVARRO, ClerK 
By A. Gi~RDEN 
'JEPLITY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
 
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an 
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G. 
MAILE, IV. and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE, 
husband and wife, 
P1aintiffs/Counter-Defendants, 
v. 
CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, flkla 
CONNIE TAYLOR, an individual; DALLAN 
TAYLOR, an individual; R. JOHN 
TAYLOR, an individual; CLARK and 
FEENEY, a partnership; PAUL T. CLARK, 
an individual; THEODORE L. JOHNSON 
REVOCABLE TRUST, an Idaho revocable 
trust; JOHN DOES I -JOHN DOES X; AND 
ALL PERSONS IN POSSESSION OR 
CLAIMING ANY RIGHT TO 
POSSESSION. 
Defendants/Counter-Claimants. 
Case No. CV-OC-0723232 
PLAINTIFFS/COUNTER­
DEFENDANTS'MEMORANDUM 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION 
TO EXCLUDE EXPERT & LAY 
TESTIMONY RE: CLAIMS 
AGAINST COUNTER­
DEFENDANTS 
COMES NOW, the Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants, by and through their co-counsel of 
record, Christ T. Troupis, provide this Memorandum Brief in support of their Motion In Limine 
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re: limiting expert's opinions regarding Idaho Law and ultimate factual issues. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The counter-claimants have provided named Dr. Graig Lewis, as an expert witness to testify 
at trial. The scope ofthe testimony is set forth in the Counter-claimants' Witness Disclosure, which 
is an attachment to the Affidavit ofChrist Troupis in Support ofthe Motion in Limine which is filed 
concurrently herewith. 
LEGAL ARGUMENT 
A.	 The Trial Court should not allow the Counter-claimants to present expert opinions 
regarding the law surrounding the cause of actions relating to the Plaintiffs' claims 
and/or actions and/or any opinions about the reasonableness of the filing and/or the 
pursuit of such claims. 
The determination of use of expert opinions is governed by LR.C.P. Rule 702. Under the 
rules, expert opinion testimony is only admissible when" the expert is a qualified expert in the field, 
the evidence will be of assistance to the trier offact, experts in the particular field would n~asonably 
rely upon the same type of facts relied upon by the expert in forming his opinion, and the probative 
value ofthe opinion testimony is not substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect." Coombs v. 
Curnow, 148 Idaho 129,219 P.3d 453 (Idaho 2009) citing Ryan v. Beisner, 123 Idaho 42, 47,844 
P.2d 24, 29 (Ct. App.1992);, see also Idaho R. Evidence 702, 703, & 403. " [E]xpert opinion which 
is speculative, conclusory, or unsubstantiated by facts in the record is ofno assistance to the jury in 
rendering its verdict, and therefore is inadmissible." Ryan, 123 Idaho at 46-47, 844 P.2dl at 28-29; 
see also Idaho R. Evidence 702. Testimony is speculative when it " theorizes] about a matter as to 
which evidence is not sufficient for certain knowledge." Karlson v. Harris, 140 Idaho 561, 565, 97 
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P.3d 428,432 (2004). 
LR.C.P. Rule 702 provides:
 
Testimony by experts. If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will
 
assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a
 
witness qualified as ,m expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education,
 
may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.
 
In general, expert testimony which does nothing but vouch for the credibility of another
 
witness encroaches upon the jury's vital and exclusive function to make credibility determinations, 
and therefore does not 'assist the trier of fact' as required by Rule 702." U.S. v. Charley, 189 F.3d 
1251,1267 (lOth Cir.1999); see also Washington v. Schriver, 240 F.3d 101, 113 (2d Cir.2001); 
Goodwin v. MTD Products Inc., 232 F.3d 600,609 (7th Cir.2000). 
The areas oftestimony in which the witness has identified in the Certification ofWitnesses, 
provides that Mr. Lewis will testify in essence that the position of the plaintiffs in filing the present 
matter was not reasonable. ill addition, the witness may attempt to testify that no other attorney in 
the State ofIdaho would have reasonably believed that res judicata and/or collateral estoppel would 
not have been applied under the facts as made known to the plaintiffs. Reasonableness is normally 
a factual issue for the jury, the court may make that determination as a matter of law when the 
evidence leads to only one reasonable conclusion. See Brand S Corp. v. King, 102 Idaho at 734,639 
P.2d at 432 (1981) Young v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 127 Idaho 130,898 P.2d 61 (Idaho 
App.1994). 
Where a jury has be,en requested, the non-moving party must receive the benefit of every 
reasonable inference that may be drawn from the facts presented. Earl v. Cryovac, A Division of 
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W.R. Grace Co., 115 Idaho 1087, 772 P.2d 725 (Ct. App.1989) (review denied); see also Anderson 
v. Ethington, 103 Idaho 658, 651 P.2d 923 (1982). Therefore, O'Neil had the burden to demonstrate 
to the judge that a triable issue arose from the facts. Earl, supra; 6 J. MOORE, W. TAGGART, & 
J. WICKER, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 56.11 (2d ed.1988). "A 'triable issue' exists 
whenever reasonable minds could disagree as to the material facts or the inferences to be drawn from 
those facts." Earl, supra 115 Idaho at 1093-94, 772 P.2d at 731-32. This threshold ofreasonableness 
is as far as the judge may look. The task of weighing the evidence and observing the demeanor of 
witnesses is properly preselved for the jury. Id. at 1094, 772 P.2d at 732. O'Neil v. Vasseur, 118 
Idaho 257, 796 P.2d 134 (Idaho App. 1990) 
Idaho courts have routinely held that "an expert's opinion, in a proper case, is admissible up 
to the point where an expression ofopinion would require the expert to pass upon the credibility of 
witnesses or the weight ofdisputed evidence. To venture beyond that point, however, is to usurp the 
jury's function." State v. Hester, 114 Idaho 688, 696, 760 P.2d 27, 35 (1988); see also State v. 
Konechny, 134 Idaho 410, 419, 3 P.3d 535, 544 (Ct. App.2000). "It is the jury's function to assess 
the demeanor of the witnesses and make a determination of credibility..... This COUlt will not 
second-guess the jury's de:tennination on credibility or the weight to be given to witnesses' 
testimony." State v. Allen, 129 Idaho 556, 558, 929 P.2d 118, 120 (1996) 
The case of Kidder, Peabody & Co., Inc. v. lAG Intern. Acceptance Group, N.V., 14 F. 
Supp.2d 391 (S.D.N.Y. 1998), involved a claim of abuse of process, among other claims. The 
District Court was called upon to determine if the defense could call an expert witness, a Harvard 
Law Professor to render an opinion that the actions ofthe defendant were reasonable in light ofthe 
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law. The court held that such testimony from an expert was not appropriate. Commencing at page 
392 ofF. Supp.2d the court held: 
In aid of that defense, Kidder wishes to call as an expert witness at trial 
Professor Arthur R. Miller, the Bromley Professor of Law at Harvard Law School 
and noted authority on Federal civil practice. Professor Miller's report has been 
furnished to IAG's counsel as initial discovery under Rule 26(a)(2) and 26(b)(4), Fed. 
R. Civ. P. On the basis ofthat report, IAG now moves in limine to preclude Professor
 
Miller's opinions....
 
The issue is whether" under the Federal Rules ofEvidence and governing case law,
 
Professor Miller's opinions may in whole or in part be placed before the jury.
 
Rules 701-706" F.R. Evid., govern opinions and expert testimony, which are 
also subject to the relevancy provisions ofRules 401-403. Rules 702, 703, and 704 
address the admissibility of the testimony of an expert witness called by a party. 
Rule 702 allows a qualified expert to testify "in the form of an opinion or 
otherwise" ifthe witness's "scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will 
assist the trier of the fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue 
... " Rule 703 provides that "[t]he facts or data in a particular case upon which an 
expert bases an opinion or inference may be those perceived by or made known to 
the expert at or before the hearing." Rule 704(a) provides that, with an exception not 
pertinent to this case:, "testimony in the form of an opinion or inference otherwise 
admissible is not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decide:d 
by the trier of fact." 
The Advisory Committee Notes describe the purpose of Rule 704(a): 
The basic approach to opinions, lay and expert, in these rules is to admit them whe:n 
helpful to the trier of fact. In order to render this approach fully effective and to allay 
any doubt on the subject, the so-called "ultimate issue" rule is specifically abolishe:d 
by the instant rule. 
However, the Notes go on to caution: 
The abolition of the ultimate issue rule does not lower the bar so as to admit all 
opinions. Under Rules 701 and 702, opinions must be helpful to the trier offact, and 
Rule 403 provides for exclusion of evidence which wastes time. These provisions 
afford ample assurances against the admission ofopinions which would merely tell 
the. jury what result to reach, somewhat in the manner of oath-helpers of an earlier 
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day. 
The proper application ofthe expert opinion rules has generated a great deal of 
litigation, in this circuit and elsewhere. Each case turns upon its own circumstances. 
It may not be possible to reconcile all the reported decisions. The analysis that 
follows looks in the first instance to Second Circuit authority. 
However, as a preliminary matter, it is apparent without citation to authority 
that, even if certain aspects of Professor Miller's opinions are admissible at trial i(a 
question considered infra), much that appears in his written report could not take the 
form of testimony by Professor Miller to the jury. 
First, Professor Miller could not testify as to what Kidder or M & W people did, 
or what they said to t::ach other. That evidence must come from the trial testimony of 
the individuals concl~rned, where it will be subject to cross-examination. 
Second, Professor Miller could not testify as to the mental processes of the 
Kidder and M & W people: what they knew, believed, assumed, or understood, on 
the basis of their own knowledge or communications from others. Again, that 
evidence must come from the trial testimony of the individuals concerned. 
Third, Professor Miller could not testify as to facts that have no support in the 
evidence generated by witnesses with knowledge ofthe facts. 
The main thrust of Professor Miller's opinion is that Kidder reasonably relied 
upon M & W's advice in suing IAG and obtaining an order of attachment, both 
Kidder and M & W having formed the reasonable beliefthat sufficient legal grounds 
existed to pursue that course. While Professor Miller's report is cast in terms of-the 
reasonableness of/adder's and M & W's conduct. it is the functional equivalent 
ofan opinion that Kidder did not act with malice. since one who in good faith 
relies upon the advice ofcounsel has probable cause to initiate civilproceeding£ 
and so does not act maliciouslv. Pinsky v. Duncan. 79 F.3d at 312. 
Accordingly Professor Miller's opinions "embrace!] an ultimate issue to be 
decided by the trier offact, " afunction sanctionedbyRule 704(a), so long as those 
opinions do not "merely tell the jury what result to reach, " an effect explicitly 
condemned by the Advisory Committee Notes. Nor may Professor Miller's opinions 
usurp the trial judgt::'s function of instructing the jury on the law. I now consider 
whether Professor Miller's proffered opinions cross the line into these forbidden 
territories. 
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I focus first upon Seeond Circuit decisions. 
In United States v. Duncan, 42 F.3d 97, 101 (2d Cir. 1994), the Second Circuit 
summarized the general principles of admissibility of expert opinions: 
Generally, the use ofexpert testimony is not permitted if it will usurp either the role 
ofthe trial judge in instructing the jury as to the applicable law or the role ofthe jury 
in applying that law to the facts before it. When an expert undertakes to tell the jury 
what result to reach, this does not aid the jury in making a decision, but rather 
attempts to substitute the expert's judgment for the jury. When this occurs, the expert 
acts outside his limited role ofproviding the groundwork in the form of an opinion 
to enable the jury to make its own informed determination. In evaluating the 
admissibility of expert testimony, this Court requires the exclusion of testimony 
which states a legal conclusion.... 
The Scop court found the SEC investigator's testimony particularly objectionable 
because his stated conclusions were based not on personal knowledge, but on his 
assessment ofthe testimony and credibilityofotherwitnesses. Therein, we found that 
the investigator encroached upon the exclusive province of the jury in weighing 
witness veracity. 
42 F.3d at 101. That analysis resonates in the case at bar, because Professor Miller 
has no personal knowledge of the facts giving rise to Kidder's suit against IAG, and 
the resolution of the issues underlying IAG's claim of malicious prosecution will 
largely depend upon the jury's weighing ofwitness veracity. 
The Second Circuit held in Hygh that the admission ofsuch opinions constituted 
error. After stating that "[t]his circuit is in accord with other circuits in requiring 
exclusion of expert testimony that expresses a legal conclusion," 961 F.2d at 363 
(citations omitted), and invoking "the advisory committee's illuminating distinction 
between admissiblf: and excludable versions of an expert's opinion testimony" 
following Rule 704(b), id., the court of appeals said: 
Far more troubling, Cox testified that Jacobs' conduct was "not justified under the 
circumstances," not "'warranted under the circumstances," and "totally improper." \Ve 
have held that an expert's testimony that a defendant was "negligent" should not have 
been allowed. See Andrews, 882 F.2d at 709; see also Strong, 667 F.2d at 686 
(question whether lack of warnings rendered product unreasonably dangerous for 
jury, not expert). We see no significant distinction in Cox's conclusory 
condemnations of Jacobs' actions here, which, in the language of the advisory 
committee, "merely [told] the jury what result to reach." Fed. R. Evid. 704 advisory 
committee's note. 
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Id. at 364. TheHygh court concluded that "Cox's testimony regarding the ultimate 
legal conclusion entrusted to the jury crossed the line and should have been 
excluded. " Id. [7] In Duncan, the Second Circuit said of Hygh: 
The ultimate issue b(~fore the jury was whether the defendant used excessive force. 
In holding that the expert's testimony was impermissible, this Court found that the 
witness went beyond simply making factual conclusions and instead asserted 
"conclusory condemnations [whichl merely told the iury what result to reach. "en 
In the portion of the Hygh opinion quoted supra, the Second Circuit relied upon its 
prior holding in Andrews v. Metro North Commuter Railroad Co., 882 F.2d 705 (2d 
Cir. 1989), and an Eighth Circuit decision, Strong v. E.!. DuPont de Nemours Co., 
Inc..,667 F.2d 682 (8th Cir. 1981). The plaintiff in Andrews alleged that he slippt:d 
off a railroad platfonn and was injured by a moving train after he had walked some 
3,000 feet along the tracks. The trial judge permitted plaintiffs expert witness to 
testify that it was "reasonable" for plaintiffto have walked that distance on the tracks, 
and that "the railroad was negligent" in failing to avoid him. 882 F.2d at 708-09. The 
Second Circuit held that by admitting those opinions, the trial judge permitted the 
expert "to exceed consistently the legitimateboundaries" ofRule 702, which preclude 
expert opinion testimony with respect to "lay matters which a jury is capable of 
understanding and deciding without the expert's help." Id. at 708. 
Strong arose out of a building explosion which killed plaintiffs decedent. 
Plaintiffs theory was that a "pull-out" of a plastic pipe from a coupling caused gas 
to seep into the basement. Plaintiff called as an expert witness an engineer who had 
investigated the explosion. He offered to testify that "the lack of adequate warnings 
and instructions constituted defects which made the products unreasonabIy 
dangerous." 667 F.2d at 685. The trial judge excluded that testimony under Rule 
704. reasoning that this answer to the underlying question-IrIs this an adequate 
warning?"-impermissibly invaded theprovince ofthe jury. 1d. at 686. The Eighth 
Circuit affinned on that basis and added: 
In United States v. Russo, 74 F.3d 1383 (2d Cir. 1996), a prosecution for stock 
manipulation, the Second Circuit affirmed the trial court's admission ofa government 
expert's testimony b(~cause "it focused solely on factual considerations and did not 
involve any legal characterizations. [The expert] gave no opinion as to whether the 
appellants had violated the securities laws and did not make any statements about 
their intent; he simply described certain stock transactions and his opinion of their 
effect on the market." 74 F.3d at 1395. Russo cited United States v. Bilzerian, 926 
F.2d 1285 (2d Cir. 1991), another securities fraud case where the government offert:d 
and the trial judge admitted comparably limited expert testimony. The Second Circuit 
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affinned, noting that "[plarticularlv in complex cases involving the securities 
industry, expert testimony may help a jury understand unfamiliar terms and 
concepts," but cautioned that the use of such testimony "must be careful{r 
circumscribed to assure that the expert does not usurp either the role o[the trial 
Judge in instructing the jury as to the applicable law or the role of the jury In 
applying the law to the facts before it." 926 F.2d at 1294. The Bilzerian court 
continued: 
Although testimony concerning the ordinary practices in the securities industry may 
be received to enable: the jury to evaluate a defendant's conduct against the standards 
of accepted practice, Marx, 550 F.2d at 509, testimony encompassing an ultimate 
legal conclusion based on the facts of the case is not admissible, and may not be 
made so simply because it is presented in tenns of industry practice. 
United States v. Bronston, 658 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1981), was the prosecution of 
a partner of a law firm for mail fraud arising out of the partner's"duty of loyalty to 
his finn's clients" and "his concealment from the clients of his promotion to their 
hann" of the interests ofa rival company. Id. at 922. The accused partner, Bronston, 
did not testify at the trial. The defense called another partner, one Freund, and sought 
to elicit from him e:xpert testimony "regarding the ultimate question of whether 
Bronston's conduct amounted to a breach of fiduciary," id. at 930. The trial judge 
excluded that testimony. The Second Circuit affinned, characterizing Freund's 
opinion as "clearly inadmissible" because, inter alia, "his testimony would In 
substance have conveyed nothing more to the jury than his 'general beliefas to 
how the case should be decided. ' " Id. (citing and quoting Marx & Co. v. Diners' 
Club, Inc., 550 F.2d 505,510 (2d Cir.)). 
"[t]he admission of such testimony would give the appearance that the court was 
shifting to witnesses the responsibility to decide the case. It is for the jury to 
evaluate the facts in the light of the applicable rules of law. and it is therefore 
erroneous for a witness to state his opinion on the law o(the (orum. " Id. at 5J0 
(citation omitted). In Marx the Second Circuit cautions trialjudges "not to allow 
trials before juries to become battles ofpaid advocates posing as experts on the 
respective sides concerning matters ofdomestic law. " Id. at 511. 
That cautionary nok resonates in the case at bar, because any opinion Professor 
Miller is allowed to give for Kidder will inevitably be countered by a contrary 
opinion by lAG's expert witness, be that witness Judge Adams or someone else. 
Klaphake and West stand for the propositions that while a client such as 
Kidder, asserting a reasonable reliance defense, may testify as to the disclosures it 
made to advisers, the advice it received and its reliance upon it, and the advisers may 
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describe the advice they gave, questions of whether the client made full disclosure, 
and acted throughout in good faith or with malice, are for the jury to decide; and the 
jury is not assisted by expert opinion testimony about the reasonableness of the 
advice or the client's reaction to it. 
In contending that Professor Miller's opinions are not only admissible but 
essential to it, Kidder cites legal malpractice cases such as Estate of GinoI' v. 
Landsberg, 960 F.Supp. 661 rS.D.N.y.1996). But the instant case is not one for 
legal malpractice. and the analogy is false. A malpracticeplainti(Jmustprove that 
the defendant fai/ell to act in con(ormity with accepted professional standards 
prevailing at theplace and time the services were rendered. Under New York la)~ 
a medical malpractice plainti(Jcannot get his case to the jury in the absence f!f 
expert opinion testimony that the defendant violated thoseprofessional standard£. 
see Sitts v. United States. 811 F.2d 736, 739-41 ad Cir. 1987) (issuespresented b,X 
medical malpractice action would "quite obviously not [bel ... within the realm Q/ 
competence ofa lay jury") (construing New York law); McDermott v. Manhattan 
Eye, Ear & Throat Hosp., 15 N.Y.2d 20,255 N.Y.S.2d 65, 68, 203 N.E.2d 469 (Ct. 
App.1960). I reached the same conclusion in a legal malpractice case, Barry v. 
Liddle, O'Connor, Finkelstein & Robinson, 1997 W.L. 7363725, 1997 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 18820 (S.D.N.Y.). 
However, in the case at bar. lAG is not suing either Kidder or M & W (or legal 
malpractice. lAG is not suing M & Wat alL lAG is suing Kidder for malicious 
prosecution: the case will turn upon the reasonableness ofKidder's conduct and 
its then-existing state o(mind: and these are the sort ofquestions that lay jurors 
have been answerinJ~ without expert assistance from time immemorial. 
I conclude that Second Circuit authority requires me to preclude Professor' 
Miller's opinion testimony, as set forth in his written report. 
To the extent that Professor Miller would seek to opine before the jury that 
Kidder had probable: cause to believe lAG breached its contract with Kidder, he 
would inevitably have to discuss his construction of the contract and the parties' 
obligations thereundl~r--as he does at length in the sub-paragraphs to his written 
report. But that testimony would usurp the role ofthe jury, and is precluded by the 
Marx and Krear decisions. [11] 
To the extent that Professor Miller would seek to opine biifore the jury about 
the elements ofNew York contract andattachmentlaw--as he does at length in the 
sub-varagraphs to his written report-his testimony would usurp the role ofthe. 
trial judge in instructing the jury on the law. 
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To the extent that Professor Miller would seek to opine before the jury that 
Kidder acted reasonably and in good faith--as he argues at length in his written 
report--the overwhelming weight of Second Circuit authority precludes expert 
testimony about thesle issues. Whether a party acted with objective reasonableness 
is a quintessential common law jury question. By the same token. juries 
traditionally decide whether an individual acted knowinf:lv. or willfullv. or 
maliciouslY. or with specific intent. or with any other relevant state ofmind. Thu.~ 
this case willpresent to the jury no new or more demandinf: task than what juries 
have always done. 
Believing that to be so, and given the Second Circuit cases cited supra, I grant 
lAG's motion to preclude Professor Miller's opinion testimony. 
Notwithstanding Kidder's protests, this result works no unfairness upon it. The 
Kidder'1md M & W witnesses will testify fully concerning the relevant facts, as 
indeed they should. The Court will instruct the jury on the laws of contrac,~ 
attachment. and malicious prosecution. as indeed it should. The jurors will then 
apply that law to the facts as they find them. as indeed they should. in fulfillment 
ofthe Nation's lef:al traditions. 
The counter-claimants use of expert testimony on areas of law which will and should be 
provided to the jurors in jury instructions, should be prohibited. The opinions ofunreasonableness 
ofthe plaintiffs' action is improper. The opinions concerning the reasonableness ofthe filing ofthe 
Berkshire suit and/or the actions taken in Judge Wilper's proceedings or the present matter, invade 
the province of the jury's functions and should be limited and restricted. 
DATED this 31st day ofDecember, 2010. 
t!hd2..-;/-­
CHRISTT. TR&?ns:
 
Co-counsel for Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants
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Christ T. Troupis, ISB # 4549 
TROUPIS LAW OFFICE 
1299 E. Iron Eagle, Ste 130 
PO Box 2408 
Eagle, Idaho 83616 
Telephone: 208/938-5584 
Facsimile: 208/938-5482 
Email: ctroupis@troupislaw.com 
Co-counsel for Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants 
JAN 03 2011 
J DAVID NAVARRO CIGi<k 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
 
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an 
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G. 
MAILE, IV. and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE, 
husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants, 
v. 
CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, f/kla 
CONNIE TAYLOR, an individual; DALLAN 
TAYLOR, an individual; R. JOHN 
TAYLOR, an individual; CLARK and 
FEENEY, a partnership; PAUL T. CLARK, 
an individual; THEODORE L. JOHNSON 
REVOCABLE TRUST, an Idaho revocable 
trust; JOHN DOES I -JOHN DOES X; AND 
ALL PERSONS IN POSSESSION OR 
CLAIMING ANY RIGHT TO 
POSSESSION. 
Defendants/Counter-Claimants. 
Case No. CV-OC-0723232 
MOTION IN LIMINE RE: 
TESTIMONY CONCERNING 
HELEN TAYLOR 
COMES NOW, the Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants, by and through their co-counsel of 
record, Christ T. Troupis, and moves this Honorable Court for entry of its Order prohibiting the 
Defendants/Counter-Claimants from referencing during oral argument, voir dire or eliciting 
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testimony concerning the desires and/or opinions of Helen Taylor, mother of the individual 
named Taylor Defendants on the grounds of relevancy. This Court has previously stricken the 
Affidavit of Helen Taylor indicating that the Affidavit of Helen Taylor has no relevance: to the 
issues involved in this matter. 
This Motion is on the grounds and for the reasons that such information is irrelevant and 
immaterial to these proceedings and lacks probative value. This motion is made on the record 
and file contained herein, including this Court's prior ruling on the counter-claimants' opposition 
to an earlier summary judgment proceeding wherein the Court ordered stricken the Affidavit of 
Helen Taylor as not relevant, and further made pursuant to 401, 402, and 403 of the Idaho Rules 
of Evidence. This Motion is further made on the grounds and for the reasons that such testimony 
and/or information is irrelevant and immaterial to these proceedings and lacks probative value 
and is supported further with the Memorandum Brief in Support ofMotion in Limine, filed 
concurrently herewith and the record and file contained herein. Oral argument is requested. 
DATED this 31st day of December, 2010. 
tJL32c
CHRIST T. TROl;iS'I"""'S=,=---------­
Co-counsel for Counter-Defendants 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on this 31 st day of December, 2010, I caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing (1) MOTION IN LIMINE RE: TESTIMONY CONCERNING 
HELEN TAYLOR, (2) MEMORANDUM BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION IN LIMINE RE: 
TESTIMONY CONCERNING HELEN TAYLOR, together with (3) NOTICE OF HEARING 
RE: MOTION IN LIMINE RE: TESTIMONY CONCERNING HELEN TAYLOR, to be 
delivered, addressed as follows: 
Connie W. Taylor U. S. Mail 
Henderson Law Firm ~ Facsimile Transmission 
900 Washington St. Suite 1020 ( ) Hand Delivery 
Vancouver, Washington 98660 ( ) Overnight Delivery 
Facsimile: (360) 693-2911 
Mark Stephen Prusynski u. S. Mail~ 
PO Box 829 ( ) Facsimile Transmission 
Boise, ID 83701 ( ) Hand Delivery 
Phone: (208) 345-2000 ( ) Overnight Delivery 
Facsimile: (208) 385-5384 
Thomas G. Maile, IV. ( ) U. S. Mail 
380 W. State Street Facsimile Transmission 
Eagle, Idaho 83616 Hand Delivery ~
 
Facsimile: (208) 939-1001 ( ) Overnight Delivery 
tJf9~
 
CHRIST T. TR£PIS,
 
Co-counsel for Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants
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Christ T. Troupis, ISB # 4549 
TROUPIS LAW OFFICE 
1299 E. Iron Eagle, Ste 130 
PO Box 2408 
Eagle, Idaho 83616 
Telephone: 208/938-5584 
Facsimile: 208/938-5482 
Email: ctroupis@troupislaw.com 
Co-counsel for Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants 
JAN 03 :2011 
.J. DAVID NiWARRO, ClerK 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
 
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an 
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G. 
MAILE, IV. and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE, 
husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants, 
v. 
CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, f/k/a 
CONNIE TAYLOR, an individual; DALLAN 
TAYLOR, an individual; R. JOHN 
TAYLOR, an individual; CLARK and 
FEENEY, a partnership; PAUL T. CLARK, 
an individual; THEODORE L. JOHNSON 
REVOCABLE TRUST, an Idaho revocable 
trust; JOHN DOES I -JOHN DOES X; AND 
ALL PERSONS IN POSSESSION OR 
CLAIMING ANY RIGHT TO 
POSSESSION. 
Defendants/Counter-Claimants. 
Case No. CV-OC-0723232 
MEMORANDUM BRIEF IN 
SUPPORT OF MOTION IN 
LIMINE RE: TESTIMONY 
CONCERNING HELEN TAYLOR 
COMES NOW, the Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants, by and through their co-counsel of 
record, Christ T. Troupis, provide this Memorandum Brief in support of their Motion In Limine 
MEMORANDUM BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION IN LIMINE RE: TESTIMONY 
CONCERNING HELEN TAYLOR- Pg 1 
001929
 
J
,~lcP T>'
 
 
l l
  
• 
re: Testimony ofHelen Taylor. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The counter-claimants in earlier proceedings attempted to have this Court consider the 
Affidavit ofHelen Taylor which was filed on April 8,2009. The counter-claimants filed their Reply 
Memorandum Brief in Support of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Relating to the 
Defendants' Counter-claim.& in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for SummaryJudgment on April 
14,2009. The counter-defendants objected to the affidavit as not having any relevance. The Court 
made its determination and ruled that the Affidavit of Helen Taylor had no relevance. 
LEGAL ARGUMENT 
A.	 There Is No Relevancy Nor Any Probative Value for the Jury relating to What Helen 
Taylor's Opinions or Understandings are as to the Trust And/or Any Disclaimer 
Agreements and the Counter-claimants Should Be Restricted from Referencing the 
Same at Any Stage of These Proceedings. 
Helen Taylor is the mother of the individual Taylor counter-claimants. What her opinions 
are or were has no bearing as to the individual Taylors' actions in the underlying litigation. Connie 
Taylor prepared pleadings and R. John Taylor executed as verified pleadings, the relevant pleadings 
in the underlying litigation.. R. John Taylor provided sworn testimony before the Probate Court. 
Those verified pleadings and his sworn testimony have no bearing on his mother's opinions then 
or now. The determination ofrelevant evidence is set forth in the following Idaho Rules ofEvidence 
which provide: 
Rule 401. Definition of relevant evidence 
"Relevant Evidence'" means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of 
any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or 
less probable than it would be without the evidence. 
MEMORANDUM BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION IN LIMINE RE: TESTIMONY 
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Rule 402. Relevant evidence generally admissible; irrelevant evidence inadmissible 
All relevant evidence is admissible except as otherwise provided by these rules or by 
other rules applicable in the courts of this state. Evidence which is not relevant is not 
admissible. 
Rule 403. Exclusion of relevant evidence on grounds of prejudice, confusion, or waste 
oftime 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion ofthe issues, or misleading the 
jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of 
cumulative evidence. 
Any attempted reference to opinions from Helen Taylor and/or actions which might have 
been undertaken by the Taylors clearly has no relevance to the issues to be resolved by the jury 
in this matter. The plaintiffs' amended verified complaint before Judge Wilper, was predicated 
upon the perjured testimony ofR. John Taylor. Helen Taylor had no bearing upon alh~gations 
which gave rise to the plaintiffs' amended complaint in these proceedings. 
CONCLUSION 
The counter-claimants should not present facts or opinions regarding Helen Taylor's state 
of mind then or now. The counter-claimants should be restricted in any attempt to allude to the 
intentions or desires of Helen Taylor and/or actions which the Taylors undertook for their 
mother. 
DATED this 31st day of December, 2010. 
MEMORANDUM BRIEF U'l" SUPPORT OF MOTION IN LIMINE RE: TESTIMONY 
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Co-counsel for Plaintiffs/Counter-Defend,mts 
Christ T. Troupis, ISB # 4549 
TROUPIS LAW OFFICE 
1299 E. Iron Eagle, Ste 130 
PO Box 2408 
Eagle, Idaho 83616 
Telephone: 208/938-5584 
Facsimile: 208/938-5482 
Email: ctroupis@troupislaw.com 
Co-counsel for Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
 
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an 
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G. 
MAILE, N. and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE, 
husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants, 
v. 
CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, flkla 
CONNIE TAYLOR, an individual; DALLAN 
TAYLOR, an individual; R. JOHN 
TAYLOR, an individual; CLARK and 
FEENEY, a partnership; PAUL T. CLARK, 
an individual; THEODORE L. JOHNSON 
REVOCABLE TRUST, an Idaho revocable 
trust; JOHN DOES I -JOHN DOES X; AND 
ALL PERSONS IN POSSESSION OR 
CLAIMING ANY RIGHT TO 
POSSESSION. 
Defendants/Counter-Claimants. 
Case No. CV-OC-0723232 
PLAINTIFFS/COUNTER­
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO 
EXCLUDE TESTIMONY OIi' BOB 
DEBOLT 
COMES NOW, the Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants, by and through their co-counsel of 
record, Christ T. Troupis, and moves this Honorable Court for entry of its Order prohibiting the 
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Defendants/Counter-Claimants from referencing during oral argument, voir dire, or eliciting 
testimony and/or advancing any evidentiary items concerning the opinions ofBob DeBolt on the 
grounds that such expected testimony lacks foundation, that such testimony and/or the 
information is immaterial to these proceedings and lacks probative value and is not relevant. 
This Motion is madl~ pursuant to Idaho Rules ofEvidence Rules 401,402,403,702, & 
703. This motion is further supported by Counter-defendants' Memorandum in Support of 
Motion In Limine to Exclude Testimony ofBob DeBolt, filed concurrently herewith which is 
incorporated by reference herein, together with Rule 26(b) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, 
the executed Stipulation for Scheduling & Planning, the counter-claimants failure to submit 
timely supplemental discov,ery responses, together with their violation of the Order for 
Scheduling entered on July 2,2009, and the pleadings and record on file in this matter. 
Oral argument is requested. 
DATED this 31st day ofDecember, 2010. 
(!M~0~~ _ 
CHRIST T. TROl1PIS, Co-counsel for 
Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on this 31 st day of December, 2010, I caused a true and 
correct copy ofthe foregoing (1) PLAINTIFFS/COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO 
EXCLUDE TESTIMONY OF SAM LANGSTON, (2) MEMORANDUM BRIEF IN SUPPORT 
OF PLAINTIFFS/COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO EXCLUDE TESTIMONY OF 
SAM LANGSTON together with (3) NOTICE OF HEARING RE: MOTION IN LIMThrE RE: 
MOTION TO EXCLUDE TESTIMONY OF SAM LANGSTON to be delivered, addressed as 
follows: 
Connie W. Taylor ~U.S.Mail 
Henderson Law Firm () Facsimile Transmission 
900 Washington St. Suite 1020 () Hand Delivery 
Vancouver, Washington 98660 () Overnight Delivery 
Facsimile: (360) 693-2911 
Mark Stephen Prusynski ~U.S.Mail 
PO Box 829 " () Facsimile Transmission 
Boise, ID 83701 () Hand Delivery 
Phone: (208) 345-2000 () Overnight Delivery 
Facsimile: (208) 385-5384 
Thomas G. Maile, IV. ( ) U. S. Mail 
380 W. State Street ( ) Facsimile Transmission 
Eagle, Idaho 83616 
Facsimile: (208) 939-1001 {t Hand Delivery Overnight Delivery 
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Co-counsel for Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants 
Christ T. Troupis, ISB # 4549 
TROUPIS LAW OFFICE 
1299 E. Iron Eagle, Ste 130 
PO Box 2408 
Eagle, Idaho 83616 
Telephone: 208/938-5584 
Facsimile: 208/938-5482 
Email: ctroupis@troupislaw.com 
Co-counsel for Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
 
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an 
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G. 
MAILE, IV. and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE, 
husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants, 
v. 
CONNIE WRIGHT l'AYLOR, f/k/a 
CONNIE TAYLOR, an individual; DALLAN 
l'AYLOR, an individual; R. JOHN 
l'AYLOR, an individual; CLARK and 
FEENEY, a partnership; PAUL T. CLARK, 
an individual; THEODORE L. JOHNSON 
REVOCABLE TRUST, an Idaho revocable 
trust; JOHN DOES I -JOI-IN DOES X; AND 
ALL PERSONS IN POSSESSION OR 
CLAIMING ANY RIGHT TO 
POSSESSION. 
Defendants/Counter-Claimants. 
Case No. CV-OC-0723232 
PLAINTIFFS/COUNTER­
DEFENDANTS'MEMORANDUM 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION 
TO EXCLUDE TESTIMONY OF 
BOB DEBOLT 
COMES NOW, the: Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants, by and through their co-counsel of 
record, Christ T. Troupis, provide this Memorandum Brief in Support of Motion to Exclude 
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Testimony of Bob DeBolt. 
I. 
INTRODUCTION 
Counter-defendants' Motion in Limine is based upon Counter-claimants' improper 
identification oftheir expert witnesses in violation of Rule 26(b)(4) of the Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure, the counter-claimants failure to abide by the executed Stipulation for Scheduling & 
Planning, their failure to submit timely supplemental discovery responses, together with their 
violation ofthe Order for Scheduling entered on July 2,2009. On December 30,2009, the 
parties filed their joint Stipulation for Scheduling and Planning. The executed stipulation 
provides, " 90 days before trial, advancing party shall disclose each person advancing paliy 
intends to call as an expert witness at trial and state the subject matter on which the witness is 
expected to testify" and "90 days before trial, advancing party shall disclose all information 
required by Rule 26(b)(4) ofthe Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure regarding expert witnesses". 
This Court entered its Civil Case Order for Scheduling Conference and Order re: Motion 
Practice on July 2,2009. Contained within that Order was the requirement that disclosure of 
expert witness be identified and the subject matter and substance of any opinions be provided no 
later than 120 days before trial or as stipulated between the parties. Full compliance pursuant to 
the Order, the stipulation, and discovery rules, was required on or before October 29 th, 2010. 
The counter-claimants initial Witness Disclosure was served on October 27, 2010. A true 
and correct copy of the same is annexed as Exhibit "A" to the Affidavit of Christ Troupis filed in 
support of the motion in limine. The counter-claimants were served and responded to specific 
PLAINTIFFS/COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF 
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interrogatories and request for production regarding potential expert witnesses. A true and 
correct copy of the relevant pages ofthe counter-claimants' Answers to the Plaintiffs' First Set of 
Discovery (pp. I, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10) are annexed as Exhibit "B" to the Affidavit of Christ Troupis 
filed in support ofthe motion in limine. The counter-claimants Supplemental Witness 
Disclosure was served on December 9, 2010. A true and correct copy ofthe same is annexed as 
Exhibit "C" to the Affidavit of Christ Troupis filed in support ofthe motions in limine. The 
counter-claimants failed to supplement their answers to the plaintiffs' first set of discovt:ry as 
required by the executed Stipulation for Scheduling & Planning on or before October 30, 20 I o. 
II. 
APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARDS 
A motion in limine enables a judge to rule on evidentiary questions without having to 
consider the matter at trial for the first time. Davidson v Beco Corp., 112 Idaho 560, 563, 733 
P.2d 781, 784 (1986) (modified on other grounds). In effect a motion in limine allows ajudge to 
have the benefit of time to research and review issues in a calculated manner instead ofhaving to 
address issues "on the fly". A motion in limine allows counsel on both sides to make strategic 
decisions before the trial concerning the context and order of evidence to be presented. Davidson, 
112 Idaho at 563, 733 P.2d at 784. 
Idaho courts have held that a failure to meet the requirements ofRule 26 of the Idaho 
Rules of Civil Procedure typically results in the exclusion of the proffered evidence. Radmer v 
Ford Motor Co., 120 Idaho 86, 89,813 P.2d 897, 900 (1991). Allowing testimony to be 
presented where Rule 26 has not been complied with is reversible error. Id.; Clark v, Klein. 137 
PLAINTIFFS/COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF 
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Idaho 154, 157,45 P.3d 810, 813 (2002). 
III.
 
ARGUMENT
 
A.	 Counter-claimants' Expert Witnesses Must Be Excluded Because Counter­
claimants Failed to Disclose the Information Required by Rule 26(b)~. 
The parties executed their stipulation for the scheduling governing the proceedings in this 
case. The executed stipulation provides, " 90 days before trial, advancing party shall disclose 
each person advancing party intends to call as an expert witness at trial and state the subject 
matter	 on which the witness is expected to testify" and "90 days before trial, advancing party 
shall disclose all information required by Rule 26(b)(4) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 
regarding expert witnesses". Rule 26(b)(4) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure states in 
pertinent part: 
A complete statement of all opinions to be expressed and the basis and reasons 
therefore; the data or other information considered by the witness in forming the 
opinions; any exhibits to be used as a summary of or support for the opinions; 
any qualifications of the witness, including a list of all publications authored by 
the witness within the preceding ten years; the compensation to be paid for the 
testimony; and a listing of any other cases in which the witness has testified as an 
expert at trial or by deposition within the preceding four years. 
Id. 
The counter-claimants' initial witness disclosure dated October 27,2010, failed to list 
Bob Debolt as a potential expert witness. The counter-defendants provided the following 
specific discovery requests to the counter-claimants: 
INTERROGATORY NO.7.: Please identify each and every expert you 
intend to call at the trial of this case and with respect to each witness you listed, 
describe: 
(a)	 The subject matter on which each expert may testify; 
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(b) The substance of the facts to which each expert may testify; 
(c) The substance of the opinions to which each expert may testify; 
(d) The expert witnesses' credentials which you allege qualify the 
witness as an expert. 
(e) The description of any and all reports prepared or used by persons 
who mayor will tes.tify as expert witnesses at any hearings or trial of this action 
(f) The description of all documents in which the expert has reviewed 
in arriving at his opinion 
(g) The description of all the data or other information considered by 
the witness in forming the opinions 
(h) The description of the qualifications of the witness, including a 
description of all publications authored by the witness within the preceding ten 
years 
(I) The detailed description of any and all cases in which the witness. 
has testified as an expert at trial or by deposition within the preceding four years. 
(j) Is the expert to be compensated for his work and efforts in 
connection with this action? If so, please state how much he is to be paid. 
INTERROGATORY NO.8.: Please identify each expert you intend to 
call as an expert witness in this matter. With regard to each such witness, pleas(: 
state: 
(a) The substance of the facts and opinion to which each such expert 
will testify; and 
(b) The identity of any document or documents upon which each such 
expert will rely in giving testimony. 
The counter-claimants indicated in their discovery responses ofAugust 27,2009, that 
such information would be forthcoming in compliance with the agreed too stipulated deadlines 
(October 30, 2010). Nothing was received. 
Nor was there any indication regarding the witnesses past history ofproviding testimony 
as an expert at trial or by d(~position within the preceding four years, hourly rates, curriculum 
vitae, however, the disclosure said it would be forth coming. Nor was there any list of all 
publications authored by the witness within the preceding ten years; nor was there any indication 
as to what the witness had been paid to provide opinions. To date there has been no such 
supplement nor has there been any supplement to discovery responses. The counter-claimants' 
PLAINTIFFS/COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION TO EXCLUDE: TESTIMONY OF BOB DEBOLT - Pg 5 
001939
  
 
 
 
!
 
 
 
! tion 
..." 
answers to discovery provided that such information would be provided by October 30, 2010. 
The disclosure of Bob DeBolt was executed and served on December 9, 2010, 
approximately 39 days after the Stipulation for Scheduling & Planning, and Order for Scheduling 
Conference and Order re: Motion Practice filed on July 2,2009, and the counter-claimants' 
agreement to supplement thl~ir answers by October 30, 2010. In addition the Supplemental 
Witness Disclosure (Exhibit "C" to Affidavit ofChrist Troupis) provided by the counter·· 
claimants was served approximately 9 days after the counter-defendants timely provided their 
expert witness disclosures on November 30, 2010. 
Such timely disclosures and the information contained therein are critical for compliance 
with Rule 26(b)(4). Real estate valuations require considerable time and considerable 
documentation to demonstrate the underlying facts and data utilized in forming any opin:ions, all 
of which were missing in counter-claimants' initial disclosure, and responses to specific 
interrogatories and requests for production. The disclosure ofthe witness Bob Debolt never was 
made in the counter-claimants' initial Witness Disclosure. The counter-claimants indicated in 
their discovery responses ofAugust 27,2009, that such information would be forthcoming in 
compliance with agreed too stipulated deadlines. Nothing was received. The Counter-claimants' 
obviously had, since August 27, 2009, time to develop any opinions which they expected. from 
Bob DeBolt. However, the Counter-claimants' chose to wait until past the compliance deadlines 
to provide the information relative to any opinion which may be advanced from Bob DeBolt. 
Typically, failure to meet the requirements of Rule 26 results in exclusion ofthe proffered 
evidence. Hopkins v. Duo-Fast Corp., 123 Idaho 205,846 P.2d 207 (Idaho 1993) 
PLAINTIFFS/COUNTER··DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION TO EXCLUDE TESTIMONY OF BOB DEBOLT - Pg 6 
001940
 
 
 
Here, counter-claimants have failed to timely identify Mr. Debolt and the substance of the 
expert testimony to be given at trial as required by the stipulation of the parties, the previous 
court order, and further fail,ed to timely supplement their answers to discovery. Counter-
claimants utterly failed to f()llow the required procedures established for disclosure of Bob 
DeBolt. 
Federal Rule ofCivil Procedure 26 provides additional insight into the requirements of 
Idaho Rule 26, in that the Idaho Rules were patterned after the Federal Rules. "In the absence of a 
ruling from the Idaho Supreme Court to the contrary, we deem it appropriate to follow tederal 
precedent in order to maintain, to the extent possible, consistency between the federal and Idaho 
rules." State v. Woodbury, 127 Idaho 757, 760, 905 P.2d 1066, 1069(Ct, App. 1995). Th(;: purpose 
ofFederal Rule 26 "is the elimination of unfair surprise" to the opposing party. Arnseon v, 
Michigan Tissue Bank, 2007 WL 468986 at *5 (D. Mont. 2007). "The test of a report is whether 
it was sufficiently complek, detailed and in compliance with the Rules so that surprise is 
eliminated. . .. Id. "An expert report should be sufficiently complete as to include the substance 
ofwhat the expert is expected to give in direct testimony, and the reasons for such testimony. 
The report should offer the 'how and why' of the results, not mere conclusions." ld. 
The failure to timely disclose Mr. Debolt, and the substance of the expected testimony 
has prejudiced the counter-defendants in their trial preparation. The counter-defendants had 
provided their disclosures and certifications to the court before their required due date of 
November 30, 2010. During the Holiday season, co-counsel for the counter-defendants. left his 
office on December 7,2010 and did not return until December 22,2010. Counter-defendants' 
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co-counsel was unable to review the disclosure until his return and was not able to address the 
issues in a timely manner. All of which have created extreme difficulty in attempting to rebut 
such late disclosed opinions of Bob DeBolt. 
In Radmer, the Idaho Supreme Court discussed at length why expert testimony should be 
timely and completely disclosed so the opposing party has an opportunity to fully evaluate and 
rebut it. Radmer, 120 Idaho at 89, 813 R2d at 900. The Court emphasized that cross-examination 
cannot be effectively conducted without timely and fill disclosures as required by Rule 26. Id. 
The Radmer Court noted, quite bluntly, that "the failure to meet the requirements of Rulle 26 
results in exclusion of the proffered evidence." Id. 
In addition, the late disclosure of Mr. Debolt, provides a complete lack of any opinion 
regarding the issue on price or market value of the subject property for the relevant periods of 
time. The proposed testimony of activity in the real estate market from January 2005 through 
December 2008 will not assist the trier of fact in determining market value in 2009. Expert 
opinion which is speculative, conclusory, or unsubstantiated by facts in the record is of no 
assistance to the jury in rendering its verdict, and therefore is inadmissible." Ryan, 123 Idaho at 
46-47, 844 P.2d at 28-29; see also Idaho R. Evidence 702. 
The opinions which will be attempted to be offered through the testimony of Bob DeBolt 
will have no relevance and should be precluded. 
III. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, counter-defendants respectfully request that the Court grant the 
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Motion in Limine and exclude the late disclosed opinion testimony of Counter-claimants' expert 
witness, Bob DeBolt, identified in the Counter-claimants' Supplemental Witness Disclosure of 
December 9,2010. 
DATED this 31st day ofDecember, 2010. 
Co-counsel for Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants 
PLAINTIFFS/COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION TO EXCLUDE TESTIMONY OF BOB DEBOLT - Pg 9 
001943
 
Christ T. Troupis, ISB # 4549 
TROUPIS LAW OFFICE JANI 03 2011 
1299 E. Iron Eagle, Ste 130 
PO Box 2408 J, DAVID NAVARRO, Clerk 
ByA. GARDENEagle, Idaho 83616 OEPUTY 
Telephone: 208/938-5584 
Facsimile: 208/938-5482 
Email: ctroupis@troupislaw.com 
Co-counsel for Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an 
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G. 
MAILE, IV. and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE, 
husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs/Counter··Defendants, 
v. 
CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, f/k/a 
CONNIE TAYLOR, an individual; DALLAN 
TAYLOR, an individual; R. JOHN 
TAYLOR, an individual; CLARK and 
FEENEY, a partnership; PAUL T. CLARK, 
an individual; THEODORE L. JOHNSON 
REVOCABLE TRUST, an Idaho revocable 
trust; JOHN DOES I -JOHN DOES X; AND 
ALL PERSONS IN POSSESSION OR 
CLAIMING ANY RIGHT TO 
POSSESSION. 
Defendants/Countler-Claimants. 
Case No. CV-OC-0723232 
MOTION IN LIMINE RE: IDAHO 
STATE BAR COMPLAINT 
COMES NOW, the Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants, by and through their co-counsel of 
record, Christ T. Troupis, and moves this Honorable Court for entry of its Order prohibiting the 
Defendants/Counter-Claimants and/or Counter-Claimants' attorney and/or witnesses from 
MOTION IN LIMINE RE: IDAHO STATE BAR COMPLAINT - Pg 1 
001944
 
 
 
l l
 
,
ibi1ti
" 
referring at any point in the above captioned proceedings including but not limited to voir dire, 
opening arguments, and further prohibiting any references and/or any testimony and/or any 
evidentiary issues surrounding to any allegations related to the Idaho State Bar complaint. 
This Motion is on the grounds and for the reasons that such information is irrelevant and 
immaterial to these proceedings and lacks probative value. This motion is made on the r,ecord 
and file contained herein, including this Court's prior ruling on the counter-claimants motion to 
amend their counterclaim during the hearing ofMay 13, 2010. This Motion is further made 
pursuant to 401, 402, and 403 of the Idaho Rules ofEvidence. Oral argument is requested. 
DATED this 31st day ofDecember, 2010. 
C~=IS=---'-----­
Co-counsel for Counter-Defendants 
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re: Idaho State Bar. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The counter-claimants have previously provided this Court with a copy ofan Idaho State Bar 
Complaint during the hearing regarding the counter-claimants' motion for summary judgment. In 
addition the counter-claimants proposed an amended counter-claim in April 29, 2010, referencing 
certain allegations pertaining to the Idaho State Bar proceeding against counter-defendant Thomas 
Maile, in his capacity as an attorney. This Court allowed the amended counter-claim to be filed 
however, required the counter-claim to strike any and all references to any Idaho State Bar 
proceedings. 
LEGAL ARGUMENT 
A.	 There Is No Relevancy Nor Any Probative Value for the Jury in Eluding to Any Idaho 
State Bar Proceedings and the Counter-claimants Should Be Restricted in Any Manner 
to Eluding to the Same at Any Stage of these Proceedings. 
The determination ofrelevant evidence is set forth in the following Idaho Rules ofEvidence 
which provide: 
Rule 401. Definition of relevant evidence 
"Relevant Evidence" means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of 
any fact that is of consequence to the determination ofthe action more probable or 
less probable than it would be without the evidence. 
Rule 402. Relevant evidence generally admissible; irrelevant evidence inadmissible 
All relevant evidencc~ is admissible except as otherwise provided by these rules or by 
other rules applicabl,e in the courts ofthis state. Evidence which is not relevant is not 
admissible. 
Rule 403. Exclusion of relevant evidence on grounds of prejudice, confusion, or 
waste of time 
MEMORANDUM BRIEF' IN SUPPORT OF MOTION IN LIMINE RE: IDAHO STATE 
BAR COMPLAINT - Pg 2: 
001948
            
 
         
            
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by the danger ofunfair prejudice, confusion ofthe issues, or misleading 
the jury, or by considerations ofundue delay, waste oftime, or needless presentation 
of cumulative evidence. 
Any attempted refenmce to allegations surrounding any pending Idaho State Bar proceeding 
clearly has no relevance to the issues to be resolved by the jury in this matter. There are allegations 
pending, however, there has been no hearing to date on any issues surround such proceedings. 
In addition there are lUles promulgated by the Idaho State Bar which further limit any attempt 
to reference such proceedings and/or the allegations surrounding the proceedings. The Idaho Rules 
of Professional Conduct, general provisions, as amended through July 1, 2010, provide in the 
section labeled Scope: 
Violation ofa Rule should not itselfgive rise to a cause ofaction against a lawyer nor 
should it create any presumption in such a case that a legal duty has been breached. 
In addition, violation ofa Rule does not necessarilywarrant anyother nondisciplinary 
remedy, such as disqualification of a lawyer in pending litigation. The Rules are 
designed to provide guidance to lawyers and to provide a structure for regulating 
conduct through disciplinary agencies. They are not designed to be a basis for civil 
liability. Furthermore, the purpose of the Rules can be subverted when they are 
invoked by opposing parties as procedural weapons. The fact that a Rule is a just 
basis for a lawyer's self-assessment, or for sanctioning a lawyer under the 
administration of a disciplinary authority, does not imply that an antagonist in a 
collateral proceeding or transaction has standing to seek enforcement of the Rule. 
Nevertheless, since the Rules do establish standards ofconduct by lawyers, a lawyer's 
violation ofa Rule may be evidence ofbreach ofthe applicable standard ofconduct. 
The Idaho Bar Commission Rules, Section V., provides: 
SECTION V. Rules For Review OfProfessional Conduct Rule 520. Immunity 
(a) Grievants - Witnesses. Grievances, complaints, testimony and other presentation 
or arguments submitted to the Professional Conduct Board, a Hearing Committee, 
anymember ofthe Professional Conduct Board or ofanyHearing Committee, orBar 
Counsel, all proceedings and conduct maintained or engaged in under these Rules, 
and all testimony and showings with respect to any such matters shall be absolutelly 
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privileged, and no civil litigation predicated thereon maybe instituted or maintained. 
The jury pursuant to the above authority has no benefit in the counter-claimants advancing 
any references to such proceedings. There is no probative value for the jury benefits. The matters 
undertaken before the Idaho State Bar Commission are privileged and confidential. 
CONCLUSION 
The counter-claimants have admitted in recent arguments before this court that their claims 
are against the counter-defendants as individuals not for anything done by Mr. Maile in a role as an 
attorney. The counter-claimants should be restricted in any attempt to elude to any allegations of 
violations of the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct. 
DATED this 31st day of December, 2010. 
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referencing the fair market value ofthe real property prior to February 2009, and/or referencing 
loss of profits prior to February 2009, and/or referencing the fair market value ofthe real 
property after August 2009, and/or referencing loss of profits after August 2009 in the above 
captioned proceedings including but not limited to voir dire, opening arguments, advancing 
testimony and/or submitting any documents surrounding loss profits and/or market value prior to 
February 2009 and/or after August 2009. 
This Motion is made pursuant to Title 45, Chapter 5 ofthe Idaho Code, I.C. § 45-1302, 
I.e. § 5-505 and 401,402, and 403 ofthe Idaho Rules of Evidence. This Motion is further made 
on the grounds and for the reasons that such testimony and/or information is irrelevant and 
immaterial to these proceedings and lacks probative value and is supported further with the 
Memorandum Brief in Support of Motion in Limine, filed concurrently herewith and the;: record 
and file contained herein. Oral argument is requested. 
DATED this 31st day of December, 2010. 
CHRIST T. TROUP , Co-counsell for 
Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants 
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1.	 The Court should limit the evidence presented on Taylors' alleged damages to the 
time period from February, 2009 to August, 2009. 
A. Taylors presented a claim for damages in the first lawsuit, together with a 
claim for rescission. 
This Court's July 2,2009 Memorandum Decision and Order stated: 
"On January 23, 2004, three of the beneficiaries, Reed Taylor, Dallan Taylor and R. John 
Taylor (collectively the Taylors), filed the first lawsuit, alleging three causes of action 
seeking damages or rescission of the sale." 
Taylors elected the remedy of rescission in the first lawsuit. Judgment was entered in 
favor of Taylors by Judge Wilper for rescission. That judgment was affirmed on appeal and the 
case remanded in February, 2009 on that suit. Any damage claims that Taylors assert based on 
the fact that title to the property had not reverted to the Trust prior to that date are barred. 
Attached to the Affidavit of Christ Troupis as Exhibit E is an excerpt from the deposition 
of R. John Taylor taken on December 14, 2004 in which he acknowledged that in their first 
lawsuit, Taylors sought to recover money damages from MaileslBerkshire and in the alternative, 
an order for rescission of the sale. 
B. Taylors only pleaded damage claims limited to that time period. 
In their Amended Counterclaim, Taylors have alleged that their damages arise 
from Mailes/Berkshire: 
, 2h. "Failing to release the lis pendens in Taylor v. Maile for six months after the 
Supreme Court decision affirming the district court order quieting title in the 
Linder Road property to the Johnson trust." 
Taylors' alleged claims for abuse of process and interference with prospective economic 
advantage in this action are that the failure to remove the Lis Pendens adversely affected their 
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ability to sell the property after the date that the rescission judgment was affirmed, February 
2009, through the date that it was released, August, 2009. 
C. The legitimacy of the Lis Pendens prior to remand of the prior lawsuit in February, 
2009 has been decided in the prior lawsuit, and cannot form the basis of a claim in this action. 
Judge Wilper ruled upon the counter-claimants' motion to strike the Lis Pendens which 
was filed pending the appeal. The Taylors in the litigation before Judge Wilper in 2007, 
requested that the court strike the Lis Pendens filed in May 2006 and/or requested that a bond be 
posted during the appeal. Judge Wilper entered his Order on March 1, 2007 denying the motion 
and pursuant to that order the lis pendens was authorized to remain of record, (attachments to 
Affidavit in Support of Motion for Certification filed July 13,2009). The appeal was remanded 
back to the district court in February 2009. The parties in the present action further stipulated 
that the above captioned matter would be stayed pending the decision in Taylor v. Maile. 
As a matter of law there was a legitimate right as to the priority of maintaining the lis 
Penden in the current case up through the time the court ruled that res judicata applied to the 
plaintiffs' claims (July 2009). In fact as Judge Wilper indicated a litigant has a right to maintain 
a lis pendens even through the appeal process. 
Taylors assertions in their Amended Counterclaim relate only to the retention of a Lis 
Pendens after the rescission order became final upon remand in February, 2009. 
2.	 On the Taylors' claim for Intentional Interference with Expectancy, the 
wrongfulness of the conduct with respect to "intentional interference with 
expectancy"is a question for the court, not the jury. The Court should delineate 
what wrongful conduct is alleged, and limit the evidence presented to whether that 
conduct occurred and whether there are any defenses to liability for it. 
In Carter v. Carter, 143 Idaho 373, 146 P.3d 639, 647 (2006), the Court noted: 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' MOTION IN LIMIE RE: 
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"THE MAGISTRATE COURT DID NOT ERR IN CONCLUDING TRc\T 
THE ELEMENT OF WRONGFULNESS IN THE TORT OF 
INTENTIONAL INTERFERENCE WITH EXPECTANCY IS AN ISSUE 
OF LAW AND NOT AN ISSUE OF FACT 
The magistrate court concluded that the element of wrongfulness in the tort 
of intentional interference with expectancy is an issue of law and not an issue: of 
fact. The district court affirmed. This Court adopts the analysis of the district 
court in reviewing this matter on appeal. 
[I]t is an issue of law for the court to determine whether the nature of the act 
complained of could be considered wrongful or not. In other words, the definition 
of what could be considered wrongful is a question of law. Once the act is so 
defined by the judge, it then becomes a jury question to determine whether the act 
was or was not committed as defined." 
The Court should therefore issue an order delineating what constitutes wrongful conduct 
for purposes of this cause of action, and issue an order limiting all evidence presented to (1) 
whether that conduct occwTed and (2) whether our defenses mitigate it or justify it. 
The jury should not be presented with evidence of other conduct that occurred during the 
prior lawsuit for the purpose of Taylors arguing that Mailes engaged in a course of wrongful 
conduct commencing in the prior action. 
3.	 In delineatingwh:ilt constitutes 'wrongful conduct,' the Court should exclude the 
riling or maintenance of a Lis Pendens. 
It is not a tort where one acts to protect her own economic interests, even if there is 
interference with the contract expectancy of another, so long as the acts of the intervenor are not 
independently wrongful. The issue of whether or not the actions complained of are or are not 
"wrongful" in this context is for the court to determine in defining the issues. The cas(: of Carter 
v. Carter, 143 Idaho 373, 146 P.3d 639 (2006) provides at p. 648 of 146 P.3d.: 
The magistrate court concluded that the element of wrongfulness in the tort of 
intentional interfefl~nce with expectancy is an issue of law and not an issue of fact. 
The district court affirmed. This Court adopts the analysis of the district court in 
reviewing this matter on appeal. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' MOTION IN LIMIE RE: 
DAMAGES- Pg 4 
001957
C
 
 
 
 
 
 
'­
In this case, it is obvious that Neta had her own expectancy, and her own interests 
to advance and protect in the matter. It is not a tort where one acts to protect hler 
own economic interests, even if there is interference with the contract 
expectancy ofanot,her, so long as the acts ofthe intervenor are not 
independently wrongful. The issue of whether or not the actions complained of 
are or are not "wrongful" in this context is for the court to determine in defining 
the issues, and would normally have been included in the instructions. The issm: 
for the jury to determine is whether or not the alleged tortfeasor acted in the 
manner alleged. 
The Carter, case injects the language "independently wrongful". Such language as an 
element of the tort seems to be traced to a California case involving claims of slander of title and 
tortious interference with contract. The case of Park 100 Investment Group II, LLC v. Ryan,_ 
Cal. Rptr.3d_, 180 Cal. AppAth 795 (2009) which held: 
Since the filing of the lis pendens on the Oviatt property in Case No. 
BC349120 alleged a real property claim and was privileged, and because Oviatt 
has made no argument that the lis pendens lacked merit for other reasons, 
recordation of the lis pendens cannot be the basis for intentional interference with 
prospective economic advantage or slander of title causes of action, even if Heron 
acted with malice. (Sylmar Air Conditioning v. Pueblo Contracting Services, Inc., 
supra, 122 Cal. AppAth at pp. 1058-1 059 [where act is privileged, plaintiff cannot 
show a probability ofprevailing]; Navarro v. IHOP Properties, Inc. (2005) 134 
Cal. AppAth 834, 843-844 [36 Cal. Rptr.3d 385] [same]; Albertson v. Raboff, 
supra, 46 Cal.2d at pp. 378-382; Woodcourt, supra, 119 Cal.App.3d at pp. 249­
251; Della Penna v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc.(l995) 11 Ca1.4th 376,393 
[45 Cal.Rptr.2d 436,902 P.2d 740] [to plead intentional interference with 
prospective economic advantage, defendant had to engage in some act that was 
wrongful by some measure other than the fact of interference itself]; Palmer v. 
Zaklama, supra, 109 Cal.AppAth at pp. 1378-1379; National Medical 
Transportation Network v. Deloitte & Touche (1998) 62 Cal.AppAth 412,440 
[72 Cal.Rptr.2d 720] [independently wrongful act is required to prove negligent 
interference with prospective economic advantage]; Brody v. Montalbano (1978) 
87 Cal. App.3d 725, 738 [151 Cal. Rptr. 206].) 
The California court in analyzing a potential claim for a filing of lis pendens requires 
"independent wrongful" act for both a slander of title and tort of interfrence with prospective 
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economic advantage. The same principles should apply in Idaho. "An act is independently 
wrongful if it is unlawful, that is, if it is proscribed by some constitutional, statutory, regulatory, 
common law, or other determinable legal standard. (Korea Supply, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 1159.) 
Edwards v. Arthur Andersen LLP, 44 Cal.4th 937,945-46,81 Cal. Rptr.3d 282, 189 P..3d 285 
(2008). The filing of a lawsuit is a pre-requisite to a filing of a lis pendens. The publication of 
the notice of lis pendens is not defamatory. It merely informs the public that the property is 
involved in litigation. Vanderford Co., Inc. v. Knudson, 144 Idaho 547, 165 P.3d 261 (Idaho 
2007). The filing of a lis pendens cannot give rise to any actionable claim against the plaintiffs. 
The Relevant portion of Idaho Code section 5-505, provides: 
5-505. LIS PENDENS. In an action affecting the title or the right ofpossession 
of real property, the plaintiff at the time of filing the complaint, ... may file for 
record with the recorder of the county in which the property or some part thereof 
is situated, a notice of the pendency of the action, containing the names of the 
parties, the object of the action or defense, and a description of the property in 
that county affected thereby. From the time ofiiling such notice for record 
only shall a purchaser or incumbrancer of the property affected thereby be 
deemed to have constructive notice of the pendency of the action, and only of its 
pendency against parties designated by their real names. (emphasis added). 
The matter before the court requires this court to construe the plain meaning and intention 
of I. C. § 5-505. The interpretation of a statute is an issue of law over which this Court exercises 
free The Idaho statute relating to the right to file a Lis Pendens is straightforward. 
The case of Joseph C.L.U. Ins. Assoc., Inc. v. Vaught, 117 Id. 555, 557, 789 P.2d 1146, 
1148 (Cl. App.1990), provides: 
A lis pendens is a notice to the world of the existence of a claim affecting certain 
real property. See I.e. § 5-505; Suitts v. First Security Bank ofIdaho, N.A., 100 
Idaho 555, 559,602 P.2d 53, 57 (1979). The lis pendens does not purport, by 
itself, to establish or to change anyone's legal rights. Of course, the filing of alis 
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pendens may highlight a possible legal problem affecting the property, thereby 
inducing an extra measure of caution by potential purchasers or lenders until the 
litigation is concluded. But this does not mean that any underlying legal rights 
have been altered. 
The Joseph, supra, case authority, establishes that the filing of a lis pendens does not 
"change the legal rights" of the litigants. It is simply a recorded document giving notice to the 
world that litigation has bt~en instituted which may affect the underlying property. Under these 
facts, did the filing of the Lis Pendens and the ultimate release of the Lis Pendens by the 
plaintiffs give rise to any actionable torts? 
The purchase price has not been returned and the plaintiffs had established rights 
pursuant to vendee's lien statute which affect the title of property as any foreclosure action does. 
The plaintiffs have the right to pursue a foreclosure of their vendee's lien. The foreclosure of 
vendee's lien as with any lien foreclosure is addressed in I.C. § 45-1302, which provides: 
Determination of All Rights upon Foreclosure Proceedings. 
In any suit brought to foreclose a mortgage or lien upon realproperty... 
the plaintiff..., plaintiff in intervention may make as party defendant in the same 
cause of action, any person, including parties mentioned in section 5-325, having, 
claiming or appearing to have or to claim any title, estate, or interest in or to any 
part of the real or personal property involved therein, and the court shall, in 
addition to granting relief in the foreclosure action, determine the title, estate or 
interest of all partic~s thereto in the same manner and to the same extent and effect 
as in the action to quiet title. 
The plaintiffs since the entry of the Order by Judge Wilper on March 1,2007 (allowing 
the continued recording of the lis pendens), have had a lawful right to foreclose a vendee's lien. 
A vendee's lien is afforded the same right as any other type oflien foreclosure referenced in I.C. 
§ 45-1302 and is given tht: same effect as a quiet title action. The specific language of the statute 
provides, "determine the title, estate, or interest of all parties thereto in the same manner and to 
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the same extent and effect as in the action to quiet title". A detennination of a vendee's lien is 
according to the statute equivalent to a quiet title action. Clearly, there is no dispute of fact that 
the plaintiffs lawfully were: entitled to record a lis pendens on their claim for a return of the 
purchase price, as provided in I.C. § 45-1302. The defendants have admitted that they have not 
returned the purchase price, and would not return the purchase price unless the plaintiffs agreed 
to dismiss their potential right to an appeal (Affidavit of Connie Taylor dated December 18, 2009 
filed 12/21/09; Exhibit "A" to Affidavit of Thomas G. Maile, IV., In Support of Plaintiffs' 
Motion for Summary Judgment Re: Defendants' Counterclaim). 
A plain reading of I.C. § 45-1302 supports the plaintiffs' position that a lis pendens was 
proper until the vendee's lien is foreclosed upon. The plaintiffs have consistently asserted that 
the right to pursue the vendee's lien and the foreclosure of the same, was part and parcd of the 
Lis Pendens which were previously filed of record. The plaintiffs have released their lis 
pendens. On July 13,2009 after receipt of the Court's Memorandum, the plaintiffs rekased the 
lis pendens relating to the current matter. Although, technically, the plaintiffs could have 
maintained the lis pendens through an appeal in the current case (as allowed by Judge Wilper 
during the appeal in Taylor v. Maile), the plaintiffs voluntarily removed the same. Until the 
purchase price was returned, pursuant to I.C. § 45-1302, the plaintiffs were entitled to maintain 
their lis pendens. 
The case of Weitz v. Green, 148 Id. 851,230 P.3d 743 (2010) held: 
The district court"s finding as to the publication element was erroneous as a 
matter oflaw. As this Court noted in Richeson v. Kessler, "[w]ith certain 
exceptions, unimportant here, defamatory matter published in the due course of a 
judicial proceeding, having some reasonable relation to the cause, is absolutely 
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privileged and will not support a civil action for defamation although made 
maliciously and with knowledge of its falsity." 73 Idaho 548, 551-52,255 P.2d 
707,709 (1953). If the defamatory statement was made in the course ofa 
proceeding and had a reasonable relation to the cause of action of that proceeding, 
that statement may not be used as the basis for a civil action for defamation. 
Carpenter v. Grimes Pass Placer Mining Co., 19 Idaho 384, 393-94, 114 P. 42, 45 
(1911). 
As the Weitz case held such statements whether set forth in a lis pendens filed of record 
or contained in allegations of a complaint are judicially immune from liability if they "had a 
reasonable relation to the cause of action of that proceeding". The actions of the counter-
defendants relating to the judicial proceeding in this matter and Judge Wilper's matter whether 
protected under a vendee's lien or a claim for a constructive trust, the pleadings and the Lis 
Pendens were reasonably related to the claims for relief in properly pursued litigation in both 
cases. 
4. The Court should exclude evidence of any claimed damages after the Counter­
defendants fIled their release of the Lis Pendens. 
The plaintiffs filed their release of the Lis Pendens in this litigation on July 13,2009 
after this court ruled that res judicata barred the plaintiffs' claims. The plaintiffs filed their 
vendee's lien of record on August 3, 2009, and Judge Wilper has ruled that this vendee's lien is 
valid and may be retained lmtil it is satisfied by repayment of the purchase price. The counter-
claimants have not been hindered by a Lis Pendens in their ability to sell, transfer, or borrow 
against the property since it was released and therefore cannot assert or recover any damages 
associated with any time subsequent to the release oflis pendens. Compensatory damages for 
lost profits and future earnings must be shown with a reasonable certainty. Hummer v. Evans, 
129 Idaho 274, 280, 923 P.2d 981,987 (1996). Damage awards based upon speculation and 
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conjecture will not be allowed. Rindlisbaker v. Wilson, 95 Idaho 752, 519 P.2d 421 (1974). 
Inland Group of Companies, Inc. v. Providence Washington Ins. Co., 133 Idaho 249, 985 P.2d 
674 (Idaho 1999). The counter-claimants cannot assert any claims for damages beyond July 
2009. 
5. The Court should exclude any claim for damages arising from the filing and 
maintenance of th.~ vendee's lien, or Plaintiff's motion to enforce their vendee's lien 
by foreclosure. 
Judge Wilper ruled that the filing of the vendee's lien and the foreclosure ofth~~ same 
were not a misuse of the judicial system that warranted sanctions. As stated in the case of Carter, 
supra, "It is an issue of law for the court to determine whether the nature of the act complained of 
could be considered wrongful or not. In other words, the definition of what could be considered 
wrongful is a question of law. Once the act is so defined by the judge, it then becomes a jury 
question to determine whether the act was or was not committed as defined." The Honorable 
Judge Wilper ruled that Plaintiffs were entitled to maintain a vendee's lien, and although Taylors 
asked Judge Wilper to sanction Plaintiffs for attempting to enforce the vendee's lien by 
foreclosure, Judge Wilper declined to assess sanctions. The Taylors' claim in their amended 
complaint that this action was actionable is inconsistent with Judge Wi1per's ruling that the 
MaileslBerkshire have a legal right to the remedy of a vendee's lien, which of necessity" includes 
the right to enforce that remedy. 
5.	 The Court should e~xclude evidence and argument that Taylors are entitled lto 
recover their attonleys fees and costs as additional damages. 
The counter-claimants should be precluded from having the jury consider any attorneys 
fees and costs incurred in the defense of the plaintiffs' claims which were dismissed by this 
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court. The case of Losser v. Bradstreet, 145 Id. 670, 183 P.3d 758 (Idaho 2008), provides 
authority for this court to restrict the counter-claimants from advancing any theories before the 
jury that they are entitled to damages based upon attorneys fees and costs incurred in the defense 
of the plaintiffs' claims. This court at the conclusion of the counter-claim will be in a position to 
detennine ifthere is a basis for any award of costs and attorneys fees. The Losser, decision 
provides: 
A party may not pursue an independent action to recover attorney fees and costs 
incurred in an earlier lawsuit involving the same parties. 
.... If a pleading is signed in violation ofRule 11 , then the court upon motion or 
upon its own initiative, shall impose "upon the person who signed it, a 
represented party, or both, an appropriate sanction, which may include ... a 
reasonable attorney's fee." Bradstreet's verification of the application for infomLal 
probate of a will that she forged clearly is not conduct "well grounded" in fact nor 
is it "warranted by I~xisting law or a good faith argument for the extension, 
modification or reversal ofexisting law." 
.... Generally, however, a litigant must pursue attorney fees and costs in the same 
proceeding as the underlying litigation. "Where an action based on the same 
wrongful act has been prosecuted by plaintiff against defendant to a successful 
issue, he or she cannot in a subsequent action recover his or her costs and 
expenses in the former action as damages." 25 C.J.S. Damages § 79 (2007) . "As 
a general rule, litigation costs and attorney's fees incurred in prior litigation 
against the same defendant are not recoverable in a subsequent action." 22 AM. 
JUR. 2D Damages § 435 (2007) . 
We do not suggest that a party may never bring an action to recover an 
award of attorney fees and costs incurred in earlier litigation. Indeed, we have 
recognized that, in certain circumstances, attorney fees may properly be awarded 
as an element of damages. See e.g., Abbie Uriguen Oldsmobile Buick, Inc. v. U.S. 
Fire Ins. Co., 95 Idaho 501,509,511 P.2d 783, 791 (1973) (attorney fees incurred 
in defense ofthird party's claim after insurance company breached contractual 
obligation to defend held to be proper element of damage arising out ofbreach). 
Rather, our holding is simply that a party may not bring a second lawsuit to 
recover attorney fees and costs incurred in an earlier lawsuit from a party to that 
earlier lawsuit. 
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In the present mattl~r, the plaintiffs' initial lawsuit has been dismissed. This court will 
have the opportunity to determine if the initial filing was a frivolous claim against the eounter­
claimants. The holding in Losser, supra, prohibits the counter-claimants from presenting any 
testimony or evidence of their attorney fees and costs incurred as the counter-claimants were 
parties to the first lawsuit. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, the Court should enter appropriate orders limiting 
presentation of evidence and argument to the jury as noted herein. 
DATED this 31st day of December, 2010. 
c~~co-counsel for 
Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants 
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DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
 
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an 
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G. 
MAILE, N. and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE, 
husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants, 
v. 
CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, flk/a 
CONNIE TAYLOR, an individual; DALLAN 
TAYLOR, an individual; R. JOHN 
TAYLOR, an individual; CLARK and 
FEENEY, a partnership; PAUL T. CLARK, 
an individual; THEODORE L. JOHNSON 
REVOCABLE TRUST, an Idaho revocable 
trust; JOHN DOES I -JOHN DOES X; AND 
ALL PERSONS IN POSSESSION OR 
CLAIMING ANY RIGHT TO 
POSSESSION. 
Defendants/Counter-Claimants. 
Case No. CV-OC-0723232 
MOTION IN LIMINE RE: 
RELEVANCE OF PRIOR 
ALLEGATIONS 
COMES NOW, the Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants, by and through their co-counsel of 
record, Christ T. Troupis, and moves this Honorable Court for entry of its Order prohibiting the 
Defendants/Counter-Claimants from referencing during oral argument, voir dire or eliciting 
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testimony and/or advancing any evidentiary items concerning the allegations which were 
involved in the prior underlying litigation Taylor v. Maile on the grounds that any and all 
allegations are barred by Rles Judicata and/or Collateral Estoppel. The Idaho Supreme Court 
affirmed Judge Wilper detl:::rmination that the real estate closing was void, for lack ofnotice to 
the beneficiaries pursuant to I.e. § 68-108. 
This Motion is made pursuant to Idaho Rules ofEvidence Rules 401,402, and 403. This 
Motion is further made on the grounds and for the reasons that such testimony and/or information 
is irrelevant and immaterial to these proceedings and lacks probative value and is supported 
further with the Memorandum Brief in Support of Motion in Limine, filed concurrently herewith 
and the record and file contained herein. Oral argument is requested. 
DATED this 31 st day ofDecember, 20 IO. 
CH~o-counSeL for 
Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on this 31 st day of December, 2010, I caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing (1) MOTION IN LIMINE RE: RELEVANCE OF PRIOR 
ALLEGATIONS, (2) MEMORANDUM BRIEF U'J" SUPPORT OF MOTION IN LIMn~E RE: 
RELEVANCE OF PRIOR ALLEGATIONS, together with (3) NOTICE OF HEARING RE: 
MOTION IN LIMINE RE: RELEVANCE OF PRIOR ALLEGATIONS to be delivered" 
addressed as follows: 
Connie W. Taylor ~U.S.Mail
 
Henderson Law Firm () Facsimile Transmission
 
900 Washington S1. Suite 1020 () Hand Delivery
 
Vancouver, Washington 98660 () Overnight Delivery
 
Facsimile: (360) 693-2911
 
Mark Stephen Prusynski ~U.S.Mail
 
PO Box 829 () Facsimile Transmission
 
Boise, ID 83701 () Hand Delivery
 
Phone: (208) 345-2000 () Overnight Delivery
 
Facsimile: (208) 385-5384
 
Thomas G. Maile, IV. () U. S. Mail
 
380 W. State Street () Facsimile Transmission
 
Eagle, Idaho 83616 ~ Hand Delivery
 
Facsimile: (208) 939-1001 () Overnight Delivery
 
~~~ 
CHRIST T. TROU~~S,=------
Co-counsel for Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants 
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DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
 
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an 
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G. 
MAILE, IV. and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE, 
husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs/Counter··Defendants, 
v. 
CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, £!kIa 
CONNIE TAYLOR, an individual; DALLAN 
TAYLOR, an individual; R. JOHN 
TAYLOR, an individual; CLARK and 
FEENEY, a partnership; PAUL T. CLARK, 
an individual; THEODORE L. JOHNSON 
REVOCABLE TRUST, an Idaho revocable 
trust; JOHN DOES I -JOHN DOES X; AND 
ALL PERSONS IN POSSESSION OR 
CLAIMING ANY RIGHT TO 
POSSESSION. 
Defendants/Counter-Claimants. 
Case No. CV-OC-0723232 
MEMORANDUM BRIEF IN 
SUPPORT OF MOTION IN 
LIMINE RE: RELEVANCE OF 
PRIOR ALLEGATIONS 
COMES NOW, the Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants, by and through their co-counsel of 
record, Christ T. Troupis, provide this Memorandum Brief in support of their Motion In Limine 
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re: Relevance of Prior Allegations. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The parties were involved in the previous underlying litigation, Taylor v. Maile. The current 
counter-claimants advanced a number ofclaims in the previous underlying litigation. Ultimately the 
Idaho Supreme Court in Taylor v. Maile (1) determined that it appeared that a conflict of interest 
might have existed with Beth Rogers, the nominated successor trustee pursuant to I.C. § 68-108. 
The Supreme Court in Taylor v. Maile (1) knew that the grantor ofthe trust, Theodore L. Johnson 
had died two days before the closing and transaction was closed by Beth Rogers, as a successor 
nominated trustee. It was this Decision that prompted Connie Taylor to draft the Amended 
Complaint in the underlying litigation to include the allegations that Reed Taylor, Dallan Taylor, and 
R. John Taylor were residual beneficiaries ofthe trust. Based upon the verified Amended Complaint 
the district court entered the "Judgment on Beneficiaries' Claims", reasoning that as residual 
beneficiaries the Taylor could set aside the real estate transaction. The underlying prior litigation 
never made any determination as to any other claims but determined, on one sole issue, that the 
property be restored to the oust because of the lack of notice to the Taylor beneficiaries. 
LEGAL ARGUMENT 
A.	 All facts, allegations, contention advanced by the Taylors apart from the lack of notice 
to the beneficiaries which resulted in the Judgment on Beneficiaries' Claim cannot be 
raised as the same ~llre not relevant. 
The determination ofrelevant evidence is set forth in the following Idaho Rules ofEvidence 
which provide: 
Rule 401. Definition ofrelevant evidence 
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·"Relevant Evidence" means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of 
any fact that is of consequence to the detennination of the action more probable or 
less probable than it would be without the evidence. 
Rule 402. Relevant evidence generally admissible; irrelevant evidence inadmissible 
All relevant evidence is admissible except as otherwise provided by these rules or by 
other rules applicable in the courts ofthis state. Evidence which is not relevant is not 
admissible. 
Rule 403. Exclusion of relevant evidence on grounds of prejudice, confusion, or 
waste of time 
Although relevant, e:vidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by the danger ofunfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading 
the jury, or by considerations ofundue delay, waste oftime, or needless presentation 
of cumulative evidence. 
The jury should not consider any of the allegations, claims, etc., that were part of the 
Judgment in the prior underlying proceedings. Those issues have no relevance to the current 
proceedings or the prior Judgment on Beneficiaries' Claims. 
Any attempted reference to allegations surrounding the initial pleadings in Maile v. Taylor 
that do not relate to I.e. § 68-108, are ofno relevance to the current proceedings and would unduly 
confuse the jury in the principle issue ofthe counter-claim, to wit: were allegations contained in the 
plaintiffs' amended complaint and demand for jury trial, groundless and constitute an intentional 
interference with a prospective business advantage and abuse of process. Any attempt by the 
counter-claimants to retry or raise similar issues that there were raised in Taylor v. Maile, are not 
relevant. Such evidence wh{:ther through testimony or any attempt to introduce evidence on such 
issues, should be excluded as its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger ofunfair 
prejudice, would confuse the issues, or mislead the jury, and would amount to undue delays, and a 
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waste of time. 
CONCLUSION 
The counter-claimants should be limited in voir dire, argument, presenting testimony and/or 
attempting to introduce evidence on issues that were covered in Taylor v. Maile. Such issues or 
theories should be barred under the above cited Rules of Evidence. 
DATED this 31st day ofDecember, 2010. 
8tv1)~ 
CHRIST T. TROGl1-S,--=------­
Co-counsel for Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
 
STATE OF IDAHO, n~ AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
 
1--;~RKS~I1~iIN~E~T~EN'~~~~C, an--­
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G. 
i MAILE, IV. and COLLEEN BIRCH­
. MAILE, husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants, 
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CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, f/k/a 
! CONNIE TAYLOR, an individual; DALLAN 
: TAYLOR, an individual; R. JOHN 
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1.	 Your Affiant is the co-counsel of record for Berkshire Investments, LLC, Thomas G. 
Maile, IV., and Colleen Birch-Maile in the above captioned matter. That the information 
and facts set forth herein are based upon your affiant's personal knowledge and/or 
observations and can testify as to the truth ofthe matters asserted herein if called upon as 
a witness at the trial ofthis matter. That your affiant provides this affidavit in support of 
the motions in limine filed herein. 
2.	 That attached hereto as Exhibit "A" is a true and correct copy of the Counter-claimants' 
Witness Disclosure received on October 27,2010, regarding witness designation and 
Rule 26 compliance, and the same is incorporated by reference herein as if set forth in 
full herein. 
3.	 That attached hereto as Exhibit "B" are true and correct copies ofthe relevant pages of 
the counter-claimants' Answers to the Plaintiffs' First Set of Discovery (pp. 1,6, 7, 8, 9, 
10), dated August 27, 2009, and the same are incorporated by reference herein as if set 
forth in full herein. That your affiant has not received nor has the counter-claimants 
provided any supplemental responses to said discovery responses. 
4.	 That attached hereto as Exhibit "c" is a true and correct copy of the Counter-claimants' 
Supplemental Witness Disclosure received on December 10, 2010, regarding witness 
designation and the same is incorporated by reference herein as if set forth in filII herein. 
5.	 That attached hereto as Exhibit "D" is a true and correct copy of the Scheduling Order in 
this matter. 
6.	 Your affiant left his office on December 7,2010, and was not able to review and consider 
the late disclosures by the counter-claimants until December 22, 2010. That the 
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disclosures referenced in the above exhibits were delivered approximately 45 days after 
stipulated discovery deadlines and after the required time referenced in the Court Order. 
That your affiant has not been able to obtain any experts in opposition to the late 
disclosed experts by the counter-claimants. 
7.	 That annexed Hereto as Exhibit "E" Is a True and Correct Copy of Page 81 from the 
Deposition ofR. John Taylor taken on December 14, 2004in the case captioned, Taylor 
vs Maile Ada County Case No. CV OC 04-00473D. 
DATED this 31st day of December, 2010. 
CHRIST T. TROUPI , 
Attorney for Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me, a Notary Public in and for said State, this 
31 st day of December, 2010. 
Notary Pu i~ for Idaho .
 
Residing at J1DA C~
 
My Commission Expires ---J.Ul?ZI'-")e>...:\L....-l""'"~ __--­
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CONNIE W. TAYLOR 
Henderson Law Office: 
900 Washington Street, Suite 1020 
VanCGuver, WA 98660 
Telephone 360.699.1530 
ISBA No. 4837 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THlC 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
BERKSHIRE INvESTMENTS, LLC, an 
Idaho Iirdted liability, and THOMAS G. 
MAILE, IV, and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE 
husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
""S. 
C01'l'NIE WRIGID' TAYLOR. et al. 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV OC 0723232 
COUNTERCLAIMANTS' 
'WITNESS DISCLOSURE 
The Counterclaimants may call any of the following witnesses to testify at the trial in the 
above matter scheduled to begin on January 31, 2011: 
Expert Witnesses: 
1.	 D. Craig Lewis, Professor Emeritus of Law
 
450 Sunv.est Drive, #73,
 
Cas8 Grande. 1"\Z 85 t 22 ,
 
Profe&sor Lewis will explain to the jurors the legal doctrines of res judicata (claim precksion) 
and c(Jllarera! estoppel (issue preclusion), and that the purpose behind those doctrines is to 
Counten:laimants' Witness Disclosure 
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preclude the multiple litigation of claims. He will testifY tbat these legal doctrines have long 
been a part of the standard Jaw school curriculum, tnat they have been recognized for many 
decades, that the doctrLnes are well estab.lished law in the State of Idaho, and that any attorney 
licensed to practice law in Idaho would be familiar with them. 
Professor Lewis will compare the issues raised in the prior lawsuit (Taylor v. Maile) to the 
Amended Complaint filed in this proceeding. and will demonstrate that the current procel~ding 
was a clear attempt by Mr, Maile to relitigate his claim that the Taylors did not have standing to 
pursue an action against him for the retum of the Linder Road property. Based on the Kdaho 
Supreme Court's rulings that the Taylors did have standing, Professor Lewis will explain why 
the suit against the Johnson Trust and its trustees is barred by claim preclusion (res judicata). 
which al50 prohibits the suit against the Trusl's attorneys, who were in privity with the Trust. 
He will further testify that the suit against the Tnlst and beneficiaries' attorneys is also barred by 
issue preclusion (collateral estoppels). because the standing of the beneficiaries to bring suit is an 
issue which Mr. Maik raised unsuccessfully in the prior lawsuit. Profe~sor Lewis will testify 
that no attorney could reasonably believe that there is a legitimate legal basis for Maile's la'\vsuit, 
and that flUng and pursuing that action is not reasonably justifiable. 
Professor lewis's opinions are based on his education, training and knowledge. as well 
as on his review of documents filed in Taylor Ii. Maile and in the present action; including but 
not limited to the foilowing (which may be used as exhibits in support of his opinions): 
From the Taylor v, Af'aile case: 
a, Maile's Answer and Counterclaim dared 917i05 
b. Order c,n Plaintiff s MSJ dated 2i13/06 
Counterclaimants' WHness Disclosure 
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c.	 Order Granting MSJ on beneficiaries' c.laims dated 5/15/06 
d.	 Judgment 011 Beneficiaries' Claims dated 6i7/06 
e.	 Memorandum Decision denying Maile's claim for unjust enrichment (11/29/06) 
f.	 Appellant's/Cross-Respondents' Reply Brief (Maile) 
g.	 Respondent's/Cross-Appellants' Reply Brief (Taylor) 
h.	 Taylor v. Maile I Supreme Court Opinion 
i.	 Taylor v. Maile II Supreme Court Opinion 
From Maile v. Taylor case: 
j.	 Maile's Amended Complaint (3/25/08). The initial complaint was never served. 
k.	 Memorandum Decision (7/02/09) dismissing Maile's claims based on res judicata 
grounds 
Professor Lewis's qualifications and publications are listed on his Curriculum Vitae, 
which is attached as Exhibit A. His fee i1' $150 per hour for consulting, $250 per hour for 
deposition or trial testimony. He has not testified as an expert at trial or by deposition within 
the preceding four years. 
2.	 Sam Langston. MAl
 
Langston & Associates, Inc.
 
2219 State Suel:t
 
Boise, m 83702
 
Mr. Langston will testify as to hi::; opinion of the market value of the Fairfield 
Estates Subdivision in accordance with Uniform Standard of Professional Appraisal 
Practice (VSPAP), with an August 3, 2009 retrospective date of value, His opinion will 
be based on comparable real property transactions, and he \vill prepare a Summary 
Counterd.limants· Witness Disclosure 
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Appraisal Report which discusses the data. reasoning and analysis used in the appraisal 
process to devdop the opinion of value. The Summary Appraisal Report will be 
provided in a supplemental response upon receipt. 
Mr. Larlgston's qualifications are set forth in the curriculum vitae whic:h is 
attached as Exhibit B. His fee tor the Summary Appraisal Report is $4,500, and his 
hourly rate for testimony (at deposition or trial) is $350 per hour. Mr. Langston's 
testimony ill the: past four years has been requested and will be provided when received.. 
3.	 Connie Shannahan
 
Coldwell Banker Tomlinson Group
 
408 South Eagk~ Roa.d
 
Eagle ID 83616
 
~s. Shannahan is a real esmte agent in Eagle, Idaho, who may be called to t(~stify 
as to the information which she gathered in the Real Estate Services Proposal dated 
January 12, 2010. a copy of whi ch was attached to her a.ffidavit dated April 22, 20 I0, 
which has been. previously provided. Specifically, she may be asked to testify as to the 
sale of lots in lEagle which are comparable to those in the Fairfield Estates subdivision 
between January of 2005 and December of 2008, and that the sale prices on five acre lots 
during the 2005-2006 time frame ranged from a lot of 5325,000 to a high of $699,000. 
Ms. Shannahan's curriculum vitae, hourly rates, and prior testimony have been 
requested and will be provided when received. 
2.	 Lay/fact witnesses who may be called to testify: 
John Taylor 
Po Box 538 
lewist.on fd 83501 
Councerdaimams' Witness Disclosure 
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DaHan J Taylor 
410 Clear Creek Drive 
Meridian Id 83462 
Chuck Leis 
2118 N Canter PI. 
Eagle, Idaho 83616 
(208) 863-0687 
Dan and Cindy LeBeau 
615 W. Rush Ct. 
Eagle, 1D 83616 
(208) 939 2556 
Stephen McPhcters 
PO Box 44137 
Boise. ID 83711 
(208) 377·4261 
(208) 377-9321 
Anna Gepford 
10601 Horseshoe Bend Rd., Space 20 
Boise. TO 83714 
(208) 938-4745 
lube Anderson 
101 Daggett Creel( Rd. 
Boise, ID 83716 
(208) 342-4018 
Steven Counter 
11789 WAlcott St. 
Boise, ID 83709 
(208) 378-0959 
Richard Zam7.:0W 
Zamzow':; Feed and Seed 
6313 fairview Ave 
Boise. Idaho 
(208) 375·4231 
Counterclaimants' \Vitness Disclosure 
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Mr. Doug Crandall 
Attorney at Law 
1015 W. Hays 
Boise, ID 83702 
(208) 343-1211 
Mr. John Wood (in person or through reading swom testimony in unjust enrichment trial) 
3390 Flint Drive 
Eagle, ill 83616 
(208) 412-5969 
The Counterclaimants reserve the right to supplement and amend this disckJ,sure 
to include rebuttal witnesses andfor testimony after receiving the Counterdefendants' 
witness disclosures. 
DATED thiJ] day of October, 2010. 
HENDERSON L..'\W OFHCE 
Counterclaimants' Wi[i.!ess Disclosure 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the ;;;Jf day "fOctober, 2010 I caused to be served a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing dDcument by the method indicated below, and addressed 
to the following: 
Thomas G.Maile G U.S. Mail 
Attorney at Law 
380 W. State St. 
Eagle, ID 83616 
G Hand Delivered k-=- Overnight Mail L~ Tek',copy (FAX) (108) 939-1001 
Mr. Christ Troupis 
Attorney at Law 
PO Box 2408 
Eagle, lD 83616 
G us. Mail 
Hand Delivered 
Overnight Mail 
Telecopy (FAX) (208) 938·5482 
Counterclaimaiits' Witness Disclosure 
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CONNIE W. TAYLOR 
CLARK and FEENEY 
P.O. Drawer 285
 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
 
Telephone (208) 743-9516
 
ISBA No. 4837
 
Attorneys for Defendants John Taylor
 
DaHan Taylor and the Johnson Trust
 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
 
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an Idaho 
limited liability, and THOMAS G. MAILE, IV,
 Case No. CV OC 0723232
 
and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE husband and
 
wife,
 
Plaintiffs, ANSWERS TO PLAINTIFFS FIRST SET
 
OF DISCOVERY DIRECTED TO
 
vs.
 DEFENDANTS DALLAN TAYLOR, AN
 
INDIVIDUAL; R. JOHN TAYLOR, AN
 
CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, et al.
 INDIVIDUAL; THEODORE L. 
JOHNSON REVOCABLE TRUST~, AN 
Defendants. IDAHO REVOCABLE TRUST 
Defendants John Taylor, DaHan Taylor, and the Theodore Johnson Trust, by and through 
their attorney of record, submit the following responses to the Plaintiffs First Set of Discovery 
Directed to Defendants DaHan Taylor, an Individual; R. John Taylor, an Individual; Theodore L. 
Johnson Revocable Trust, an Idaho Revocable Trust: 
ANSWERS TO THE PLAINTIFFS BY: .. ~ ~ -. ­
FIRST SET OF DISCOVERY -1­
LAW OFFICES OF 
CLARK AND FEENEY 
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INTERROGATORY NO.4: Please identify in full and complete detail each and every 
document, writing, or other physical evidence which you intend to offer as an exhibit in the trial of 
this matter. 
ANSWER Exhibits could include but not be limited to those submitted in the trial of the 
companion case Taylor v. },4aile, Case No. CV OC 04 00473D. Attached as Exhibit "A" are copies 
ofthe Plaintiffand Defend,mt Exhibit lists. In addition, counterclaimants will introduce each ofthe 
court decisions (district and appellate) which have established the fact that neither the\1ailes nor 
Berkshire Investments has any legitimate claim to ownership of the Linder Road propel1y. 
INTERROGATORY NO.5: Please identifY each and every lawsuit in which you have been 
a party by providing the caption of said case, the case number and the court in which said action has 
or was filed, including, but not limited to, actions brought against you by any governmental agency 
or body. 
ANSWER: Other than the Taylor v. Maile litigation relating to the Linder Road property, 
any lawsuits are irrelevant, immaterial, and not calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible 
evidence. 
INTERROGATORY NO.7: Please identify each and every expert you intend to call at the 
trial of this case and with respect to each witness you listed, describe: 
(a) The subject matter on which each expert may testify; 
(b) The substance of the facts to which each expert may testifY; 
(c) The substance of the opinions to which each expert may testify; 
(d) The expert witnesses' credentials which you allege qualifY the witness as an expert 
ANSWERS TO THE PLAINTIFFS 
FIRST SET OF DISCOVERY -6­
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(e)	 The description of any and all reports prepared or used by persons who mayor will 
testify as expert witnesses at any hearings or trial ofthis action. 
ANSWER: This information will be provided within the time frames set forth in the 
Court's scheduling order. 
INTERROGATORY NO.8: Please identify each expert you intend to call as an expert 
witness in this matter. With regard to each such witness, please state: 
(a)	 The substance of the facts and opinion to which each such expert will testify; and 
(b)	 The identify of any document or documents upon which each such expert will rely 
in giving testimony. 
ANSWER: See Answer to Interrogatory 7. 
INTERROGATORY NO.9: Relative to any ofthe documents described in your responses 
to the Requests for Production accompanying these Interrogatories please identify in full and 
complete detail each and every document, writing, or other physical evidence which has either been 
lost, misplaced or in otherwise not available at this time. Relative thereto please explain your 
inability to produce the same. 
ANSWER: Not applicable. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 10: Please identify in full and complete detail each and every 
document, writing or other physical evidence which you relied upon in answering any of the 
interrogatories contained herein. 
ANSWER: No documents were relied upon in answering these interrogatories. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 11: As to each item ofgeneral and/or special damages for which 
you seek recovery in this lawsuit, please state: 
ANSWERS TO THE PLAINTIFFS 
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(a)	 The date and amount of the item; 
(b)	 A brief description of the item; and 
(c)	 If the item was a charge or bill, the name and address of the originator thereof, i.e., 
the person or entity by whom or in whose behalf the charge was made. 
ANSWER: The conduct ofthe counterdefendants has made it impossible to sell the Linder 
Road property. The amount of damage will be the difference between the value of the property at 
the time of trial as compared to the amount which could have been obtained for the propl~rty but for 
the litigation. This will be, at a minimum, the $1.8 million offer as testified to by John Wood in the 
trial of the unjust enrichment claim in Taylor v. Maile. Other damages include but will not 
necessarily be limited to costs and attorneys fees, which currently exceed $60,000 for these 
defendants. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 12: With regard to the claims asserted to damages, please itemize 
each element ofdamages for which you are suing, and state in dollars and cents the amount ofmoney 
you are suing for each. 
ANSWER: See previous answer, which will be supplemented prior to the trial. 
REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO.1: Please produce the ORIGINAL and/or copies 
ofall letters, memoranda, records, receipts, invoices, agreements, contracts and other documents and 
exhibits which Defendants, or Defendants' attorney, intend to use or offer in evidence at the trial of 
this case. 
RESPONSE: Exhibits could include but not be limited to those submitted in the trial of the 
companion case Taylor v. Maile, Case No. CV OC 04 00473D. Attached as Exhibit "A" are copies 
ANSWERS TO THE PLAINTIFFS 
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of the Plaintiff and Defendant Exhibit lists. The counterdefendant is in possession of copies of 
these exhibits, as well as the decisions of the trial courts and the appellate courts. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO.2: Please produce the ORIGINAL and/or copies 
of any and all reports prepared or used by persons who mayor will testify as expert witnesses on 
behalf of the Defendants at the trial of this action, together with all documents in which the expert 
has reviewed in arriving at his opinion, all documents which relate to all opinions to be expressed 
and the documents which relate to the basis and reasons therefore, together with all documents 
demonstrating the data or other information considered by the witness in forming the opilnions; any 
exhibits to be used as a summary of or support for the opinions; any documents including but not 
limited to resumes demonstrating the qualifications of the witness, including all publications 
authored by the witness within the preceding ten years; any and all documents indicating the 
compensation to be paid or which has been paid for the testimony; any and all documents which list 
of any other cases in which the witness has testified as an expert at trial or by deposition within the 
preceding four years. 
RESPONSE: This information will be provided within the time frame for disclosing expert 
witness information set forth in any scheduling order issued by the trial court. 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO.3: Please produce the ORIGINAL and/or copies 
of any and all documents which in any way tend to support your claim that counter-claimants have 
suffered special and/or other general damages, and estimated future damages as alleged in your 
counter-claim. 
RESPONSE: See responses to preceding requests for production. 
ANSWERS TO THE PLAINTIFFS 
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REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO.4: Please produce any and all tax documents, files, 
records, etc., relating to the Theodore 1. Johnson Revocable Trust, for the years 2004,2005,2006., 
2007, 2008, both Federal and State, including but not limited to all tax returns, 1041 s, 1099s, K-1 s, 
etc. 
RESPONSE: See Johnson Trust tax returns for 2004 - 2007, which are attached as Exhibit 
"B" to these responses 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO.5: All exhibits which counter-claimants anticipate 
utilizing at the trial of this matter 
RESPONSE: See Answer to Interrogatory No.4. The counterdefendant already has copies 
of all exhibits which have been identified at this point in time. 
REQUEST FORPRODUCTION NO.6: All documents which in any way tend to support 
counter-claimants claim for damages, past and present, as alleged in your counter-claim. 
RESPONSE: See response to preceding request for production. 
/' {1ftl
 
DATED this j, f j day of August, 2009.
 
CLARK and FEENEY 
( 
By "~ -.- ~. ') 
, I 
Connie W. Taylor, a memfer of the firm: / 
Attorneys for Defendants.\ / 
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CONNIE W. TAYLOR 
Henderson Law Office 
900 Washington Street, Suite 1020 
Vancouver, WA 98660 
Telephone 360.699.1530 
ISBA No. 4837 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an 
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G. 
MAILE, IV, and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE 
husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, et al. 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV OC 0723232 
COUNTERCLAIMANTS' 
SUPPLEMENTAL 
WITNESS DISCLOSURE 
The Counterclaimants hereby supplement their previous witness disclosure with the 
following information: 
2.	 Sam Langston, MAl
 
Langston & Associates, Inc.
 
2229 State Street
 
Boise, ID 83702
 
Mr. Langston wiD testify as to his opmlOn of the value of the Fairfield Estates 
Subdivision in accordance with Unifonn Standard of Professional Appraisal Practice (USPAP). 
Counterclaimants' Supplemental 
Witness Disclosure 001992
 
 
  
 
 
 
He will testify that as of August 3,2009 retrospective date of value, the parcels had a total value 
of $650,000.00; and will explain the method by which he reached that value, all of which is 
detailed in the Summary Appraisal which has been provided, by email, to opposing counsel on 
December 7, 2010. A hard copy of the Summary Appraisal is attached hereto. 
Mr. Langston win also testify to the Residential Demand Analysis, contained at pages 30 
- 33 of the Summary Appraisal, and the fact that the Ada County residential market is in a period 
of market correction from the high levels of demand experienced during the 2005 and early 2006 
markets. The facts on which his opinions are based are set forth in detail in the Summary 
Appraisal Report which discusses the data, reasoning and analysis used in the appraisal process 
to develop the opinion of value. 
3.	 Bob Debolt
 
Coldwell Banker Tomlinson Group
 
408 South Eagle Road
 
EagieID 83616
 
Mr. Debolt is a real estate broker in Eagle, Idaho, who may be called to testify as to the 
information on historical sales of real property in Eagle, Idaho which is contained in the Real 
Estate Services Proposal dated January 12, 2010 (a copy of which was attached to the Affidavit 
of Connie Shannahan datt~d April 22, 2010, which has been previously provided). Specifically, 
Mr. Debolt may be asked to testify as to the sale of lots in Eagle which are similar to those in the 
Fairfield Estates subdivision between January of 2005 and December of 2008, and that the sale 
prices on five acre lots during the 2005-2006 time frame ranged from a low of $325,000 to a 
high of $699,000, which means that a reasonable aggregate value for the lots in the Fairfield 
Subdivision during those years would have ranged from a low of $2,275,000 to a high of 
Counterclaimants' Supplemental 
Witness Disclosure 
001993
  
 
 
 
$4,893,000. He may also be asked to testify to the decline in both the number of sales and in the 
sale price for such parcels which occurred between 2006 and 2009. 
Mr. Debolt's curriculum vitae, hourly rates, and prior testimony have been requested and 
will be provided when received. 
The Counterclaimants reserve the right to further supplement and amend this disclosure 
to include rebuttal witnesses and/or testimony.
alft 
DATED this ~I-- day of December, 2010. 
Counterclaimants' Supplemental 
Witness Disclosure 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the -3- day of December, 2010 I caused to be served a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed 
to the following: 
Thomas G. Maile 
Attorney at Law 
380 W. State St. 
Eagle, ID 83616 
Mr. Christ Troupis 
Attorney at Law 
PO Box 2408 
Eagle, ID 83616 
U.S. Mail 
Hand Delivered 
Overnight Mail 
Telecopy (FAX) (208) 939-1001 
~" 
U.S. Mail
 
Hand Delivered
 
Overnight Mail
 
el copy (FAX) (208) 938-5482 
---...:~ 
onnie W. Taylor /
 
Attorney for Defendants
 
Counterclaimants' Supplemental 
Witness Disclosure 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT~OF t.. L.<J,) 
J. DAVID r,IA\!i\QP('
II .VJ;, II \'. , 
THE STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF AfJAEf\)I'J:~::Rl\cNI~i[lv 
, 
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS LLC,
 
THOMAS G MAILE IV,
 
COLLEEN BIRCH MAILE,
 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR,
 
DALLAN TA YLOR,
 
CLARK AND FEENEY,
 
PAUL T CLARK,
 
THEODORE L JOHNSON REVOCABLE
 
TRUST,
 
R. JOHN TAYLOR, 
Defendant. 
Dt:PUTY 
Case No. CV-OC-2007-23232
 
CIVIL CASE
 
ORDER FOR SCHEDULING
 
CONFERENCE AND ORDER RE:
 
MOTION PRACTICE
 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the above-captioned case is scheduled for a scheduling 
conference to commence on AUGUST 3, 2009 at 2:30 p.m. by telephone conference; plaintiffs 
counsel shall initiate the conference call. 
The purpose of the conference will be to enter a scheduling order regarding the deadlines 
contained in the attached schedule. All parties must appear at this time in person or by 
counsel. Counsel must be the handling attorney, or be fully familiar with the case and have 
authority to bind his/her client and law firm on all matters set forth in I.R.c.P. 16(a) and ;l6(b). 
In lieu of this scheduling conference, all parties may stipulate to deadlines and other 
information required in the enclosed Stipulation for Scheduling and Planning. This stipulation 
must be completed and signed by all parties, and filed with the court at least three (3) working 
days before the scheduling conference. The hearing will not be vacated until: I) the attached 
stipulation is received by the court; and 2) counsel has contacted the court's clerk at the number 
set forth below to confirm that the hearing is vacated. The foregoing notwithstan.d;ifl.·.gd~~fl~S 
: L..:'::l \~ li; JJ, I!J 8 Ii! 
. J) ,I 
\ 
\
---.-/! 
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STIPULATION MAY NOT ALTER THE TIME REQUIREMENTS SPECIFIED IN THIS 
ORDER, EXCEPT AS TO THE TIME OF DISCRETIONARY DEADLINES. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the following shall apply to motions filed in this case. 
1. SCHEDUI.ING AND HEARINGS. The Court holds its regular civil law and 
motion calendar on Mondays, Wednesdays and Thursday afternoons commencing at 3:00 P.M. 
Scheduling conferences and miscellaneous matters shall be heard starting at 4:00 P.M. Motions 
shall be generally heard commencing at 3:00 P.M. Absent an order shortening time, all motion 
practice other than motions for summary judgment will be governed by I.R.C.P. 7. Counsel is 
expected to contact the Court's Deputy Clerk, Jennifer Kennedy (phone 208-287-7531) to 
schedule hearings and to confirm the availability of opposing counsel for proposed hearing dates. 
ANY MATTER REQUIRING TESTIMONY TOTALING MORE THAN 30 MINUTES 
SHALL NOT BE SCHEDULED ON THE COURT'S REGULAR MOTION CALENDAR. As 
an accommodation to out-of-town counsel and parties,. hearings on any pretrial motion (except 
motions for summary judgment, motions in limine or hearings at which testimony is to be 
offered) may be conducted by telephone conference call pursuant to I.R.C.P. 7(b) (4). Unless 
ordered by the court, telephone conferences will be held ONLY if all counsel so stipulate and the 
court approves that stipulation. Counsel requesting a hearing by conference call will be 
responsible for arranging for placement of the call and the cost thereof. The telephone 
conference must be pre-arranged with the clerk before the date of the hearing. 
2. MOTIONS GENERALLY (applies to every motion). 
a.	 One additional copy marked or stamped "JUdge's Copy" of any motion and 
opposing papers (including affidavits, and briefs) must be submitted to the 
judge's chambers when such documents are filed or lodged with the clerk of 
the court. 
b.	 Pursuant to the local rules each side will be allotted 15 minutes for oral 
argument on a motion will be set by the court, except for summary judgments. 
ORDER FOR SCHEDULING CONFERENCE AND ORDER RE: MOTION PRACTICE PAGE-2 
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Each side will be allowed 30 miinutes on motions for summary judgment, 
including rebuttal argument. 
c.	 If a notice of hearing is not filed within fourteen (14) days after the motion is 
filed, the motion will be deemed withdrawn. 
3. WITNESS DISCLOSURES/EXPERT WITNESSES: Unless the parties 
stipulate otherwise or the court orders otherwise at the request of a party, the 
following governs disclosure of witnesses before the pre-trial conference. With 
the exception of impeachment witnesses I.R.C.P 16(e)(6)(J), each party shall 
disclose the existence and identity of intended or potential expert or lay witnesses 
to the extent required by interrogatories or other discovery requests propounded 
by another party. There is no independent duty to disclose expert or lay witnesses 
except as required to adequately respond to discovery requests or supplement 
prior responses. If discovery requests seeking disclosure of expert witnesses are 
propounded, the plaintiff upon whom such requests are served shall, in good faith, 
disclose the existence and identity of potential or intended expert witnesses and 
the subject matter and the substance of any opinions of such experts at the earliest 
opportunity, and in no event later than one hundred-twenty (120) days before trial. 
A defendant upon whom such requests are served shall, in good faith, identify any 
potential or intended expert witnesses and the subject matter and substance of any 
opinions of such experts at the earliest opportunity, and in no event later than 
eighty-five (85) days before trial. THIS PROVISION MEANS THAT WHEN 
AN EXPERT IS IDENTIFIED, HE OR SHE MUST HAVE PERFORMED 
SUCH INVESTIGATION AS MAY BE NECESSARY, REVIEWED SUCH 
DOCUMENTS AS MAYBE NECESSARY, AND REACHED CONCLUSIONS 
OR OPINIONS AS MAY BE REQUIRED SO THAT DISCLOSURE OF THAT 
INFORMATION, OR SUCH OTHER INFORMATION AS MAY BE 
REQUESTED BY DISCOVERY OR BY I.R.E. 703 AND 705 WILL BE 
DISCLOSED NO LATER THAN 120 DAYS OR 85 DAYS PRIOR TO TRIAL. 
THE EXPECTATION THAT AN EXPERT MAY BE DEPOSED IS NOT A 
GROUND FOR FAILURE TO MAKE DISCLOSURES CALLED FOR BY 
ORDER FOR SCHEDULING CONFERENCE AND ORDER RE: MOTION PRACTICE PAGE-3 
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DISCOVERY, BY RULE OF EVIDENCE, OR BY RULE 26(b)(4) IRCP. 
EXPERTS MAYBE PROHIBITED FROM TESTIFYING TO ANY OPINIONS 
OR FOU~rDATION FOR SUCH OPINIONS THAT HAVE NOT BEEN THE 
SUBJECT OF TIMELY AND PROPER DISCLOSURE. IF AN OPTI'JION OR 
FOUNDATION FOR AN OPINION OF AN EXPERT CHANGES IN ANY 
FASHION AFTER PREVIOUS DISCLOSURES HAVE BEEN MADE THERE 
IS A DUTY TO IMMEDIATELY _SUPPLEMENT SUCH INFORMATION 
PURSUANT TO RULE 26(e) IRCP. 
Any party upon whom discovery is served who intends or reserves the right to call 
any expert witness in rebuttal or sur··rebuttal shall, in good faith, identify such 
experts at the earliest opportunity, and in no event later than forty-two (42) days 
before trial. A DEFENSE EXPERT INTENDED TO BE CALLED DURING 
DEFENSE CASE IN CHIEF IS NOT A "REBUTTAL" WITNESS WITHIN 
THE TER1\.1S OF THIS ORDER. Any party upon whom discovery requests are 
served seeking disclosure of lay witnesses shall, in good faith, disclose the 
identity of all such witnesses at the earliest opportunity, and in no event later than 
forty-two (42) days before trial. Absent a showing of good cause and a lack of 
unfair prejudice to any other party, any witness who has not been timely disclosed 
will not be permitted to testify at trial. 
4. MOTIONS TO COMPEL DISCOVERY. 
a.	 A motion to compel discovery Bmst contain a certification as required by 
IRCP 37(a) (2) (that efforts were made to resolve the dispute before the 
motion was filed). 
b.	 The motion to compel must SPECIFICALLY ADDRESS THAT PORTION 
OF THE DISCOVERY AT ISSUE and CONTAIN A STATEMENT OF 
REQUESTED RELIEF. 
c.	 Reasonable expenses incurred when successfully prosecuting or opposing a 
motion to compel discovery will be awarded as provided in Rule 37(a)(4) of 
the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
5. MOTIONS FOR FULL OR PARTllAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
ORDER FOR SCHEDULING CONFERENCE AND ORDER RE: MOTION PRACTICE PAGE-4 
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a.	 The party movmg for summary judgment shall prepare as separate 
documents: (a) a motion; and (b) a legal memorandum containing a written 
statement of reasons and legal authority in support of the motion. A concise 
statement of the claimed undisputed material facts alleged by movant shall be 
included at the beginning of the memorandum following a concise statement 
of the nature of the case. Each statement of facts shall include a reference to 
the particular place in the record which supports the claimed fact. The legal 
memorandum shall ALSO include a statement, supported by authority, of the 
elements of any claim or defense relevant to the motion. 
b.	 The party opposing a motion for summary judgment shall prepare a legal 
memorandum containing a written statement of reasons in opposition to the 
motion, which shall include a concise statement of claimed genuine issues of 
material fact and/or which are material facts omitted from the moving party's 
statement of facts. Each statement of a fact shall include a reference to the 
particular place in the record which supports the factual dispute. The legal 
memorandum shall include a statement, supported by authority, of the 
elements of any claim or defense relevant to the motion. 
c.	 The schedule for serving briefs and affidavits shall be as set forth in Idaho 
Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c). COUNSEL ARE EXPECTED TO STRICTLY 
COMPLY WITH TIME REQUIREMENT. 
d.	 The hearing on a motion for summary judgment will be set AFTER the 
moving party has submitted the motion, legal memorandum and statement of 
facts. The hearing date can then be obtained from the judge's court clerk. 
DATED this --l-- day f	 , 2tJ~ . 
Richard D. Greenwood 
District Judge 
ORDER FOR SCHEDULING CONFERENCE AND ORDER RE: MOTION PRACTICE PAGE· : 
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XN mE DISTRiCT COt.rRT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
TH.E STATE Oli' IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
13atshiY~ In\}'. e.-t aJ 
caseNo.0V DC Dl-~3~3a..Plaintiff, 
CMLCASE 
S1JPULAnON FOR SO:£EDULING & 
PLANNING 
The above parties hereby stipulate to the folJowing scheduling deadlines: 
A. EXPERT WlTNESSES 
o.n . nJ . ~ J' (){1 ~ 
. erts) uuVlLnG\ n~. o.aVl11\CA na r.~..v~0 dnys before trial, plai=tia: shalJ..tii clas·1. ch person plairrHff int~ds to call
 
as an expert witnes:s at trial and 1;ltate the subject matter on which the witness IS expected to
 
testify.
 
2. l1D days before trial,_~.u~~ all intbrrnatioD. required by Rule
 
26(b)(4) ofthe Idaho Rules ofCivil Procedure rogarding expert witnesses.
 
3. 3D day~ before lriaJ,~ ~ £~tb any deposltiollB Oftll~~~~g par~
 
~nitial ClXp:rt wiltlesse,g, .,
 
=~~tR.CI1s) ~1"II'tYlIl i~ Dtu4u Yf..(O{)nd,ina. D1Y-fJ J 
4. --=.Lo..lL- days before trial~~!Ji-di~ose each person~ iDkehds' u.:J
 
to call as an expert witness at trial and state tbe subject matter on which th= witness IS expectod
 
to testify.
 
5. ~~ days before ttia{~~~Jli~P@,~~se all infonnation required by Rule
 
26(b)(4) ofrhe Idaho Rule:s ofCiviJ Procedure regarding expert w.itnesses.
 
6. ~D days before triall{,\~~Ji~A\IP'U'"~te any depositions of t'he
 
~feneant'5 expert witnesses.
 
respondJn~ p~ 
STIPULATION FOR scmmULINC 1'.1'/0 PLANNrNG PAGI1,·! 
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a~~~n.1~rts)	 .
 
aciVanc1nd	 ad.v'tU1CAnC~ 
7. ~_ days before trial,~sE!lI disclose each person~inten{js to 
call as an expert witn,e~s at trial to rebut new information or issues disclosed or raised by the 
.defeli6Bl'l.t. reSfX'nf;i.fns 
tW.vttntl'n4 
8. 3D _days before trialrflle:intifJ shalP disclose all infQnnation required by Rule 
26(b)(4) of the Idaho R.ules ofCivil Procedure regarding the rebuttal expert witnesses, 
9. 15 dayS before trial, r~mi~~l1 complete any depositions of the 
pXi'7tlff'p rebuttal expert witnesses. 
a IJa.nLAn~ 
B.	 LAYWITNESSES 
(J h. MVM1c.ina adva..nc-in/il
1. ~_ days before tril!l, ~damflff shall disclose each pe:rson-fllQi~g intends to 
call as a lay witness at trial (exclud.ing impeachment witnesses). 
~D r~d..im	 r~e:U'na2. _ days before trial,BBt, sltaH disclose each petso~t int:tJds 
to oall as a lay wttness at trial (l'X.cluding impeachment witnesses).
 
QQ adVMtina_

3,. . days before trial,1"!nm.tifi sWill diBCloso each lay witn.ess (exotu1cHng 
~peachmcht ~tnesses) ~~ to call at ~rial to rebut new information or issues 
dIsclosed or rmsed by the eefeft~t. ad Vl1.J1t.4nOt
resr;ontU tl~	 ..J 
4. ~~Q 'days befor&""'trlal~ all parties shall complete at,>, depositions of lay 
witnesses. 
C.	 DEADLINES FOR INlTIATING DISCOVERY 
1. qD days before trial is the last" day for serving interrogatories, requests for 
production, requests to pennit entry upon land or other property, M,d requests for admission. 
~, n~ W1,ys before tdal 'is the last day for .filing motions for a physical or mental 
examination. 
D.,	 DEADLINE FOR SUPPLEMENTAL RESPONSES TO DISCOVERY 
I. 3D days before trial, all parties must serve any supplomental responsl~ to
 
discovery required by Rule 26(e) ofthe Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.
 
E.	 PRETRrAL MOTlONS 
1.	 Summary judgment and other dispositive motions must be filed and heard, no litter 
lhan 60 day:; before trial. 
STIPULAt'lON FOR SCU~D\JLlNG A~D PLANNING	 rAGE- 2 
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clays before trial is the last day to file motions to add additional parti~31. ..-..0:--0...:..-:::-°_ 
to the lawsuit 
2. Cl0 days before trial is the last day to .file I'l motion to H111end the claims 
between existing parties to the lawsuit, including to add a claim {or punitive damages. 
3. All other Don-dispositive pre-trial motions (including, but not limited to motionll in 
(imine) mltst be filed ruld heard not less than {wenty~one (21) da)'S before trial. 
F. TRIAL SETTING 
1. This case can 'be sctfor a trial to commence on or after MaxCh I ZD Ib Nl)te, 
that :ilbsent extrernely l:ompelling Circumstanccs, 110 (lase wiD be set ror trial more than Eilll 
days from the date ofming the eomp]ajDt. 
2. It is estimated that the trial will take --Ldays. 
3. This case is 10 be tried as a:
 
_~_ court trial
 
-=::;:::jUt)' trial
 
4. Patties preferenoe for trial dates: {Please confer and complete.. Do Dot atu!£!! 
:':unsyaiJable dates~, _The parties may inquire ofthr: clerk available mal dates.
 
- /'Cl)'AEU: OF MO:NDAt'~ \DECEMBER 13 2010. .
(J) (b.-)Wt~ek a/Monday,s f1, 20 /I . 
( ) (C)Wcek ofMonday,_ ~ 3l =,200. (J ((L;W~~e.k ofMonday, ., 'w ~ 20_11. 
5. The parties will submit a pretrial conference memorandum pursuant to I.R.C.P. J6(d), 
whic:h sha.1l bo filed with the Clerk no Jat=r thtm ~evr;n (7) days before tbe pro-trial conferem:e. 
Th~ Memorandum may be filed as a joint sUbmission or separately. 
G. MEDIATION 
I. The parties agrc ll3 to mediation: Yes_ NO$... 
2. Ifyes: 
a.	 The parties agre:e to submit 10 mediation with a mediator mutually ngreed 
upon. 
b.	 Mediaticm shall bl;gin days {'rior to trial. 
STIPULATION POR SCHElJllL:Il'lG AND I'LANNlIIICl PACE·3 
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c.	 Unless otherw:ise agreed in writing 1;)ctween the partics j the cost of mediation 
sha1l be equally divided between the parties. 
The parties ref:enre the right to amend this stipolation by agreement of aU parties, 
subject to Cou rt approval; eaell party reserves tbe right to seek: amendment hereof by 
Court order, and to request lurther status tobferences f&r .9uch purpo~e, in ac:cord~"ce 
with UtC,P. 16(a) and 16(b). 
~_---.::~.-:::::.:.:a~::"'::::.......!~~~L- Dato: 
Coul:Iscl for Other P 
__~__~	 Date:~	 _ 
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DEPOSITION EXCERPT OF R. JOHN TAYLOR TAKEN 12-14-2004 
PAGE 81 
Q. Exhibit 26 of Beth Rogers' deposition, that's the Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial.
 
That's signed by your brother and your wife; is that correct.
 
19 A. Yes.
 
20 Q. And did you have a chance to review that document?
 
22 A. I did.
 
23 Q. Before it was actually filed?
 
24 A. I did.
 
25 Q. Did you concur in the language of the Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial?
 
2 A. Yes.
 
3 Q. And what is it that the plaintiffs want out of this litigation; what is it they seek?
 
5 A. We want the difference in -- well, the difference in the value of the property and the
 
amount that it was sold for. And we believe that is $6 to $800,000. 
8 Q. Okay. You've also sued for damages. Is that the damage claim that you're wanting? 
10 A. Yes, essentially. 
11 Q. Is that you want out ofthis lawsuit? 
12 A. 6- to 800,000. Yes. 
13 Q. Anything else you want out of this litigation? 
14 A. We would -- we would like to see that, uh --, punitive damages are added to that. 
16 Q. Okay. 
17 A. And we would like to see, uh, you eventually disbarred. 
19 Q. Okay. Anything else? 
20 A. No. That's enough. 
21 Q. Now, there is an allegation that you want a recision of the contract? 
23 A. As an alternative. Yes. 
24 Q. But you want the money first? 
25 A. It would be easier. It goes to my mom. 
002008
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RFCEIVED JAN 10 20ftJAN 10 2011 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
Ada County Clerk By LARA AMES 
DePUTY 
CONNIE W. TAYLOR 
Henderson Law Firm, PLLC 
900 Washington Street, Suite 1020 
Vancouver, WA 98660 
Telephone 360.699.1530 
Fax 360.693.2911 
ISBA No. 4837 
Attorneys for Johnson Trust, 
DaHan Taylor, and John Taylor 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
 
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an 
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G. 
MAILE, IV, and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE 
husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
CONNIE WRIGHT l'AYLOR, et al. 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV OC 0723232 
AFFIDAVIT IN OPPOSITION TO 
MOTIONS TO EXCLUDE TESTIMONY 
OF SAM LANGSTON, BOB DEBOLT 
STATE OF WASHINGTON ) 
: ss. 
County of Clark ) 
Connie Taylor, being duly sworn, states as follows: 
1. I am the attorney for the defendants John Taylor, DaHan Taylor, and the Theodore 
Johnson Trust, and make this affidavit from my personal knowledge. 
AFFIDAVIT IN OPPOSITION TO 
MOTIONS TO EXCLUDE TESTIMONY 
OF LANGSTON, DEBOLT 1 
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2. Our expert witness disclosures were due by October 31,2010. On October 27, 
2010, I disclosed that Sam Langston was performing an appraisal as to the value of the Linder 
Road property as of August 3,2009, that he would be preparing a summary report, and that it 
would be provided as soon as it was received. In addition, when I transmitted that disclosure to 
opposing counsel, I stated "I will supplement as soon as additional information is received, and 
stipulate to extend time for your expert disclosure ifnecessary." I am attaching true and correct 
copies of the Fax Transmittal confirmations to Mr. Troupis and Mr. Maile as Exhibit A. 
3. Mr. Langston has submitted an affidavit which indicates that because of the 
severe downturn in the real estate market, it was exceedingly difficult for him to locate property 
sales which could be used as comparables in the preparation of the Summary Report. Because 
of this situation, the preparation of this report took longer to complete than is typical. 
4. I received the report from Langston and Associates on December 6, and promptly 
forwarded it to opposing counsel on December 7. 
5. The Counter-Defendants' certification of witnesses disclosed Maurice Clifton as 
an expert witness who will give extremely detailed testimony as to the market conditions and 
comparable properties, a history of five-acre parcels in the Eagle area which were marketed as 
far back as 2005, as well as his opinion as to the market value of the lots at various time frames. 
6. I did not receive a request from opposing counsel for an extension of time to 
disclose their experts. By letter dated January 4, 2011, I have indicated that we will still honor 
that offer, but have received no response. A copy of that letter is enclosed as Exhibit B. 
7. With regard to witness Bob DeBolt, I believe there has simply been a 
misunderstanding. After our October 27,2010 disclosure, Connie Shannahan infomled me that 
she could not be available to testify during the anticipated trial dates.	 Bob DeBolt, who is the 
2 
002010
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broker in the same real estate office, will be testifying to exactly the same information Ms. 
Shannahan would have. The substance of his testimony is contained in a report which opposing 
counsel has had since April 28, 2010. I have confirmed that fact by letter to Mr. Troupis dated 
January 5, 2011, a copy of which is attached as__Exhi&it-.~. 
L 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the ~ day of January, 2011 I caused to be served a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Thomas G. Maile, IV U.S. Mail
 
380 West State Street Hand Delivered
 
Eagle, ID 83616
 Overnight Mail 
Telecopy (FAX) (208) 939-1001 
U.S. Mail
 
Attorney at Law
 
Mr. Christ Troupis 
Hand Delivered
 
PO Box 2408 Overnight Mail
 
Eagle, ID 83616 Telecopy (FAX) (208) 938-5482
 
Mark Prusynski U.S. Mail
 
MOFFATT THOMAS Hand Delivered
 
101 S Capitol Blvd., 10lh Floor Overnight Mail
 
PO Box 829 Te1ecopy (FAX) (208) 385-5384
 
Boise, ID 83701 
-$; e~~jl."
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Connie W. Taylor 
~~~ rO- -Z D\\ Subscribed and sworn to before me on ' iffieefJ~, ~
Not~~ P~bhc for Washington.State ,..J,. 
Resldmg m Ij:;W-C ~~ \~' 00/1 
Commission expires:'T\ ( 
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TRANSMISSION VERIFICATION REPORT 
TIME 10/27/2010 13:57 
NAME HOREN:;TEI N LAW 
FAX 3505994989 
TEL 3505991530 
SER." BROJ5J347770 
DATE,TIME 10/27 13: 55 
FAX NO. /NAME 12089385482 
DURATION 00:02:18 
PAGE(S) 11 
RESULT ClK 
MODE STANDARD 
ECM 
HENDERSON LAW O.FFICE 
Attorneys at Law 
900 Washington, Suite 1020 
Vancouver, WA 98660 
(360) 699·.1 530 Fax: (360) 693-29U 
FAX MEMORANDUM
 
TO: Thomas Maile IV (208) 939..1001 
Christ Troupis (208) 938-5482 
DATE: October 27,2010 
RE~ Berkshire v. Taylor 
FROM: Connie Taylor 
NO. PAGES: ---J.-I-11_
 
pgJOriginal will not be sent 
Gentlemen: I am enclosing a letter to the Clerk of the Court, Notice ofServi.ce, and 
Couoterclaimant's Witness Disclosure. 1 will supplement as soon as additional 
infonnation is received, and stipulate to extend time for your expert disclosure if 
necessary. 
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TRANSMISSION VERIFICATION REPORT 
TIME 10/27/2010 13:54 
NAME HOREN~)TE IN LAW 
FAX 3505994989 
TEL 3506991530 
SER.# BROJ5J347770 
DATE,TIME 10/27 13:52 
FAX NO. /NAME 12089391001 
DURATION 00:02:18 
.. j .. V,l,PAGE(S) 11 
RESULT OK r vt I)··V'-' 
MODE STANDARD I
ECM 
HENDERSON I..AW OFFICE 
Attorneys at .Law 
900 Washington, Suite 1020 
Vancouver, WA 98660 
(360) 699~1530FBJ;: (360) 693-2911 
FAX MEMORANDUM
 
TO: Thomas Maile IV (208) 939-1001 
Christ Troupis (208) 938-5482 
DATE: October 27,2010 
RE: Berkshire v. Taylor 
FROM: Connie Taylor 
NO. PAGES: __/-I-L__
 
~Original will not be sent 
Gentlemen: I am enclosing a letter to the Clerk ofthe Court, Notice of Service, and 
Counterc1aimant's Witness Disclosure. I will supplement as soon as additional 
infonnation is received, and stipulate to extend time for your expert disclosure if 
necessary. 
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HENDERSON LAW FIRM, PLLC
 
900 Washington Street, Suite 1020 
Vancouver, WA 98660 
(360) 699-1530 Fax: (360) 693-2911 
Attorneys Paralegals 
Paul L. Henderson Linda Wolfe 
Connie W. Taylor * Tami Henderson 
*(admitted in Washington and Idaho) 
January 4,2011 
Facsimile: (208) 938-5482 
Mr. Christ Troupis 
PO Box 2408 
Eagle, ID 83616 
Re: Maile v. Taylor 
Dear Christ: 
I have just received your packet of motions. In regard to Mr. Langston, I would like to remind you that my Fax 
Memorandum to you dated October 27, 2010 indicated I would supplement as soon as additional information was 
received, and stipulate to extend time for your expert disclosure if necessary. His report was sent to me on 
December 6th , and I forwarded it to both you and Mr. Maile by email on December 7'h. 
You did not request additional time for your expert disclosure, but I would still honor the offer I made to you 
nearly a month ago. You also have not indicated a desire to depose Mr. Langston, who assures me he can be 
available for such a deposition. 
Sincerely, 
cc:	 Client (by email) 
Mark Prusynski email 
Thomas Maile (FAX) (208) 939-1001 
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HENDERSON LAW FIRM, PLLC
 
900 Washington Street, Suite 1020 
Vancouver, WA 98660 
(360) 699-1530 Fax: (360) 693-2911 
Attorneys Paralegals 
Paul L. Henderson Linda Wolfe 
Connie W. Taylor * Tami Henderson 
*(adrnitted in Washington and Idaho) 
January 5, 2011 
Facsimile: (208) 938-5482 
Mr. Christ Troupis 
PO Box 2408 
Eagle, ID 83616 
Re: Maile v. Taylor 
Dear Christ: 
I believe there may be a misunderstanding as to our witnesses Connie Shannahan and Robert DeBolt. 
Ms. Shannahan cannot be available to testify during the trial dates, so Mr. DeBolt at her office has 
agreed to testify as to the information contained in the Real Estate Services Proposal dated January 12, 
2010, a copy of which was sent to you by Federal Express on April 28, 2010. Mr. DeBolt is not an 
additional witness; he will be testifying to precisely the same information that Ms. Shannahan would 
have. 
Also, I would like to confirm that you are arranging the conference call for the pretrial conference on 
Monday at 3:30 p.m., as required by the January 4,2010 scheduling order. Please let me know if there 
is a number I should call in to, or if an operator will be placing the calls. 
Sincerely, 
cc:	 Client (by email) 
Mark Prusynski email 
002015
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ReCEIVED 
J:.:: 1 J 2011 
AGe. C:;""'J C~:Jrk 
CONNIE W. TAYLOR 
Henderson Law Firm, PLLC 
900 Washington Street, Suite 1020 
Vancouver, WA 98660 
Telephone 360.699.1530 
Fax 360.693.2911 
ISBA No. 4837 
Attorneys for Johnson Trust, 
DaHan Taylor, and John Taylor 
:'~.1D~~~
JAN 10 2011 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH Clerk 
By ELYSHIA HOLMES'
 
DI:PUTY
 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
 
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an 
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G. 
MAILE, IV, and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE 
husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, et al. 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV OC 0723232 
COUNTERCLAIMANTS' 
REQUESTED JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
Attached are Counterc1aimants' requested jury instructions 1 through 3L. 
Counterc1aimants also request that the court give the following IDJI2d pattern instructions: 
1.00, 1.01, 1.03, 1.05, 1.09, 1.13, 1.15.2, 1.17, 1.20.1, 1.22, 1.24.2, 1.28, 1.43.1. 
It will quite likely be necessary to modify these instructions after the Court rules on the 
parties' motions in limine. Because at this point it is impossible to predict all of the testimony, 
Counterc1aimants' Requested 
Jury Instructions 
002016
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",-,," 
the Counterclaimants reserve the right to submit additional or supplemental jury instructions 
prior to or at trial of this matter. 
DATED this __ day of January, 2011. 
Counterclaimants' Requested 
Jury Instructions 
002017
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the __ day of January, 2011 I caused to be served a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed 
to the following: 
Thomas G. Maile, IV 
380 West State Street 
Eagle, ID 83616 
Mr. Christ Troupis
 
Attorney at Law
 
PO Box 2408
 
Eagle, ID 83616
 
U.S. Mail 
Hand Delivered 
Overnight Mail 
Telecopy (FAX) (208) 939-1001 
U.S. Mail 
Hand Delivered 
Overnight Mail 
Telecopy (FAX) (208) 938-5482 
Mark Prusynski 
MOFFATT THOMAS
 
101 S Capitol Blvd., 10th Floor 
PO Box 829 
G
G
G
G 
u.s. Mail 
Hand Delivered 
Overnight Mail 
T y (FAX) (208) 385-5384 
Boise, ID 83701 
-1'\,~ 
Counterclaimants' Requested 
Jury Instructions 
002018
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-------
------
------
------
-------
Counterclaimants' Requested 
INSTRUCTION NO.1 
In this case the Counterclaimants claim that these are the facts: 
That the Counter-defendants committed an abuse of the legal process by wrongfully and 
for an improper purpose asserting baseless claims to real property and pursuing and needlessly 
prolonging litigation over that property. The Counterclaimants also claim that the Counter-
defendants wrongfully interfered with an offer to purchase the property, causing the 
Counterclaimants to lose the opportunity to sell their real property and incur other expenses to 
maintain the property. 
Thus the Counterclaimants seek to recover from the Counter-defendants losses as well as 
its incidental or conseqmmtial losses for the abuse of process and interference with prospective 
economic advantage. 
Given 
Refused
Modified 
Covered 
Other 
JUDGE 
002019
tiall
 
-------
------
-------
--------
COUNTERCLAIMANT'S REQUESTED 
INSTRUCTION NO.2 
On the issue of abuse of process, the Counterclaimants have the burden 
of proof on each of the following propositions: 
(1)	 The Counter-defendants committed a willful act in the use of 
legal process not proper in the regular course of the 
proce(~ding 
(2) The ad was committed for an ulterior, improper purpose 
You will be asked th(~ following question on the jury verdict form: 
Did the Counter-defendants commit an abuse of process? 
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence in the case that 
each of the propositions contained in this instruction has been proved, you 
should answer the jury question "yes." If you find that any of these 
propositions has not been proved, you should answer the question "no." 
Bade// v. Beeks, 115 Idaho 101, 104, 765 P.2d 126, 129 (1998) 
Given
------_. 
Refused
Modified 
Covered
Other
JUDGE
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-------
------
------
COUNTERCLAIMANTS' REQUESTED 
INSTRUCTION NO.3 
On the Counterclaimants' claim of intentional interference with a 
prospective economic advantage against the Counter-Counter-defendant 
Thomas Maile, the Counterclaimants have the burden of proof on each of the 
following propositions: 
1) The existence of a valid economic expectancy; 
2) knowledge of thl~ expectancy on the part of the interferer; 
3) intentional interference inducing termination of the expectancy; 
4) the interferenc«~ was wrongful by some measure beyond the fact of the 
interference itsdf (Le. that the Counter-Counter-defendant interfered for an 
improper purpose or improper means) and 
5) resulting damage to the Counterclaimants whose expectancy has been disrupted. 
You will be asked the following question on the jury verdict form: 
Did the Counter-Defendants intentionally interfere with a prospedive 
economic advantage? 
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each of these 
propositions has be{~n proved, then you should answer this question "yes." If 
you find from youJr consideration of all of the evidence that any of these 
propositions has not been proved. then you should answer this Question "no." 
IDJI 1.41.2, WESCO v. Ernest, IDSCCI #35732, November 24,2010 
Given
Refused 
Modified
Covered 
-------, 
Other 
-------, 
JUDGE 
002021
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-------
------
------
------
-------
COUNTERCLAIMANTS' REQUESTED 
INSTRUCTION NO.4 
If the jury decides the Counterclaimants are entitled to recover from the 
Counter-defendants, the jury must determine the amount of money that will 
reasonable and fairly compensate the Counterclaimants for any of the following 
elements of damages proved by the evidence to have resulted from the Counter­
defendant's conduct: 
1.	 Direct, incidental and consequential damages resulting from the loss of 
prospective economic advantage 
2.	 Damages incurred in defending against the abuse of process 
Whether any of these elements of damage has been proved is for you to 
determine. 
IDJI 9.03 (modified) 
72 C.J.S. Process § 164, citing Marlin Oil Corp. y. Barby Energy Corp., 2002 OK CIV APP 92, 55 P.3d 446 (Diy. 3 
2002), Zachair, Ltd. Y. Driggs, 135 Md. App. 403, 762 A.2d 991 (2000). 
Given
Refused 
Modified
Covered 
Other
JUDGE
 
002022
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COUNTERCLAIMANTS' REQUESTED
 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO.5 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an Idaho 
limited liability, and THOMAS G. MAILE, IV, 
and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE husband and 
wife, 
Plaintiffs / Counter-Defendants, 
vs. 
CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, f/k/a CONNIE 
TAYLOR an individual; DALLAN TAYLOR, 
an individual; R. JOHN TAYLOR an 
individual; CLARK AND FEENEY, a 
partnership; PAUL T. CLARK an individual; 
THEODORE L. JOHNSON REVOCABLE 
TRUST, an Idaho revocable trust; JOHN 
DOES I - JOHN DOES X; AND ALL PERSONA 
IN POSSESSION OR CLAIMING ANY RIGHT 
TO POSSESSION. 
Defendants / Counterclaimants. 
Case No. CV OC 0723232 
VERDICT 
We, the Jury, answer the special interrogatories as follows:
 
Question No.1: Did the Counter-Defendants commit an abuse of process?
 
Answer to Question No.1: Yes [-l No [-l
 
002023
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_]  _] 
Question No.2: Did the Counter-Defendants intentionally interfere with a prospective
 
economic advantage?
 
Answer to Question No.2: Yes [_] No [_]
 
If you answered "Yes" to either or both of questions 1 and 2, answer Question No.3.
 
Question No.3: What is the total amount of damage sustained by the Counterclaimants as
 
a result of the conduct of the Counter-Defendants?
 
Answer to Question No.3: We assess Counterclaimants' damages as follows: 
$-------­
Dated February _----J 2010. 
Foreperson 
002024
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002025
-------
------
------
------
-------
COUNTERCLAIMAI\JTS'REQUESTED 
INSTRUCTION NO.6 
Intent may be established by inference as well as by direct proof. 
Highland Enters., Inc. v. Barker, 133 Idaho 330, 340,986 P.2d 996,1006 (2009 
Given 
Refused 
Modified 
Covered 
Other 
JUDGE 
002026
-------
------
------
------
-------
COUNTERCLAIMANTS' REQUESTED 
INSTRUCTION NO.7 
One who uses a legal process against another primarily to accomplish a purpose for which it 
is not designed, is subject to liability to the other for harm caused by the abuse of process. 
Restatement (Second) of Torts A§ 682 (1977). 
Given
Refused
Modified 
Covered 
Other 
JUDGE 
002027
 
 
-------
------
------
-------
-

COUNTERCLAIMAINTS'REQUESTED 
INSTRUCTION NO.8 
Intentional interference with a prospective economic advantage may be demonstrated if it 
is shown that the actor desires to bring about the interference, or knows that the interference is 
certain or substantially certain to occur as a result of his action. 
Intent can be shown even if the interference is incidental to the actor's intended purpose 
and desire but known to him to be a necessary consequence of his action. 
Highland Enters.. Inc. v. Barker, 133 Idaho 330, 340,986 P.2d 996, 1006 (2009)(quoting 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 766 cmt. D,j (1977)) 
Given 
Refused
._-----­
Modified 
Covered 
Other 
JUDGE 
002028
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-
-------
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------
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COUNTERCLAIMANTS' REQUESTED 
INSTRUCTION NO.9 
Wrongfulness of intentional interference with a prospective economic expectancy may be 
shown by proof that either: 
(1) the Counter··defendant had an improper objective or purpose to harm the 
Counterclaimants; or 
(2) the Counter-defendant used a wrongful means to cause injury to the prospective 
business relationship. 
However, an enforceable contract need not be shown to exist, just a valid economic 
expectancy. 
Idaho First Nat'l Bank v. Bliss Valley Foods, Inc., 121 Idaho 266, 286, 824 P.2d 841, 861 
(1991); Commercial Ventures, Inc. v. Rex M & Lynn Lea Family Trust, 145 Idaho 20S, 217, 177 
P.3d 955, 964 (2008). 
Given 
Refused 
Modified 
Covered 
Other 
------_. 
JUDGE 
002029
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Christ T. Troupis, ISB # 4549
 
TROUPIS LAW OFFICE : If4tfa~t. _

I ¥L­1299 E. Iron Eagle, Ste 130 
PO Box 2408 JAN 10 2011 
Eagle, Idaho 83616 
Telephone: 208/938-5584 
Facsimile: 208/938-5482 
Email: ctroupis@troupislaw.com 
Co-counsel for Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
 
By eARLY l.ATIMORE
 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
 
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an 
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G. 
MAILE, N. and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE, 
husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants, 
v. 
CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, flk/a 
CONNIE TAYLOR, an individual; DALLAN 
TAYLOR, an individual; R. JOHN 
TAYLOR, an individual; CLARK and 
FEENEY, a partnership; PAUL T. CLARK, 
an individual; THEODORE L. JOHNSON 
REVOCABLE TRUST, an Idaho revocable 
trust; JOHN DOES I -JOlIN DOES X; AND 
ALL PERSONS IN POSSESSION OR 
CLAIMING ANY RIGHT TO 
POSSESSION. 
Defendants/Counter-Claimants. 
Case No. CV-OC-0723232 
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' 
REQUESTED JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS AND PROPOSED 
SPECIAL VERDICT FORM 
COMES NOW, the Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants, by and through their co-counsel of 
record, Christ T. Troupis, and respectfully submits their requested Jury Instructions, numbered 
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' REQUESTED JURY INSTRUCTIONS AND PROPOSED 
SPECIAL VERDICT FORM - Pg 1 
002030
-"' 
 
 
L  
 
 
 I I
 
-"'"
 
page one through pagel)? , together with their requested Special Verdict and request the
 
following stock Jury Instmctions, as IDJI Stock instmctions as follows: 1.00; 1.01; 1.02; 1.03;
 
1.03.1;1.05; 1.09; 1.11; 1.13; 1.13.1; 1.20.1; 1.24.1; 1.24.2; 1.40; 1.404;
 
9.0; 9.01; 9.07; 9.12; 9.14.
 
DATED this 9th day of January, 2011. 
CHRIST T. TROU S, Co-counsel for 
Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants 
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' REQUESTED JURY INSTRUCTIONS AND PROFIOSED 
SPECIAL VERDICT FORM - Pg 2 
002031
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10
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on this 9th day of January, 2011, I caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing (1) COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' REQUESTED JURY INSTRUCTIONS, 
together with the proposed Special Verdict fonn to be delivered, addressed as follows: 
Connie W. Taylor (X) U. S. Mail 
Henderson Law Finn () Facsimile Transmission 
900 Washington St. Suite 1020 () Hand Delivery 
Vancouver, Washington 98660 () Overnight Delivery 
Facsimile: (360) 693-2911 
Mark Stephen Prusynski (X) U. S. Mail 
PO Box 829 () Facsimile Transmission 
Boise, ID 83701 () Hand Delivery 
Phone: (208) 345-2000 () Overnight Delivery 
Facsimile: (208) 385-5384 
Thomas G. Maile, IV. () U. S. Mail 
380 W. State Street () Facsimile Transmission 
Eagle, Idaho 83616 (X) Hand Delivery 
Facsimile: (208) 939-100 I () Overnight Delivery 
WORD FILE transmitted to dclykema@adaweb.net 
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' REQUESTED JURY INSTRUCTIONS AND PROPOSED 
SPECIAL VERDICT FORM - Pg 3 
002032
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COUNTER-DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. I 
These instructions explain your duties as jurors and define the law that applies to this case. 
It is your duty to detennine the facts, to apply the law set forth in these instructions to those facts, 
and in this way to decide the case. Your decision should be based upon a rational and objective 
assessment of the evidenct:. It should not be based on sympathy or prejudice. 
It is my duty to instruct you on the points of law necessary to decide the case, and it is your 
duty to follow the law as I instruct. You must consider these instructions as a whole, not picking out 
one and disregarding others. The order in which these instructions are given or the manner in which 
they are numbered has no significance as to the importance ofany ofthem. Ifyou do not understand 
an instruction, you may send a note to me through the bailiff, and I will try to clarify or t:xplain the 
point further. 
In detennining the facts, you may consider only the evidence admitted in this trial. This 
evidence consists of the testimony of the witnesses, the exhibits admitted into evidence, and any 
stipulated or admitted facts. While the arguments and remarks of the attorneys may help you 
understand the evidence and apply the instructions, what they say is not evidence. If an attorney's 
argument or remark has no basis in the evidence, you should disregard it. 
The production of evidence in court is governed by rule oflaw. At times during the trial, I 
sustained an objection to a question without pennitting the witness to answer it, or to an offered 
exhibit without receiving it into evidence. My rulings are legal matters, and are solely my 
GIVEN:
 
REFUSED:
 
MODIFIED: _
 
COVERED: _
 
OTHER:
 
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 1 
002033
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 __ _ 
---
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COUl'ITER-DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 
responsibility. You must not speculate as to the reason for any objection, which was made, or my 
ruling thereon, and in reaching your decision you may not consider such a question or exhibit or 
speculate as to what the answer or exhibit would have shown. Remember, a question is not evidence 
and should be considered only as it gives meaning to the answer. 
There were occasions where an objection was made after an answer was given or the remark 
was made, and in my ruling on the objection I instructed that the answer or remark be stricken, or 
directed that you disregard the answer or remark and dismiss it from your minds. In your 
deliberations, you must not consider such answer or remark, but must treat it as though you had 
never heard it. 
The law does not require you to believe all ofthe evidence admitted in the course ofthe trial. 
As the sole judges of the facts, you must determine what evidence you believe and what weight you 
attach to it. In so doing, you bring with you to this courtroom all ofthe experience and background 
of your lives. There is no magical formula for evaluating testimony. In your everyday affairs, you 
determine for yourselves whom you believe, what you believe and how much weight you attach to 
what you are told. The considerations you use in making the more important decisions in your 
everyday dealings are the same considerations you should apply in your deliberations in this case. 
LD.J.L 1.00 - Introductory instruction to jury 
GIVEN:
 
REFUSED: _
 
MODIFIED: _
 
COVERED: _
 
OTHER:
 
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 2 
002034
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__  
__  
 
---
---
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. ~ 
During your deliberations, you will be entitled to have with you my instructions concerning 
the law that applies to this case, the exhibits that have been admitted into evidence and any notes 
taken by you in the course of the trial proceedings. 
If you take notes during the trial, be careful that your attention is not thereby diverted from 
the witness or his testimony; and you must keep your notes to yourself and not show tht~m to other 
persons or jurors until the jury deliberations at the end of the trial. 
I.DJ.I. 1.01 - Deliberation procedures
 
GIVEN:
 
REFUSED: _
 
MODIFIED:
 
COVERED:
 
OTHER:
 
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 3 
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COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' REQUESTED 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. ~ 
There are certain things you must not do during this trial: 
1. You must not associate in any way with the parties, any of the attorneys or their 
employees, or any of the witnesses. 
2 You must not discuss the case with anyone, or permit anyone to discuss the case with 
you. If anyone attempts to discuss the case with you, or to influence your decision in the case, you 
must report it to me promptly. 
3. You must not discuss the case with other jurors until you retire to the jury room to 
deliberate at the close of the entire case. 
4. You must not make up your mind until you have heard all ofthe testimony and have 
received my instructions as to the law that applies to the case. 
5. You must not contact anyone in an attempt to discuss or gain a greater understanding 
of the case. 
6. You must not go to the place where any alleged event occurred. 
IDJI 1.03 - Admonition to jury
 
GIVEN:
 
REFUSED:
 
MODIFIED: _
 
COVERED: _
 
OTHER:
 
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 4 
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COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' REQUESTED
 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO.-----=±­
Members ofthe jury, I remind you that you are not to discuss this case among yourselves or 
with anyone else, nor to form any opinion as to the merits of the case, until after I finally submit the 
case to you. 
IDJI 1.03.1 - Admonition to jury - short form 
GNEN: 
REFUSED: 
MODIFIED: _ 
COVERED: _ 
OTHER: 
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 5 
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COUNTER-DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. ~ 
Any statement by me identifying a claim of a party is not evidence in this case. I have 
advised you of the claims of the parties merely to acquaint you with the issues to be decided. 
IDJI 1.05 - Statement of claims not evidence
 
GIVEN:
 
REFUSED: _
 
MODIFIED: _
 
COVERED: _
 
OTHER:
 
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 6 
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---
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. ---.L2.­
Members ofthe jury, I remind you that you are not to discuss this case among yourselves or 
with anyone else, nor to form any opinion as to the merits ofthe case, until after I finally submit the 
case to you. 
IDJI 1.03.1 ­
GIVEN:
 
REFUSED: _
 
MODIFIED: _
 
COVERED:
 
OTHER:
 
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 7 
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COUNTER-DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED
 
JURY INSTRUCTION No.l 
The following facts are not: in dispute: 
1. The Supreme Court in 2009 stated "While the first appeal to this Court was pending, the 
beneficiaries ofthe Trust executed the Disclaimer, Release, and Indemnity Agreement (Disclaimer) 
in June 2004. In the Disclaimer, the beneficiaries, other than the Taylors, disclaimed any interest in 
the lawsuit against the Mailes. In addition, the Taylors disclaimed their interest in all other Trust 
property in favor of their mother, the beneficiaries agreed to an immediate distribution to 
beneficiaries, the Rogers resigned as trustees, the named successor trustee declined to serve as 
trustee, and the beneficiaries nominated and appointed the Taylors as trustees". 
2. The Taylors who were represented by the law firm Clark and Feeney, filed their verified petition 
in the probate court on November 12,2004, requesting the probate court appoint them as successor 
trustees ofthe Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust. The petition was executed by R. John Taylor 
as a verification ofthe facts contained in the petition. Page 2 of the verified petition stated under 
oath, "the petitioner's 88-year-old mother, Helen Taylor, is the sole remaining beneficiary ofthis 
trust by virtue ofthe terms ofa Disclaimer, Release and Indemnity Agreement." 
3. In December 2005, the Idaho Supreme Court rendered its decision that the Taylors as 
beneficiaries had standing to pursue claims against the Plaintiffs. "The Taylors allege they were 
aggrieved of these actions by virtue of their status as residual beneficiaries of the Trust". 
4. On March 9, 2006, a Verified Amended Complaint was filed by the Taylors, who were 
GIVEN:
 
REFUSED:
 
MODIFIED: _
 
COVERED:
 
OTHER:
 
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 8 
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COUNTER-DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 
represented by the law firm ofClark and Feeney. Page 1 ofthe Verified Amended CompIaint stated 
under oath, "Reed and R. John Taylor are residents ofNez Perce County, Idaho; Dallan Taylor is a 
resident of Ada County Idaho. All ofthe plaintiffs are residual beneficiaries ofthe Theodore L. 
Johnson Trust." 
4. Judge Wilper held: Once a party treats a contract as valid after the appearance of facts giving rise 
to a right ofrescission, the right ofrescission is waived. The district court entered its Memorandum 
Decision and Order on July 28, 2005 allowing the trust to amend its complaint after tht;: successor 
trustees received the required appointment by the probate court. The district court did grant 
Berkshire Investments' and Mailes' motion in part ruling that the Taylors and the trust had waived 
rights to rescind the contract as "once a party treats a contract as valid after the appearance of facts 
giving rise to a right ofrescission, the right ofrescission is waived." The District Court fmther found 
that the "Plaintiffs (Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust and the Taylors), now with s.tanding as 
trustees, did not act promptly to pursue rescission once the grounds for it arose. 
5. Judge Wilper had ruled that Berkshire Investment could pursue its claims for quasi and equitable 
estoppel and its claim oftortuous interference with contract claim against the trust and the Taylors 
which was entered prior to the ruling on the Judgment on Beneficiaries' Claims (Judg1e Wilper's 
Order Regarding Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, filed on February 13, 2006). 
6. The Taylors filed a motion for sanctions against the plaintiffs before the Idaho Supreme Court 
GIVEN:
 
REFUSED:
 
MODIFIED: _
 
COVERED:
 
OTHER: 
--­
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 9 
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COUNTER-DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 
which was related to the filing of the initial complaint in this present action. The Idaho Supreme 
Court denied any imposition ofsanctions against the plaintiffs-counter-defendants ( Supreme Court 
Order dated February 11, 2008) relating to the filing of the first complaint in 2007 in this action. 
7. Judge Ronald Wilper entered an Order denying the plaintiffs' verified motion to fon~close their 
vendee's lien during the pendency of this action and denied the counter-claimants' motion for 
sanctions on March 11, 2010. 
8. The current legal proceedings are not being pursued by the counter-claimants against Thomas 
Maile as an attorney. The claims are against Thomas Maile and Colleen Maile, husband and wife 
and Berkshire Investments LLC. 
IDJI 1.07. Facts not in dispute
 
GIVEN:
 
REFUSED: _
 
MODIFIED: _
 
COVERED:
 
OTHER:
 
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 10 
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COUNTER-DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. ~ 
In deciding this case, you may not delegate any of your decisions to another or decide any 
question by chance, such as by the flip of a coin or drawing of straws. If money damages are to be 
awarded or percentages of fault are to be assigned, you may not agree in advance to average the sum 
of each individual juror's estimate as the method of determining the amount of the damage award 
or percentage of negligence. 
IDJI 1.09 - Quotient verdicts
 
GIVEN:
 
REFUSED:
 
MODIFIED: _
 
COVERED: _
 
OTHER:
 
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 11 
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COUNTER-DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED
 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. ~
 
If it becomes necessary during your deliberations to communicate with me, you may send a 
note signed by one or more ofyou to the bailiff. You should not try to communicate with me by any 
means other than such a note. 
During your deliberations, you are not to reveal to anyone how the jury stands on any ofthe 
questions before you, numerically or otherwise, unless requested to do so by me. 
IDJI 1.11 - Communications with court 
GIVEN:
 
REFUSED:
 
MODIFIED: _
 
COVERED:

OTHER:
 
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 12 
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COUNTER-DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. ID 
Members ofthe Jury: In order to return a verdict, it is necessary that at least three-fourths of 
the jury agree. Your verdict must represent the considered judgment of each juror agre:eing to it. 
It is your duty, as jurors, to consult with one another and to deliberate with a view to reaching 
an agreement, if you can do so without violence to individual judgment. Each ofyou must decide 
the case for yourself, but do so only after an impartial consideration ofthe evidence with your fellow 
jurors. In the course ofyour deliberations, do not hesitate to reexamine your own views ,md change 
your opinion if convinced it is erroneous. But do not surrender your honest conviction as to the 
weight or effect of evidence solely because of the opinion of your fellow jurors, or for the mere 
purpose of returning a verdict. 
You are not partisans. You are judges - judges ofthe facts. Your sole interest is to ascertain 
the truth from the evidence in the case. 
IDJI 1.13.1 Alternate form - concluding remarks 
GNEN: 
REFUSED: _ 
MODIFIED: 
COVERED:
--­
OTHER: 
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 13 
002045
 
 
 
  
              
             
 
              
__ 
-
 
---
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COUNTER-DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. ~ 
When I say that a patiy has the burden ofproofon a proposition, or use the expression "ifyou 
find" or "if you decide," I mean you must be persuaded that the proposition is more probably true 
than not true. 
IDJI 1.20.1 - Burden of proof - preponderance of evidence 
GIVEN:
 
REFUSED: _
 
MODIFIED:

COVERED:
 
OTHER:
 
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 14 
002046
               
 
 
__  
 
 
 
---
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' REQUESTED 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. ~ 
When I say a party has the burden ofproofon a proposition by clear and convincing evidence, 
I mean you must be persuaded that it is highly probable that such proposition is true. This is a higher 
burden than the general burden that the proposition is more probably true than not true. 
IDJI 1.20.2 - Burden ofproof - preponderance of evidence 
GNEN: 
REFUSED: 
MODIFIED: _ 
COVERED: 
OTHER: 
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS -15 
002047
      
 
__ 
---
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. ~ 
Evidence may be either direct or circumstantial. The law makes no distinction between direct 
and circumstantial evidence. Each is accepted as a reasonable method ofproof and each is respected 
for such convincing force as it may carry. 
IDJI 1.24.1 - Circumstantial evidence without definition 
GIVEN:
 
REFUSED:
 
MODIFIED: _
 
COVERED: _
 
OTHER:
 
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 16 
002048
             
 
 
__  
__  
 
---
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. ~ 
Evidence may be either direct or circumstantial. Direct evidence is evidence that directly 
proves a fact. Circumstantial evidence is evidence that indirectly proves the fact, by proving one or 
more facts from which the fact at issue may be inferred. 
The law makes no distinction between direct and circumstantial evidence as to the degree of 
proof required; each is accepted as a reasonable method of proof and each is respected for such 
convincing force as it may carry. 
IDJI 1.24.2 - Circumstantial evidence with definition 
GIVEN:
 
REFUSED:
 
MODIFIED:
---
_
 
COVERED:
 
OTHER:
 
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS -17 
002049
 
 
 
---
 __ _ 
 
1
---
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. \~ 
Once a party treats a contract as valid after the appearance of facts giving rise to a right of 
rescission, the right of rescission is waived. 
White v. Mock, 140 Idaho 882, 104 P.3d 356 (Idaho 2004) 
GIVEN:
 
REFUSED:
 
MODIFIED: _
 
COVERED: _
 
OTHER:
 
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 18 
002050
 
 
 
---
__  
 
---
---
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED 
JURY INSTRUCTION No.1 
A "chose in action" is defined to include personal property that one person owns but 
another person possesses, the owner being able to regain possession through a lawsuit. 
Black's Law Dictionary 258 (8th ed. 2004) defines 
GNEN: 
REFUSED: _ 
MODIFIED: 
COVERED: 
OTHER: 
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS -19 
002051
__ 
---
---
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. n 
To be a judicial admission a statement must be a deliberate, clear, and unequivocal 
statement of a party about a concrete fact within that party's knowledge. 
Strouse, 129 Idaho at 619,930 P.2d at 1364 (Ct. App. 1997). Get more 
GIVEN:
 
REFUSED: _
 
MODIFIED:
 
COVERED:
 
OTHER:
 
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 20 
002052
 
 
__  
 
 
 
---
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS'REjsSTED 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 
PERJURY DEFINED. Every person who, having taken an oath that he will testify, 
declare, depose, or certifY truly, before any competent tribunal, legislative committee, officer, or 
person in any of the cases in which such an oath may by law be administered, wilfully and 
contrary to such oath, states as true any material matter which he knows to be false, is guilty of 
perjury. 
Idaho Code Section 18-5401 
GIVEN: 
REFUSED: _ 
MODIFIED:
COVERED: _ 
OTHER: 
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 21 
002053
__ 
 
---
---
---
---
COU1\J"TER-DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. ~ 
The tenn "oath" as used in the last section 18-5402, includes an affinnation, and every 
other mode authorized by law of attesting the truth of that which is stated. 
§ 18-5402. OATH DEFINED 
GIVEN: 
REFUSED: 
MODIFIED: 
COVERED: 
OTHER: 
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 22 
002054
 
---
---
---
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. JlL 
SUBORNATION OF PERJURY. Every person who wilfully procures another person to 
commit perjury is guilty of subornation of perjury, and is punishable in the same manner as he 
would be if personally guilty of the perjury so procured. 
Idaho Code section 18-5410 states: 
GIVEN: 
REFUSED: 
MODIFIED:
COVERED:
OTHER: 
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 23 
002055
 
 
__ _ 
 
 
---
---
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED
 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. ~
 
It is no defense to a prosecution for peIjury that the accused did not know the materiality 
ofthe false statement made by him; or that it did not, in fact, affect the proceeding in or for which 
it was made. It is sufficient that it was material, and might have been used to affect such 
proceeding. 
§ 18-5406. IGNORANCE OF MATERIALITY NO DEFENSE 
GNEN: 
REFUSED: _ 
MODIFIED:
COVERED:
OTHER: 
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 24 
002056
 
---
 __ _ 
 __ _ 
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' REQUESTED 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. JFJ.-. 
The test for materiality is whether the testimony probably would or could influence a 
tribunal or jury on the issue before it. The false statement relied upon need not bear direetly upon 
the ultimate issue of fact. A statement is material if it is material to any proper point of inquiry, 
and if it is calculated and intended to bolster the witness' testimony on some material point or to 
support or attack his credibility. The degree of materiality is not important.. .. It is no de£ense to a 
prosecution for perjury that the accused did not know the materiality of the false statement made 
by him; or that it did not, in fact, affect the proceeding in or for which it was made. It is sufficient 
that it was material, and might have been used to affect such proceeding. 
State v. Wolfrum; 175 P.3d 206 (Idaho C.A. 2007) 
GIVEN:
 
REFUSED:
 
MODIFIED:
---
_
 
COVERED: _
 
OTHER:
 
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 25 
002057
'
)
 
 
  
 
 
 __  
__  
 
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. ~ 
The plaintiff has the burden of proving each of the following propositions by clear and 
convincing evidence: 
1. That the defendant stated a fact to the plaintiff; 
2. The statement was false; 
3. The statement was material; 
4. The defendant either knew the statement was false or was unaware of whether the statement 
was true at the time the statement was made. 
5. The plaintiff did not know that the statement was false; 
6. The defendant intended for the plaintiffto rely upon the statement and act upon it in a manner 
reasonably contemplated; 
7. The plaintiff did rely upon the truth ofthe statement; 
8. The plaintiffs reliance was reasonable under all the circumstances; 
9. The plaintiff suffered damages proximately caused by reliance on the false statement. 
10. The nature and extent of the damages to the plaintiff, and the amount thereof. 
IDJI 4.60. Fraud - issues 
GIVEN:
 
REFUSED: _
 
MODIFIED: _
 
COVERED: _
 
OTHER:
 
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 26 
002058
 
__  
__  
__  
 
---
---
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED
 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. ~
 
Persons procuring, aiding, abetting, advising, consenting, or ratifying abusive acts. 
Liability for the abuse of process tort generally extends to all who knowingly procure, participate 
in, aid, or abet the abuse, and those who advise or consent to the abusive acts, or who 
subsequently adopt or ratify them, are liable as joint tortfeasors. 
1 Am. Jur. 2d Abuse of Process § 19 
GNEN: 
REFUSED: 
MODIFIED: 
COVERED: 
OTHER: 
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 27 
002059
 
 
---
---
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' REQUESTED
 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. ~CO
 
The elements essential to sustain the action are: (1) that the defendant made an illegal, 
improper, perverted use of the process, a use neither warranted nor authorized by the process, and 
(2) that the defendant had an ulterior motive or purpose in exercising such illegal, perve11ed, or 
improper use of process, and (3) that damage resulted to the plaintiff from the irregularity. 
1 Am. Jur 2d Abuse of Process §4. 
GNEN: 
REFUSED: 
MODIFIED:
COVERED: _ 
OTHER: 
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 28 
002060
 
 
 
__ 
---
---
---
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. ~ 
A non-client may bring a cause of action against an attorney for abuse of process. 
The absolute privilege that protects attorneys from liability for defamation occurring in the course 
of a judicial proceeding does not provide an attorney with an absolute defense to liability for 
abuse of process. Thus, an attorney may be liable for damages for abuse of process where the acts 
complained of are personal acts, or are the acts of others wholly instigated and carried on by the 
attorney. 
1 Am. Jur. 2d Abuse of Process § 21 Attorneys 
GIVEN: 
REFUSED: 
MODIFIED: 
COVERED: 
OTHER: 
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 29 
002061
 
  
 011 
---
---
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. n 
It was the duty of the Taylors and their attorneys, before and at the time of the alleged 
negligent action, to use ordinary care for the well being ofBerkshire Investment. 
IDJI 2.00.1. Duty of care (modified) 
GIVEN:
 
REFUSED: _
 
MODIFIED:
 
COVERED:
 
OTHER:
 
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 30 
002062
  
 
 
 
---
 __ _ 
 __ _ 
 
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED
 
JURY n~STRUCTIONNO.11lL
 
When I use the word "negligence" in these instructions, I mean the failure to use ordinary 
care in the management of one's property or person. The words "ordinary care" mean the care a 
reasonably careful person would use under circumstances similar to those shown by the evidence. 
Negligence may thus consist ofthe failure to do something which a reasonably careful person 
would do, or the doing of something a reasonably careful person would not do, under 
circumstances similar to those shown by the evidence. The law does not say how a reasonably 
careful person would act under those circumstances. That is for you to decide. 
IDJI 2.20 Negligence. 
GNEN: 
REFUSED: 
MODIFIED:
---
_ 
COVERED: _ 
OTHER: 
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 31 
002063
 
'l" ON J  
 
 
---
---
---
.....' 
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' REQUESTED 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. ~ 
There was a certain statute in force in the state of Idaho at the time of the of the occurrence 
in question which provided that: 
PERJURY DEFINED. Every person who, having taken an oath that he will testify, 
declare, depose, or certify tmly, before any competent tribunal, legislative committee, officer, or 
person in any of the cases in which such an oath may by law be administered, wilfully and 
contrary to such oath, states as true any material matter which he knows to be false, is guilty of 
pelJury. 
A violation of the statute is negligence, unless compliance with the statute was impossible 
or something over which the party had no control placed the individual in a position of violation 
of the statute or an emergency, not of the party's own making, caused the individual to fail to 
obey the statute or an excuse specifically provided for within the statute existed. 
IDJI 2.22. Violation of statute or ordinance - negligence per se 
GIVEN:
 
REFUSED:
 
MODIFIED:
 
COVERED:
---
_
 
OTHER:
 
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 32 
002064
 
  
 
 __ _ 
 __ _ 
 
---
 
---
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. ~ 
There was a certain statute in force in the state of Idaho at the time of the of the occurrence 
in question which provided that: 
SUBORNATION OF PERJURY. Every person who wilfully procures another pl~rson to 
commit perjury is guilty of subornation of peIjury, and is punishable in the same manner as he 
would be if personally guilty of the peIjury so procured. 
A violation of the statute is negligence, unless compliance with the statute was impossible 
or something over which the party had no control placed the individual in a position of violation 
of the statute or an emergency, not of the party's own making, caused the individual to fail to 
obey the statute or an excuse specifically provided for within the statute existed. 
IDJI 2.22. Violation of statute or ordinance - negligence per se 
GIVEN:
 
REFUSED:
 
MODIFIED: _
 
COVERED: _
 
OTHER:
 
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 33 
002065
,;!
 
 
 
 
 
 
---
__  
 
---
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED
 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. ~
 
The effect of establishing negligence per se through violation of a statute is to 
conclusively establish the first two elements of a cause of action in negligence. Negligence per se 
lessens the plaintiffs burden only on the issue of the 'actor's departure from the standard of 
conduct required of a reasonable man. Thus, the elements of duty and breach are estab1i shed as a 
matter of law and do not need to be determined by a jury. 
Nation v. State, Dept. ofColTection, 144 Idaho 177, 158 P.3d 953 (Idaho 2007) 
GIVEN:
 
REFUSED: _
 
MODIFIED: _
 
COVERED:

OTHER:
 
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 34 
002066
 
 
l
 
 
---
__  
 __ _ 
 
---
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. ~ 
Constructive fraud is a breach of legal or equitable duty which, irrespective of the moral 
guilt of the fraud feasor, the law declares fraudulent because of its tendency to deceive others, to 
violate public or private confidence, or to injure public interests. Neither actual dishonesty of 
purpose nor intent to deceive is an essential element of constructive fraud. In its generic sense 
constructive fraud comprises all acts, omissions and concealments involving a breach of legal or 
equitable duty, trust or confidence and resulting in damage to another. Constructive fraud does not 
require a Plaintiff to plead the nine elements of common law fraud. 
McGhee v McGhee 82 Idaho 367 (1960); Hudson v. Cobbs, 118 Idaho 474,797 P.2d 1322 (Idaho 
1990) 
GIVEN:
 
REFUSED: _
 
MODIFIED: _
 
COVERED:
 
OTHER:
 
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 35 
002067
 
  
 
 
__  
__  
 
 
---
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. H?J 
Upon a trial for having with intent to cheat or defraud another designedly, by any false 
pretense, obtained the signature of any person to a written instrument, or having obtained from 
any person, any money, personal property, or valuable thing, the defendant cannot be convicted if 
the false pretense was expressed in language, unaccompanied by a false token or writing, unless 
the pretense or some note or memorandum thereofbe in writing, subscribed by or in the hand 
writing ofthe defendant, or unless the pretense be proven by the testimony oftwo (2) witnesses, 
or that of one (1) witness and corroborating circumstances; but this section shall not apply to a 
prosecution for falsely representing or personating another, and, in such assumed character, 
marrying, or receiving any money or property. 
§ 19-2116. FALSE PRETENSE - SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE 
GIVEN:
 
REFUSED:
 
MODIFIED:
---
_
 
COVERED:
 
OTHER:
 
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 36 
002068
 
 
 
 __ _ 
 __  
 
 
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. .~L\-
An "enterprise" is defined as "any sole proprietorship, partnership, corporation, business, 
labor union, association or other legal entity or any group of individuals associated in fad 
although not a legal entity, and includes illicit as well as licit entities." I.C. § 18-7803(c). A 
"pattern of racketeering" is defined as: engaging in at least two (2) incidents of racketeering 
conduct that have the same or similar intents, results, accomplices, victims or methods of 
commission, or otherwise are interrelated by distinguishing characteristics and are not isolated 
incidents, provided at least one (1) of such incidents occurred after the effective date of this act 
and that the last of such incidents occurred within five (5) years after a prior incident of 
racketeering conduct. 
A single scheme may be sufficient to establish a pattern of racketeering if the plaintiff 
establishes "that the predicate acts themselves amount to, or constitute a threat of, continuing 
racketeering activity." 
Spence v. Howell, 126 Idaho 763,775,890 P.2d 714, 726 (1995). Mannos v. Moss, 143 Idaho 
927,931, 155 P.3d 1166, 1170 (2007) 
GIVEN:
 
REFUSED: _
 
MODIFIED: _
 
COVERED: _
 
OTHER:
 
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 37 
002069
 
 
__  
__  
__  
 
---
---
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. ~l:J 
It is unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise to conduct or 
participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of the affairs of such enterprise by enga~~ng in a 
pattern of racketeering activity. Whoever violates the provisions of this subsection is guilty of a 
felony. 
Idaho Code § 18-7803(a)(1)-(21). Idaho Code § 18-7804(c) 
GIVEN:
 
REFUSED:
 
MODIFIED:
 
COVERED: _
 
OTHER:
 
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 38 
002070
  g 
   
 
 
 
__  
 
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' REQUESTED 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 3lo 
"Racketeering" means any act which is chargeable or indictable under the following 
sections of the Idaho Code or which are equivalent acts chargeable or indictable as equivalent 
crimes under the laws of any other jurisdiction: 
(10) Fraudulent practices, false pretenses, insurance fraud, financial transaction card crimes 
and fraud generally (sections 18-2403, 18-2706, 18-3002, 18-3101, 18-3124, 18-3125, 18-3126, 
18-6713,41-293,41-294 and 41-1306, Idaho Code); 
(17) Perjury (sections 18-5401 and 18-5410, Idaho Code); 
It is unlawful for any person who has received any proceeds derived directly or indirectly from 
a pattern of racketeering activity in which the person has participated, to use or invest, directly or 
indirectly, any part of the proceeds or the proceeds derived from the investment or use thereof in 
the acquisition of any interest in, or the establishment or operation of, any enterprise or rleal 
property. 
It is unlawful for any person to engage in a pattern of racketeering activity in order to acquire 
or maintain, directly or indirectly, any interest in or control of any enterprise or real prop,erty 
18-7803 Definitions; 18-7804 Prohibited Activities -- Penalties. 
GIVEN: 
REFUSED: 
MODIFIED: _ 
COVERED: 
OTHER: 
--­
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 39 
002071
 
 
 ~
---
---
__ _ 
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. '61 
A judgment obtained by fraud may, however, be void under some circumstances, and 
subject to collateral attack, as where such fraud appears on the face of the record or goes to the 
method of acquiring jurisdiction. Likewise, the judgment may be attacked collaterally where fraud 
has been practiced in the very act of obtaining the judgment, or on the party against whom the 
judgment was rendered, so as to prevent him from having a fair opportunity to present his case. 
Judgments obtained by extrinsic, rather than intrinsic, fraud may be attacked collaterally. The 
extrinsic fraud which is required as a basis for collateral attacks on judgments is defined as fraud 
which is collateral to the issues tried in the case where the judgment is rendered. 
Res Judicata. 50 C.J.S. Judgments § 532 
GIVEN: 
REFUSED: _ 
MODIFIED: _ 
COVERED: _ 
OTHER: 
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 40 
002072
---
__ 
__ 
---
---
.......
 
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' REQUESTED
 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. i6
 
Extrinsic fraud is I1where a party is prevented by trick, artifice, or other fraudulent conduct 
from fairly presenting his claims or defenses or introducing relevant and material evidence. It is 
more than mere interparty misconduct. Id. It is a I1tampering with administration ofjustice" which 
suggests "a wrong against the institutions set up to protect and safeguard the public. 
Campbell v. Kildew, 141 Idaho 640, 115 P.3d 731 (Idaho 2005) (quoting 7 Moore's Federal 
Practice, P 60.37(1) 612-13). 
GIVEN: 
REFUSED: 
MODIFIED: 
COVERED: 
OTHER: 
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS· 41 
002073
..  
 
 
"
"tamper  
__ _ 
TIONS -
---
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. ~ 
The subornation of perjury by an attorney and/or the intentional concealment of documents 
by an attorney are actions which constitute extrinsic fraud. 
Chewning v. Ford Motor Co., 354 S.C. 72, 579 S.E.2d 605 (2003). 
GIVEN:
 
REFUSED:
 
MODIFIED: _
 
COVERED: _
 
OTHER:
 
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 42 
002074
 
 
 
__  
__  
 
---
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. /f0 
Fraud is extrinsic when it actually prevents an adversarial trial but is intrinsic when it is 
employed during the course of the hearing which provides the forum for the truth to appear, albeit, 
the truth was distorted by the complained of fraud. 
Jones v. Rosenberg, 178 Mel. App. 54,940 A.2d 1109 (Md. App. 2008) Manigan, 160 Md. App. 
at 121, 862 A.2d 1037 (quoting Billingsley, 43 Md. App. at 719, 406 A.2d 946). 
GIVEN:
 
REFUSED:
 
MODIFIED:
--­
COVERED: _
 
OTHER:
 
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 43 
002075
t O
 
 
 
-
 
__  
 
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' REQUESTED 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. ~ 
Extrinsic fraud is " fraud that induces a person not to present a case or deprives a person of 
the opportunity to be heard." 
Hilton Head Ctr. of S.C. v. Public Servo Commn., 294 S.c. 9, 11, 362 S.E.2d 176, 177 (1987). 
GIVEN:
 
REFUSED: _
 
MODIFIED:
 
COVERED:
--­
OTHER: 
--­
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 44 
002076
 
__  
 
-
 
-
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. L\~ 
Relief is granted for extrinsic fraud on the theory that because the fraud prevented a party 
from fully exhibiting and trying his case, there has never been a real contest before the court on 
the subject matter ofthe action. On the other hand, intrinsic fraud is fraud which was presented 
and considered at trial. 
Hagy v. Pruitt, 339 S.C. 425, 431-32, 529 S.E.2d 714, 718 (2000) (citing Evans v. Gunter, 294 
S.C. 525, 529, 366 S.E.2d 44, 46 (Ct. App.1988)). 
GIVEN:
 
REFUSED:
 
MODIFIED:
---
_
 
COVERED:
 
OTHER: 
--­
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 45 
002077
l
 
 
 
---
 
-
---
---
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. L\-'/J 
Extrinsic fraud is a fraud which misleads and induces the court to find in favor of the party 
perpetrating the fraud. 
Hilton Head Ctr., 294 S.C. at 11, 362 S.E.2d at 177. 
GIVEN:
 
REFUSED:
 
MODIFIED:
 
COVERED:
--­
OTHER:
 
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 46 
002078
"
 
 
 
-
 
 
---
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' REQUESTED 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. Lt4 
"Extrinsic fraud is 'fraud that induces a person not to present a case or deprives a person of 
the opportunity to be heard.' " 
Id. at 81,579 S.E.2d 605,579 S.E.2d at 610 Raby Const., L.L.P. v. Orr, 358 S.c. 10,594 S.E.2d 
478 (S.C. 2004) 
GNEN: 
REFUSED: 
MODIFIED:
--­
COVERED: _ 
OTHER: 
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 47 
002079
__ _ 
 
---
---
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. L\C:J 
Extrinsic fraud is "fraud that induces a person not to present a case or deprives a person of 
the opportunity to be heard. Relief is granted for extrinsic fraud on the theory that because the 
fraud prevented a party from fully exhibiting and trying his case, there has never been a real 
contest before the court on the subject matter of the action." 
Hilton Head Ctr. of South Carolina v. Public Servo Comm'n, 294 S.C. 9, 11,362 S.E.2d ] 76, 177 
(1987). Chewning V. Ford Motor Co., 354 S.C. 72, 579 S.E.2d 605 (S.C. 2003) 
GIVEN:
 
REFUSED:
 
MODIFIED: _
 
COVERED: _
 
OTHER:
 
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 48 
002080
4
 
 
__  
__  
 
---
---
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' REQUESTED 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. ~ 
The subornation of perjury by an attorney and/or the intentional concealment of documents 
by an attorney are actions which constitute extrinsic fraud. Contrary to perjury by a witness or a 
party's failure to disclose requested materials, conduct which constitutes intrinsic fraud, where an 
attorney--an officer of the court--suborns perjury or intentionally conceals documents, he or she 
effectively precludes the opposing party from having his day in court. These actions by an 
attorney constitute extrinsic fraud. Moreover, while the analysis does not turn on the 
categorization of fraud as intrinsic or extrinsic, the law hold an attorney's subornation of perjury 
and/or the intentional concealment ofdocuments constitutes fraud upon the court. 
See Kupferman v. Consol. Research & Mfg. Corp., 459 F.2d 1072 (2d Cir. 1972) 
GIVEN:
 
REFUSED: _
 
MODIFIED:
 
COVERED:
 
OTHER:
 
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 49 
002081
  
 
 
 
 
__  
 
 
 
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' REQUESTED 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. ~ 
Involvement of an attorney, as an officer of the court, in a scheme to suborn perjury would 
be considered fraud on the court. 
Cleveland Demolition Co. v. Azcon Scrap Corp., 827 F.2d 984,986 (4th Cir. 1987)
 
GIVEN:
 
REFUSED: _
 
MODIFIED:
 
COVERED: 
---
_
 
OTHER:
 
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 50 
002082
 
 
__  
 
__  
 
---
-

COUNTER-DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. L\;1O 
A verdict may be set aside for fraud on the court if an attorney and a witness have 
conspired to present peIjured testimony. 
Rozier v. Ford Motor Co., 573 F.2d 1332 (5th Cir. 1978) 
GIVEN:
 
REFUSED: _
 
MODIFIED: _
 
COVERED:

OTHER:
 
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 51 
002083
t-\l(;
 
__  
__  
 
 
---
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' REQUESTED 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. lJ/\ 
Since attorneys are officers of the court, their conduct, if dishonest, would constitute fraud 
on the court. 
Dixon v. Comm'n ofInternal Revenue, 2003 WL 1216290 (9th Cir. 2003) 
GIVEN:
 
REFUSED: _
 
MODIFIED: _
 
COVERED:
 
OTHER:
 
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 52 
002084
L\C\
 
 
__  
__  
 
 
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED 
JURY n~STRUCTION NO. ~ 
Attorney subornation of petjury and false statements to trial court constitute fraud upon the 
court. 
Porcelli v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co., 78 F.R.D. 499 (E.D.Wis.l978) (noting distinction 
between petjury involving officers of the court and witness or party); see 12 James Wm. Moore et 
aI., Moore's Federal Practice,-r 60-21[4] [b] (3d ed.2002).Chewning v. Ford Motor Co., 354 S.C. 
72, 579 S.E.2d 605 (S.C. 2003) 
GIVEN:
 
REFUSED: _
 
MODIFIED: _
 
COVERED: _
 
OTHER:
 
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 53 
002085
 
---
__  
__  
 
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 2L 
In order for a party to obtain relief under such a rule, the party seeking relief must prove 
the most egregious conduct involving corruption ofthe judicial process itself by establishing to 
the satisfaction of the trial judge that there was perjured testimony which influenced the judgment 
of the court. ... In any event, some courts hold that a judgment may be vacated for perjury under 
certain conditions, as where a party obtains a judgment by that party's own willful perjury, or by 
the use of false testimony, which the party knows at the time to be false. 
49 C.J.S. Judgments § 310 
GWEN: 
REFUSED: 
MODIFIED:
--­
COVERED:
---
_ 
OTHER: 
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 54 
002086
-
 
 __ 
---
---
COU1\TTER-DEFENDANTS' REQUESTED 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. Sf}., 
Idaho Court Rules provide: 
Rule 60(b). Mistakes, inadvertence, excusable neglect, newly discovered evidence, fraud, grounds 
for relief from judgment on order. 
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or his It:gal 
representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, 
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by due 
diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) 
fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other 
misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, 
released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise 
vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application; or (6) 
any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made 
within a reasonable time, and for reasons (1), (2), and (3) not more than six (6) months after the 
judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A motion under this subdivision (b) does not 
affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its operation. Such motion does not require leave from 
the Supreme Court, or the district court, as the case may be, as though the judgment has been 
affirmed or settled upon appeal to that court. This rule does not limit the power of a court to: (I) 
entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order or proceeding, or (ii) to 
GIVEN:
 
REFUSED:
 
MODIFIED: _
 
COVERED:
 
OTHER:
 
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 55 
002087
 .
 
 
 
__  
 
 
-

COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' REQUESTED 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 
set aside, as provided by law, within one (I) year after judgment was entered, a judgment obtained 
against a party who was not personally served with summons and complaint either in the state of 
Idaho or in any other jurisdiction, and who has failed to appear in said action, or (iii) to set aside a 
judgment for fraud upon the court. 
LR.C.P. Rule 60(b) 
GIVEN:
 
REFUSED:
 
MODIFIED:
---
_
 
COVERED: _
 
OTHER:
 
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 56 
002088
 
 
 __  
__  
 
---
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' REQUESTED 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. S?) 
Claims brought under LR.C.P. 60(b) are not barred by res judicata because they are one of 
the recognized "avenues ... for attacking a judgment." 
Wallerv. State, Dept. ofHealth and Welfare, 146 Idaho 234,192 P.3d 1058 (Idaho 2008), Davis 
v. Parrish, 131 Idaho 595,599,961 P.2d 1198, 1202 (1998) 
GIVEN:
 
REFUSED: _
 
MODIFIED:
 
COVERED: _
 
OTHER:
 
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 57 
002089
s
1. .c
 
 
__  
 
__  
 
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. £ii.­
When an issue of standing is raised, the focus is not on the merits of the issues raised, but 
upon the party who is seeking the relief. 
Miles v. Idaho Power Co., 116 Idaho 635, 641, 778 P.2d 757, 763 (1989). Scona Inc. v. Green 
Willow Trust, 133 Idaho 283, 286,985 P.2d 1145, 1148 (1999). 
GIVEN:
 
REFUSED:
 
MODIFIED:
---
_
 
COVERED: _
 
OTHER:
 
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 58 
002090
~ 
 
 
 __  
__  
 
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. ~ 
Questions of standing must be decided by this Court before reaching the merits of the 
case. 
Citibank v. Carroll, 35053 (IDSCCI) 
GIVEN:
 
REFUSED: _
 
MODIFIED:
 
COVERED:
--­
OTHER: 
--­
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 59 
002091
 
 
__  
 
-
 
-
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' REQUESTED 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. ~ 
A real party in interest 'is the person who will be entitled to the benefits ofthe action if 
successful, one who is actually and substantially interested in the subject matter. 
Christensen Family Trust v. Christensen, 133 Idaho 866,870,993 P.2d 1197, 1201 (1999) 
GIVEN:
 
REFUSED: _
 
MODIFIED: _
 
COVERED: _
 
OTHER:
 
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 60 
002092
 
__  
__  
__  
 
---
---
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. Sl 
Under Idaho Code, section 68-1 06(c)(1), the successor trustees are specifically and 
unequivocally empowered under the statute to sell a trust asset which was placed in trust by the 
trustor, without court approval. 
GIVEN:
 
REFUSED: _
 
MODIFIED:
 
COVERED:
 
OTHER:
 
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 61 
002093
 
 
__  
 
 
 
.......
 
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. f:11l­
There can be no Res Judicata (claim preclusion) ifthere is not ripe for judicial 
determination a valid cause of action. 
Idaho First Natl. Bank v. Bliss Valley Foods, Inc., 121 Idaho 266, 283-84, 824 P.2d 841, 858-59 
(1991) 
GIVEN:
 
REFUSED: _
 
MODIFIED:
 
COVERED:
---
_
 
OTHER:
 
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 62 
002094
 
~ 
 
__  
 
 
---
 
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. SC\ 
The time when a cause of action accrues may be a question of law or a question of fact, 
depending upon whether any disputed issues ofmaterial fact exist. Where there is no dispute over 
any issue ofmaterial fact regarding when the cause of action accrues, the question is on(~ of law 
for determination by the court. 
Reis v. Cox, 104 Idaho 434,. 660 P.2d 46 (1982) 
GIVEN:
 
REFUSED: _
 
MODIFIED:
 
COVERED:
--­
OTHER: 
--­
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 63 
002095
 
         
 
__  
 
-
 
-
---
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED
 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. JiL
 
The policy considerations underlying the doctrine of res judicata are aimed at discouraging 
the splintering of actions, at precluding repetitive actions based on the same transaction. It is a 
different question than the question of when a cause of action accrues. 
Kawai Farms, Inc. v. Longstreet, 121 Idaho 610, 613, 826 P.2d 1322, 1325 (1992). 
GIVEN:
 
REFUSED: _
 
MODIFIED: _
 
COVERED:
 
OTHER:
 
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 64 
002096
 
 
 
 
  
 
__  
__  
 
 
---
---
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. ~ 
The time of taking occurs, and hence the cause of action accrues, as of the time that the 
full extent of a party's loss of use and enjoyment of the property becomes apparent. 
McCuskey v. Canyon County Commissioners 128 Id. 213, 128 Idaho 213 (1996). 
GIVEN:
 
REFUSED: _
 
MODIFIED:
 
COVERED:
 
OTHER:
 
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 65 
002097
 
  
 
__  
 
 
 
---
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. J.Q.L 
After the court entered its order in July 2009 dismissing the plaintiffs' claims tht: Idaho 
Supreme Court ruled, a cause of action against one party's opponent's attorney in litigation, based 
on conduct the attorney committed in the course ofthat litigation, may not be properly instituted 
prior to the resolution ofthat litigation, even where the allegedly aggrieved party believ(~s that the 
attorney in question has been acting outside the legitimate scope of representation and solely for 
his own benefit. In addition, allegations of aiding and abetting in the commission of tortious acts, 
must await resolution ofthe underlying case, before a complaint can be commenced. 
Taylor v. McNichols, 36130, 36131 (lDSCCI) 
GNEN:
 
REFUSED:
 
MODIFIED:
--­
COVERED: _
 
OTHER:
 
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 66 
002098
u
 
 t
  
I
 
 __ _ 
 
---
 
---
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. ~ 
Only when a case has been concluded may one truly identify whether or not a prosecution 
has been malicious, whether an attorney has committed malpractice, or, whether an attorney has 
acted fraudulently or solely for his own benefit. 
Taylor v. McNichols, 36130, 36131 (IDSCCI) 
GIVEN:
 
REFUSED: _
 
MODIFIED: _
 
COVERED:
 
OTHER:
 
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 67 
002099
 
__  
__  
 
 
---
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. Ji::L 
A constructive trust can be imposed where property was obtained either fraudulently or 
through violation of a fiduciary duty. 
Hettinga v. Sybrandy, 126 Idaho 467, 469,886 P.2d 772, 774 (1994), Witt v. Jones, 111 Idaho 
165, 722 P.2d 474 (1986). 
GIVEN:
 
REFUSED: _
 
MODIFIED: _
 
COVERED:

OTHER:
 
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 68 
002100
 
 
__  
__  
 
 
---
---
-,.
 
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. ~ 
Constructive trusts are raised by equity for the purpose of working out right and justice, where 
there was no intention of the party to create such a relation, and often directly contrary to the 
intention of the one holding the legal title.... If one party obtains the legal title to proP{:rty, not 
only by fraud or by violation of confidence or of fiduciary relations, but in any other 
unconscientious manner, so that he cannot equitably retain the property which really belongs to 
another, equity carries out its theory of a double ownership, equitable and legal, by impressing a 
constructive trust upon the property in favor of the one who is in good conscience entitled to it, 
and who is considered in equity as the beneficial owner. 
Bengoechea v. Bengoechea, 106 Idaho 188, 677 P.2d SOl (Ct. App.1984). 
GIVEN:
 
REFUSED:
 
MODIFIED:
 
COVERED: _
 
OTHER:
 
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 69 
002101
 
 
  
 
501
 
 
 
__  
 
---
---
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED
 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. ~
 
Any action "affecting the title to real property" allows the filing of a lis pendens by an
 
interested party in order to protect their interest in the property subject to the litigation. Such 
actions include actions attempting to set aside a fraudulent conveyance of real property; actions to 
establish a constructive trust over real estate which may have been obtained by fraud. 
Bengoechea v. Bengoechea, 106 Idaho 188, 677 P.2d 501 (Ct. App.1984). 
GIVEN: 
REFUSED: 
MODIFIED: 
COVERED: 
OTHER: 
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 70 
002102
 
 
 
.l
---
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 1.O1 
The publication of the notice oflis pendens is not defamatory. It merely informs the public 
that the property is involved in litigation. 
Vanderford Co., Inc. v. Knudson, 144 Idaho 547, 165 P.3d 261 (Idaho 2007). 
GIVEN:
 
REFUSED:
 
MODIFIED: _
 
COVERED: _
 
OTHER:
 
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 71 
002103
~ 
 
 
---
---
 
---
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. a 
In order to succeed under a claim of tortious interference with a business relationship, the 
claimant must allege that the interferer did something illegal, unethical or fraudulent. There is 
nothing illegal, unethical or fraudulent in filing a lawsuit, whether groundless or not. 
Dalley v. Dykema Gossett P.L.L.C, 289046 (MICA) (Michigan 2010), citing Early Detection 
Center, P.e., v. New York Life Ins. Co., 157 Mich. App. 618 at 631,403 N.W.2d 830 (Mich. 
App.1986). 
GIVEN:
 
REFUSED: _
 
MODIFIED:
 
COVERED:
--­
OTHER:
 
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 72 
002104
 
__  
 
-
 
 
---
---
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. loq 
Res Judicata involves five factors which are required to bar re-litigation of an issue 
detennined in a prior proceeding: (1) the party against whom the earlier decision was asserted had 
a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue decided in the present action; (2) the issue decided 
in the prior litigation was identical to the issue presented in the present action; (3) the issue sought 
to be precluded was actually decided in the prior litigation; (4) there was a final judgment on the 
merits in the prior litigation; and (5) the party against whom the issue is asserted was a party or in 
privity with a party to the litigation. 
TicorTitlev. Stanion, 144 Idaho 119, 123, 157 P.3d 613, 617(2007). 
GIVEN:
 
REFUSED: _
 
MODIFIED:
 
COVERED:
 
OTHER:
 
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 73 
002105
I
 
__  
 
 
 
---
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' REQUESTED 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 1D 
One of the oldest and most universally accepted juridical principles is that embmced in the 
doctrine of res judicata. In the absence offraud or collusion a judgment is conclusive as between 
the parties and their privies on all issues which were (or should have been) litigated in the 
action.... Generally speaking, the fraud which will invalidate a judgment must be extrinsic or 
collateral to the issues tried, by which the aggrieved party has been prejudiced, or prevented from 
having a fair trial. 
Robinson v. Robinson, 70 Idaho 122, 128, 212 P.2d 1031, 1034 (1949) 
GIVEN:
 
REFUSED:
 
MODIFIED:
--­
COVERED: _
 
OTHER:
 
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 74 
002106
 
 
 
 
 __ _ 
 
---
 
---
---
---
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. '1 \ 
Rule 60(b) LR.C.P., provides that the court may relieve a party from a judgment: (1) under 
60(b)(3) for 'fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic)', and (2) under a portion 
of the last sentence of 60(b), empowering the court 'to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the 
court.' 
The Law defines extlinsic fraud as being fraud by which the aggrieved party has been 
prejudiced, or prevented from having a fair trial. 
Willis v. Willis, 93 Idaho 261, 460 P.2d 396 (1969) 
GIVEN: 
REFUSED: 
MODIFIED: 
COVERED: 
OTHER: 
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 75 
002107
I.
ic)" 
 
__ _ 
__ _ 
---
---
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. ~ 
Determination of All Rights upon Foreclosure Proceedings. 
In any suit brought to foreclose a mortgage or lien upon real property... 
the plaintiff..., plaintiff in intervention may make as party defendant in the same cause of action, 
any person, including parties mentioned in section 5-325, having, claiming or appearing to have or 
to claim any title, estate, or interest in or to any part of the real or personal property involved 
therein, and the court shall, in addition to granting relief in the foreclosure action, detemtine the 
title, estate or interest of all parties thereto in the same manner and to the same extent and effect as 
in the action to quiet title. 
I.e. § 45-1302 
GIVEN:
 
REFUSED: _
 
MODIFIED:
 
COVERED:
 
OTHER:
 
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 76 
002108
 
 
 
---
 __ _ 
 __ _ 
 
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' REQUESTED 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 1 ') 
In an action affecting the title or the right of possession of real property, the plaintiff at the 
time of filing the complaint, and the defendant at the time of filing his answer, when affirmative 
relief is claimed in such answer, or at any time afterward, may file for record with the recorder of 
the county in which the property or some part thereof is situated, a notice of the pendency of the 
action, containing the names of the parties, the object of the action or defense, and a description of 
the property in that county affected thereby. From the time of filing such notice for record only 
shall a purchaser or incumbrancer of the property affected thereby be deemed to have constructive 
notice of the pendency of the action, and only of its pendency against parties designated by their 
real names. 
Idaho Code § 5-505. LIS PENDENS
 
GIVEN:
 
REFUSED:
 
MODIFIED:
--­
COVERED:
---
_
 
OTHER:
 
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 77 
002109
 
            
 
 
 
-
 
 __  
 
---
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS'REQU:ESTED 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. '1 t.\­
An action may be brought by any person against another who claims an estate or interest in 
real or personal property adverse to him, for the purpose of determining such adverse claim. 
Idaho Code § 6-401. ACTIONS TO QUIET TITLE 
GIVEN:
 
REFUSED:
 
MODIFIED: _
 
COVERED: _
 
OTHER:
 
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 78 
002110
-
 
 
 
__  
__  
 
---
---
---
-, 
­
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. '1S 
Because the doctrine oflaches is founded in equity, in determining whether the doctrine 
applies, consideration must be given to all surrounding circumstances and acts of the parties. The 
lapse of time alone is not controlling on whether laches applies. 
Thomas v. Arkoosh Produce, Inc., 137 Idaho 352, 48 P.3d 1241 (Idaho 2002) 
GIVEN: 
REFUSED: 
MODIFIED: 
COVERED: 
OTHER: 
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 79 
002111
-
-
 
 
-

COUNTER-DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. ~ 
The basis for the doctrine oflaches is that "courts of equity do not favor antiquated or stale 
demands, and will refuse to interfere where there has been gross laches in commencing the proper 
action, or long acquiescence in the assertion of adverse rights." 
Abrams v. Porter, 128 Idaho 869, 920 P.2d 386 (Idaho 1996) 
GIVEN:
 
REFUSED: _
 
MODIFIED: _
 
COVERED: _
 
OTHER:
 
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 80 
002112
 
 
---
__  
__  
 
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' REQUESTED 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 'l1 
A foreclosure is an equitable proceeding. 
Fann Credit Bank of Spokane v. Stevenson, 125 Idaho 270,869 P.2d 1365 (Idaho 1994) 
GNEN: 
REFUSED: _
 
MODIFIED: _
 
COVERED: _
 
OTHER:
 
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 81 
002113
__  
__  
__  
 
---
---
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' REQUESTED 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. ·1~ 
The relationship between an attorney and client is one of agency wherein the attorney acts 
as agent for the principal. 
Vreeken v Lockwood Engineering P.V. 148 Idaho 89 (2009) 
GIVEN:
 
REFUSED: _
 
MODIFIED:
 
COVERED:
 
OTHER:
 
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 82 
002114
 
 
__  
 
 
 
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. -1°\ 
There is no dispute in this case that Connie Wright Taylor, flk/a Connie Taylor, Clark and 
Feeney, a partnership and Paul T. Clark were the agent of the principals DaHan Taylor, R. John 
Taylor, and the Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust, at the time of the transaction described by 
the evidence. Therefore, DaHan Taylor, R. John Taylor, and the Theodore L. Johnson Revocable 
Trust, the principals, were responsible for any act of Connie Wright Taylor, f/k/a Connie Taylor, 
Clark and Feeney, and Paul T. Clark, the agents, within the scope of the agent's authority. 
IDJI 6.41.1. Agent's act binds principal - agency admitted (modified) 
GWEN: 
REFUSED: _ 
MODIFIED: _ 
COVERED: 
OTHER: 
--­
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 83 
002115
I I
 
 
__ 
__ 
-
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED 
JURY INBTRUCTION NO. ~ 
One ofthe issues to be decided by you is whether Connie Wright Taylor, £!kIa Connie 
Taylor, Clark and Feeney, a partnership and Paul T. Clark and Dallan Taylor, R. John Taylor, and 
the Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust were engaged in a joint enterprise. A joint enterprise 
exists if all of the following elements are present: 
(1) an agreement, express or implied, between two or more persons to carry out a common 
purpose as a group; 
(2) a community of pecuniary interest in the common purpose shared among each member of the 
group; and 
(3) an equal voice in the control of the enterprise held by each member of the group. 
The phrase "community of pecuniary interest" means that the common purpose of the enterprise 
must be the accomplishment of a commercial or business objective, carried out for the mutual 
profit ofthe group. It is not present where the purposes ofthe individual members of the group are 
separable or entirely personal to the individuals or their families, even if the separate purposes or 
personal purposes are pecuniary gain. 
IDJI 6.48. Definition ofjoint enterprise 
GIVEN:
 
REFUSED:
 
MODIFIED:
--­
COVERED:
---
_
 
OTHER:
 
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 84 
002116
'
 
 
 
 
 
-
 
 __  
 
---
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. iLL 
It is not a tort where one acts to protect her own economic interests, even if there is 
interference with the contract expectancy of another, so long as the acts of the intervenor are not 
independently wrongful. 
Carter v. Carter, 143 Idaho 373, 146 P.3d 639 (Idaho 2006) 
GIVEN:
 
REFUSED:
 
MODIFIED: _
 
COVERED: _
 
OTHER:
 
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 85 
002117
 
 
__  
__  
 
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 0~ 
Tortious interference with a prospective economic advantage has five elements: "(1) The 
existence of a valid economic expectancy; (2) knowledge of the expectancy on the part of the 
interferer; (3) intentional interference inducing termination of the expectancy; (4) the interference 
was wrongful by some measure beyond the fact of the interference itself (i.e. that the defendant 
interfered for an improper purpose or improper means) and (5) resulting damage to the pllaintiff 
whose expectancy has been disrupted." 
This tort requires a showing that the interference was wrongful beyond the fact of 
interference itself. 
Highland Enters., Inc. v. Barker, 133 Idaho 330, 338, 986 P.2d 996, 1004 (1999), Lexington 
Heights Dev., LLC v. Crandlemire, 140 Idaho 276, 286,92 P.3d 526,536 (2004), Commercial 
Ventures, Inc. v. Rex M. & Lynn Lea Family Trust, 145 Idaho 208, 177 P.3d 955 (Idaho 2008) 
GIVEN:
 
REFUSED: _
 
MODIFIED: _
 
COVERED:
 
OTHER: 
--­
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 86 
002118
 
__  
__  
 
-
---
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 0'j 
To establish that the intentional interference resulting in injury was wrongful, a party may 
offer proof that either: "(1) the defendant had an improper objective or purpose to harm the 
plaintiff; or (2) the defendant used a wrongful means to cause injury to the prospective business 
relationship." 
Commercial Ventures, Inc. v. Rex M. & Lynn Lea Family Trust, 145 Idaho 208, 217, 177 P.3d 
955,964 (2008). Wesco Autobody Supply, Inc. v. Ernest, 35732 (lDSCCI), Idaho First Nat'l Bank 
v. Bliss Valley Foods, Inc., 121 Idaho 266,286,824 P.2d 841,861 (1991) 
GIVEN:
 
REFUSED:
 
MODIFIED: _
 
COVERED: _
 
OTHER:
 
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 87 
002119
 
 
I
 
 
__  
__  
 
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. ~ 
Every pleading, motion, and other paper of a party represented by an attorney shall be 
signed by at least one (l) licensed attorney of record of the state ofIdaho, in the attorney's 
individual name, whose address shall be stated before the same may be filed. A party who is not 
represented by an attorney shall sign the pleading, motion or other paper and state the party's 
address. Except when otherwise specifically provided by rule or statute, pleadings need not be 
verified or accompanied by affidavit. The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate 
that the attorney or party has read the pleading, motion or other paper; that to the best of the 
signer's knowledge, information, and belief after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and 
is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal 
of existing law, and that it is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to 
cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation. If a pleading, motion or 
other paper is not signed, it shall be stricken unless it is signed promptly after the omission is 
called to the attention of the pleader or movant. If a pleading, motion or other paper is signed in 
violation of this rule, the court, upon motion or upon its own initiative, shall impose upon the 
person who signed it, a represented party, or both, an appropriate sanction, which may include an 
order to pay to the other party or parties the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because 
of the filing of the pleading, motion, or other paper, including a reasonable attorney's fee. 
Rule I I (a)(l). Signing ofpleadings, motions, and other papers; sanctions defined 
GIVEN: 
REFUSED: 
MODIFIED: _ 
COVERED: _ 
OTHER: 
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 88 
002120
1
 
  
11 1  
__ 
__ 
---
---
---
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED 
JURY U'l"STRUCTION NO. 
"Conduct" means filing a civil action, asserting a claim, defense, or other position in connection 
with a civil action, or taking any other action in connection with a civil action. 
"Frivolous conduct" means conduct of a party to a civil action or of his counsel of record that 
satisfies either of the following: 
(I) It obviously serves merely to harass or maliciously injure another party to the civil action; 
(ii) It is not supported in fact or warranted under existing law and cannot be supported by a good 
faith argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of existing law. 
Idaho Code § 12-123. Sanctions for Frivolous Conduct in a Civil Case 
GIVEN: 
REFUSED: 
MODIFIED: 
COVERED: 
OTHER: 
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 89 
002121
  
---
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. t)S 
The counter-defendants have asserted the affinnative defense of equitable estoppd. This is 
a legal tenn which means the counter-claimants may be prevented from pursuing their claims by 
reason of the counter-claimants' own conduct. 
To establish the defense of equitable estoppel, the counter-defendant has the burdlen of 
proof on each of the following propositions: 
1. The counter-claimants falsely represented or concealed a material fact to the counter-defendants 
and/or the court; 
2. The counter-claimants knew or should have known the true facts; 
3. The court and/or the counter-defendants did not know and could not discover the true facts; 
4. The court and/or counter-defendants relied on the misrepresentation or concealment to the 
counter-defendants' prejudice. 
IDJI 6.22.1. Equitable estoppel 
GIVEN:
 
REFUSED:
 
MODIFIED:
---
_
 
COVERED:
 
OTHER:
 
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 90 
002122
 
 
 __  
 
 
---
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. ~ 
The doctrine of quasi-estoppel applies when: (1) the offending party took a different 
position than his or her original position, and (2) either (a) the offending party gained an 
advantage or caused a disadvantage to the other party; (b) the other party was induced to change 
positions; or (c) it would be unconscionable to permit the offending party to maintain an 
inconsistent position from one he or she has already derived a benefit or acquiesced in. 
Terrazas v. Blaine County ex reI. Bd. ofCom'rs, 147 Idaho 193,207 P.3d 169 (Idaho 20(9); Allen 
v. Reynolds, 145 Idaho 807, 812,186 P.3d 663, 668 (2008) 
GIVEN:
 
REFUSED: _
 
MODIFIED: _
 
COVERED:
 
OTHER:
 
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 91 
002123
 
__  
__  
 
 
---
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' REQUESTED 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 10-1 
Judicial estoppel is intended to prevent abuse of the judicial process by deliberate shifting 
of positions to suit the exigencies of a particular action. For guidance purposes and to avoid 
misapplication ofjudicial estoppel, it should be made clear that the concept should only be 
applied when the party maintaining the inconsistent position either did have, or was chargeable 
with, full knowledge of the attendant facts prior to adopting the initial position. Stated another 
way, the concept ofjudicial estoppel takes into account not only what a party states under oath in 
open court, but also what that party knew, or should have known, at the time the original position 
was adopted. Thus, the knowledge that the party possesses, or should have possessed, at the time 
the statement is made is determinative as to whether that person is "playing fast and loose" with 
the court. 
Representations of fact, purporting to be on the basis of the lawyer's personal knowledge, 
may well be used against that lawyer in subsequent proceedings. Certainly, statements in an 
affidavit of an attorney purporting to be based upon personal knowledge could be governed by the 
doctrine ofjudicial estoppel. 
Heinze v. Bauer, 145 Idaho 232, 235, 178 P.3d 597, 600 (2008) 
GIVEN: 
REFUSED: _ 
MODIFIED: _ 
COVERED: 
OTHER: 
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 92 
002124
O"
 
 
 
---
__ 
__ _ 
---
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED
 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. ~
 
Admission constitutes a binding judicial admission -- "a fonnal ...statement made by ... 
an attorney, in the course ofjudicial proceedings, for the purpose, or with the effect, of dispensing 
with the need for proof by the opposing party of some fact. "Judicial admissions may be 
considered for the purposes which they were made without admission into evidence, and a party 
making an admission may not controvert the statement on appeal. 
Strouse v. K-Tek, Inc., 129 Idaho 616, 618, 930 P.2d 1361, 1363 (Ct. App. 1997) (citing McLean 
v. City of Spirit Lake, 91 Idaho 779, 783,430 P.2d 670,674 (1967» 
GIVEN:
 
REFUSED: _
 
MODIFIED: _
 
COVERED:
 
OTHER:
 
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 93 
002125
 
 
            
 
__  
__  
 
 
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED 
JURY IN"STRUCTION NO. Ql'\ 
A judicial admission is a statement made by a party or attorney, in the course ofjudicial 
proceedings, for the purpose, or with the effect, of dispensing with the need for proof by the 
opposing party of some fact. 
Sun Valley Potato Growers, Inc. v. Texas Refinery Corp., 139 Idaho 761, 765, 86 P.3d 475, 479 
(2004). 
GIVEN:
 
REFUSED: _
 
MODIFIED:
 
COVERED:
---
_
 
OTHER:
 
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 94 
002126
 
 
 
__  
 
 
---
 
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. ~O 
A judicial admission is a deliberate, clear, unequivocal statement of a party about a 
concrete fact within the party's peculiar knowledge, not a matter oflaw.... [and] not opinion. 
In re Universe Life Ins. Co., 144 Idaho 751,171 P.3d 242 (Idaho 2007) 
GIVEN:
 
REFUSED: _
 
MODIFIED: _
 
COVERED:
 
OTHER: 
--­
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 95 
002127
 
 
 
__  
__  
 
-
---
---
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. C\ \ 
Fraud which will invalidate a judgment must be extrinsic or collateral to the issm:s tried, 
by which the aggrieved party has been prejudiced, or prevented from having a fair trial. 
Frank v. Bunker Hill Co., 117 Idaho 790, 792 P.2d 815 (Idaho 1988) 
GIVEN: 
REFUSED: 
MODIFIED: 
COVERED: _ 
OTHER: 
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 96 
002128
---
---
-,
 
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' REQUESTED 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 3L 
A judgment obtained by fraud may, however, be void under some circumstances, and 
subject to collateral attack, as where such fraud appears on the face of the record or goes to the 
method of acquiring jurisdiction. Likewise, the judgment may be attacked collaterally where fraud 
has been practiced in the very act of obtaining the judgment, or on the party against whom the 
judgment was rendered, so as to prevent him from having a fair opportunity to present his case. 
50 C.J.S. Judgments § 532. Fraud, collusion, or perjury 
GWEN:
 
REFUSED:
 
MODIFIED:
 
COVERED: _
 
OTHER:
 
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 97 
002129
 
 
 
 
 
__  
 
---
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' REQUESTED
 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. q'~
 
Statutory protection is a defense to any alleged wrongful recording of a notice of claim. 
Hewson v. Asker's Thrift Shop, 120 Idaho 164, 167,814 P.2d 424,427 (1991). 
GIVEN:
 
REFUSED:
 
MODIFIED:
 
COVERED:
---
_
 
OTHER:
 
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 98 
002130
 
 
 
 
 __  
 
---
---
---
......
 
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. qL\­
Generally a right which stems from statutory protection is a defense to certain actions. 
Rincover v. State, 128 Idaho 653, 656, 917 P.2d 1293, 1296 (1996). 
GNEN: 
REFUSED: 
MODIFIED: 
COVERED: 
OTHER: 
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 99 
002131
-
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED
 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. e10
 
A claimant can state a cause of action for abuse of process or tortious intentional 
interference with a business advantage against a third party who is conditionally privileged if the 
claimant can set forth factual allegations from which actual malice may reasonably be said to 
exist. 
Taylor v. McNichols, 36130, 36131 (IDSCCI) (2010) (modified) 
GIVEN:
 
REFUSED: _
 
MODIFIED:
 
COVERED:
---
_
 
OTHER:
 
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 100 
002132
 
 
 
__  
 
 __  
 
---
---
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. C\lp 
Only when a case has been concluded may one truly identify whether or not a prosecution 
has been malicious, whether an attorney has committed malpractice, or, whether an attomey has 
acted fraudulently or solely for his own benefit. 
Taylor v. McNichols, 36130, 36131 (IDSCCI) 
GIVEN:
 
REFUSED: _
 
MODIFIED:
 
COVERED: .
 
OTHER:
 
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 101 
002133
 
__  
 
 
 
---
...... 
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. on 
Attorneys must not knowingly counselor assist a client in committing a crime or fraud. 
Taylorv. McNichols, 36130, 36131 (IDSCCI) 
GIVEN:
 
REFUSED: _
 
MODIFIED:
 
COVERED: _
 
OTHER:
 
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 102 
002134
l
 
__  
 __ _ 
---
 
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. {\CO 
By giving you instructions on the subject of damages, I do not express any opinion as to 
whether the counter-claimants are entitled to damages. 
IDJI 9.00. Cautionary instruction on damages 
GIVEN:
 
REFUSED: _
 
MODIFIED: _
 
COVERED: _
 
OTHER:
 
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 103 
002135
 
__  
---
__  
 
---
---
---
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' REQUESTED 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. C\(~ 
If the jury decides the counter-claimant is entitled to recover from the counter­
defendant(s), the jury must determine the amount ofmoney that will reasonably and faid y 
compensate the counter-claimant for any damages proved to be proximately caused by the 
counter-defendant(s)' conduct. 
The elements of damage the jury may consider are: 
1. The difference between the fair market value of the property immediately before the
 
occurrence, and its fair market value after the occurrence.
 
Whether the plaintiff has proved any of these elements is for the jury to decide.
 
IDJI 9.01. Damage instruction for injuries to plaintiff - general case 
GIVEN: 
REFUSED: 
MODIFIED: 
COVERED: 
OTHER: 
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS -104 
002136
-
          
 
 
  
 
 
---
---
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. \ CO 
If the jury decides that the counter-claimant is entitled to recover from the counter-
defendants, the jury must determine the amount of money that will reasonably and fairly 
compensate the counter-claimant for any damages proved to be proximately caused by the 
counter-defendant(s)' conduct. 
The elements of damage to counter-claimant's property are: 
The difference between the fair market value of the property immediately before the occurrence, 
and its fair market value after the occurrence. 
IDJI 9.07. Property damage instruction 
GNEN:
 
REFUSED: _
 
MODIFIED:
 
COVERED:
 
OTHER:
 
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS -105 
002137
 
 
 
__  
 __ _ 
 
 
---
---
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. JQL 
When I use the tenn "value" or the phrase "fair market value" or "actual cash value" in 
these instructions as to any item of property, I mean the amount of money that a willing buyer 
would pay and a willing seller would accept for the item in question in an open marketplace, in 
the item's condition as it existed immediately prior to the occurrence in question. 
IDJI 9.12. Value or fair market defined 
GIVEN:
 
REFUSED: _
 
MODIFIED:
 
COVERED:
 
OTHER:
 
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 106 
002138
 
 
__  
 
 
 
---
---
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. \D'A 
A person who has been damaged must exercise ordinary care to minimize the damage and 
prevent further damage. Any loss that results from a failure to exercise such care cannot be 
recovered. 
IDJI 9.14 - Mitigation of damages
 
GIVEN:
 
REFUSED: _
 
MODIFIED:
 
COVERED:
 
OTHER:
 
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS -107 
002139
 
 
 
__  
 
 
 
---
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' REQUESTED 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO.J.(22 
I have given you the rules of law that apply to this case. I have instructed you regarding 
matters that you may consider in weighing the evidence to determine the facts. In a few minutes 
counsel will present their closing arguments to you and then you will retire to the jury room for 
your deliberations. 
Each of you has an equally important voice in the jury deliberations. Therefore, the 
attitude and conduct ofjurors at the beginning of the deliberations are important. At the outset of 
deliberations, it is rarely productive for a juror to make an emphatic expression of opinion on the 
case or to state how he or she intends to vote. When one does that at the beginning, one's sense 
of pride may be aroused and there may be reluctance to change that position, even if shown that it 
is wrong. Remember that you are not partisans or advocates, but you are judges. For you, as for 
me, there can be no triumph except in the ascertainment and declaration of the truth. 
Consult with one another. Consider each other's views. Deliberate with the objective of 
reaching an agreement, if you can do so without disturbing your individual judgment. Each of 
you must decide this case for yourself; but you should do so only after a discussion and 
consideration of the case with your fellow jurors. 
IDJI 1.13 - Concluding remarks 
GIVEN:
 
REFUSED: _
 
MODIFIED:
 
COVERED:
 
OTHER: 
--­
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 108 
002140
.D
            
 
 
 
---
 __ _ 
 
-
---
---
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' REQUESTED 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 'bl.\ 
On retiring to the jury room, select one of your number as a foreman, who will preside 
over your deliberations. 
Appropriate forms of verdict will be submitted to you with any instructions. Use only the 
ones conforming to your conclusions and return the others unused. 
A verdict may be reached by three-fourths of your number, or nine of you. If your verdict 
is unanimous, your foreman alone will sign it; but if nine or more, but less than the entire jury, 
agree, then those so agreeing will sign the verdict. 
As soon as you have completed and signed the verdict, you will notify the bailiff: who 
will then return you into open court. 
IDJll.15.1 Completion of verdict form - general verdict
 
GIVEN:
 
REFUSED: _
 
MODIFIED:
 
COVERED:
 
OTHER:
 
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS -109 
002141
L
 
 
  
JI 1.15.   
 
__  
 
 
 
---
---
---
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. \OS 
On retiring to the jury room, select one ofyour number as a foreman, who will preside 
over your deliberations. An appropriate form ofverdict will be submitted to you with any 
instructions. Follow the directions on the verdict form, and answer all of the questions required 
of you by the instructions on the verdict form. A verdict may be reached by three-fourths of your 
number, or nine of you. As soon as nine or more ofyou shall have agreed upon each of the 
required questions in the verdict, you should fill it out as instructed, and have it signed. It is not 
necessary that the same nine agree on each question. If your verdict is unanimous, your foreman 
alone will sign it; but if nine or more, but less than the entire jury, agree, then those so agreeing 
will sign the verdict. As soon as you have completed and signed the verdicts, you will notify the 
baili ff, who will then return you into open court. 
IDJI 1.15.2 - Completion ofverdict form on special interrogatories 
GIVEN: 
REFUSED: 
MODIFIED: 
COVERED: 
OTHER: 
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS -110 
002142
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
---
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. \oto 
I have given you the rules of law that apply to this case. I have instructed you regarding 
matters that you may consider in weighing the evidence to determine the facts. In a few minutes 
counsel will present their closing arguments to you and then you will retire to the jury room for 
your deliberations. 
Each of you has an equally important voice in the jury deliberations. Therefore, the 
attitude and conduct ofjurors at the beginning of the deliberations are important. At the;: outset of 
deliberations, it is rarely productive for a juror to make an emphatic expression of opinion on the 
case or to state how he or she intends to vote. When one does that at the beginning, one's sense 
of pride may be aroused and there may be reluctance to change that position, even if shown that it 
is wrong. Remember that you are not partisans or advocates, but you are judges. For you, as for 
me, there can be no triumph except in the ascertainment and declaration of the truth. 
Consult with one another. Consider each other's views. Deliberate with the obj(~ctive of 
reaching an agreement, if you can do so without disturbing your individual judgment. Each of 
you must decide this case for yourself; but you should do so only after a discussion and 
consideration of the case with your fellow jurors. 
IDJI 1.13 - Concluding remarks
 
GIVEN:
 
REFUSED:
 
MODIFIED: _
 
COVERED:
 
OTHER:
 
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 111 
002143
 
            
 
 
 
 
 
__  
 
 
---
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' REQUESTED 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. \01 
On counter-claimants' claim of abuse of process against the counter-defendants, the 
counter-claimants have the burden of proof on each of the following propositions by clear and 
convincing evidence: 
(1) Counter-defendants affirmatively used a legal process against the counter-claimants; 
(2) primarily to accomplish an improper purpose outside of simply gaining an advantage in the 
underlying litigation for which the process was not designed; 
(3) harm has been caused to the counter-claimants by misuse of the process external to the 
litigation that cannot be compensated in the underlying proceeding. 
On counter-claimants' claim of tortious interference with prospective business advantage 
against the counter-defendants, the counter-claimants have the burden of proof on each of the 
following propositions: 
1. The existence of a valid economic expectancy; 
2. knowledge of the expectancy on the part of the interferer; 
3. intentional interference inducing termination of the expectancy; 
4. the interference was wrongful by some measure beyond the fact of the interference itself; 
5. resulting damage to the counter-claimant whose expectancy has been disrupted. 
6. It is not a tort where one acts to protect her own economic interests, even if there is 
interference with the contract expectancy of another, so long as the acts of the intervenor are not 
GIVEN:
 
REFUSED:
 
MODIFIED:
 
COVERED:
--­
OTHER:
 
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 112 
002144
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 __ _ 
 __ _ 
 
---
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 
independently wrongful. 
In this case, the counter-defendants have asserted affirmative defenses. On these 
affirmative defense, the counter-defendants have the burden of proof on each of the following 
propositions for any oftheir affirmative defenses: 
1. The doctrine of quasi-estoppel applies when: (1) the offending party took a different position
 
than his or her original position, and (2) either (a) the offending party gained an advantage or
 
caused a disadvantage to the other party; (b) the other party was induced to change positions; or
 
(c) it would be unconscionable to permit the offending party to maintain an inconsistent position
 
from one he or she has already derived a benefit or acquiesced in.
 
2. Equitable Estoppel. The doctrine of equitable-estoppel applies when:
 
1. The counter-claimants falsely represented or concealed a material fact to the counter-

defendants and/or the court;
 
2. The counter-claimants knew or should have known the true facts;
 
3. The court and/or the counter-defendants did not know and could not discover the true facts;
 
4. The court and/or counter-defendants relied on the misrepresentation or concealment to the
 
counter-defendants' prejudice.
 
3. Judicial Estoppel. The doctrine ofjudicial-estoppel applies when:
 
Judicial estoppel is intended to prevent abuse of the judicial process by deliberate shifting of
 
GIVEN:
 
REFUSED: _
 
MODIFIED:
 
COVERED:
 
OTHER: 
--­
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS -113 
002145
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
__  
 
 
-
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COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' REQUESTED 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 
positions to suit the exigencies of a particular action. For guidance purposes and to avoid 
misapplication ofjudicial estoppel, it should be made clear that the concept should only be 
applied when the party maintaining the inconsistent position either did have, or was chargeable 
with, full knowledge of the attendant facts prior to adopting the initial position. Stated another 
way, the concept ofjudicial estoppel takes into account not only what a party states under oath in 
open court, but also what that party knew, or should have known, at the time the original position 
was adopted. Thus, the knowledge that the party possesses, or should have possessed, at the time 
the statement is made is determinative as to whether that person is "playing fast and loose" with 
the court. 
Representations of fact, purporting to be on the basis of the lawyer's personal knowledge, 
may well be used against that lawyer in subsequent proceedings. Certainly, statements in an 
affidavit of an attorney purporting to be based upon personal knowledge could be governed by 
the doctrine ofjudicial estoppel. 
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that the counter-claimants have 
proved each of the propositions required of the counter-claimants for either of their claims on 
the case in chief, and further find that the counter-defendants have failed to prove each of the 
propositions required for anyone of their affirmative defense, your verdict should be for the 
counter-claimants. 
GIVEN:
 
REFUSED:
 
MODIFIED:
 
COVERED:
---
_
 
OTHER:
 
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS -114 
002146
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
---
 
---
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 
If you find that the counter-claimants have failed to prove each of the propositions 
required of the counter-claimants for any of their claims on the case in chief, or find that the 
counter-defendants have proved each of the propositions required for the any of their aHirmative 
defense, your verdict should be for the counter-defendants. 
You will be asked the following question on the jury verdict form: 
This form consists of a series of questions that you are to answer. I will read the verdict 
form to you now. 
QUESTION NO. 1. Did the Counter-Defendants commit an abuse ofprocess? 
ANSWER: Yes No 
QUESTION NO.2. Did the Counter-Defendants commit a tortious interference with a 
prospective economic advantage? 
ANSWER: Yes No 
If you answered the first two questions "No," you are done. Sign the verdict as instructed and 
advise the Bailiff. If you answered either question "Yes," continue to the next questions., 
QUESTION NO.3. Was there proof establishing a claim of "Equitable Estoppel" against 
the counter-claimants? 
ANSWER: Yes No 
QUESTION NO.4. Was there proof establishing a claim of "Quasi-Estoppel" against the 
GIVEN:
 
REFUSED:
 
MODIFIED: _
 
COVERED: _
 
OTHER:
 
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - 115 
002147
  
  fj
 
 
 
 
__  
__  
 
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS'REQUESTED 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 
counter-claimants? 
ANSWER: Yes No 
QUESTION NO.5. Was there proof establishing a claim of "Judicial Estoppel" against 
the counter-claimants? 
ANSWER: Yes No 
If you answered any of the above question numbers 3 through 5, "Yes" then please, sign 
the verdict as instructed and advise the Bailiff. If you answered all the above question numbers 1 
through 6, "No", continue to the next questions. 
The verdict form continues: 
QUESTION No.6: What is your determination of the total amount of damages sustained 
by the counter-claimants: 
Answer: "",$=======
 
Finally, you should sign the verdict as explained in another instruction."
 
IDJI 1.43.1. Instruction on special verdict form
 
GIVEN:
 
REFUSED: _
 
MODIFIED: _
 
COVERED:
 
OTHER: 
--­
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS -116 
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__  
__  
 
-
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
 
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an 
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G. 
MAILE, IV. and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE, 
husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants, 
v. 
CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, flkla 
CONNIE TAYLOR, an individual; DALLAN 
TAYLOR, an individual; R. JOHN 
TAYLOR, an individual; CLARK and 
FEENEY, a partnership; PAUL T. CLARK, 
an individual; THEODORE L. JOHNSON 
REVOCABLE TRUST, an Idaho revocable 
trust; JOHN DOES I -JOHN DOES X; AND 
ALL PERSONS IN POSSESSION OR 
CLAIMING ANY RIGHT TO 
POSSESSION. 
Defendants/Counter-Claimants. 
Case No. CV-OC-0723232 
SPECIAL VERDICT 
"We, the jury, answer the questions submitted to us in the special verdict as follows: 
QUESTION NO. 1. Did the Counter-Defendants commit an abuse of process? 
ANSWER: Yes No 
QUESTION NO.2. Did the Counter-Defendants commit a tortious interference with a 
prospective economic advantage? 
ANSWER: Yes No 
QUESTION NO.3. Was there proof establishing a claim of "Equitable Estoppel" against 
the counter-claimants? 
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ANSWER: Yes No 
QUESTION NO.4. Was there proof establishing a claim of "Quasi-Estoppel" against the 
counter-claimants? 
ANSWER: Yes No 
QUESTION NO.5. Was there proof establishing a claim of "Judicial Estoppel" against 
the counter-claimants? 
ANSWER: Yes No 
QUESTION No.6: What is your determination of the total amount of damages sustained 
by the counter-claimants: 
Answer: -"',$======= 
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JUROR JUROR
 
JUROR JUROR
 
JUROR JUROR
 
JUROR JUROR 
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Christ T. Troupis, ISB # 4549 
TROUPIS LAW OFFICE 
1299 E. Iron Eagle, Ste 130 
PO Box 2408 
Eagle, Idaho 83616 
Telephone: 208/938-5584 
Facsimile: 208/938-5482 
Email: ctroupis@troupislaw.com 
Co-counsel for Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants 
JAN' 0 2011 
CHRISTOPHER O. RICH C 
ByJAMIe RANDAl I lerkI 
0EPIJTy nw.. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUJ'l"TY OF ADA
 
-- -----------c-----­
· BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an 
I, Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G. 
I MAILE, IV. and COLLEEN BIRCH­
MAILE, husband and wife,
 
Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants, 
· v. 
I CONNIE WRIGHT l'AYLOR, f/k/a 
, CONNIE TAYLOR, an individual; DALLAN 
· l'AYLOR, an individual; R. JOHN 
l'AYLOR, an individual; CLARK and 
• FEENEY, a partnership; PAUL T. CLARK, 
· an individual; THEODORE L. JOHNSON 
· REVOCABLE TRUST, an Idaho revocable 
i trust; JOHN DOES I -JOHN DOES X; AND 
I ALL PERSONS IN POSSESSION OR 
! CLAIMING ANY RIGHT TO 
· POSSESSION. 
Defendants/Counter-Claimants. 
----------~-l 
Case No. CV-OC-0723232 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO 
COUNTER-CLAIMANTS' MOTION IN 
LIMINE AND SUPPLEMENTAl. 
MOTION IN LIMINE 
The Counter-Defendants by and through their undersigned co-counsel of record provide 
this Memorandum Brief in Opposition to Counter-Claimants Motion in Limine and 
Supplemental Motion in Limine, as follows: 
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LEGAL ARGUMENT
 
A. Subjects of Counterclaimants' limine motion. 
Counterclaimants request limine orders for exclusion of evidence and/or argument in 
approximately 41 categories. They are summarized briefly as follows: 
1. Opinion testimony that the Court's ruling in this case on the issue of res judicata was in 
error. 
2. Opinion testimony that the court's ruling denying BerkshirelMailes' motions to 
dismiss and/or for summary judgment were in error. 
3. Mr. Maile's opinion that the appellate court will reverse the ruling on res judicata 
and/or find an exception based on perjury or fraud on the court. 
4. Mr. Runft opinion that Judge Wilper would not have ordered property restored to the 
trust without Taylor's misrepresentation of their status as beneficiaries of the trust. 
5. Mr. Runft's opinion that if Taylors were no longer beneficiaries, the judgment ordering 
the property restored to the trust was wrongfully obtained by their fraud and/or crimina.l 
misconduct. 
6. That the litigation privilege should apply as a defense in this case. 
7. Testimony about the Taylor v. McNichols lawsuit between Reed Taylor and John and 
Connie Taylor. 
8. Testimony as to when a claim for litigation misconduct accrues, and limitations of 
appellate review to areas ripe for judicial determination. 
9. Testimony that Taylors did not have the legal right to seek return of the Linder 
property to the trust. 
10. Mr. Maile's testimony that he interpreted the Supreme Court's decision in Taylor II 
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as holding that "Taylors had in fact disclaimed their entire interest in the trust" and were not 
beneficiaries of the trust. 
11. Mr. Runft's testimony that Taylors didn't retain any beneficial interest in the trust, 
and "committed an unlawful objective in having the property restored by misrepresenting their 
status as beneficiaries." 
12. Testimony that the refusal of the Court to award sanctions on Taylors' request 
justifies an inference that Counterdefendants' claims were not frivolous. 
13. Testimony as to the "custom and practice of attorneys in the State ofIdaho." 
14. Testimony as to the money invested by Berkshire in the property, and theories as to 
why Berkshire and Mailes were denied the remedy of unjust enrichment. 
15. Testimony that Berkshire paid for the land and the Trust waived its right to rescind 
the transacdtion, and Beth Rogers represented to Mailes and Berkshire that the Trust would stand 
by the contract. 
16. Testimony as to applicability ofjudicial estoppel. 
17. Testimony as to Counterdefendants' Second and Third Affirmative Defenses. 
18. Testimony about the value of the Linder property in 2002, 2004, and 2006. 
19. Testimony by Al Knudson about the construction loan obtained by Mailes in 2004. 
20. Testimony by Bart Harwood about the disclaimer agreement. 
21. Testimony by David Wishney about the 2002 purchase of the Linder prope:rty. 
22. Testimony by Phillip Collaer about the erroneous admission in appellate briefing that 
Maile had a conflict of interest in purchasing the Linder property. 
23. Testimony by Jack Gjording about the erroneous admission in appellate briefing that 
Maile had a conflict of interest in purchasing the Linder property. 
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24. Testimony by Imajean Hetherington about the value of the property in 2002. 
25. Testimony about the agreement or disagreement of other beneficiaries with the filing 
of the initial lawsuit against Berkshire and Mailes. 
26. Testimony about Ted Johnson's state of mind about sale of the property to :\1ailes. 
27. Testimony about communications between the trustees and beneficiaries of the trust 
and their attorneys. 
28. Testimony about communications prior to execution of the Disclaimer Agreement 
and surrounding the resignation of Beth and Andy Rogers. 
29. Testimony as to Helen Taylor's will. 
30. Testimony by Helen Taylor. 
31. Testimony about administration and distributions of the Trust. 
32. Advocacy by Mr. Maile during the trial. 
33. Any Cumulative evidence. 
34. Testimony about Reed and DaHan Taylors purchase of real property from the trust. 
35. Testimony that Counterclaimants recover would not subject to taxation. 
36. Amount of damages requested in pleadings. 
37. Comment on testimony of witnesses who will not or may not testify. 
38. Comment on financial status of a party to the suit. 
39. Comment on adverse effects on society of an award. 
40. Expert opinions not disclosed pursuant to the scheduling order. 
41. Comments on motions to exclude evidence. 
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B.Argument 
Counterclaimants contend that Counterdefendants committed abuse of process "by their 
conduct in Taylor v. Maile and in the present lawsuit." They allege that Counterdefendants 
"engaged in willful acts ...primarily to accomplish an improper purpose... " The Amended 
Counterclaim lists a number of specific acts, all of which occurred in the litigation. In their 
witness disclosure, Counterclaimants assert their intention to introduce evidence regarding 
events that occurred during the present and prior litigation, and to introduce valuations of the real 
property going back to 2004 as part of their damage claims. 
It appears from Counterclaimants' Motion in Limine that they view abuse of process and 
interference with economic advantage to be strict liability torts. That is, they argue that since this 
Court dismissed the Berkshire/Maile Complaint, ruling that it was barred by res judicata, that this 
fact, together with the fact that Berkshire/Maile filed a Notice of Lis Pendens and various other 
filings, are not only sufficient, but conclusive evidence proving their claims, and therefore, all 
that remains for them is to submit those facts and then prove up their damages. 
Neither of these tort claims are strict liability offenses. To prove their claim for abuse of 
process, Counterclaimants must show: 
1.	 Counterdefendants affirmatively used a legal process against counterclaimants; 
2.	 Primarily to accomplish an improper purpose outside of simply gaining an advantage 
in the underlying litigation, for which the process was not designed; and 
3.	 Harm has been caused to the Counterclaimants by misuse of the process external to 
the litigation that cannot be compensated in the underlying proceeding. 
The tort of intentional interference with prospective economic advantage requires proof 
that: 
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1.	 The defendant had an improper objective or purpose to harm the plaintiff; or 
2.	 The defendant used a wrongful means to cause injury to the prospective business 
relationship; and 
3.	 The defendant's actions caused damage to the plaintiffs prospective business 
relationship. 
In their motion in limine, Counterclaimants argue for application of a double standard -­
that the Court should allow Counterclaimants to present evidence about all of the 
Counterdefendants' actions in the prior litigation, claiming that each of these actions constituted 
an abuse of process and resulted in an interference with their prospective economic advantage, 
but at the same time preclude Counterdefendants from presenting any evidence in response to 
explain why they took the actions, their justification for the actions and state of mind as to the 
propriety and legality of those actions at the time that they took them, and present expE:rt 
testimony with respect to the legal basis of their reasoning at the time. Granting the 
Counterclaimants' motion on most of the requested areas of testimony would effectively convert 
the torts of abuse of process and intentional interference with prospective economic advantage to 
strict liability claims. If the actions are relevant to the claims, then the reasons underlying those 
actions are just as relevant to establish defenses to the claims. 
In their defense to these claims of abuse of process and intentional interference, 
Counterdefendants are entitled to present evidence on all factual issues and respecting all of the 
events that Counterclaimants introduce in their case in chief. Counterdefendants are entitled to 
present evidence on each of these factual issues to establish that they did not willfully act "to 
accomplish an improper purpose." As proof of these defenses, the following will be rdevant and 
material: (1) the subjective state ofmind of Counterdefendants at the time that they undertook 
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each of the acts that Counterclaimants complain of; (2) the reasons that Counterdefendants did 
each ofthe specific alleged acts, and (3) whether they reasonably believed these acts were 
justified under the circumstances, and (4) given the state of Idaho law at the time that t:ach act 
occurred, and the procedural posture of the litigation, whether Counterdefendants could 
reasonably entertain such beliefs, and (5) the absence of any ulterior or wrongful motive by 
Counterdefendants at the time that they undertook each of the complained of acts. 
If Counterclaimants do not present evidence regarding a particular act, 
Counterdefendants will have no need to introduce evidence to defend that act. However, it is 
impossible for us to predict what subjects the Court will allow Counterclaimants' case to cover. 
In response to Counterdefendants' motion in limine regarding the litigation privilege, 
Counterclaimants made the following argument: "If the litigation privilege does not apply, there 
can be no rational argument that Maile's actions in prior litigation are not directly relevant to the 
claims of abuse ofprocess and tortious interference with contract." 
While the motion in limine addresses 41 categories, the foregoing covers most of 
Counterclaimants' argument in support of their motion, including issues # 1,2,3,4,5,6,9, 10, 
11,13, 14, 15, 16, 17,20,22, and 23. 
Issues 1- 5. 
Counterclaimants seek to exclude expert testimony about the application of res judicata in 
this case. Counterclaimants claim that because the Court ruled that res judicata barred the 
Counterdefendants' complaint, that the filing was an abuse of process. Counterdefendants' 
experts will testify that at the time that the Counterdefendants' Complaint was filed in this case, 
that the application of the doctrine of res judicata to these facts was not clearly established, and 
that it was not umeasonable for Counterdefendants to conclude that res judicata did not preclude 
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their claims. That testimony is not contrary to this Court's ruling on res judicata or dismissal of 
the claims, and is relevant to the defenses asserted in this case because it bears on the willfulness, 
motives, and state of mind of the Counterdefendants in filing their complaint. 
Counterclaimants want the court to preclude Thomas Maile from testifying that he 
believes that the appellate court will reverse the Court's ruling on res judicata and/or the 
perjury/fraud exception to it. His subjective belief in the merits of his claims, to the extent that 
those beliefs motivated the actions that Counterclaimants contend were an abuse of process, is 
relevant. 
Counterclaimants want the court to preclude John Runft from testifying that Judge Wilper 
"would not have ordered the property restored to the trust" without Taylors active 
misrepresentation. This is a gross oversimplification of his expert testimony. Mr. Runft will 
testify that given the legal posture ofthe case at the time that the hearing on unjust enrichment 
was held, that the Taylors' misrepresentation of their status as beneficiaries and the Court's 
acceptance of that status caused the Court to reverse its prior ruling that Berkshire could pursue 
its claims for quasi-estoppel, allowing Taylors to rescind the transaction and limiting Berkshire's 
remedy to unjust enrichment. A hearing on the quasi estoppel claim was never allowed against 
the trust since the property had been restored to the trust independent of the action of the mailes 
and/or the trust. 
BerkshirelMailes were prevented from defending their right to retain title to the property 
as against the trust on the basis of quasi estoppel, which was previously authorized by Judge 
Wilper. That claim was supported by facts establishing their equitable claims -- they had paid the 
full purchase price, taken possession, and made improvements amounting to a detriment to 
MaileslBerkshire. These facts are relevant to establish extrinsic fraud by Taylors. The Mailes 
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were deprived of an opportunity to defend the claims affecting title by the trust as the Taylors 
perjury as to their status led to the entry ofjudgment on Beneficiaries claims instead of a 
judgment on the Trust's claims. The cases were consolidated and Taylors' asserting th(~mselves 
as beneficiaries deprived the defense to the trust's claims to title. This has nothing to do with 
unjust enrichment claims. 
Counterdefendants' expert witness disclosure stated that Mr. Runft would testify as 
follows: 
The witness will testify that without the Taylors active misrepresentation, Judge Wilper 
would not have ordered the property restored to the trust. Judge Wilper's Memorandum 
Decision and Order, on July 28, 2005 (attached to the Affidavit of Thomas Maile Part 2-Exhibit 
K), establishes that the trust could not rescind the transaction since the action of the trustee, Beth 
Rogers demonstrated the trust had waived its right to rescind the sales transaction. Judge Wilper 
had previously ruled that Berkshire Investment could pursue its claims for quasi and equitable 
estoppel and its claim of tortious interference with contract claim (Judge Wilper's Order 
Regarding Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, on February 13,2006). The trust could 
not have had the property restored as it waived that right to restore the real property to the trust 
and/or the claims of quasi estoppel would have been considered by the court. An unlawful 
objective was committed by the defendants in having the property restored by misrepresenting 
their status as beneficiaries before the court in January 2006. The plaintiffs were prevented from 
advancing to trial to show that the trust was estopped from claiming title and this constitutes a 
valid claim of extrinsic fraud. Fraud is extrinsic when it prevents a party from having his day in 
court. The plaintiffs were prevented from presenting their claim based on quasi estoppel to 
maintain title to the property. The plaintiffs were limited to their claim for money damages 
(unjust enrichment) for enhancement of value to the property only. 
Issue #6 That the litigation privilege should apply as a defense in this case. 
The litigation privilege applies to parties as well as their attorneys. Depending on the 
specific conduct that the Counterclaimants assert constituted an abuse of process, testimony that 
the Counterdefendants believed that conduct was privileged is relevant. 
Issue #7. Testimony about the Taylor v. McNichols lawsuit between Reed Taylor and John and 
Connie Taylor. 
Counterdefendants contend that they filed the lawsuit against Taylors for a proper 
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purpose and that their actions were reasonable. The Supreme Court's ruling in Taylor v.
 
McNichols supports that claim.
 
Issue #8.Testimony as to when a claim for litigation misconduct accrues, and limitations of
 
appellate review to areas ripe for judicial determination.
 
Counterdefendants contend that they reasonably believed that they had a right to file the 
lawsuit against Taylors, and that the prior Supreme Court decision did not bar the suit. Their 
state of mind is relevant in that regard as well as the existing law and/or goodfaith argument for 
the extension of law. 
Issue #9. Testimony that Taylors did not have the legal right to seek return of the Linder 
property to the trust. 
This evidence is relevant to the Counterdefendants subjective beliefs at the time that they 
filed their lawsuit against Taylors. The manner in which the Taylors obtained their judgment 
was based upon perjury and extrinsic fraud. The case of Taylor v. McNichols recognizes that 
attorneys and parties acting fraudulently or committing a crime gives rise to a new cause of 
action at the conclusion ofthe underlying case. 
Issue #10. Mr. Maile's testimony that he interpreted the Supreme Court's decision in Taylor II as 
holding that "Taylors had in fact disclaimed their entire interest in the trust" and were not 
beneficiaries of the trust. 
Mr. Maile's subjective belief and state of mind at the time that the suit was fikd against 
Taylors for abuse of process is relevant. 
Issue #11. Mr. Runft's testimony that Taylors didn't retain any beneficial interest in the trust, 
and "committed an unlawful objective in having the property restored by misrepresenting their 
status as beneficiaries." 
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Mr. Runft's expert opinion that a reasonable argument can be made in support of 
Maile/Berkshire's position and decision in filing the lawsuit against Taylors supports the defense 
that it was filed with a proper purpose. 
Issue #12. Testimony that the refusal ofthe Court to award sanctions on Taylors' request 
justifies an inference that Counterdefendants' claims were not frivolous. 
The fact that Judge Wilper and the Supreme Court both refused to award sanctions 
against BerkshirelMaile although asked to do so by Taylors for specific conduct during the 
litigation is material evidence on the issue whether their actions were legally authorized, or 
frivolous and supports the opinions that the filing of the claims against the counter-claimants was 
based upon meritorious claims and/or issues. 
Issue #13. Testimony as to the "custom and practice of attorneys in the State ofIdaho." 
To the extent that Taylors have admitted that they are not suing Tom Maile as 1m 
attorney, and this Court has so indicated in its prior rulings, testimony in this area may not be 
introduced. However, Counterdefendants should be permitted to respond to any testimony 
allowed by the Court from Taylors as to a reasonableness or lack of reasonableness of filing and 
pursuing the claims dismissed by this court standard of care for attorneys. 
Issue #14. Testimony as to the money invested by Berkshire in the property, and theories as to 
why Berkshire and Mailes were denied the remedy of unjust enrichment. 
BerkshirelMailes have not contended that they were denied the remedy of unjust 
emichment. They were denied the remedy of quasi-estoppel as against the Trust which was 
making a claim to the title, recovery for which is not dependent upon an increase in th{: value of 
the property from the investment. Quasi estoppel as allowed by Judge Wilper would have 
allowed an evaluation of the competing equities to the title. The Mailes were prevented from 
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defending the claims of title by the trust based upon quasi estoppel. Equitable considerations 
authorizing the remedy of quasi estoppel included the fact that Mailes paid the entire purchase 
price, took possession of the property and made improvements costing $250,000. All ofthese 
facts amounted to a detriment to Mailes and these facts are relevant to establish the basis for 
BerkshirelMailes' claims for extrinsic fraud. The Mailes were deprived of an opportunity to 
defend the claims affecting title by the trust as the Taylors perjury as to their status led to 
judgment on beneficiaries claims as opposed to a judgment on trust's claims. The cases were 
consolidated. Taylors asserted themselves as beneficiaries, which deprived Berkshire~..1ailes 
defense to the trust's claims to title. This has nothing to do with unjust enrichment claims This 
testimony supports the Counterdefendants' claim that they brought suit for damages against 
Taylors and their attorneys for a proper purpose based upon their belief that Taylors had engaged 
in extrinsic fraud which prevented BerkshirelMailes from having a trial on their quasi-estoppel 
claim. Counterdefendants also believed that they had the right under IRCP Rule 60(b), not barred 
by res judicata, to file a separate action against Taylors to seek equitable relief and damages 
based on that extrinsic fraud. The issue is not whether BerkshirelMailes were correct in those 
beliefs, but whether they entertained them at the time that the complaint was filed. Those beliefs 
negate the element of 'improper purpose' required in proof of an abuse ofprocess or interference 
with economic advantage claim. 
Issue #15. Testimony that Berkshire paid for the land and the Trust waived its right to rescind 
the transaction, and Beth Rogers represented to Mailes and Berkshire that the Trust would stand 
by the contract. 
This testimony supports the Counterdefendants' claim that they brought suit for damages 
against Taylors for a proper purpose. See Response to #14. 
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Issue #16. Testimony as to applicability ofjudicial estoppel. 
This testimony supports the Counterdefendants' claim that they brought suit for damages 
against Taylors for a proper purpose. See Response to #14. 
Issue #17. Testimony as to Counterdefendants' Second and Third Affirmative Defensl~s. 
Counterdefendants are entitled to introduce evidence on the facts supporting the claims 
that they filed against Taylors and their belief as to the viability oftheir claims, to the extent that 
Taylors assert the claims that Berkshire/Mailes did not file the claims with a proper purpose. See 
Response to #14. 
Issue #18. Testimony about the value of the Linder property in 2002, 2004, and 2006. 
We have moved in limine to preclude Taylors from introducing any evidence as to the 
value of the property, except for the period oftime from the issuance ofthe remittitur in Taylor 
II, which was April 15,2009, and the date that the lis pendens was removed, July 13,2:009. To 
the extent that this limitation is applied, valuations on other dates would not be relevant. 
Issue #19. Testimony by Al Knudson about the construction loan obtained by Mailes in 2004. 
This testimony forms the basis for Counterdefendants' quasi-estoppel claims which were 
not brought to a trial for the reasons set out in #14 above. Mr. Knudson will testify that the 
construction loan required the Mailes to incur expenses to complete the subdivision eVt~n in light 
of the Taylors' filing the 1st lawsuit and lis pendens. Mailes were forced to continue the 
development, and did so in reliance upon representations made by Beth Rogers (nominated 
successor's trustee) in 2003 that the Trust was standing by the real estate contract. Mailes had to 
invest an additional $250,000 in the property in addition to the purchase price. 
Issue #20. Testimony by Bart Harwood about the disclaimer agreement. 
Bart Harwood represented Beth Rogers. The basis of Counterdefendants' claims against 
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Taylors arose from their execution of the disclaimer agreement. Counterdefendants believed that 
Taylors perpetrated perjury and a fraud on the court that resulted in BerkshirelMailes' loss of the 
Linder Road property. That was the basis for their lawsuit against Taylors for equitable relief and 
their claim for damages. The facts regarding the disclaimer supported the Counterdefendants' 
beliefs that caused them to file the lawsuit, and support their claim that it was filed for a proper 
purpose. Bart harwood will provide testimony surrounding the purpose of the disclaimer 
agrement and whether the judicial admissions by the counter-claimants that Helen Taylor was 
the sole beneficiary of trust was consistent with the disclaimer agreement as negotigat~:d by and 
between the Taylor beneficiaries and his client Beth Rogers. 
Issue #21. Testimony by David Wishney about the 2002 purchase ofthe Linder property. 
We cannot predict what testimony Counterclaimants will be allowed to introduce on their 
claims. To the extent that they attempt to attack Thomas Maile by asserting that the transaction 
with Ted Johnson was not fair, testimony by third parties as to that transaction would be relevant. 
Issue #22. Testimony by Phillip Collaer. 
Mr. Collaer was one of the handling attorneys in Taylor v. Maile. To the extent that 
Taylors are allowed to argue and present evidence to support the claim that actions taken in that 
lawsuit by Counterdefendants constituted an abuse ofprocess, Mr. Collaer has knowledge ofthe 
facts relative to those actions and their proper purpose. Additionally, his testimony would be 
foundational as to how that case ended with a determination that IC §68-106 was violated. 
Issue #23. Testimony by Jack Gjording. 
Mr. Gjording will not be called as a witness. 
Issue #24. Testimony by Imajean Hetherington about the value of the property in 2002. 
Ms. Hetherington will not be called as a witness. 
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Issue #25. Testimony about the agreement or disagreement of other beneficiaries with the filing 
of the initial lawsuit against Berkshire and Mailes. 
Counterdefendants may call Beth Rogers to testify about the acts leading up to the 
execution of the disclaimer agreement and her contacts with Connie Taylor and the other Taylors 
with regard to their efforts to gain control ofthe Trust starting in 2003. It is Counterdefendants' 
contention that Connie Taylor worked to gain control ofthe trust and place John Taylor as 
trustee in place of Beth Rogers so that they could pursue the lawsuit against Berkshire/Mailes. 
Her testimony will also establish that the Taylors knew of the importance to gain beth rogers as 
trustee to join in the litigation as evidenced by the fact that the Taylors first lawsuit as 
beneficiaries was dismissed for lack of standing since the court ruled that the trustee was 
required to bring suit. Beth Rogers testimony is also important to establish the facts reIative to 
Counterdefendants' quasi-estoppel claim. 
Issue #26. Testimony about Ted Johnson's state of mind about sale of the property to MaBes. 
This testimony would be relevant only if the Court were to allow Taylors to introduce 
evidence or make the claim that Tom Maile took advantage ofTed Johnson with respect to the 
sale of the real property from the Trust. 
Issue #27. Testimony about communications between the trustees and beneficiaries of the trust 
and their attorneys. 
Bart Harwood will testify about the negotiations and execution of the disclaimt:r 
agreement, and its effect. He represented Beth Rogers. Taylors do not have standing to assert a 
privilege claim on her behalf. In addition there has been a request to preclude Connie Taylor as a 
witness. There is now new counsel who has filed his motion for limited admission to at::t as 
counsel for counter-claimants. The jury should consider some essential facts relating to Connie 
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Taylor that would require only limited testimony. Connie Taylor drafted the documents which 
her husband executed which amounted to perjury. These acts ultimately lead to the judgment on 
the beneficiaries' claims. She attended depositions were her clients made admissions under oath 
concerning the fact that Helen Taylor was to get any money or property from the underlying 
litigation. Connie Taylor dealt with the beneficiaries ofthe trust to obtain her husband's control 
over the trust. This enabled her husband to file a lawsuit on behalf of the trust while the Taylors' 
first lawsuit was dismissed by Judge Wilper. Her conduct and her testimony is relevant for the 
jury to consider relating to the basis of the good faith clams advanced by the Counterdefendants 
demonstrating there was no abuse ofprocess. Also see response to #20 
Issue #28. Testimony about communications prior to execution ofthe Disclaimer Agreement and 
surrounding the resignation of Beth and Andy Rogers. 
Beth Rogers may testify about the circumstances surrounding her resignation and her 
understanding of the effect of the disclaimer agreement on the interests of the Taylors as 
beneficiaries of the Trust. See Responses to #27 & 20. 
Issue #29. Testimony as to Helen Taylor's will. 
So long as Taylors are precluded from testifying that they acted on behalf of their mother 
and with her consent in pursuing the lawsuits, this testimony would not be relevant. However, to 
the extent that they do introduce such evidence, Helen Taylor's testimony and contents of her 
will would be relevant. 
Issue #30 Testimony by Helen Taylor. 
See above. See Response to #29 
Issue #31 Testimony about administration and distributions of the Trust. 
Distribution ofthe trust assets was made in violation of the express terms of tht;: trust. 
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Those facts show that Taylors disclaimed their interests as beneficiaries. The terms of the trust 
provided that Ted Johnson's siblings only received income of the trust during their lives with no 
right to invade the corpus of the trust. The Taylor brothers were beneficiaries of the corpus of the 
trust, but relinquished their entire beneficial interest in the trust and authorized disbursement of 
the trust corpus to their mother in exchange for the right to pursue the lawsuit as trustt:::es, and 
retaining only a liability to the trust, which was their agreement to indemnify the trust in the 
event that they lost the lawsuit against Berkshire/Mailes. See Response to #28, 27, 25, & 20. 
Issue #32 Advocacy by Mr. Maile during the trial. 
Mr. Maile is a witness and party in the case. He is represented by counsel who will 
handle all aspects of the trial. 
Issue #33 Any Cumulative evidence. 
The court does not have the ability to determine at this point in time what evidence is 
cumulative. Ruling on this motion should be reserved until evidence has been presented at trial. 
Issue #34 Testimony about Reed and Dallan Taylors purchase of real property from the 
trust. 
Counterdefendants cannot anticipate what evidence Taylors may introduce on their 
claims. If they assert that the price paid to the Trust by BerkshirelMailes was not fair, the 
subsequent sale ofproperty to Reed and Dallan Taylor by the trust without any appraisal would 
be relevant to that claim. 
Issue #35 Testimony that Counterclaimants recover would not subject to taxation. 
Issue #36 Amount of damages requested in pleadings. 
Issue #37 Comment on testimony of witnesses who will not or may not testify. 
Issue #38 Comment on financial status of a party to the suit. 
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Issue #39 Comment on adverse effects on society of an award.
 
Issue #40 Expert opinions not disclosed pursuant to the scheduling order.
 
Counterdefendants agree that expert witnesses should only be allowed to testif:y to the 
extent that either side has properly disclosed such expert in a timely manner and fully as required 
by the scheduling order. Counterdefendants have fully complied with the scheduling order by 
timely disclosing their expert witnesses and providing a complete description of their ,mticipated 
testimony. However, Counterclaimants have not done so with the exception ofD. Craig Lewis. 
The testimony of all other experts offered by Counterclaimants should therefore be excluded. D. 
Craig Lewis' testimony should be excluded for other reasons as set out in our motion in limine. 
Issue #41. Comments on motions to exclude evidence. 
RESPONSE TO SUPPLEMENTAL MOTION IN LIMINE 
Counterclaimants ask for exclusion ofevidence about the Petition for Appointment of 
Trustees dated November 15, 2004, contending that it was superseded by the amended petition of 
April 18, 2005. The relevance of this pleading in this case does not depend on whether the 
document continues to function as a pleading. Instead, its relevance is based on whether 
Counterdefendants believed that this filing evidenced an attempt to commit perjury and extrinsic 
fraud. In this case, the evidence is admissible to show that Counterdefendants' purpose in 
pursuing their complaint was proper in that they believed they had legal rights that were 
enforceable at the time that the complaint was filed. 
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Counterclaimants also ask for exclusion of evidence about the probate court hearings. The same
 
principles apply to that evidence as to the Petition noted above.
 
DATED this 10th day of January, 2011.
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CHRIST T. TR PIS, Co-counsel for 
Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants 
i 
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on this 10th day of January, 2010, I caused a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Memorandum in Opposition to CounterClaimants' Motion in Limine and 
Supplemental Motion in Limine to be delivered, addressed as follows: 
--,­
­ I 
I Connie W. Taylor I ( ) u. S. Mail ; 
Henderson Law Firm , (X) Facsimile Transmission 
900 Washington St. Suite 1020 I ( ) Hand Delivery 
Vancouver, Washington 98660 I ( ) Overnight Delivery 
., Facsimile: (360) 693-2911 I II 
I 
I, Mark Stephen Prusynski ( ) U. S. Mail 
!PO Box 829 (X) Facsimile Transmission 
Boise, ID 83701 ( ) Hand Delivery 
Facsimile: (208) 385-5384 ( ) Overnight Delivery 
Thomas G. Maile, IV. 
380 W. State Street ( ) U. S. Mail 
Eagle, Idaho 83616 I (X) Facsimile Transmission 
Facsimile: (208) 939-1001 Hand Delivery 
1 ( ) 
I ( ) Overnight Delivery 
"---- "---1_ 
t?v~ 
CHRIST T. TROLf~
 
Co-counsel for Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants
 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO COUNTERCLAIMANTS' MOTION IN LIMINE AND 
SUPPLEMENTAL MOTION IN LIMINE - PO 20 
002171
., 
I, 
: 
I, 
-
 
 
 
 
U
 
_____________________  
- 1 
: 
 
 
-

,c; 
NO. FILED "3 » : 
A.M_----P. M-::::...--­
CONNIE W. TAYLOR JAN 11 2011Henderson Law Firm, PLLC 
900 Washington Street, Suite 1020 CHRISTOPHER D. IRICH, ClerkVancouver, WA 98660 By BETH MAS1iERSTelephone 360.699.1530 OEPUTY 
Fax 360.693.2911 
ISBA No. 4837 
Attorneys for Johnson Trust, 
DaHan Taylor, and John Taylor 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
 
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an Idaho 
limited liability, and THOMAS G. MAILE, IV, and 
COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
YS.
 
CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, et al.
 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV OC 0723232 
MEMORANDUM OPPOSING COUNTER­
DEFENDANTS' MOTION IN LIMINE 
The Counterclaimants (Johnson Trust, Dallan Taylor, and John Taylor) submit the 
following memorandum in opposition to the motions in limine filed by the Counter-Defendants. 
1. Witness Sam Langston: The Counter-Defendant's Motion to exclude the testimony of 
Sam Langston states that "such testimony and/or the information is immaterial to these 
proceedings and lacks probative value and is not relevant." The memorandum, however, 
focuses solely on the timeliness of the disclosure of his appraisal; that is the argument this 
memorandum will address. 
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Mr. Langston's identify, qualifications, and the nature of his testimony were provided 
on October 27, and his report was provided on December 7. The Counter-defendant 
incorrectly state that they have not received supplemental discovery responses. In actuality, a 
supplemental response which specifically incorporated the witness disclosures was faxed to 
them on December 29, two days before the date on the Motion. A list of the law firms for 
which Mr. Langston has acted as a witness has also been provided by informal means. 
This court's scheduling order and I.R.C.P. 26(e)(l) require a party to "seasonably" 
supplement disclosures as to expert witnesses. Under subparagraph 4, the court may exclude 
the testimony of witnesses not disclosed by a required supplementation of the responses. The 
decision as to whether to exclude undisclosed expert testimony is committed to the sound 
discretion of the trial court. Schmechel v. Dille, 148 Idaho 176, 219 P.3d 1192 (2009). 
The cases in which expert testimony has been excluded all look to whether the other 
party was unfairly surprised, and whether the delay in disclosure prevented the other party 
from having time to prepare to cross examine the witness. Neither of those elements is present 
in this instance, and this is not a case which justifies the exclusion of this witness. The 
affidavit from Sam Langston shows that there was good cause for the delay in completing his 
appraisal, and indicates that it was provided on December 6. The Counter-Defendants 
acknowledge they received a copy of the appraisal on December 7, so there can be no 
argument that the disclosure was not "seasonably supplemented." 
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This case certainly is not analogous to the Radmer case upon which the Counter-
Defendants rely; in that case, the defendant did not learn until the first day of trial that one of 
the plaintiff's experts would be testifying to opinions that had not been disclosed. Nor is it like 
the Clark case, where the disclosure was not supplemented until several days into the trial. In 
the other case cited in support of this motion, Hopkins v. Duo-Fast, the trial court allowed a 
defense witness to express undisclosed opinions even though the plaintiffs were not advised of 
changes in the expert's anticipated testimony until the morning he was going to testify. 
Similarly, in Wiseman v. Schaffer, I the Court of Appeals affirmed a decision aJilowing two 
expert witnesses to testify who were disclosed for the first time in a supplemental discovery 
response only three days before trial. 
Most importantly, there is no factual support for counsel's statement that "your affiant 
has not been able to obtain any experts in opposition to the late disclosed experts.,,2 Mr. 
Langston's appraisal does not raise any issues which were not addressed in great detail by the 
Counter-Defendants' witness Maurice Clifton,3 including an in-depth analysis of the market for 
five-acre parcels in Eagle, how it has changed over the years, what comparable lots have sold 
for, and his opinion as to the present market value of the lots in question. Mr.Clifton's opinion 
is actually very close to Mr. Langston's valuation; Mr. Clifton will opine that these seven lots 
115 Idaho 537, 768 P.2d 900 (CI. App. 1989), 
2 Affidavit of Christ Troupis in support of motions in limine, paragraph 7, page 3. 
3 Certification to Opposing Counsel of Expert & Lay Witnesses, pages 8-15. 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION 
TO COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' 
MOTIONS IN LIMINE 3 
I 
002174
l
"have a present market value of between $90,000 and $125,000 each lot for a quick sale," and 
Mr.Langston placed a value on the entire parcel of $650,000. 
2. Witness Bob DeBolt. The October 27 disclosure indicated that Connie Shannahan of 
Coldwell Banker's realty would be testifying as to the information contained in the Coldwell 
Banker Real Estate Services Proposal dated January 12, 2010, a copy of which had been filed 
to opposing counsel as an attachment to her affidavit dated April 22, 2010. Because Ms. 
Shannahan is unable to be present at the trial, the broker in her office, Bob DeBolt, was 
substituted to testify to the exact same information. This change in witnesses was "seasonably 
supplemented" on December 9, 2010. 
Because Mr. DeBolt's testimony will be the same as that of Ms. Shannahan, there is no 
basis for excluding his testimony. See Vannoy v. Uniroyal Tire CO.,4 in which the Idaho 
Supreme Court stated: 
We also find no error in the trial court's allowance of Dr. Surbaugh to testify in place of 
plaintiff's treating physician who was unavailable at trial. Dr. Surbaugh was an associate 
of plaintiff's treating physician, and his testimony was offered as being substantially the 
same as the treating physician's testimony would be, and further testifying from the same 
medical records which the treating physician would have testified from. 
The Counter-Defendants certainly cannot argue that they are prejudiced by this change in 
witness, or that there has been an unfair surprise. 
3. Witness Connie Shannahan. The first complaint about the disclosure for Ms. 
Shannahan is that it merely provided her name and "a short, vague, potential conclusory 
statement regarding the expected experts' opinions contained in her affidavit previously provided 
4 III Idaho 536, 544, 726 P.2d 648 (1985) 
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to this court on April 22, 2010." This is not accurate; the disclosure stated she would testify as 
to the infonnation contained in the Real Estate Services Proposal which was attached to her 
affidavit. That proposal is a 37 page document which contains much of the same infonnation as 
is contained in the disclosure for the Counter-Defendants' expert witness, Maurice Clifton. 
The second complaint is that there was no opinion provided relating to the market value 
of the real property "for the relevant periods of time," just the reference to a "range of listing 
prices." The report covers the sale of comparable lots from January 2005 through January 12, 
20 I0, which is essential to show the damage to the Taylors from their inability to (1) accept the 
$1.8 million offer they received in September 2005 and/or (2) actively market the property. The 
Counter-defendants may have a different theory as to what time period is "relevant," but that is 
an argument which goes to the weight, not the admissibility, of this testimony. It is a rather odd 
argument, though, because the detailed infonnation contained in this report is very similar to the 
testimony which they propose to elicit from Mr. Clifton, who makes repeated references to the 
range of prices for similar lots in the Eagle area and a variety of different opinions as to potential 
listing and possible sale prices for the Linder Road lots. 
The third complaint is that we have not provided infonnation on qualifications, fees, prior 
testimony or publications. We have requested that infonnation from Mr. DeBolt and it will be 
provided immediately when received; however, it is frequently difficult to obtain such 
infonnation from witnesses who are not in the business as testifying as experts. They cite no 
cases in which a late disclosure of background infonnation has resulted in the exclusion of a 
witness. 
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4. "Expert and Lay testimony Re: claims against Counter-Defendants." This motion 
seeks to exclude any opinions as to the reasonableness of Mr. Maile's filing of the Berkshire suit 
and/or the actions taken in Judge Wilper's proceedings, arguing that it invades the province of 
the jury's functions. This motion is quite peculiar in light of the fact that the Counter-
Defendants have indicated that both John Runft5 and Thomas Maile6 will provide extensive 
testimony and opinions that Mr. Maile's conduct was "allowed," was "acceptable," was 
"reasonable," was "authorized," was "within the acceptable standard," was "appropriate," was 
"required," and was "reasonably supported." 
The memorandum in support of this motion consists of a six page quotation from a 1998 
federal district court case, Kidder, Peabody v. JAG, 7 which included an abuse of process claim. 
In its defense, Kidder, Peabody claimed that it had acted on the advice of counsel, and disclosed 
as an expert witness a law professor who intended to testify that Kidder, Peabody was reasonable 
in relying on that advice. The court excluded the testimony because it felt that the real question 
was whether the client had acted in good faith or with malice, and the jury would not be assisted 
by expert opinion testimony. 
This case is distinguishable from Kidder because the "client" is also an attorney, with 
unique duties and obligations which are beyond the knowledge of lay persons. The trial will 
involve an analysis of conduct in two different cases, with two appeals, one trial, numerous 
motions, and many decisions. Expert testimony is absolutely necessary to help the jury 
understand terms and concepts which are well outside the knowledge of a lay person. Because of 
5 Certification to Opposing Counsel of Expert & Lay Witnesses, pages 2 - 8 
6 Certification to Opposing Counsel of Expert & Lay Witnesses, pages 15 - 16 
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Mr. Maile's status as an attorney, the reasonableness of his conduct must be analyzed by persons 
with qualifications in the legal field. 
Counsel has been unable to locate any abuse of process cases other than Kidder in which 
a legal expert was not allowed to testify under a 702-704 analysis. For example, in the very 
recent 2009 Washington case Hough v. Stockbridge,8 two attorneys were allowed to testify as 
expert witnesses about proper procedures, proper basis for motions, and express an opinion about 
whether Mr. Hough had complied with civil discovery rules. See also Yater v. Coy,9, in which 
the defendant was an attorney accused of abuse of process for filing a claim that had no factual 
basis. The attorney filed a motion for summary judgment which was support by the: affidavit of 
an attorney, who express the expert opinion that the lawyer's conduct was reasonablle as well as 
procedurally and substantively proper. The trial court's order granting summary judgment was 
affirmed by the Indiana Court of Appeals, which noted that the plaintiffs had jailed to counter 
the defense expert by presenting evidence that no competent and reasonable attomey familiar 
with the law of the forum would have considered the claim worthy of litigation, or that the 
attorney was acting with ulterior motive when filing the suit. 
The issues in this case are analogous to legal malpractice cases, III which expert 
testimony is almost always mandatory. See, for example, the Idaho Court of Appeals decision 
in Jarman v. Hale, 10 in which the Court cited Annot. 14 A.L.R.4th 170 (1982) for the proposition 
that "A lay witness does not have the experience, knowledge and wisdom to opinionate on the 
7 S.D.N.Y. 1998) 
8 152 Wash.App. 328, 216 P.2d 1077 (2009) 
9681 N.E.2d 232, 234 (Indiana, 1997)
 
10 J 12 Idaho 270, 273, 73 J P.2d 813, 816 (et. App. 1986)
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complexities of trial practice ... " The expert testimony must, however, relate to a disputed 
factual issue, rather than merely being legal argument. Jordan v. Beeks, 135 Idaho 586, 21 P.3d 
908 (2001). 
I.R.E. 704 allows expert testimony, by opinion or inference, which embraces an ultimate 
issue to be decided by the trier of fact. The Counter-Defendants' own disclosure recognizes that 
the question of whether Mr. Maile's conduct was reasonable or appropriate is relevant in this 
case. That goes directly to the issue of whether his use of the legal process was proper in the 
regular course of proceedings. They certainly can't be seriously arguing that Professor Lewis 
may not testify to the very matters they plan to argue so vociferously. The jury will be left with 
the role of deciding which of the conflicting testimony to believe, and the ultimate question of 
whether Mr. Maile's conduct was done for an improper purpose or by improper means. 
5. Idaho State Bar Complaint. Taylors have the burden of showing that Mr. Maile's 
Conduct was wrongful (i.e. had an ulterior, improper objective or was done by improper 
means).ll Because the Idaho Supreme Court has recognized that "what motivates a person to 
act seldom is susceptible of direct proof,"l2 Idaho has specifically recognized that interference 
can be "wrongful" by reason of a statute or other regulation, or a recognized rule of common 
law, or an established standard of trade or profession. 13 
II Idaho First Nat'! Bank v. Bliss Valley Foods, Inc., 121 Idaho 266, 286, R24 P.2d R41, 861 (1991); Commercial
 
VentI/res, Inc. v. Rex M. & Lynn Lea Family Trust, 145 Iduho 20R, 217,177 !'.3d 955,964 (2008) Badell v. Beeks.
 
115 Idaho 101, 104, 765 P.2d 126, 129 (1998)
 
12 Highland Enterprises v. Barker, 133 Idaho 330 at 340.
 
13 Idaho First Nat. Bank v. Bliss Valley Foods, Inc, 121 Idaho 266, 285, 824. P.2d 841,860 ((1991).
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Taylors' position is that Mr. Maile's conduct has been motivated, in part, by the ulterior 
motive or improper purpose of forestalling a disciplinary action by the Idaho State Bar. He is 
unlikely to admit that, so it will have to be established through inference. They will present 
evidence of wrongfulness through testimony by Professor Craig Lewis and rebuttal testimony of 
Leland Ripley that Mr. Maile's conduct has failed to comply with the standard for attorneys, 
including the court rules and the rules of professional conduct. This is directly allowed by the 
Idaho First Nat. Bank v. Bliss decision, and does not amount to attempting to bring a civil suit 
for violation of a rule. John Taylor will testify that he filed a grievance with the Idaho State Bar 
in 2005, and that the Bar did not file its complaint until 2009, after the Idaho Supreme Court had 
issued its second decision and this Court dismissed Mr. Maile's complaint. Mr. Ripley will also 
testify as to the IBCR which allows the Bar to suspend a disciplinary proceeding when litigation 
is ongoing, and that many attorneys who are facing disciplinary proceedings raise the fact that 
litigation is still pending to forestall the Bar. 
The Idaho State Bar Complaint is, therefore, extremely relevant and probative on the 
issue of whether Mr. Maile's conduct was undertaken for an improper purpose or by improper 
means. The fact that the Bar is recommending a suspension gives him substantial incentive to 
keep the litigation churning. How else can you explain why an attorney would appeal a decision 
which was based on facts to which there was no dispute (which in fact simply complied with the 
directive of the Supreme Court in Taylor 1), pursue claims which had no legitimate basis, file 
duplicative and uniformly unsuccessful motions and repeated requests to reconsider every ruling 
against him, and basically do everything within his power to drag this litigation out for over 
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seven years (so far), including filing a second lawsuit which was barred by the most elemental 
legal principles? 
Where evidence has substantial probative value on the issue on which is it introduced and 
that issue is genuinely in dispute, it should be allowed. 14 As to the argument that the Complaint 
is prejudicial, unfortunately the truth frequently does not put us in a favorable light. The 
question is whether it is unduly prejudicial, which in this case it is not. Any potential prejudice 
can be handled by advising the jury that the evidence is being admitted for a limited purpose, that 
Mr. Maile has denied the Complaint, and that a final determination has not yet bt:::en reached. 
The Complaint could be used for illustrative purposes only as the witnesses testify, and not 
transmitted to the jury room. 
6. Damages. 
a. Claims in Taylor v. Maile. The Counter-Defendants have filed a motion in 
limine arguing that there is no relevance to the facts, allegations and contentions from Taylor v. 
Maile prior to the Amended Complaint. On the issues of damages, however, they take the 
opposite position and argue that the remedies sought in the initial pleadings should somehow 
limit the damages sought in this case. They cite no legal authority for this position. 
There is no relevance to deposition testimony taken over six years ago, nor to the 
damages sought in the initial Complaint in the first lawsuit. It is incorrect to state that Judgment 
was entered in favor of Taylors by Judge Wilper for rescission; the truth is that the Judgment was 
entered because the purchase agreement was found to be void ab initio because of the lack of 
14 Watson v. Navistar Int'! TrallSp. Corp., 121 Idaho 643,827 P.2d 656 (1992).
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court approval. There is no authority cited for the position that damages claimed prior to the date 
of remand are barred; the prior suit did not address the current counterclaims. 
b. Time period. Counter-Defendants' request that the Court limit the damage 
evidence to the time period from February to August of 2009. This request is based on their oft-
repeated position that the abuse of process claim is based solely on the filing of lis pendens. 
That is not, and never has been, accurate. They point to a single paragraph from the Amended 
Counterclaim, and ignore the fact that the remaining nine paragraphs state broad allegations as to 
conduct undertaken for an improper purpose in both the current lawsuit15 and in Taylor v. 
Maile. 16 
c. Lis pendens. This is a red herring. The Taylors' claims are based on Mailes' 
conduct in continuing to assert an ownership interest in the Linder Road propeliy after the 
December 23, 2005 opinion in Taylor I. They have never been based solely on the existence of 
Maile's lis pendens. Their insistence in focusing solely on the lis pendens is like dancing 
maniacally around a single tree and ignoring the rest of the forest. Nevertheless, the fact that 
the lis pendens in the prior action was allowed to remain in place during the appl~al does not 
answer the question of whether, given the Supreme Court's opinion in Taylor I, Mr. Maile's 
continued efforts to claim ownership of the property were not proper in the regular course of the 
proceeding and were pursued for an improper purpose, which is the issue in this case. 
It is, however, incorrect to state that the vendee's lien creates an ownership interest in the 
property. That statement is, in fact, directly contrary to Idaho law. The Idaho Supreme Court 
15 Paragraphs 2(a), (b), and 0) Amended Counterclaim dated May 28, 2010. 
16 Paragraphs 2(c) though 0), Amended Counterclaim.
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has ruled that a lien creates a personal property right, not an interest in real property. Under 
Idaho law, a lien is a charge upon property to secure payment of a debt and transfers no title to 
the property subject to the lien. I.C. § 45-109; I.C. § 45-101. Chavez v. Barrus, 146 Idaho 212, 
221, 192 P.3d 1036, 1045 (2008), citing Middlekauff v. Lake Cascade, Inc., 103 Idaho 832, 834, 
654 P.2d 1385, 1387 (1982); 51 Am.Jur.2d Liens § 2 (stating that a lien confers no ownership 
interest). The Counter-Defendants incorrectly argue that they "have the right to pursue a 
foreclosure of their vendee's lien." Judge Wilper specifically ruled that they do NOT have that 
right as long as they continue to seek to have his judgment set aside in a collateral proceeding, 
and called their efforts "disingenuous."17 
While the simple act of recording a lis pendens does not support a slander of title claim, 
maintaining a "wrongful" lis pendens when there is no legitimate claim to ownership of the 
property has been found to support claims for abuse of process and intentional interference. 
Hewitt v. Rice, 154 P.3d 408 (Colo. 2007). 
d. Wrongfulness of conduct on intentional interference claim. This argument is, 
In essence, a third motion for summary judgment on the counterclaim for intentional 
interference with economic expectancy. Counter-Defendants request that this Court make a 
determination of "what constitutes wrongful conduct," then limit the evidence to th{l question of 
whether the conduct occurred and whether there are defenses which mitigate it or justify it. 
The problem with this position is that it completely removes the element which looks to 
the objective or purpose of the conduct. Idaho courts have ruled that the wrongfulness of 
17 A copy of the March 25, 2010 order and the bankers' statements upon which it was based were attached as 
Exhibit A to the April 28, 2009 Affidavit of Counsel. 
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intentional interference with a prospective economic expectancy may be shown by proof that 
either (1) the Counter-defendant had an improper objective or purpose to harm the 
Counterclaimants; or (2) the Counter-defendant used a wrongful means to cause injury to the 
prospective business relationship. Idaho First Nat'l Bank v. Bliss Valley Foods, Inc., 121 Idaho 
266,286,824 P.2d 841, 861 (1991); Commercial Ventures, Inc. v. Rex M & Lynn Lea Family 
Trust, 145 Idaho 208, 217, 177 P.3d 955, 964 (2008). The wrongfulness can corne from the 
actor's intention, not soley from the conduct. Idaho cases have long recognized that intent is a 
question of fact for the jury.18 
The Carter case upon which the Counter-Defendants pin their argument is an anomaly. 
It was a probate case in which the judge submitted questions to an advisory jury; one of the 
questions submitted was whether Mrs. Carter's intentional interference was wrongful. No jury 
instructions were requested, nor were any given on the definition of what could or could not be 
considered as a wrongful act. From the opinion, it does not appear that there was an allegation or 
any proof that Mrs. Carter had an improper objective or purpose to harm the opposing party, and 
her conduct was limited to seeking a determination of the validity of the trust. The judge, in 
electing not to follow the advisory jury, noted that "the definition of what could be considered 
wrongful is a question of law.,,19 In affirming the ruling, the Supreme Court speciJically noted 
"The issue of whether or not the actions complained of are or are not 'wrongful' in this context is 
for the court to determine in defining the issues, and would normally have been included in the 
18 Urry v. Walker and Fox Masonry Contractors, 115 Idaho 750, 769 P.2d 1122 (1989); Sohn v. Foley, 125 Idaho 
168, 868 P.2d 496, (et. App. 1994) 
19 Carter v. Carter, 143 Idaho 373, 146 P.3d 639, 647, 648 (2006) 
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instructions." Id. 
This case is very different from Carter. Here, there are allegations that the interference 
was wrongful because it done for an improper objective or purpose to harm, and jury instructions 
on the legal definition of "wrongfulness" have been requested. Whether interference was for 
an improper purpose is uniformly recognized to be a question of fact. See, for example, Gillmor 
v. Family Link, LLC, 224 P.3d 741, 2010 WL 114814, 647 Utah Adv. Rep. 3,2010; Young v. 
Allstate Ins. Co., 119 Hawai'i 403, 198 P.3d 666 (2008); Awakuni v. Awana, 115 Hawai'i 126, 
165 P.3d 1027 (2007); Cascade Ambulance Service, Inc. v. City ofBellingham, 113 Wash.App. 
1054, (Wash.App. Div. I, 2002). Idaho law does not require a showing of conduct which is 
"independently wrongful," and it is improper to suggest that this court adopt that as an element 
of intentional interference claims simply because the Counter-Defendants think "the same 
principles should apply in Idaho." This is particularly true in light of the fact that the California 
case cited deals with negligent, not intentional, interference. 
The other big difference between the instant matter and the facts in Carter is the question 
of the legitimacy of the underlying claim. The Court in Carter noted, "In this case, it is obvious 
that Neta had her own expectancy, and her own interests to advance and protect in the matter. It 
is not a tort where one acts to protect her own economic interests, even if there is interference 
with the contract expectancy of another. .." Id. In the present case, the wrongful interference 
occurred after the Supreme Court issued its decision in Taylor I on December 23, 2005. That 
decision noted that Maile's brief on appeal had pointed out the conflicting interests among the 
classes of beneficiaries, and stated unequivocally that: 
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Where a trustee has an individual interest in the trust that poses a conflict in the exercise 
of a trust power, such as the power to close a sale of real property, "the power may be 
exercised only by court authorization ..." Idaho Code § 68-108(b). There is no indication 
in the record that the Rogers obtained court approval for the sale and one could 
reasonably infer that they did not, since the sale occurred just one week after Mr. 
Johnson's death.... Here, the Mailes are alleged to have known all of the facts because of 
Mr. Maile's position as attorney and realtor for both parties and purchaser of the property. 
Under the allegations, he and his associates could not be considered bona fide purchasers 
for value. The remedy provided for under the foregoing authorities is imposition of a 
constructive trust. .. 20 
From the date of this opinion forward, Mr. Maile had no legitimate factual or legal basis 
to claim an ownership interest in the real property. He himself had pointed out that the trustee 
had a conflict of interest, which he was in a unique position to know as the attorney who had 
drafted the trust agreement. There was no dispute that court approval was not obtained, and 
there is no dispute that Mr. Maile was aware of those facts. He had no legitimate claim to 
ownership of the property, which would support a jury finding that his asserting such a claim 
was wrongful. 
e. Damages after release of lis pendens. There is no dispute as to this issue; Sam 
Langston will testify as to the value of the Linder Road property as of the date the lis pendens 
were finally released, and no claim will be made for reduction in the value of the property after 
that date. 
f. Damages arising from vendee's lien. The Taylors do not expect to claim any 
specific damages solely stemming from the vendee's lien, but will argue that the efforts to 
20 Taylor v. Maile, 142 Idaho 253, 259-60, 127 P.3d 156, 162-63 (2005) 
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foreclose that lien while concurrently seeking to set aside the judgment upon which it was based 
is part of the wrongful conduct of the Counter-Defendants. This is an entirely different issue 
from a court's decision of whether to assess sanctions for a Rule 11 violation on a single motion. 
g. Attorneys fees as damages. We agree that it is not proper to file an independent 
action seeking to recover fees and costs incurred in an earlier lawsuit, as stated in Losser v. 
Bradstreet.21 That principal would prohibit Taylors from seeking an award of fees incurred in 
Taylor v. Maile, and they are not making such a claim. It does not, however, prevent them from 
seeking the fees incurred in defending themselves in the present litigation as an element of 
damages for abuse of process and intentional interference with economic advantage. Those 
costs and attorneys fees were incurred in the present matter, not in an earlier lawsuit. 
7. Prior allegations. Taylors agree that their March 9, 2006 Amended Complaint in 
Taylor v. Maile superseded the allegations in their prior Complaint; however, many of those 
same allegations were litigated as part of the affirmative defense of unclean hands im the unjust 
enrichment trial. Taylors do agree, however, that the value of the Linder Road property at the 
time of Mailes' purchase became moot, given the basis for voiding the contract, and do not 
intend to offer evidence on that issue. 
21 145 Idaho 670,183 P.3d 758 (2008).
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Under the same analysis, the filing of the Taylors' Amended Petition on Apri118, 2005 in 
the Johnson Trust probate superseded the petition dated November 14, 2004, and no testimony 
should be allowed on the earlier petition.22 
It should be noted that the Counter-Defendants' memorandum on this issue once again 
misstates the holding in Taylor II as ordering "that the property be restored to the trust because 
of the lack of notice to the Taylor beneficiaries." There was absolutely no discussion of any kind 
as to notice to the benneficiaries" The Mailes' purchase contract was voided because they 
acquired the property with actual knowledge of the fact that the transaction had not been 
approved by the court as required under Idaho Code 68-108. 
8. Desires and/or opinions of Helen Taylor. 
The Supreme Court has already ruled in Taylor II that Helen Taylor's children reserved 
their interest in the Linder Road property and that athey had the right to pursue the action 
seeking to recover title to the property. That ruling is the law of the case, and this Court has 
already ruled that the Counter-Defendants are estopped from attempting to raise that issue again. 
There is no ambiguity as to the agreement, and therefore no need to interpret it or look to the 
intent or understanding of the parties. For these reasons, the Counterclaimants agree that there is 
no relevance to Helen Taylor's opinions and understandings as to the Trust and/or the Disclaimer 
Agreement. However, if the Counter-Defendants are allowed to in any way argue or infer that 
Helen Taylor's children do not have an ongoing interest in that real property, it will be necessary 
22 Once an amended pleading is filed, it supersedes the original and causes it to cease to function as a 
pleading. Ernst v. Hemenway, 120 Idaho 941,947,821 P.2d 996, 1002, citing People v. Hunt, 1 
Idaho 433, 436 (1872). 
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to set the record straight. This issue is discussed in more detail in the Taylors' motion in limine, 
paragraph lee) on page 5, and paragraph l(t) on page 6. 
DATED this 10th day of January, 2011. 
HENDERSON LAW FIRM, PLLC 
'\ 
( 
" : 
By 
Connie W. Taylor, a member of the fii)11. 
Attorneys for Counterclaimants. , ) 
"-~/ 
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the -lD- day of January, 2011 I caused to be served a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Thomas G. Maile, IV U.S. Mail 
380 West State Street Hand Delivered 
Eagle, ID 83616 Overnight Mail 
Telecopy (FAX) (208) 939-1001 
Mr. Christ Troupis U.S. Mail 
Attorney at Law Hand Delivered 
PO Box 2408 Overnight Mail 
Eagle, ID 83616 Telecopy (FAX) (208) 938-5482 
Mark Prusynski U.S. Mail 
MOFFATT THOMAS Hand Delivered 
101 S Capitol Blvd., 10th Floor Overnight Mail 
PO Box 829 
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Telecopy (FAX) (208) 385-5384 
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Facsimile: 208/938-5482 
Email: ctroupis@troupislaw.com 
Co-counsel for Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants 
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A.M._ FIL~.~~ _ 
JAN 12 2011 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
 
~ERKSHlRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an 
II Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G. 
! MAILE, IV. and COLLEEN BIRCH­
: MAILE, husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants, 
Iv. 
i CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, f/k/a 
CONNIE TAYLOR, an individual; DALLAN 
TAYLOR, an individual; R. JOHN 
TAYLOR, an individual; CLARK and 
FEENEY, a partnership; PAUL T. CLARK, 
an individual; THEODORE L. JOHNSON 
" REVOCABLE TRUST, an Idaho revocable 
I trust; JOHN DOES I -JOHN DOES X; AND 
ALL PERSONS IN POSSESSION OR 
CLAIMING ANY RIGHT TO 
I POSSESSION. 
Defendants/Counter-Claimants. 
Case No. CV-OC-0723232 
AFFIDAVIT OF CHRIST TROUPIS 
IN SUPPORT OF MOTION IN 
LIMINE 
---------------~~~~~~~~~-------~-
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss: 
County of Ada) 
CHRIST T. TROUPIS, being duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says: 
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- - - -------- - - - - - - --~--------------- -------- - ---
 
1.	 Your Affiant is the co-counsel of record for Berkshire Investments, LLC, Thomas G. 
Maile, IV., and Colleen Birch-Maile in the above captioned matter. That the information 
and facts set forth herein are based upon your affiant's personal knowledge and/or 
observations and can testify as to the truth of the matters asserted herein if called upon as 
a witness at the trial of this matter. That your affiant provides this affidavit in support of 
the motion in limine filed herein. 
2.	 That attached hereto as Exhibit "A" is a true and correct copy of the contract executed by 
Connie Taylor, on behalf of the Counter-claimants, with the appraiser Sam Langston 
dated October 20, 2010. 
3.	 Your Affiant never consented, authorized or led opposing counsel to believe that any 
discovery deadlines would be extended, enlarged or modified. Your Affiant never 
received a proposed stipulation to modify the stipulated scheduling orders and your 
affiant never authorized an extension of any discovery responses relating to the: disclosure 
of experts or facts and opinions relating to the same. Also, your affiant never requested 
opposing counsel to extend Counter-Defendants' stipulated deadlines. 
4.	 Your Affiant has reviewed, ordered and generally been involved with clients and 
participated in the ordering of commercial real estate appraisals. That based upon such 
professional history of more than 30 years in the practice of law, your affiant believes 
that it was extremely unrealistic to expect an appraisal to be completed within nine or ten 
days. 
DATED this 11 th day of January, 2011. 
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CHRIST T. TROU;r=
 
Attorney for Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants
 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me, a Notary Public in and for said State, this 
11 th day of January, 2011. 
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""""",I HEREBY CERTIFY That on this 11 th day of January, 2011, I caused a true and correct 
copy ofthe foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF CHRIST TROUPIS IN SUPPORT OF MOTIONS IN 
LIMINE to be delivered, addressed as follows: 
I Connie W. Taylor U. S. Mail 
Henderson Law Firm Facsimile Transmission 
r
I ~xl 
I 900 Washington 81. Suite 1020 I ( ) Hand Delivery 
Vancouver, Washington 98660 ( Overnight Delivery I ) 
Facsimile: (360) 693-2911 , 
I 
! Mark Stephen Prusynski 
I PO Box 829 I 
( ) 
(X) 
U. S. Mail 
Facsimile Transmission 
• Boise, ID 83701 ( ) Hand Delivery 
Phone: (208) 345-2000 ( ) Overnight Delivery 
I Facsimile: (208) 385-5384 
I 
I 
Thomas G. Maile, IV. 
I, 380 W. State Street 
I Eagle, Idaho 83616 
() U. S. Mail J[I () Facsimile Transmission (X) Hand Delivery 
I Facsimile: (208) 939-1001 I() 0 'hDl'
_____---"- v_ernig t e Ivery _ 
Co-counsel for Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants 
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october 20- 2010
.. '. .. __ : 1 
h-1.s, Connie Tav1ar 
... .. ..;.;". :"
 
,Heilder&CIl.Law
 
.. ~W~~~~~;~~,Suit~l(t20 'anc~)l.n(,.rr •~. > ~,
 
Ph.. 36(1)99.1530 .....
 
·.£Onrlie~-ttM!prt~~il;C?m 
Re:	 Engagelnent Agreemertt cmFatrpeldEstatesSubdivisionJocatednortI1.of
 
BeaC:onLightRo..dandeast9fLimlerRoad;:has:le,idaho;.
 
Dear J\ifs, Taylor: 
Thahkyotlfotse~ting(;itltfuriitciprovideappraisa1Services:tp YPt.t .TIle 
r~:-= Ofthis lettcr'is tOcmlii r!rl]he~(jpeat<.dterms9fotirell:gagemenf:,a$ . 
l~Youha,\1easkedto develop an opinion <ffthemarket: valut': ()fthe 
.abovereferencedpi-opertv(&e "Property") ill accort.hmce o/It.ljIJnuorm 
Standa-rds ofProfessional Appra1salPractke ("USPA-P").UnIessother..lise set 
forfhin the ilpp1~~lisal.rep()rt~tlie w~d<etvalue$hall beasdef1l1ed:in USPAP, 
2 . ·Y()Jjhavt'ask¢4·U?Joprepare<l$lllmiulry,lrppl'aisriJP.e,x,rtas. 
~~~,,~,I:n.t:t::~J"X;~)r.~·,4{~p:~~fZ~~~~;~=::·~~~~·~'~·~~ ~
 
the data.~a.'>OrJngandtirialysisusedirrtheappJ'ai'Kd 'prtJ<;~todeveh')pJ he 
(}pjnion{)fv~l1Jf;:>t '.SupportiligdcCll.Il1entation.eonceinL."1gtheda~Fre~}aingand 
analysiSwil1 beret,iillled in{JU1' tiLe. The depth ofdtSCll$..~ioncontaine<i.inthb 
repmt is speqillc tothe.ne:ed5.oftltedienlandJor the:Intended.Use.stated'vithin 
therepQrt.·. 
3. ·We'will perform our services inaccordanrewithUSPAPandthe 
Code ofProfessional Ethics ofthe App:raisallnstitute. Those ~tandards requite 
·ustQperlo:rm.appraisa1a$ignm.ents·~\ithimpartiality,o~te(:tl,\I'ityaI1.d 
independent judgment.· We'cannotj< andwill not.. ·guarantee that ourappraisal 
repo,twillmet?t any precOriceiVedopinions oft:oodusionS. ... 
4.. Our frefor th~scope of,,,'ork identified abc e 
balance is dueimmediately upon your receipt of the appraisal YQU und.erstand 
lU9 Vi.STArf; S"flleer.8'}!S£,Jt mlti !>fflJliE:;I~.!tr.l~OO rol.l>f'Rl'£: ~.m.'~ $'llX:ltill.li~,UJi4 
......... fla~Qii,""'" 
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DEPUTY
 
IJ\j THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
 
STATE OF IDAHO, m AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
 
BERKSHIRE mVESTMENTS, LLC, an
 
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G.
 
MAILE, IV. and COLLEEN BIRCH­

MAILE, husband and wife,
 
Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants, 
v. 
. CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, f/k/a 
CONNIE TAYLOR, an individual; DALLAN 
TAYLOR, an individual; R. JOHN 
TAYLOR, an individual; CLARK and 
FEENEY, a partnership;. PAUL T. CLARK, 
an individual; THEODORE L. JOHNSON 
!	 REVOCABLE TRUST, an Idaho revocable 
trust; JOHN DOES I -JOHN DOES X; AND 
ALL PERSONS m POSSESSION OR 
CLAIMmG ANY RIGHT TO 
POSSESSION. 
Defendants/Counter-Claimants. 
Case No. CV-OC-0723232 
REPLY MEMORANDUM BRIEF 
IN SUPPORT OF COUNT}~R­
DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS IN 
LIMINE 
j.
'----------------"-----------------­
The counter-defendants by and through their undersigned co-counsel of record, and 
provide their Reply Memorandum Brief in Support of Counter-defendants' Motions in Limine, 
as follows: 
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LEGAL ARGUMENT 
1. Exclusion of Sam Langston. 
The Counter-Claimants do not deny they failed to meet the deadlines for the required 
disclosure. They did not timely provide expert opinions and the facts that supported those 
opinions in accordance with the scheduling order. 
They argue that they seasonably supplemented disclosures as to experts. Under I.R.C.P. 
Rule 26(e) of the Idaho Rules ofCivil Procedure a party has a duty to seasonably supplement 
discovery responses. But the argument that the late disclosure of the opinions and the underlying 
facts is nothing more than a seasonable supplement flies in the face of the parties stipulation, the 
Court's Order, and the counter-claimants promise to supplement specific discovery requests by 
the agreed discovery deadlines. A true and correct copy of the relevant pages of the counter-
claimants' Answers to the Plaintiffs' First Set ofDiscovery (pp. 1,6, 7, 8, 9, 10) are mmexed as 
Exhibit "B" to the Affidavit of Christ Troupis filed on December 30, 2010 in support of the 
motion in limine. 
Counterclaimants assert that the opinions and underlying facts of the appraisal was 
delivered to Counterdefendants on December 7,2010. Mr. Troupis was out ofhis office on that 
date because he was on a pre-planned vacation to Hawaii. He was not able to review and 
consider the late disclosures by the counter-claimants until his return on December 23,2010. 
The disclosure was delivered approximately 40 days after stipulated discovery deadlines and 
after the required time refl;:renced in the Court Order. Co-counsel was not been able to obtain 
any experts in opposition to the late disclosed experts by the counter-claimants. In addition no 
REPLY MEMORANDUM BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' 
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attempt was made by the counter-claimants to submit an appropriate stipulation for the extension 
of deadlines. Nor was any motion filed by the counter-claimants to seek a court order modifying 
the Scheduling Order and/or the Stipulation for Scheduling & Planning filed approximately 12 
months earlier. Nor did the counter-defendants agree to extend any deadlines. 
In their affidavits, Counterclaimants submit that because of the downturn in the real 
estate market, preparation of an appraisal took longer than anticipated. The fact is that the 
Counterclaimants did not even retain their appraiser until October 20,2010, ten days prior to 
their disclosure deadline. (See Affidavit of Christ Troupis filed concurrently herewith). The 
scheduling order was stipulated to in December, 2009. Counterclaimants knew that the issues in 
their case required the retention of real estate experts. They have no excuse for waiting until 10 
days before the discovery cut-off date to hire an expert. Counterclaimants excuse for their failure 
to comply with the discovery deadlines is unreasonable, and prejudicial to Counterdefendants. 
The expert should be excluded from testifying. 
2. Exclusion of Bob DeBolt. 
The Affidavit of Christ Troupis Exhibit "C" filed December 31, 2010, contains a true and 
correct copy of the Counter-claimants' Supplemental Witness Disclosure which was delivered on 
December 10, 2010. This was the first time Bob DeBolt was identified as an expert. There is no 
reference in the supplemental disclosure that he was substituting for Connie Shannahan. Even if 
he is a substitute for her, no timely disclosures were made as to his proposed testimony or his 
qualifications. Once again the counter-claimants failed to meet the established discovery dates 
and the expert witness should be excluded. 
REPLY MEMORANDUM BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' 
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3. Exclusion of Connie Shannahan. 
The fundamental problem with the disclosure of Ms. Shannahan is that she willl not offer 
an opinion about a selling price of the subject property, but simply a "range oflisting prices", as 
set out in her report. In Farr West Investments v. Topaz Marketing L.P., 148 Id. 272, 220 P.3d 
1091 (Idaho 2009), the Court specifically held that listing opinions have no relevance to market 
value, and are not material evidence of market value. The opinion testimony from the witness 
for the year 2010 also has no bearing on any relevant point in time in this case. This witness 
and/or substituted witness, Bob DeBolt, should be excluded. 
4. Exclusion of Craig Lewis. 
To allow the potential testimony of Mr. Craig Lewis would be tantamount of putting him 
in the jury box, since he proposes to testify as to what was reasonable and what was 
unreasonable in filing a lawsuit and the pleadings associated with litigation. The disclosure filed 
October 27, 2010 by the counter-claimants stated that Mr. Lewis would testify regarding the 
unreasonableness of the filing of the amended complaint by the counter-defendants (p. 2 of 
Counterclaimants' Witness Disclosure). It is for the trier of fact to detennine whether the actions 
of the Counterdefendants were reasonable or unreasonable, not the province of experts.. In 
addition, testimony by Mr. Lewis regarding the court's determination made on res judicata is 
cumulative and would not aid to the jury. The Court's Memorandum Decision is an undisputed 
fact that res judicata was mled to apply to the case. BerkshirelMailes intend to present 
testimony that at the time that their lawsuit was filed, that they believed that their claims could 
properly be brought. That evidence directly relates to disproving the elements of abuse of 
REPLY MEMORANDUM BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' 
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process and/or the tort of intentional interference with a business advantage. It does not 
contradict the Court's subsequent ruling that these claims were barred by the application of res 
judicata. Berkshire/Mailes intend to show that they did not file and prosecute their complaint for 
"an illegal, improper, perverted use of the process, a use neither warranted nor authorized by the 
process" 1 Am. Jur 2d Abuse of Process §4. 
Counter-Claimants cite the Washington case Hough v. Stockbridge, 216 P.3d :ll077 
(Wash. App. Div. 2,2009) as support for their proposition that Mr. Lewis should be allowed to 
testify as to reasonableness of the Counter-defendants actions in filing the amended complaint. 
However, the Washington case dealt with an entirely different set of issues compared to the 
expected area of Greg Lewis' testimony. There, the two attorneys testified as to whether the 
attorney complied with civil discovery rules, the proper basis for a motion for reconsideration, 
and pleadings associated with an involuntary dismissal. The Washington court allowed such 
opinion testimony, on whether the attorney complied with civil discovery rules and on the proper 
basis for a motion for reconsideration. The testimony was based upon the witnesses technical or 
specialized knowledge of the law. The Washington attorneys did not testify as to the 
reasonableness of the filing of motions and/or the reasonableness of discovery. 
The complete opposite is involved with the potential expected testimony of Mr. Lewis. 
The testimony of Mr. Lewis as set forth in the Counterclaimants' Witness Disclosure is not 
relevant and not proper for opinions from an expert and should be excluded. 
5.	 Exclusion of Idaho State Bar Complaints. 
The counterclaim,mts allege that Maile used the current proceedings to avoid 
REPLY MEMORANDUM BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' 
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disciplinary action by the Idaho State Bar. The argument has no merit. There is no one listed to 
testify from the counterclaimants' witness disclosure or discovery responses that could provide a 
basis in fact that the current proceedings are an attempt to derail the Bar proceedings. There is 
no witness from the State Bar listed that provide the jury with any foundation as why 
proceedings are commenced and/or the timetable for such proceedings. The evidence of the 
allegations before the State Bar are mere allegations that are not substantive evidence of abuse of 
process or tortious interference with business advantage. The filing of a Bar proceeding has no 
bearing on a jury determination that Berkshire/Mailes acted with "an illegal, improper, perverted 
use of the process, a use neither warranted nor authorized by the process". 
Furthermore, the counterclaimants have admitted during the motion for summary 
judgment/motion to dismiss that the litigation privilege applies to Mr. Maile as an attorney. The 
'countercIaimants have admitted that the current action is not against Mr. Maile for any action 
committed as an attorney since such action is protected by the litigation privilege. There are no 
allegations that Mr. Maile committed fraud or criminal activity that would be an exception to the 
litigation privilege. 
The Counterclaimants' obscure connection to the State Bar proceedings is based on pure 
speculation. They assert "How else can you explain why an attorney would appeal a decision 
which was based on facts to which there was no dispute (which in fact simply complied with the 
directive of the Supreme Court in Taylor I)" (Memorandum in Opposition to Counter-
Defendants' Motion in Limine p. 9). Clearly, there were good faith arguments advanced before 
the Supreme Court, as the Court denied the counterclaimants' motion for costs and attorneys fees 
REPLY MEMORANDUM BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' 
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on appeal. There was no finding of frivolous litigation either by the district court or the 
appellate court. There have never been any sanctions assessed either by the district court or the 
appellate court against BerkshirelMailes, although the counterclaimants have repeatedly 
requested sanctions. The State Bar proceedings have no relevance to the current proceedings and 
under the specific the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct State Bar cited any reference to such 
proceedings must be excluded at trial. 
6. Damages. 
The counterclaimants argue that the actions of BerkshirelMailes during Taylor v. Maile 2 
including the appeal amount to actionable abuse of process and a tort of interference with a 
prospective business advantage. The Idaho Supreme Court considered the arguments advanced 
in Taylor v. Maile 2 and affirmed the district court, but did not find any frivolous conduct on the 
part of the Appellants Ber'kshirelMailes. On March 17,2009 the appellate court entered its 
Order Awarding Costs - Supreme Court Docket No. 33781 in approximately $700.00. On April 
15,2009 the Remittitur was entered by the Supreme Court. The scope of any of 
counterclaimants' damages cannot reach back to a point in time where the counterdefendants 
were lawfully pursuing their appellate rights in Taylor v. Maile 2. Permitting Counterdaimants 
to claim that the filing of the appeal constituted an actionable tort would subject any 
unsuccessful appellant to such specious claims. That is not the law in Idaho. 
The vendees' lien remains as a valid lien against the real property. The vendel~s' lien will 
remain until $400,000.00 is paid to Berkshire Investments. The counterclaimants can claim no 
damages as a result ofthe vendees' lien as the counterclamants themselves have the power to 
REPLY MEMORANDUM BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' 
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pay the amount outstanding which will result in the lien being satisfied. If the Lis Pendens was 
wrongfully maintained, a point the counter-defendants refute, then what is the period of time for 
which the counter-claimants can assert damages? As a matter oflaw, there can be no wrongful 
conduct by BerkshirelMailes for any period of time in which the recording of the Lis Pendens 
was authorized specifically by Judge Wilper. 
The Counter-Claimants mis-apply the law on the issue of damages representing the 
recovery of costs and attorneys fees. Had there been a slander of title action that was viable 
perhaps one could so argue. However, the Counter-Claimants voluntarily withdrew their slander 
of title claim and consequently there is no basis for the jury to consider costs and attorneys fees 
incurred in defense of the multi count amended complaint filed by the Counter-defendlant's in 
this case. Any argument that the Counter-Claimants may have regarding an award of their 
attorneys fees incurred as a result of the filing of the Complaint should properly be submitted to 
the Court at the conclusion of this case, not to a jury. 
In addition, the Counterclaimants have failed to properly supplement their disc:overy 
responses with respect to their claims for costs and attorneys fees. Specific exhibits Wl~re 
requested in discovery. The Counterclaimants did not provide any exhibit relating to costs and 
attorneys fees associated with any defense involving the initial complaint filed by the Counter 
defendants herein. Counterclaimants should not be allowed to present the jury with damage 
claims for attorneys fees and costs, when they have failed to respond to discovery requests that 
specifically requested such information. Evidence of these claims should be excluded at trial. 
6. Helen Taylor. 
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In ruling on a prior motion for summary judgment, the court has stated that Helen 
Taylor's opinions and desires have no relevancy in this matter. As testified by John Taylor 
during his deposition taken December 14, 2004, 
" there is an allegation that you want a recision of the contract? A. As an 
alternative. Yes. Q. But you want the money first? A. It would be easier. [t 
goes to my mom". 
This deposition testimony was taken only 32 days after the Taylors filed their verified 
petition in the probate court on November 12,2004, requesting the probate court to appoint them 
as trustees of the Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust. The petition was executed by R. John 
Taylor as a verification of the facts contained in the petition. Page 2 of the verified petition 
states under oath, "the petitioner's 88-year-old mother, Helen Taylor, is the sole remaining 
beneficiary ofthis trust by virtue ofthe terms ofa Disclaimer, Release and Indemnity 
Agreement." What Helen Taylor desired or how the Taylors acted on her behalf has been 
clearly documented under oath. There is no relevance as to the desires ofHelen Taylor or the 
intentions of her sons relative to the course ofproceedings in the underlying litigation.. 
DATED this 11 th day of January, 2011. 
(Jt, V E-...::,"c _ 
CHRIST T. TRO{JPIS, 
Co-counsel for Plaintiffs/Counter­
Defendants 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
 
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on this 11 th day of January, 2011, I caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing REPLY MEMORANDUM BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF COUNTER­
DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS IN LIMINE, to be delivered, addressed as follows: 
,­ , 
I Mark Stephen Prusynski i () U. S. Mail 
• PO Box 829 I (X) Facsimile Transmission 
Boise, ID 83701 () Hand Delivery 
Phone: (208) 345-2000 () Overnight Delivery 
: Facsimile: (208) 385-5384 I 
Connie W. Taylor 
! Henderson Law Finn 
. 900 Washington S1. Suite 1020 
I Vancouver, Wa. 98660
 
Facsimile: (360) 693-2911
 
Thomas G. Maile, IV. 
I 380 W. State Street 
, Eagle, Idaho 83616 
I Facsimile: (208) 939-1001 
I, ( ) 
I (X) 
'( ) 
'( ) 
I ( ) 
(X) 
( ) 
( ) 
I 
U. S. Mail 
Facsimile Transmission 
Hand Delivery 
Overnight Delivery 
U. S. Mail 
Facsimile Transmission 
Hand Delivery 
Overnight Delivery 
(}4 7) I:J- _
 
CHRIST T. TR'(j{Jj>j"S, co-counsel for 
Plaintiffs/Counter-defendants 
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By ELYSHIA HOLMES
 
OEPUTY 
Attorneys for Defendants/Counterclaimants Connie Wright Taylor fka 
Connie Taylor, Clark and Feeney, and Paul T. Clark 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an 
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G. 
MAILE, IV, and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE, 
husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants, 
vs. 
CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, fka CONNIE 
TAYLOR, an individual; DALLAN 
TAYLOR, an individual; R. JOHN TAYLOR, 
an individual; CLARK and FEENEY, a 
partnership; PAUL T. CLARK, an individual; 
THEODORE L. JOHNSON REVOCABLE 
TRUST, an Idaho revocable trust; JOHN 
DOES I-JOHN DOES X; AND ALL 
PERSONS IN POSSESSION OR CLAIMING 
ANY RIGHT TO POSSESSION, 
Defendants/Counterc1aimants. 
Case No. CV-OC-0723232 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION IN 
LIMINE TO PRECLUDE CONNIE 
TAYLOR'S TESTIMONY 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION IN LIMINE TO PRECLUDE 
CONNIE TAYLOR'S TESTIMONY-1 Client: 18979151 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Counterdefendants ("Berkshire") have indicated a desire to call Connie Taylor as 
a trial witness. Counterclaimants filed a motion in limine and addressed this issue in Section 6 
on pages 11 and 12 of their brief in support of their motion in limine. Counterclaimants 
responded on January 10 with a brief in opposition to the motion in limine, referring to the issue 
ofConnie Taylor's testimony as issue No. 27 and addressing it as follows on pages 15 and 16 of 
their brief: 
In addition there has been a request to preclude Connie Taylor as a 
witness. There is now new counsel who has filed his motion for 
limited admission to act as counsel for counter-claimants. The jury 
should consider some essential facts relating to Connie Taylor that 
would require only limited testimony. Connie Taylor drafted the 
documents which her husband executed which amounted to 
perjury. These acts ultimately lead to the judgment on the 
beneficiaries' claims. She attended depositions were her clients 
made admissions under oath concerning the fact that Helen Taylor 
was to get any money or property from the underlying litigation. 
Connie Taylor dealt with the beneficiaries of the trust to obtain her 
husband's control over the trust. This enabled her husband to file a 
lawsuit on behalf ofthe trust while the Taylors' first lawsuit was 
dismissed by Judge Wilper. Her conduct and her testimony is 
relevant for the jury to consider relating to the basis of the good 
faith clams advanced by the Counterdefendants demonstrating 
there was no abuse of process. Also see response to #20 
II. CONNIE TAYLOR'S TESTIMONY IS NOT RELEVANT TO THE CLAIMS OR
 
DEFENSE AT TRIAL
 
Berkshire's brief simply describes the role of any lawyer involved in litigation-
drafting documents, attending depositions, dealing with the clients, and filing a lawsuit - and 
then concludes "Her conduct and her testimony is relevant for the jury to consider relating to the 
basis of the good faith claims advanced by the Berkshire demonstrating there was no abuse of 
process." Some explanation should be required to cover the leap to the conclusion that her 
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testimony is relevant. Berkshire failed to explain how the undisputed facts that Connie Taylor 
drafted documents and attended depositions that led to the judgment against Berkshire had "any 
tendency to make the existence of' Berkshire's good faith or lack thereof more or less probable, 
and therefore Berkshire failed to pass the basic relevancy test under Rule 401 of the Idaho Rules 
of Evidence. 
Furthermore, Berkshire's proposed testimony relates solely to claims that have 
been dismissed from this case. Berkshire's claims of fraud upon the court, the Taylors' lack of 
standing, and the alleged perjury concerning Helen Taylor being the only beneficiary has been 
addressed numerous times and dismissed on the motion for summary judgment from this case 
and reaffirmed in the decision on the motion to reconsider. That testimony is not relevant to any 
issues in the case, because all of those issues have been dismissed from the case. 
III. CONNIE TAYLOR'S TESTIMONY IS PRIVILEGED. 
Berkshire apparently intends to have Connie Taylor testify about her work on the 
lawsuits involving the property. The pleadings or other documents that she prepared or signed, 
and the depositions she attended speak for themselves. Any testimony beyond those documents 
would necessarily involve her mental impressions or communications with her clients, which 
would invade the work product and attorney-client privileges. 
IV. BERKSHIRE DOES NOT PASS THE THRESHOLD TEST FOR CALLING
 
OPPOSING COUNSEL
 
The undersigned counsel was unable to find any Idaho reported cases dealing with 
calling opposing counsel as a witness at trial. Perhaps the lack of reported decisions was the 
result of civility among attorneys in Idaho. The Idaho Supreme Court, however, in Foster v. 
Traut, 145 Idaho 24, 175 P.3d 186 (2007), dealt with the somewhat analogous attempt to 
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disqualify opposing counsel. The court began its analysis by noting that the preamble to the 
Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct stated, "The purpose of the Rules can be subverted when 
they are invoked by opposing parties as procedural weapons." 145 Idaho at 32. The court then 
stated that when the motion to disqualify comes from an opposing party, the motion should be 
viewed with caution, and approved of a four part test adopted by the Idaho Court ofAppeals in 
Weaver v. Millard, 120 Idaho 692, 696, 819 P.2d 110, 114 (Ct. App. 1991). The four parts ofthe 
test are: 
(1) Whether the motion is being made for the purposes of 
harassing the defendant, 
(2) Whether the party bringing the motion will be damaged in 
some way if the motion is not granted, 
(3) Whether there are any alternative solutions, or is the proposed 
solution the least damaging possible under the circumstances, and 
(4) Whether the possibility ofpublic suspicion will outweigh any 
benefits that might accrue to continued representation. 
Foster v. Traul, 145 Idaho at 32-33 (quoting Weaver v. Millard, 120 Idaho at 698,819 P.2d at 
116). 
Rule 3.7 of the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct deals with a lawyer as a 
witness, stating: 
(a) Lawyers shall not act as advocate at a trial in which the lawyer 
is likely to be a necessary witness unless: 
(1) The testimony relates to an uncontested issue; 
(2) The testimony relates to the nature and value of 
services rendered in the case; or 
(3) Disqualification of the lawyer would work substantial 
hardship on the client. 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION IN LIMINE TO PRECLUDE 
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Rule 37, however, does not seem to contemplate situations in which the lawyer is called as a 
witness by the opposing party. Some of the sUIToundingjurisdictions have dealt with the 
application of a similar rule to disqualification of counsel by an opposing party. In Chappell v. 
Cosgrove, 121 N.M. 636, 916 P.2d 836 (1996), the New Mexico Supreme Court followed other 
jurisdictions focusing on the "necessary witness" language of the Rule. The court held that an 
attomey was not a necessary witness and therefore could not be disqualified because there were 
four other potential witnesses who could testify about a relevant meeting that was the issue of the 
lawsuit. Id., 916 P.2d at 839-40. 
The Colorado Supreme Court treats the subpoena of opposing counsel as the 
functional equivalent of a motion to disqualify. Williams v. District Court, 700 P.2d 549, 555 
(Colo. 1985). The Court in Williams decided that the party serving the subpoena had the burden 
of establishing that the opposing counsel's testimony would actually be adverse to his or her 
client, that the evidence sought to be elicited would likely be admissible, and there was a 
compelling need for such evidence that could not be satisfied by some other source. !d. at 555­
56. 
The seminal case regarding whether opposing counsel can be deposed is Shelton 
v. American Motors Corp., 805 F.2d 1323 (8th Cir. 1986). In Shelton, the court discussed the 
potential disruption of the adversarial system by the use ofthe tactic to depose opposing counsel 
and adopted a test similar to the test adopted by the Colorado Supreme Court in Williams, supra. 
Since motions to disqualify or attempts to depose opposing counsel are to be 
viewed with caution, calling opposing counsel at trial should certainly be justified only under 
extreme circumstances. In exercising this court's discretion, the tests adopted by other courts in 
similar circumstances are instructive. Berkshire should have the burden ofproving that Connie 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION IN LIMINE TO PRECLUDE 
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Taylor's testimony is relevant to the issues in the case, is essential to the defense of the claims 
against Berkshire, and carillot be presented by any other means. Berkshire cannot prove this. It 
cannot show that Connie Taylor's testimony is essential to the defense of any issues in this suit. 
The same testimony can be established because it is not contested by the claimants, can be 
shown by other witnesses, or proved by the use of the depositions that Connie Taylor attended. 
This written evidence would seemingly be the best evidence in any event. Because Berkshire 
cannot establish the elements of these tests, Berkshire's attempt to call Connie Taylor as a 
witness appears to be a "procedural weapon" subverting the Idaho Rules of Professional 
Conduct, which should not be condoned. 
DATED this .L]J:iday of January, 2011. 
MOFFATT, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK & 
FIELDS, CHARTERED 
~]~ /( I 
By-------,~~'-"'-----'----""-=---J'_/_-----
Mark S Prusynski - Of the irm 
Attorneys for Defendants/Counterclaimants 
Connie Wright Taylor fka Connie Taylor, 
Clark and Feeney, and Paul T. Clark 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this /J.-tUday of January, 2011, I caused a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION IN LIMINE TO 
PRECLUDE CONNIE TAYLOR'S TESTIMONY to be served by the method indicated 
below, and addressed to the following: 
Thomas G. Maile IV 
LAW OFFICES OF THOMAS G MAILE IV, P.A. 
380 W. State St. 
Eagle, ID 83616-4902 
Facsimile (208) 939-1001 
Christ T. Troupis 
TROUPIS LAwOFFICE, PA 
P.O. Box 2408 
Eagle, ID 83616 
Facsimile (208) 938-5482 
Jolm C. Mitchell 
CLARK & FEENEY 
1229 Main St., Suite 201 
P.O. Box 285 
Lewiston, ID 83501-0285 
Facsimile (208) 746-9160 
Connie W. Taylor 
HEN DERSON LAW 
900 Washington, Suite 1020 
Vancouver, WA 98660 
Facsimile (360) 693-2911 
(v(U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
(r(Facsimi Ie 
( v{U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
(oJ1 Facsimile 
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Mark rJ. Prusynski 
p.2Jan 20 11 11 :45a Christ Troupis 2nS-938-5482 
m-.- 3l~3Z::AIM .4........ ""'-i.....-........., 
JAN 20 2011 
Christ T. Troupis, ISB # 4549 
TROUPIS LAW OFFICE 
1299 E. Iron Eagle, Ste 130 
PO Box 2408 
Eagle, Idaho 83616 
Telephone: 208/938-5584 
Facsimile: 208/938-5482 
Email: ctroupis@troupislaw.com 
Co-counsel for Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COl."TNTY OF ADA 
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an 
Idaho limited Liability, and THOMAS G. Case No. CV-OC-0723232 
MAILE, IV. and COLLEEN BIRCH­
MAILE, husband and wife, SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT OF 
CHRIST TROUPIS IN SUP:lPORT 
Plaintiffs/Count'er-Defendants, OF MOTION IN LIMINE RE: 
STATE BAR 
v. 
CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, £'kIa 
CONNIE TAYLOR, an individual; DALLAN 
TAYLOR, an individua1; R. JOHN 
TAYLOR, an individuaJ; CLARK and 
FEENEY, a partnership; PAUL T. CLARK, 
an individual; THEODORE L. JOHNSON 
REVOCABLE TRUST, an Idaho revocable 
trust; JOHN DOES I -JOHN DOES X; AND 
ALL PERSONS IN POSSESSION OR 
CLAIMING ANY RIGHT TO 
POSSESSION. 
'--­
Defendants/Counter-Claimants. 
--lL..­ _ 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss.: 
County ofAda) 
CHRIST T. TROUPIS, being duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says: 
AFFIDAVlT OF CHRIST TROUPlS Th' SUPPORT OF MOTION IN LIMINE 
RE: STATE BAR COMPLAINT AND DAMAGES 1 
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1.	 Your Affiant is the co-counsel of record for Berkshire Investments, LLC, Thomas G. 
Maile, IV., and O)Ueen Birch-Maile in the above captioned matter. That the information 
and facts set forth herein are based upon your affiant's personal knowledge and/or 
observations and Gan testify as to the truth of the matters asserted herein if calkd upon as 
a witness at the trial of this matter. That your affiant provides this affidavit in .:mpport of 
the motion in limine filed herein. 
2.	 The two attachments to this affidavit establish conclusively that, contrary to thl~ 
Counterclaimants' contention, Thomas Maile did not appeal the adverse ruling on 
Beneficiaries Claims for the purpose of delaying a hearing on the grievance filed by R. 
John Taylor. The grievance letter from Mr. Taylor was not sent until after the date that 
the Mailes requested certification of the Court's decision for the purpose of filing an 
appeal on issues rc;:lating to Mailes' right to regain title to the property. 
3.	 Attached hereto as Exhibit "A" is a true and correct copy of the Motion for Cel1ification 
Pursuant to IRCP 54(b) Re: Judgment on Beneficiaries' Claims which was filed June 28, 
2006 in case number CV OC 04-004730. 
4.	 Attached hereto as Exhibit "B" is a true and correct copy of the July] 0, 20061etter from 
R. John Taylor to the Idaho State Bar, complaint fonn cover sheet and Index dc~tailing the
 
documents provided to the State Bar.
 
DATED this 20th day of January, 2011.
 
tJL/})~ 
CHRIST T. TROUPIS,~
 
Attorney for Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants
 
AFFlDAVIT OF CHRIST TROUPIS IN SUPPORT OF MOTION IN LIMIl\t: 
RE: STATE BAR COMPLAPH AND DAMAGES - Pg 2 
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SUBSCRIBED A~D SWORN TO before me, a Notary Public in and for said State, this 
'Li2 day of January, 2011. 
\,,,.U.,,,,
 
~'~~.'I Pea.;;';"
 
~ v ".'..$';;~ ~ \ il-\1.-l~
-
.-
..
- .­: ~_,.. E CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
, ;: 
'\ ~ 0 ~ ~,/.t ,"CERTIFY That on this 20th day of January, 2011, I caused a true and correct 
cop~M.,,@~goingAFFIDAVIT OF CHRIST TROUPIS IN SUPPORT OF MOTION IN 
LIMINE RE: STATE BAR to be delivered, addressed as follows: 
Connie W. Taylor 
Henderson Law Firm 
900 Washington St. Suite 1020 
Vancouver, \Vashington 98660 
Facsimile: (360) 693-2911 
Mark Stephen Prusynski
 
PO Box 829
 
Boise, In 83701
 
Phone: (208) 345-2000
 
Facsimile: (208) 385-5384
 
Thomas G. Maile, IV.
 
380 W. State Street
 
Eagle, Idaho 83616
 
Facsimile: (208) 939-1001 
() U. S. Mail 
(X) Facsimile Transmission 
() Hand Delivery 
() Ovemight Delivery 
() U. S. Mail 
(X) Facsimile Transmission 
() Hand Delivery 
() Overnight Delivery 
() U. S. Mail 
() Facsimile Transmission 
(X) Hand Delivery 
() Overnight Delivery 
----~ 
CHRIST T. TROUPI , 
Co-counsel for Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants 
AFFIDAVIT OF CHR1ST TROUPIS IN SUPPORT OF MOTION IN LIMINE 
RE: STATE BAR COMPLAINT AND DAMAGES - Pg 3 
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EXHIBIT "A"
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DEl\"NIS M. CHARNE,Y, ISB #4610 
Attorney at Law 
951 East Plaza Drive, Suite 140 
Eagle, Idaho 83616 
Telephone: (208) 938-9500 
Facsimile: (208) 938-9504 
Attorney for Defendants/Counter-Claimants 
W"" •. ~" 
"J
 ". '1".'
 ~'" CO P'Y' 
",u'--r~F::[; --­
,\.M. ?M.. _ 
JH,,1 9 Q. 900~~ ._ .... '" i.. IJ. 
J, f)/.,\i11) ~·J_i\\{r~f1R(), Cierk,
 
E\' ..! BLACK
 
rd"UTY
 
f.\l THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRlCT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
REED TAYLOR, DALLAN TAYLOR, and 
R. JOHN TAYLOR, 
PlaintiffsiColmter-Defendants, 
v. 
THOMAS MAILE, IV and COLLEEN 
MAll...E, husband and wife, THOMAS MAILE 
REAL ESTATE C011PANY and 
BERKSHIRE INVEST1t1ENTS, LLC, 
Defendants/Counter-Claimants. 
THEODORE L. JOHNSON REVOCABLE 
TRUST, 
Plaintiffi'Counter-Defendant, 
v. 
THOMAS MAILE, IV and COLLEEN 
I\1A.ILE, husband and wire, and BERKSHIRE 
INVEST:\1ENTS, LLC, 
Defendants/Counter-Claimants. 
)
 
)
 
) Case No. CV OC 04-00473D 
)
 
)
 
) MOTION FOR CERTIFICATION 
) PURSUANT TO IRCP 54(b) 
) RE: JUDGMENT ON 
) BENEFICL-\RIES' CLAIMS 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
MOTION FOR CERTIFICATION PURSVANT TO IRCP 54(b) RE: Jl7DGMENT ON 
BENEFICIARIES' CLfUMS - 1 
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.~ 
The Defendants/Counter-Claimants, pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b), 
request that the Court enter its Judgment dated June 7, 2006, based upon the Coun's 
Memorandwn Decision and Order entered May 15,2006, and the subsequent Order Denying the 
Defendants' .\1otion to Reconsider, dated June 20, 2006, containing the language, as provided, 
to wit: 
\Vith respect to the issues determined by the above judgment or 
order it is hereby CERTIFIED, in accordance with Rule 54(b), 
LRC.P., that the court has determined that there is no just reason 
for delay of the entry of a final judgment and that the court has and 
does hereby direct that the above judgment or order shall be a final 
judgment upon which execution may issue and an appeal may be 
taken as provided by the Idaho Appellate Rules. 
This Motion is based on the grounds set forth above and the record and file herein, and 
the accompanying Memorandum Brief filed herewith. 
DATED this d'6 _day of June, 2006. 
DENl\IS M. CHARNEY 
Attorney for Defendants/Counter-Claim~U1ts 
1\:[OTION FOR CERTH'TCATION PURS1:ANT TO IRep 54(b) RE: JLDGMENT ON 
BENEFICIARIES' CLAIMS - 2 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on thisQ:X' day of June, 2006, I caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing document to be served by the method indicated below, and addressed to 
the following: 
Connie W. Taylor 
Paul Thomas Clark 
Clark and Feeney 
1229 Main Street 
P.O. Drawer 285 
Lewiston, ill 83:501 
Fax: (208) 746-9160 
Thomas G. Maile:, IV 
Attorney at Law 
380 West State Street 
Eagle, ill 83616 
Fax: 939-1001 
Jack S. Gjording 
Gjording & Fauser, PLLC 
P.O. BDx 2837 
Boise, ID 83701··2837 
Fax: 336-9177 
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
(y) Facsimile 
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
C ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
CYJ Facsimile 
C ) U.S. ),1ail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
Cf) Facsimile 
Dennis M. Chanley 
MOTION FOR CERTIFICATION PURSUA='fT TO IRCP 54(b) RE: JUDGMENT ON 
BENEFICIARIES' CLAIMS· 3 
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ORIGINAL 
FU~CE'VED 
,JUt 20 2DiJ6 
July 10, 2006 
IDAHO STATE BAR 
Mr. Brad Andrews, Bar Counsel
 
Idaho State Bar
 
Box 895
 
Boise, ID 83701
 
Re: Grievance again~ Thomas G. Maile IV 
Dear Mr. Andrews: 
I am enclosing an ISB Complaint Fonn Cover sheet relating to a grievance against Thomas Maile 
on behalf of the Theodore Johnson Revocable Trust and the beneficiaries of that trusrt. 
This grievance is based on conduct relating to Maile's representation of the trust on an offer to 
pcrchase real property, which Maile ultimately purchased himself on terms which were: extremely 
lmfavorable to his client. tris conduct included self-dealing, failure to inform of the need for 
independent legal counsel, breach of fiduciary duty, and lack of candor amounting to dishonesty. 
I believe he has, and continues to abuse the legal system to barass and annoy by filing frivolous 
counterclaims, refiling the same motions over and over, and deposing his former client ex parte after 
he had been infonned that. opposing counsel was unavailable and had filed a motion for protective 
order. 
nle facts are set forth in the following documents, which are included for your review: 
]. Correspondence leading up to Maile's purchase of the property; 
2. Earnest Money Agreement which Maile drafted; 
3. Affidavit of Sam Rosti; 
4. Affidavit of Rick Zamzow; 
5. Sununary of Facts and Exhibits, briefing, and transcripts; 
6. Affidavits of Dan Grober; 
002223
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:Mr. Brad Andrews, Bar Counsel
 
July 10, 2006
 
Page 2
 
7.	 Memo re request for punitive damages; 
8.	 Documents: relating to our motion for summary judgment on counterdaims and 
opinion granting summary judgment; 
9.	 Supreme Court opinion; and 
10.	 Briefing on MSJ for Beneficiaries' claims and Court opinion granting: summary 
judgment. 
I will look forward to working with you on this matter. 
002224
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ORIGINAL
 
OFFICE OF BAR COUNSEL ",... 
IDAHO STATE BAR 
P.O. BOX 895 IISBI 
BOISE, ID 83701 
IDAHO STATE BAR(208) 334-4500 
CO~LAINTFORM COVER SHEET RECEIVED 
(Please read attached information before completing.) 
JU l 1. a 20!J5Date 07'06/06 
IDAHO STATE BAR 
Your Name John Taylor on behalf of Trustees and Beneficiari.es of 'l1:teodore Johnson Trust 
Please Print Legibly 
Mailing Address _PO_..,.R_o_x....,..._5_3-:8,..-~ Le----:w:-:-i_s_t_o_n _----:I:-:-d_ah_o --:8=:-3_5_0_1__ 
Street or Box No. City State Zip 
Home Phone 208-743-7536 Work Phone 208-799-9100 May we call you at work? Yl=-­
mal') Address jtaylor@aiainsuranceocom _E 
Attorney's Name Thomas Mail_e_I_V _ 
Name of attorney this complaint is directed against. (If you are complaining about mOrE' than one 
attorney, please copy this complaint form and complete a separate complaint for each attomel'{, we must 
have an attorney name to process your compla;nt. not the name of the law finn.)
J 
Mailing Address 380 W State Street Eagle Idaho 83616 
Street or Box No, City Slate Zip 
Date You Hired Attorney A_p--=p_r_o_x_o_l_9_9_6 , 
(If applicable) 
Amount Initially Paid Attorney _N_I_A Total Amount Paid _N_'_A _ 
(If applicable) 
Did You Sign a Fee or Retainer Agreement?_N_o _ 
(If applicable) 
Do You Presently Owe The Attorney Any Fees? -'N~o~ _ 
(If applicable) 
Type Of Legal Problem Attorney Was Hired To Handle: Sale of Real Pr~perty wh:lch 
(U applicable)AtLbrney then bought personally. 
'.', 
FOR OFFICE USE ONLY 
Intake Number: 06 - r-) ,..)£) .(;'
(',. G 
District & A#: Lt, ( 0. '3] 6__) 
Updated I!J3/06 Page - 6­
ComplaintFormPacket-3 
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OFFICE OF BAR COUNSEL
 
IDAHO STATE BAR
 .'"
r1IIII'rz
) 
P.O. BOX 895 IISBI 
BOISE, ill 83701 
IDAHO STATE BAR(208) 334-4500 
IiPLE 
Ir 
Updated 1/13106 Page - 7­
ComplaintFormPackef-3 
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INDEX 
'". , 
" DOCUMENTS INCLUDED IN TABBED SECTIONS·· 
Correspondence Lea.ding up to Maile's Purchase of the Property 
• 
05/24/02 Letter from Ms. Hetherington, CPA to Mr. Maile 
05/29/02 Letter from Mr. Maile to Mr. Johnson 
06/04/02 Letter from Mr. Maile to Mr. Haff 
05/07/03 Letter from Ms. Rogers to Mr. Maile 
01/09/04 Release and Reconveyance Instrument No. 104006068 
01126/04 Letter from Idaho Independent Bank to Berkshire Investml~nts, Attn. Mr. 
Maile 
08/23/99 Deed ofReconveyance Instrument No. 99344] 8 
08/06/0 I Deed ofReconveyance Instrument No. 20013] 865 
08/06/0 I Deed ofReconveyance Instrument No. 20013866 
2 Earnest Money Agreement - 07/22102 
3 Affidavit of Sam Rosti - 11105/04 
4 Affidavit of Rick Zamzow - 11/05104 
5 
Summary of Facts and Exhibits, Briefing, and Transcripts 
• 
• 
Summary of Facts and Exhibits - 03/02/05 
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to DisinisslMotion for 
Summary Judgment and Motion for Partial Summary Judgment ­ 03/02/05 
Submission ofDeposition Transcripts and Exhibits - 03/02/05 
6 
Affidavits ofDan Grober 
• 
• 
Atlidavit ofDan Grober - 10/21/05 
Supplemental Affidavit ofDan Grober - 10/24/05 
Second Supplemental Affidavit of Dan Grober - 11/03105 
7 
Memo Re. Request for Punitive Damages 
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint for Punitive 
Damages - 10/24/05 
8 
Documents Relating to Our Motion for Summary Judgment on Counterclaims and Opinion 
Granting Summary Judgment 
• 
• 
Notice ofHearing on Amended Motion for Summary Judgment - 09129/05 
Affidavit ofR. John Taylor in Support of Plaintiffs' Amended Motion for Summary 
Judgment - 09/29/05 
Plaintiffs' Amended Motion for Summary Judgment - 09129105 
Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Amended Motion for Summ~/ Judgment­
09/29/05 
Order Regarding Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment - 02113106 
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9
 
10
 
Supreme Court Opinion 
• 2005 Opinion No. 135 - 12123/05 
Order Granting Motion for Summary Judgment 
• Affidavit ofR. John Taylor in Support of Beneficiaries' Motion for Summary 
Judgment - 02/09/06 
Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgmtmt on 
Bene5cia.ries' Claim - 02/09/06 
• Order Granting Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment on Beneficiaries' Claim ­
05115106 
• Order Denying Defendants' Motion to Reconsider - 06/20/06 
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NO. =-=~----
~. tJ:/Y'-" A.MI-__...J 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
 
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, 
an Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G. 
MAILE, IV and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE, 
husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants, 
vs. 
CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, 
f/k/a CONNIE TAYLOR, an individual; 
DALLAN TAYLOR, an :individual; 
R. JOHN TAYLOR, an individual;
 
CLARK and FEENEY, a partnership;
 
PAUL T. CLARK, an ind.ividual;
 
THEODORE L. JOHNSON REVOCABLE
 
TRUST, an Idaho revocable trust;
 
JOHN DOES I-JOHN DOES X; AND
 
ALL PERSONS n~ POSSESSION OR
 
CLAIMING ANY RIGHT TO POSSESSION,
 
Defendants/Counter-Claimants. 
Case No. CV-OC-2007-23232
 
SUMMARY ORDER
 
RE MOTIONS IN LIMINE
 
This matter is before the Court on pretrial motions in limine filed by the Counterclaimant 
and Counter-defendant. The trial is set to begin on January 31, 2011. The Court heard oral 
argument on the motions on January 18,2011. At that time the Court ruled on record regarding 
the majority of the motions and took the remaining two issues under advisement. 
The remaining issues are: 1) whether an ethics complaint against Mr. Maile pending with 
the Idaho State Bar is admissible to show that the motivation for filing this suit and whether other 
SUMMARY ORDER RE MOTIONS IN LIMINE - PAGE 1 
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actions taken in the cours~: of this litigation and the earlier litigation was to delay the bar 
proceedings; and 2) whether the late disclosed expert appraisal report of Sam Langston should be 
excluded from trial. At the hearing on the motion Counterclaimant proffered as evidence of the 
motive to delay the fact that Mr. Maile requested bar proceedings be delayed pending outcome of 
this litigation. While it is marginally possible a jury could infer an improper motive from this, 
the probative value is outweighed by the potential unfair prejudice. The fact that a bar complaint 
was filed, absent additional corroborating evidence, will be excluded on grounds the probative 
value is minimal and outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. 
The Court's Order for Scheduling Conference dated November 16,2009 states that 
"experts may be prohibited from testifying to any opinions or foundation for such opinions that 
have not been the subject of timely and proper disclosure." For good cause, the Court can 
modify these deadlines in its discretion. There is no question here that the report was not timely 
disclosed. The Counterclaimant has offered as cause to extend the deadline the fact that 
preparation of the report took longer than anticipated by the expert. This is not a sufficient 
showing to overcome the prejudice to Counter-defendant who is faced with a 100 page expert 
report less than 60 days before trial. The opinions of expert Sam Langston will be excluded 
except to the extent any portion of it was disclosed before the deadline imposed by the pre-trial 
Order. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated this -d.1--- day of January 
SUMMARY ORDER RE MOTIONS IN LIMINE - PAGE 2
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
1 J 
I hereby certify that on the d I day of January 2011, I mailed (served) a true and correct 
2 
copy of the within instrument to: 3 
4 
CHRIST T. TROUPIS
 
5
 TROUPIS LAW OFFICE
 
1299 E IRON EAGLE, STE 130
 
6 PO BOX 2408
 
7 EAGLE, ID 83616
 
8 MARK S. PRUSYNSKI
 
MOFFATT THOMAS BARRETT ROCK
 
9 & FIELDS, CHARTERED
 
101 S CAPITOL BLVD, ]OTH FL
 
10 PO BOX 829 
11 BOISE, ID 83701-0829 
12 CONNIE W. TAYLOR 
HENDERSON LAW FIRM PLLC 
13 I 900 WASHINGTON ST., SUITE 1020
 
: VANCOUVER, WA 98660
 
14 
PAUL L. HENDERSON15 
HENDERSON LAW FIRM PLLC 
16 900 WASHn~GTON ST., SUITE 1020 
VANCOUVER, WA 98660 
17 
THOMAS G. MAILE 
18 LAW OFFICES OF
 
THOMAS G. MAILE IV, PA
 19 
380 W STATE STREET
 
EAGLE, ID 83616
20 
21 
22 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH 
23 Clerk uf the District Court 
24 
25 
ByAd)i= ~ 
Deputy Clfukr-
SUMMARY ORDER RE MOTIONS IN LIMINE - PAGE 3
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JAN 21 2011 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
 
By KATHY JOHNSON
 
OS'UTV 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
 
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an 
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G. Case No. CV OC 0723232 
MAILE, IV, and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE 
husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, ORDER FOR LIMITED ADMISSION 
vs. 
CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, et a1. 
Defendants. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that pursuant to the Motion for Limited Admission filed in 
this above-entitled matter, and good cause appearing therefor; PAUL L. HENDERSON shall be 
admitted for limited admission as co-counsel for the Counterclaimants in the above matter. 
~ DATED lhis 24 ' day of  
ORDER FOR LIMITED ADMISSION
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CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
~-Sf
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 0_'_ day of January, 2011 I caused to be served a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed 
to the following: 
Thomas G. Maile, IV
 
380 West State Street 
Eagle, ID 83616
 
Mr. Christ Troupis 
Attorney at Law
PO Box 2408
 
Eagle, ID 83616
 
Mark Prusynski
 
MOFFATT THOMAS
 
101 S Capitol Blvd., 10th Floor
 
PO Box 829
 
Boise, ID 83701
 
Connie W. Taylor
 
Henderson Law Firm, PLLC
 
900 Washington, Suite 1020
 
Vancouver WA 98660
 
Paul L. Henderson
 
Henderson Law Firm, PLLC
 
900 Washington, Suite 1020
 
Vancouver WA 98660
 
U.S. Mail
 
Hand Delivered
 
Overnight Mail
 
Telecopy (FAX) (208) 939-1001
 
U.S. Mail
 
Hand Delivered
 
Overnight Mail
 
Telecopy (FAX) (208) 938-5482
 
U.S. Mail
 
Hand Delivered
 
Overnight Mail
 
Telecopy (FAX) (208) 385-5384
 
U.S. Mail
 
Hand Delivered
 
Overnight Mail
 
Telecopy (FAX) (208) 938-5482
 
U.S. Mail
 
Hand Delivered
 
Overnight Mail
 
Telecopy (FAX) (208) 385-5384
 
ORDER FOR LIMITED ADMISSION 2
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Christ T. Troupis, ISB # 4549 
TROUPIS LAW OFFICE 
1299 E. Iron Eagle, Ste 130 
PO Box 2408 
Eagle, Idaho 83616 
Telephone: 208/938-5584 
Facsimile: 208/938-5482 
Email: ctroupis@troupislaw.com 
Co-counsel for Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants 
NO_ . - FIL~O if ~~._P.M.=6..:, f? 
JAN 26 2011 
OHRlst-oPHER D. RICH, Clerk
 
By KATHY BIEHL
 
DlIPUlr
 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF lEE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
.------------------ ------,-_._--_. ---------~--. 
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an 
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G. 
· MAILE, IV. and COLLEEN BIRCH­
MAILE, husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs/Count4~r-Defendants, 
· v. 
CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, £'k/a 
CONNIE TAYLOR, an individual; DALLAN 
TAYLOR, an individual; R. JOHN 
TAYLOR, an individual; CLARK and 
FEENEY, a partnership; PAUL T. CLARK, 
an individual; THEODORE L. JOHNSON 
REVOCABLE TRUST, an Idaho revocable 
· trust; JOHN DOES I -JOHN DOES X; AND 
ALL PERSONS ~ POSSESSION OR 
CLAIMING ANY RlGHT TO 
POSSESSION. 
Defendants/Counter-Claimants. 
Case No. CV-OC-0723232 
MOTION AND :MEMORANDUM 
IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO 
PROHIBIT COUNTER­
CLAIMANTS FROM CALLING 
THOMAS MAILE AS A WITNESS 
IN THEm CASE IN CHIEF 
COMES NOW, Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants, by and through their co-counsel of record, 
Christ T. Troupis, and move for an order prohibiting Counterclaimants from calling Thomas 
Maile as a witness in their case in chief. This motion is supported by the following Memorandum 
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of Points and Authorities.
 
Summary of the Motion
 
Counterclaimants have listed Thomas Maile as one of their witnesses. Mr. Maile has been 
identified by Counterdefendants as one of their expert witnesses as well as a fact witness. 
Counter-elaimants, in their motion in limine and at the hearing on the motion in limine:, 
acknowledged that Mr. Maile may provide expert testimony in this case. (1) Counterclaimants 
have not disclosed Mr. Maile in their witness disclosures or discovery responses as thdr lay or 
expert witness. (2) It is improper for Counterclaimants to attempt to elicit testimony in their case 
in chief from one ofCotmterdefendants' expert witnesses. 
As we have previously noted in our other motions in limine, the Order for Scheduling 
required Counterdefendants' timely disclosure of all of their witnesses 90 days prior to trial. 
They have not complied '"vith this Order with respect to disclosing Mr. Maile as their witness. 
Further, the Order required disclosure ofCounterdefendants' expert witnesses] 20 days 
prior to trial. They have not complied with this Order with respect to disclosing Mr. :vIaile as 
their expert witness. 
On January 10, 2010, the first inclination that the counter-claimants were intending to 
call Thomas :Maile appear(~d in their Amended Witness List. The disclosure was 20 days before 
trial. Thomas Maile had been listed in Counter-defendants' Certification to Opposing Counsel of 
Expert & Lay Witnesses as both a lay witness and as an expert witness. 
I. 
ARGUMENT 
A. Counter-elaimants should be prohibited from calling Thomas Maile as a witness in their 
MOTION TO PROHIBIT COUNTERCLAlMANTS FROM CALLING mOMAS MAILE AS A WITNESS 
IN THEIR CASE IN CHIEF- Pg 2 
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case in chief because they failed to comply with the Court's Scheduling Order. 
The counter-claimants' disclosures have been previously provided to the Court as 
attachments to the Affidavit of Christ Troupis filed December 31, 2010. The counter-claimants' 
initial disclosure was filed on October 27,2010. The counter-defendants' supplemental 
disclosure was served on December 10,2010. The counter-claimants failed to list Mr. Maile in 
their initial discovery responses either as a lay witness or an expert witness. The counter-
claimants failed to supplement their discovery responses with any reference to Mr. Maile as 
either a lay or expert witness as required by the Scheduling Stipulation. 
B. Counterclaimants should be prohibited from calling Thomas Maile as a witness in their 
case in chief because be lis designated as one of Counterdefendants' expert witnesses. 
Mr. Maile has been properly identified as an expert for the counter-defendants. An 
expert witness disclosed by one side cannot be called as a witness by the other side at trial. White 
v. Jvlock, 140 Idaho 882, 104 P.3d 356 (Idaho 2004) 
The discovery ruh$ contain no provision directly addressing whether the plaintiff 
may call one ofthe defendant's experts at trial. In that the rules do not allow for 
depositions of a party's expert who is not expected to be called as a witness at 
trial, pursuant to I.R.C.P. 26(b)(4)(B), it follows that expert cannot be called by 
the opposing party during trial unless a proper showing of exceptional 
circumstances is made. In keeping with the policy behind the discovery rules thc~n, 
and based upon White's failure to name Dr. Beaulieu as his expert, we conclude 
that the district court did not abuse its discretion in barring the testimony of the 
defense's expert to establish White's prima facie case against the defendants. w(~ 
also hold that a general "reservation ofrights" to call the other party's witnesses is 
not the type ofdisclosure envisioned by the rule, in that it does not apprise the 
opposing party of the identity of the specific expert to be relied upon and does not 
reveal the general substance of that testimony or its relation to the legal theory of 
the plaintiff. SeeGallo v. Peninsula Hospital, 164 Cal. App.3d 899, 903-904, 2It 
Cal. Rptr. 27, 30 (1'985) (holding general reservation of rights to caD the other 
party's witness is not the type of disclosure envisioned by the rule). 
MOTION TO PROHIBIT CODNTERCLAIMANTS FROM CALLING THOMAS MAILE AS A WITNESS 
IN THEIR CASE IN CIllEF-})g 3 
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Counterclairnants: did not list Mr. Maile as their expert, or include in their 
discovery responses a general reservation of a right to cal I the other party's v·:itnesses. 
Based on the foregoing, the Counterclaimants should be precluded from calling Mr. 
Maile in their case in chid. 
DATED this 26 th day of January, 2011. 
CHRIST T. TROUP ,
 
Co-counsel for Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants
 
MOTION TO PROHIBIT COUNTERCLAlMANTS FROM CALLING THOMAS MAILE AS A 
WITNESS IN THEIR CASE IN CffiEF- Pg 4 
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CERTDnCATEOFSERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on this 26th day of January, 2011, I caused a true and comect copy of 
the foregoing PLAINTIFFS/COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' MOTION AND MEMORA1'.-OUM 
IN SlJ-PPORT OF MOTION TO PROHIBIT COUNTERCLAIMANTS FROM CALLING 
THOMAS MAILE AS A WITNESS IN THEIR CASE IN CHIEF. to be delivered, addressed as 
follows: 
IConnie W. Taylor 
Paul Henderson 
Henderson Law Firm 
900 Washington St. Suit,~ 1020 
Vancouver, Washington 98660 
Facsimile: (360) 693-2911 
Mark Stephen Prusynski 
PO Box 829 
Boise. ID 83701 
Phone: (208) 345-2000 
Facsimile: (208) 385-5334 
Thomas G. Maile, IV. 
380 W. State Street 
Eagle, Idaho 83616 
Facsimile: (208) 939-1001 
( ) 
(Z:;) 
( ) 
( ) 
( ) 
. ()o:..) 
( ) 
( ) 
( ) 
( ) 
(~) 
( ) 
--~-~-._--~
U. S. Mail 
Facsimile Transmission 
Hand Delivery 
Overnight Delivery 
u. S. Mail 
Facsimile Transmission 
Hand Delivery 
Overnight Delivery 
U. S. Mail 
Facsimile Transmission 
Hand Delivery 
Overnight Delivery 
.._~ .._­
MOTION AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO PROHIBIT COUNTERCLAIMANTS 
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Christ T. Troupis, ISB # 4549 
TROUPIS LAW OFFICE 
1299 E. Iron Eagle, Ste 130 
POBox 2408 
Eagle, Idaho 83616 
Telephone: 208/938-5584 
Facsimile: 208/938-5482 
Email: ctroupis@troupislaw.com 
Co-counsel for Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants 
FEB 01 2011 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH. Clerk 
By EMILY CHILO 
[JEPIJN 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
 
BERKSHIRE INVESTIvIENTS, LLC, an 
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G. 
fvIAILE, IV. and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE, 
husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants, 
v. 
CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, £!k!a 
CONNIE TAYLOR, an individual; DALLAN 
TAYLOR, an individual; R. JOHN TAYLOR, 
an individual; CLARK and FEENEY, a 
partnership; PAUL T. CLARK, an individual; 
THEODORE L. JOHNSON REVOCABLE 
TRUST, an Idaho revocable trust; JOHN 
, DOES I -JOHN DOES X; AND ALL 
. PERSONS IN POSSESSION OR 
CLAIMING ANY RIGHT TO 
POSSESSION. 
I 
I 
Defendants/Counter-CLaimants. 
Case No. CV-OC-0723232 
COUNTERDEFENDANTS' MOTJION 
AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION TO PROHIBIT 
COUNTERCLAIMANTS FROM 
INTRODUCING OR REFERRIN(; TO 
NOVEMBER 2006 ORDER, C-C 
EXHIBIT 11 AND 2005 PURCHASE AND 
LAND SALE AGREEMENT, C-C 
EXmBIT 5~ OR THE ISSUES RAJlSED 
THEREIN 
MOTION AND MEMORANIJUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO PRECLUDE COUNTERCLAIMANTS 
FROM USE OR REFERENC[ TO EXHIBITS 11 AND 5, OR ISSUES RAISED THEREIN - Pg 1 
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COMES NOW, the Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants, by and through their co-counsel of 
record, Christ T. Troupis, and present the following Objection and Motion to Preclude the 
introduction of Counterclaimants' Exhibits 11 and 5, and to make any reference to the matters set 
out in those exhibits. 
1. 
Counterclaimants t Exhibit 11 is inadmissible 
Under mE Rule 402 and 608 
The Counter-Claimants have listed as a proposed exhibit the Memorandum Decision and 
Order Denying Counterclaimant's Claim for Damages Grounded on the Theory of Unjust 
Enrichment entered November 29,2006 by Judge Wilper. The exhibit offers at least two 
fundamental problems that the counter-claimants cannot overcome. 
First, the exhibit is irrelevant and inadmissible under IRE Rule 402. Counterc1aimants 
referred to comments made in Exhibit 11 by Judge Wilper about "sharp practices" and "self 
dealing." Those comments are offered solely to make the inference that the Maile was untruthful 
or untrustworthy as an attack upon his character. 
Judge Wilper's comments, quoted by Counterclaimants' counsel in her opening 
statement, are not compewnt evidence that is relevant and material to the issues in this case. 
Moreover, they were entirely dicta and not used to support his conclusion that the improvements 
did not benefit the Theodore Johnson Trust, which was the specific finding made by the Court. It 
cannot be cited as a finding of the Court relevant to these proceedings. 
As noted in State v. Sherrod, 131 Id. 56, 951 P.2d 1283 (1998), a statement not necessary 
to support the prior judgment does not constitute a settled issue of fact or law that would raise 
MOTION AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO PRECLUDE COUNTERCLAIMANTS 
FROM USE OR REFERENCE TO EXHIBITS 11 AND S. OR ISSUES RAISED THEREIN - Pg 2 
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collateral estoppel. That case states that collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, "means simply 
that when an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid and final judgment, that 
issue cannot agaln be litigated between the same parties in any future lawsult. Such a 
determination of a factual issue will preclude its r~litigation if the resolution of that issue 
was necessary to support the prior judgment (emphasis added)". This principle of issue 
preclusion appEes in criminal as well as civil cases. 
The comments of Judge Wilper were not findings because he made his decisior.. without 
reference to his beliefs about Mr. Maile's purported conduct during the sale transaction with the 
decedent. On page 5 of his decision, he stated: "Nevertheless, the Court believes that this case 
can be decided on its merits by analyzing the elements of the unjust enrichment claim, without 
proclaiming that Mr. Maile is barred from seeking equitable relief based on the doctrine of 
unclean hands", The dicta in Judge Wilper's ruling is therefore not relevant nor mateJial to any 
issue in this case. 
The Taylors attempted use of the November 2006 Decision is a maneuver to put before 
the jury two statements about \fr. Maile's character, "self dealing" and "sharp practices", that 
are not probative, but are int1ammatory and prejudicial. These tenus were used in reference to 
Mr. Maile's relationship with Ted Johnson and his drafting ofthe contract between Ted Johnson 
and himself. Those issues were litigated and resolved in Taylor 1. When he makes a comment 
that is not incorporated into a specific finding necessary to the judgment, Judge Wilper has no 
different standing than any other third party called as a witness to impeach a party's character. 
His statements must comply with IRE Rule 608 to be admissible. 
MOTION AND MEMORANUUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO PRECLUDE COUNTERCLAIMANTS 
FROM USE OR REFERENCE TO EXHIBITS 11 AND 5, OR ISSUES RAISED THEREIN - Pg 3 
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The Taylors are not trying to take such an opinion and interject the same into the abuse of 
process and interference of business advantage claims, inferring the same behavior applied to 
asserting counterclaims in response to Taylors' complaint or pursuing the appeal in Taylor v. 
Maile 2 or in filing the perjury complaint. The actions referenced by Judge Wilper had nothing 
to do with the appeal process, the counterclaims, or the perjury complaint. In fact Judge Wilper 
after making such comments went on to allow the Mailes to maintain the lis pendens during the 
appeal of Taylor v. Maile 2 because he found that it was proper, and not frivolous, unreasonable, 
or without foundation. The counter-claimants are attempting to interject these comments for an 
improper purpose. 
Second, this proposed use of Judge Wilper's statements about Mr. Maile to attack his 
character and conduct in the initjal sale transaction is not permitted under the Idaho Rules of 
Evidence. I.R.E. Rule 608 provides: 
Evidence of character and conduct of witness 
(a) Opinion and reputation evidence of character. The credibility of a witness may be 
attacked or supported by evidence in the form of opinion or reputation, but subj eet to 
these limitations: (1) the evidence may refer only to character for truthfulness or 
untruthfulness, and (2) evidence oftruthful character is admissible only after the 
character of the witness for truthfulness has been attacked by opinion or reputation 
evidence or otherwise. 
(b) Specific instances of conduct. Specific instances of the conduct of a witness, for the 
purpose of attacking or supporting the credibility, of the witness, other than conviction of 
crime as provided in Rule 609, may not be proved by extrinsic evidence. They may, 
however, in the discretion of the comi, if probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness, be 
inquired into on cross-examination of the witness concerning (1) the character of the 
witness for truthfulness or untruthfulness, or (2) the character for truthfulness or 
untruthfulness of another witness as to which character the witness being cross-examined 
has testified. 
MOTION AND MEMORANUUM. IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO PRECLUDE COUNTERCLAIMANTS 
FROM USE OR REFERENCE TO EXIDBITS 11 AND 5, OR ISSUES RAISED THERElN - Pg 4 
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The introduction of the exhibit would violate the above rule of evidence. There is no 
evidence, nor will there be any evidence presented, that any opinions regarding truthfulness or 
untruthfulness of Tom Maile were raised before Judge Wilper. 
Counterclaimants" other proposed use of the document is also irrelevant. They infonned 
the jury that this document establishes the value of property in October 2006. lfthat is relevant 
and material to any issue in this case, the court can take judicial notice of the finding without 
offering Exhibit 11 into evidence. However, Counterdefendants object to the introductl.on of that 
finding as well as the Exhibit on the grounds that Counterclaimants cannot establish that the 
value of the property in October 2006 is relevant and material to any issue in this case, until they 
establish that Counterdefendants engaged in Vlfongful conduct that constituted either abuse of 
process or intentional interference that preceded that date. The sole purpose of establishing value 
is to prove that the value has declined and argue that Mailes are liable for the differenc<~ because 
of their alleged Vlfongful conduct. 
After the District Court entered its order on November, 2006, the case was appealed to 
the Idaho Supreme Court. The decision was rendered on January 30, 2009. A notice of lis 
pendens was properly recorded during the entire appeal. Although the 'peljury complaint' was 
served in March, 200&, th~: parties stipulated to a stay of proceedings until the Supreme Court 
ruled in Taylor 2. The filing of the 'perjury complaint' did not cause any delay in the rendering 
of the Supreme Court's opinion, and its Notice of Lis Pendens was only operative after the 
Supreme Court issued its remittitur in April, 2009. 
MonON AND MEMORANUUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO PRECLUDE COUNTERCLAIMANTS 
FROM USE OR REFERENCE TO EXHIBITS 11 AND 5, OR ISSUES RAISED THEREIN - Pg 5 
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The elements of intentional interference require proof that the interference was wrongful 
by some measure beyond the fact of the interference itself. Moreover, Counterclaimants in their 
opening advised the jury that Mr. Maile was represented by six attorneys at various times during 
the litigation history and at some times was acting as his own attorney. To the extent that the sole 
conduct Counterclaimants intend to present as evidence of tortious conduct occurred during the 
course of the litigation and consisted of filing pleadings and presenting claims, that conduct 
would be subject to a litigation privilege. 
Although Thomas Maile filed certain motions pro se before the Supreme Court in 
attempting to augment the record, the Supreme Court appellants briefs were submitted by the 
Office of Dennis Charney and the Law Offices of Thomas Maile on behalf of a corporate client, 
Berkshire Investments, LLC as well as the individuals, Tom and Colleen Maile. A corporation 
cannot represent itself but must be represented by an attorney, acting in his capacity as <:ffi 
attorney. This court has previously ruled that the litigation privilege applied to attorneys and not 
parties. The Litigation privilege should apply to any allegations, facts, statements, etc., which are 
contained in the briefmg before the Supreme Court in Taylor v. Maile 2. 
The Court is aware that Judge Wilper entered an order allowing the Lis Pendens to be 
recorded and maintained tlu-oughout the appeal process, and denied Taylors' motion for 
attorneys fees finding that the Mailes' actions in litigating their claims throughout that 
proceeding were not frivOlOlllS, unreasonable or without foundation. The Court is also aware that 
the Supreme Court in Taylor 2 denied Taylors' motion for attorneys' fees on the same basis and 
affi.rmed the finding of the District Court in that regard. Taylors' contention that Mailes abused 
MOTION AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO PRECLUDE COUNTERCLAThIANTS 
FROM USE OR REFERENCE 'ro EXHIBITS 11 AND 5, OR ISSUES RAISED THEREDil - Pg 6 
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the process of the court and intentionally interfered with Taylors' economic interests solely by 
assel1ing these legitimate counterclaims in the trial court and on appeal in the case brought by the 
Taylors, is not tenable. The case ofCarter v. Carter, 143 Idaho 373, 146 P.3d 639 (2006) 
provides at p. 648 of 146 P.3d: It is not a tort where one acts to protect her own economic 
interests, even if there is interference with the contract expectancy of another, so long as the acts 
of the intervenor are not independently \vyongfuI. In Highland Enterprises, Inc. )1. Barker, 133 
Idaho 330, 338, 986 P.2d 996, 1004 (1999), the elements of that claim are listed as follows: 
"( 1) The existence of a valid economic expectancy; (2) knowledge of the expectancy on 
the part of the interferer; (3) intentional interference inducing tennination oftht: 
expectancy; (4) tht: interference was "vrongful by some measure beyond the fact of the 
interference itself (i.e. that the defendant interfered for an improper purpose or improper 
means) and (5) resulting damage to the plaintiffwhose expectancy has been disrupted." 
As noted above, the Court in Taylor 2 has already ruled that the MaiJes properly brought 
their counterclaims and properly pursued them on appeal, and that the filing of a Notice' of Lis 
Pendens during the appellate process through the remittitur of Taylor 2 in April, 2009 was 
proper. The orders ofJudge Wilper and the Supreme Court denying Taylors' requests for 
attorneys fees as a sanction for bringing claims that were "frivolous, unreasonable, or without 
foundation" conclusively establish that Mailes used proper means, and had a proper pur::)ose (i.e. 
they had legitimate claims that they had a right to prosecute in the District Court and on appeal). 
Any verdict in favor of the Taylors based upon the claim that :\1.ailes were not entitled to 
pursue their counterclaims prior to issuance of the final decision in Taylor 2 would necessarily 
contradict the prior ruling of Judge Wilper and the Idaho Supreme Court in Taylor 2, and violate 
the doctrine of res judicata 
MOTION AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO PRECLUDE COUNTERCLAI\1ANTS 
FROM USE OR REFERENCE TO EXHIBITS 11 AND 5, OR ISSUES RAISED THEREIN - Pg 7 
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Counterdaimants' Exhibit 5 is inadmissible 
Under IRE Rule 402 
Counterclaimants propose to introduce a 2005 offer to purchase the property involved in 
the prior lawsuit. The offer preceded the date of issuance of the Supreme Court's decision in 
Taylor 1 in December, 2005. At the time that the offer was made, the District Court had 
cJismissed the Taylors' beneficiaries claims, which were on appeal, and had ruled that the trust 
coulcJ not rescind the sale ofthe property to the Mailes. The evidence of this offer is apparentty 
intended for the inference that Mailes did not pay fair market value for the property when they 
purchased it in 2002. That issue is foreclosed based on the final judgment in Taylor 1. In opening 
statement, counsel informed the jury that this value fixed the amount of the countercl aimants' 
damages based on a reduction in value from that date. Until they present evidence that Mailes 
engaged in some tortious 'wrongful conduct that preceded that date, the offer is irrelevant. 
The counter-c]aimants should be prohibited from referencing the November 2006 Order 
or introducing the same into evidence. The Counterclaimants should also be precluded from 
introducing Exhibit 5 or any other evidence of the purported 2005 offer. 
DATED this 151 day of Feb:mary, 2011. 
.. ~'> 
/ .:t.:-,-. ~) / . 
CHRIST T~ TRatffiS, 
Co-counsel for Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants 
MOTION AND MEMORANDl.JM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO PRECLUDE COUNTERCLAIMANTs 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on this 151 day of February, 2011, I caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing PLAINTIFFS/COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' MOTION AND 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO PROHIBIT 
COUNTERCLAIMANTS FROM USE OR REFERENCE TO EXHIBITS II AND 5, to 
be delivered, addressed as follows: 
----._­t 
i	 Connie W. Taylor ( ) u. S. Mail 
Paul Henderson ( ) Facsimile Transmission 
Henderson Law Firm ( ) Hand Delivery 
900 Washington St. Suitc~ 1020 ( ) Overnight Delivery 
Vancouver, Washington 98660 (X) Email 
Facsimile: (360) 693-2911 
, () U. S. Mail
 
Thomas G. Maile, IV. () Facsimile Transmission
 
380 W. State Street (X) Hand Delivery
 
i	 Eagle, Idaho 83616 () Overnight Delivery 
Facsimile: (208) 939-1001 
.... l __~~ 
MOTION AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO PRECLUDE COUNTERCLAIMANTS 
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1299 E. Iron Eagle, Ste 130 
POBox 2408 
Eagle, Idaho 83616 
Telephone: 208/938-5584 
Facsimile: 208/938-5482 
Email: ctroupis@troupislaw.com 
Co-counsel for Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants 
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COMES NOW, the Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants, by and through their co-counsel of 
record, Christ T. Troupis, and present the following Objection and Motion to Preclude the 
introduction of Counterclaimants' Exhibits 11 and 5, and to make any reference to the matters set 
out in those exhibits. 
I. 
~ounterclaimants' Exhibit 11 is inadmissible 
Under IRE Rule 402 and 608 
The Counter-Claimants have listed as a proposed exhibit the Memorandum Decision and 
Order Denying Counterclaimant's Claim for Damages Grounded on the Theory of Unjust 
Enrichment entered November 29,2006 by Judge Wilper. The exhibit offers at least hvo 
fundamental problems that the counter-claimants cannot overcome. 
First, the exhibit is irrelevant and inadmissible under IRE Rule 402. Counterclaimants 
referred to comments made in Exhibit 11 by Judge Wilper about "sharp practices" and "self 
dealing." Those comments are offered solely to make the inference that the Maile was untruthful 
or untrustworthy as an attack upon his character. 
Judge Wilper's comments, quoted by Counterclaimants' counsel in her opening 
statement, are not compet.ent evidence that is relevant and material to the issues in this case. 
Moreover, they were entirely dicta and not used to support his conclusion that the improvements 
did not benefit the Theodore Johnson Trust, which was the specific finding made by the Court. It 
cannot be cited as a finding of the Court relevant to these proceedings. 
As noted in State v. Sherrod, 131 [d. 56, 951 P.2d 1283 (1998), a statement not necessary 
to support the prior judgment does not constitute a settled issue of fact or law that would raise 
MOTION AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO PRECLUDE COUNTERCLAIMANTS 
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collateral estoppel. That case states that collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, "means simply 
that when an issue of ultimate fact has once been detennined by a valid and final judgment, that 
issue cannot again be litigated between the same parties in any future lawsuit. Such a 
determination of a factual issue will preclude its re-litigation if the resolution of that issue 
was necessary to support the prior judgmen1 (emphasis added)". This principle of issue 
preclusion applies in criminal as well as civil cases. 
The comments of Judge Wilper were not findings because he made his decision without 
reference to his beliefs about Mr. Maile's purported conduct during the sale transaction with the 
decedent. On page 5 of his decision, he stated: "Nevertheless, the Court believes that this case 
can be decided on its merits by analyzing the elements of the unjust enrichment claim, without 
proclaiming that Mr, Maile is barred from seeking equitable relief based on the doctrine of 
unclean hands", The dicta in Judge Wilper's ruling is therefore not relevant nor material to any 
issue in this case. 
The Taylors attempted use of the November 2006 Decision is a maneuver to put before 
the jury two statements about Mr. Maile's character, "self dealing" and "sharp practices", that 
are not probative, but are inflammatory and prejudicial. These tenns were used in reference to 
Mr. Maile's relationship ",..ith Ted Johnson and his drafting oftbe contract between Ted Johnson 
and himself. Those issues were litigated and resolved in Taylor 1. When he makes a comment 
that is not incorporated into a specific finding necessary to the judgment, Judge Wilper has no 
different standing than any other third party called as a witness to impeach a party's character. 
His statements must comply with IRE Rule 608 to be admissible. 
MOTION AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO PRECLUDE COUNTERCLAIMANTS 
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The Taylors are not trying to take such an opinion and interject the same into the abuse of 
process and interference of business advantage claims, inferring the same behavior applied to 
asserting counterclaims in response to Taylors' complaint or pursuing the appeal in Taylor v. 
Maile 2 or in filing the perjury complaint. The actions referenced by Judge Wilper had nothing 
to do with the appeal proeess, the counterclaims, or the perjury complaint. In fact Judge Wilper 
after making such commc:~nts went on to allow the MaBes to maintain the lis pendens during the 
appeal of Taylor v. Maile 2 because he found that it was proper, and not frivolous, unreasonable, 
or without foundation. TIle counter-claimants are attempting to interj ect these comments for an 
improper purpose. 
Second, this proposed use of Judge Wilper's statements about Mr. Maile to attack his 
character and conduct in the initial sale transaction is not permitted under the Idaho RuJes of 
Evidence. I.R.E. Rule 608 provides: 
Evidence of character and conduct of witness 
(a) Opinion and reputation evidence of character. The credibility ofa witness may be 
attacked or supported by evidence in the form ofopinion or reputation, but subject to 
these limitations: (1) the evidence may refer only to character for truthfulness or 
untruthfulness, and (2) evidence oftruthful character is admissible only after the 
character of the witness for truthfulness has been attacked by opinion or reputation 
evidence or othenvise. 
(b) Specific instances of conduct. Specific instances ofthe conduct ofa witness, for the 
purpose ofattacking or supporting the credibility, of the witness, other than conviction of 
crime as provided in Rule 609, may not be proved by extrinsic evidence. They may, 
however, in the discretion of the court, if probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness, be 
inquired into on cross-examination of the witness concerning (1) the character of the 
witness for truthfulness or untruthfulness, or (2) the character for truthfulness or 
untruthfulness ofanother witness as to which character the witness being cross-examined 
has testified. 
MOTION AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO PRECLUDE COUNTERCLAIMANTS 
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The introduction of the exhibit would violate the above rule of evidence. Then~ is no 
evidence, nor will there be any evidence presented, that any opinions regarding truthfUllness or 
untruthfulness of Tom Maile were raised before Judge Wilper. 
Counterclaimants' other proposed use ofthe document is also irrelevant. They informed 
the jury that this document establishes the value of property in October 2006. If that is relevant 
and material to any issue in this case, the court can take judicial notice of the finding ~.rithout 
offering Exhibit 11 into evidence. However, Counterdefendants object to the introduction of that 
finding as well as the Exhibit on the grounds that Counterclaimants cannot establish that the 
value of the property in October 2006 is relevant and material to any issue in this case, until they 
establish that Counterdef~~ndantsengaged in wrongful conduct that constituted either abuse of 
process or intentional interference that preceded that date. The sole purpose of establishing value 
is to prove that the value has declined and argue that Mailes are liable for the differenc1e because 
of their alleged wrongful conduct. 
After the District Court entered its order on November, 2006, the case was appealed to 
the Idaho Supreme Court. The decision was rendered on January 30, 2009. A notice of lis 
pendens was properly recorded during the entire appeal. Although the 'peIjury complaint' was 
served in March, 2008, the parties stipulated to a stay of proceedings until the Supreme Court 
ruled in Taylor 2. The filing ofthe 'perjury complaint' did not cause any delay in the n:ndering 
of the Supreme Court's opinion, and its Notice of Lis Pendens was only operative after the 
Supreme Court issued its :remittitur in April, 2009. 
MOTION AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO PRECLUDE COUNTERCLAIMANTS 
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The elements of intentional interference require proof that the interference was wrongful 
by some measure beyond the fact of the interference itself. Moreover, Counterclaimants in their 
opening advised the jury that Mr. Maile was represented by six attorneys at various times during 
the litigation history and at some times was acting as his own attorney. To the extent that the sole 
conduct CountercIaimants intend to present as evidence of tortious conduct occurred during the 
course of the litigation and consisted of filing pleadings and presenting claims, that conduct 
would be subject to a litigation privilege. 
Although Thomas Maile filed certain motions pro se before the Supreme Court in 
attempting to augment the record, the Supreme Court appellants briefs were submitted by the 
Office of Dennis Charney and the Law Offices of Thomas Maile on behalfof a corporate client, 
Berkshire Investments, LLC as well as the individuals, Tom and Colleen Maile. A corporation 
cannot represent itself but must be represented by an attorney, acting in his capacity as an 
attorney. This court has previously ruled that the litigation privilege applied to attorneys and not 
parties. The Litigation privilege should apply to any allegations, facts, statements, etc., which are 
contained in the briefIng before the Supreme Court in Taylor v. Maile 2. 
The Court is aware that Judge Wilper entered an order allowing the Lis Pendens to be 
recorded and maintained throughout the appeal process, and denied Taylors' motion for 
attorneys fees finding that the Mailes' actions in litigating their claims throughout that 
proceeding were not frivolous, unreasonable or without foundation. The Court is also aware that 
the Supreme Court in Taylor 2 denied Taylors' motion for attorneys' fees on the same basis and 
affiooed the finding of the District Court in that regard. Taylors' contention that Mailes abused 
MOTION AND MEMORANI)UM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO PRECLUDE COUNTERCLAIMANTS 
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the process of the court and intentionally interfered with Taylors' economic interests solely by 
asserting these legitimate counterclaims in the trial court and on appeal in the case brought by the 
Taylors, is not tenable. The case ofCarter v. Carter, 143 Idaho 373, 146 P.3d 639 (2006) 
provides at p. 648 of 146 P.3d: It is not a tort where one acts to protect her own economic 
interests, even if there is interference with the contract expectancy of another, so long.as the acts 
of the intervenor are not independently \VTongful. In Highland Enterprises, Inc. v. Barker, 133 
Idaho 330, 338, 986 P.2d 996, 1004 (1999), the elements of that claim are listed as follows: 
""( 1) The existence ofa valid economic expectancy; (2) knowledge ofthe expectancy on 
the part of the interferer; (3) intentional interference inducing tennination ofth(~ 
expectancy; (4) the interference was v..Tongful by some measure beyond the fact of the 
interference itself (i.e. that the defendant interfered for an improper purpose or improper 
means) and (5) resulting damage to the plaintiff whose expectancy has been disrupted." 
As noted above, the Court in Taylor 2 has already ruled that the Mailes properly brought 
their counterclaims and properly pursued them on appeal, and that the filing of a Notice ofLis 
Pendens during the appellate process through the remittitur of Taylor 2 in April, 2009 was 
proper. The orders ofJudge Wilper and the Supreme Court denying Taylors' requests for 
attorneys fees as a sanction for bringing claims that were "frivolous, Wlfeasonable, or ~lithout 
foundation" conclusively establish that Mailes used proper means, and had a proper purpose (i.e. 
they had legitimate claims that they had a right to prosecute in the District Court and on appeal). 
Any verdict in fave)r of the Taylors based upon the claim that MaiJes were not entitled to 
pursue their counterclaims prior to issuance of the final decision in Taylor 2 would necessarily 
contradict the prior ruling ofJudge Wilper and the Idaho Supreme Court in Taylor 2, and violate 
the doctrine of res judicata. 
MOTION AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO PRECLUDE COUNTERCLAIMANTS 
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Counterclaimants' Exhibit 5 is inadmissible 
Under IRE Rule 402 
Counterclaimants propose to introduce a 2005 offer to purchase the property involved in 
the prior lawsuit. The offer preceded the date of issuance of the Supreme Court's decision in 
Taylor 1 in December, 2005. At the time that the offer was made, the District Court had 
dismissed the Taylors' beneficiaries claims, which were on appeal, and had ruled that the trust 
could not rescind the sale of the property to the Mailes. The evidence of this offer is apparently 
intended for the inference that MaBes did not pay fair market value for the property when they 
purchased it in 2002. That issue is foreclosed based on the final judgment in Taylor 1. In opening 
statement, counsel infomled the jury that this value fixed the amount of the cOlU1terclaimants' 
damages based on a redw:tion in value from that date. Until they present evidence that Mailes 
engaged in some tortious \\Tongful conduct that preceded that date, the offer is irrelevant. 
The counter-claimants should be prohibited from referencing the November 2006 Order 
or introducing the same into evidence. The Counterc1aimants should also be precluded from 
introducing Exhibit 5 or any other evidence of the purported 2005 offer. 
DATED this 1st day ofFebruary, 2011. 
.~\ 
/.-'t.:,'-. l) I.· 
CHRIST T~ TRODPiS, 
Co--counsel for Plaintiffs/Counter-Defend~Ults 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on this 151 day of Febmary, 2011, I caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing PLAINTIFFS/COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' MOTION AND 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO PROHIBIT 
COUNTERCLAIMANTS FROM USE OR REFERENCE TO EXHIBITS 11 AND 5, to 
be delivered, addressed as fonows: 
I 
i	 Connie \V. Taylor 
Paul Henderson 
Henderson Law Firm 
900 Washington St. Suite 1020 
Vancouver, Washington 98660 
Facsimile: (360) 693-2911 
Thomas G. Maile, IV.
 
380 W. State Street
 
() u. S. Mail 
() Facsimile Transmission l() Hand Delivery 
() Overnight Delivery 
(X) Email 
( ) U. S. Mail 
( ) Facsimile Transmission 
(X) Hand Delivery 
, Eagle, Idaho 83616 
Facsimile: (208) 939-1001 I ( ) Overnight Delivery 
L­ ..~--. _ 
L1~;:;J ~ 
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an Idaho limited liability, and
 
THOMAS G. MAILE, IV and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE,
 
husband and wife,
 
Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants, 
vs. 
CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR,
 
file/a CONNIE TAYLOR, an individual;
 
DALLAN TAYLOR, an individual;
 
R. JOHN TAYLOR, an individual; 
CLARK and FEENEY, a partnership; 
PAUL T. CLARK, an individual; and 
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INSTRUCTION NO.1 
These instructions explain your duties as jurors and define the law that applies to this 
case. It is your duty to determine the facts, to apply the law set forth in these instructions to those 
facts, and in this way to decide the case. Your decision should be based upon a rational and 
objective assessment of the evidence. It should not be based on sympathy or prejudice. 
It is my duty to instruct you on the points of law necessary to decide the case, and it is 
your duty to follow the law as I instruct. You must consider these instructions as a whole, not 
picking out one and disregarding others. The order in which these instructions are given or the 
manner in which they are numbered has no significance as to the importance of any of them. If 
you do not understand an instruction, you may send a note to me through the bailiff, and I will try 
to clarify or explain the point further. 
In determining the facts, you may consider only the evidence admitted in this trial. This 
evidence consists of the testimony of the witnesses, the exhibits admitted into evidence, and any 
stipulated or admitted facts. While the arguments and remarks of the attorneys may help you 
understand the evidence and apply the instructions, what they say is not evidence. If an 
attorney's argument or remark has no basis in the evidence, you should disregard it. 
The production of evidence in court is governed by rule of law. At times during the trial, 
I may sustain an objection to a question without permitting the witness to answer it, or to an 
offered exhibit without n:ceiving it into evidence. My rulings are legal matters, and are solely 
my responsibility. You must not speculate as to the reason for any objection, which was made, or 
my ruling thereon, and in reaching your decision you may not consider such a question or exhibit 
002258
-

or speculate as to what the answer or exhibit would have shown. Remember, a question is not 
evidence and should be considered only as it gives meaning to the answer. 
There may be occasions where an objection is made after an answer was given or the 
remark was made, and in my ruling on the objection I will instruct that the answer or remark be 
stricken, or direct that you disregard the answer or remark and dismiss it from your minds. In 
your deliberations, you must not consider such answer or remark, but must treat it as though you 
had never heard it.] 
The law does not require you to believe all of the evidence admitted in the course of the 
trial. As the sole judges of the facts, you must determine what evidence you believe and what 
weight you attach to it. In so doing, you bring with you to this courtroom all of the experience 
and background of your lives. There is no magical formula for evaluating testimony. In your 
everyday affairs, you determine for yourselves whom you believe, what you believe and how 
much weight you attach to what you are told. The considerations you use in making the more 
important decisions in your everyday dealings are the same considerations you should apply in 
your deliberations in this case. 
2
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INSTRUCTION NO.2 
These instructions explain your duties as jurors and define the law that applies to this 
case. It is your duty to detennine the facts, to apply the law set forth in these instructions to those 
facts, and in this way to decide the case. Your decision should be based upon a rational and 
objective assessment of the evidence. It should not be based on sympathy or prejudice. 
It is my duty to instruct you on the points of law necessary to decide the case, and it is 
your duty to follow the law as I instruct. You must consider these instructions as a whole, not 
picking out one and disregarding others. The order in which these instructions are given or the 
manner in which they are numbered has no significance as to the importance of any of them. If 
you do not understand an instruction, you may send a note to me through the bailiff, and I will try 
to clarify or explain the point further. 
In detennining the facts, you may consider only the evidence admitted in this trial. This 
evidence consists of the testimony of the witnesses, the exhibits admitted into evidence, and any 
stipulated or admitted facts. While the arguments and remarks of the attorneys may help you 
understand the evidence and apply the instructions, what they say is not evidence. If an 
attorney's argument or remark has no basis in the evidence, you should disregard it. 
The production of evidence in court is governed by rule of law. At times during the trial, 
I may sustain an objection to a question without pennitting the witness to answer it, or to an 
offered exhibit without receiving it into evidence. My rulings are legal matters, and are solely 
my responsibility. You must not speculate as to the reason for any objection, which was made, or 
my ruling thereon, and in reaching your decision you may not consider such a question or exhibit 
002260
or speculate as to what the answer or exhibit would have shown. Remember, a question is not 
evidence and should be considered only as it gives meaning to the answer. 
There may be occasions where an objection is made after an answer was given or the 
remark was made, and in my ruling on the objection I will instruct that the answer or remark be 
stricken, or direct that you disregard the answer or remark and dismiss it from your minds. In 
your deliberations, you must not consider such answer or remark, but must treat it as though you 
had never heard it.] 
The law does not require you to believe all of the evidence admitted in the course of the 
trial. As the sale judges of the facts, you must determine what evidence you believe and what 
weight you attach to it. In so doing, you bring with you to this courtroom all of the experience 
and background of your lives. There is no magical formula for evaluating testimony. In your 
everyday affairs, you determine for yourselves whom you believe, what you believe and how 
much weight you attach to what you are told. The considerations you use in making the more 
important decisions in your everyday dealings are the same considerations you should apply in 
your deliberations in this case. 
2
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INSTRUCTION NO.3
 
During your deliberations, you will be entitled to have with you my instructions 
concerning the law that applies to this case, the exhibits that have been admitted into evidence 
and any notes taken by you in the course of the trial proceedings. 
If you take notes during the trial, be careful that your attention is not thereby diverted 
from the witness or his testimony; and you must keep your notes to yourself and not show them 
to other persons or jurors until the jury deliberations at the end of the trial. 
002262
 
 
 
-INSTRUCTION NO.4 
Any statement by me identifying a claim of a party is not evidence in this case. I have 
advised you of the claims of the parties merely to acquaint you with the issues to be decided. 
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INSTRUCTION NO.5 
When I say that a party has the burden of proof on a proposition, or use the expression "if 
you find" or "if you decide," I mean you must be persuaded that the proposition is more probably 
true than not true. 
002264
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INSTRUCTION NO.6
 
Certain evidence may be presented to you by deposition. A deposition is testimony taken 
under oath before the trial and preserved in writing or upon video tape. This evidence is entitled 
to the same consideration you would give had the witness testified from the witness stand. 
You will only receive this testimony in open court. Although there is a record of the 
deposition testimony, this record will not be available to you during your deliberations. 
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INSTRUCTION NO.7
 
Evidence may be either direct or circumstantial. Direct evidence is evidence that directly 
proves a fact. Circumstantial evidence is evidence that indirectly proves the fact, by proving one 
or more facts from which the fact at issue may be inferred. 
The law makes no distinction between direct and circumstantial evidence as to the degree 
of proof required; each is accepted as a reasonable method ofproof and each is respected for such 
convincing force as it may carry. 
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INSTRUCTION NO.8 
It is important that as jurors and officers of this court you obey the following instructions 
at any time you leave the jury box, whether it be for recesses of the court during the day or when 
you leave the courtroom to go home at night. 
Do not discuss this case during the trial with anyone, including any of the attorneys, 
parties, witnesses, your fj-iends, or members of your family. "No discussion" also means no 
emailing, text messaging, tweeting, blogging, posting to electronic bulletin boards, and any other 
form of communication, electronic or otherwise. 
Do not discuss this case with other jurors until you begin your deliberations at the end of 
the trial. Do not attempt to decide the case until you begin your deliberations. 
I will give you some form of this instruction every time we take a break. I do that not to 
insult you or because I don't think you are paying attention, but because experience has shown 
this is one of the hardest instructions for jurors to follow. I know of no other situation in our 
culture where we ask strangers to sit together watching and listening to something, then go into a 
little room together and not talk about the one thing they have in common: what they just 
watched together. 
There are at least two reasons for this rule. The first is to help you keep an open mind. 
When you talk about things, you start to make decisions about them and it is extremely 
important that you not make any decisions about this case until you have heard all the evidence 
and all the rules for making your decisions, and you won't have that until the very end of the 
trial. The second reason for the rule is that we want all of you working together on this decision 
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when you deliberate. If you have conversations in groups of two or three during the trial, you 
won't remember to repeat all of your thoughts and observations for the rest of your fellow jurors 
when you deliberate at tht~ end of the trial. 
Ignore any attempted improper communication. If any person tries to talk to you about 
this case, tell that person that you cannot discuss the case because you are a juror. If that person 
persists, simply walk away and report the incident to the bailiff. 
Do not make any independent personal investigations into any facts or locations 
connected with this case. Do not look up any information from any source, including the 
Internet. Do not communicate any private or special knowledge about any of the 11ctS of this 
case to your fellow jurors. Do not read or listen to any news reports about this case or about 
anyone involved in this case, whether those reports are in newspapers or the Internet, or on radio 
or television. 
In our daily lives we may be used to looking for information on-line and to "Google" 
something as a matter of routine. Also, in a trial it can be very tempting for jurors to do their 
own research to make sure they are making the correct decision. You must resist that temptation 
for our system of justice to work as it should. I specifically instruct that you must decide the case 
only on the evidence received here in court. If you communicate with anyone about the case or 
do outside research during the trial it could cause us to have to start the trial over with new jurors 
and you could be held in contempt of court. 
While you are actually deliberating in the jury room, the bailiff will confiscate all cell 
phones and other means of electronic communications. Should you need to communicate with 
me or anyone else during the deliberations, please notify the bailiff. 
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INSTRUCTION NO.9
 
You have now heard all the evidence in the case. My duty is to instruct you as to the law. 
You must follow all the rules as I explain them to you. You may not follow some and 
ignore others. Even if you disagree or don't understand the reasons for some of the rules, you are 
bound to follow them. If anyone states a rule of law different from any I tell you, it is my 
instruction that you must follow. 
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INSTRUCTION NO.1 0 
On the claim of abuse of process, the Counterclaimants have the burden of 
proof on each of the following propositions: 
(l) The Counter-defendants committed a willful act in the use of 
legal process not proper in the regular course of the proceeding 
(2) The act was committed for an ulterior, improper purpose 
You will be asked the following question on the jury verdict form: 
Did the Counter-defendants commit an abuse of process? 
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence in the case that each 
of the propositions contained in this instruction has been proved, you should 
answer the jury question "yes." If you find that any of these propositions has not 
been proved, you should answer the question "no." 
002270
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INSTRUCTION NO. 11 
On the claim of intentional interference with a prospective economic advantage against 
the Counter-defendants, the Counterclaimants have the burden of proof on each of the following 
propositions: 
1) The existence of a valid economic expectancy; 
2) knowledge of the expectancy on the part of the interferer; 
3) intentional interference inducing termination of the expectancy; 
4) the interference was wrongful by some measure beyond the fact of the mterference 
itself; and 
5) resulting damage to the Counterclaimants whose expectancy has been disrupted. 
You will be asked the following question on the jury verdict form: 
Did the Counter-Defendants intentionally interfere with a prospective economIC 
advantage? 
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each of these propositions has 
been proved, then you should answer this question "yes." If you find from your consideration of 
all ofthe evidence that any of these propositions has not been proved, then you should answer 
this question "no." 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 12 
To establish that the intentional interference resulting in injury was wrongful, a party may 
offer proof that either: "(1) the defendant had an improper objective or purpose to harm the 
plaintiff; or (2) the defendant used a wrongful means to cause injury to the prospective business 
relationship." 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 13 
Intent may be established by inference as well as by direct proof. 
002273
INSTRUCTION NO. 14 
By giving you instructions on the subject of damages, I do not express any opinion as to 
whether the Counterclaimants are entitled to damages. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 15 
If the jury decides the Counterc1aimants are entitled to recover from the Counter 
defendants, the jury must determine the amount of money that will reasonably and fairly 
compensate the plaintiffs for any of the following elements of damages proved by the evidence to 
have resulted from the defendants' conduct: 
1. As to the interference with a prospective economic advantage, any diminution in 
value of the real estate or expenses related to the real estate in issue from the time of the 
commencement of the interference to the time the interference ended. You are instructed that any 
wrongful interference with Counterc1aimants' prospective advantage could not commence before 
January 30,2009, the date the decision was rendered by the Idaho Supreme Court in the second 
appeal of the case of Taylor vs. Maille. 
2. As to the abuse of process, any cost of defending against the conduct found by you to 
be an abuse. 
Whether any of these elements of damage has been proved is for you to determine. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 16 
In deciding this case, you may not delegate any of your decisions to another or decide any 
question by chance, such as by the flip of a coin or drawing of straws. If money damages are to 
be awarded you may not agree in advance to average the sum of each individual juror's estimate 
as the method of determining the amount of the damage award. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 17 
If it becomes necessary during your deliberations to communicate with me, you may send 
a note signed by one or more of you to the bailiff. You should not try to communicate with me 
by any means other than such a note. 
During your deliberations, you are not to reveal to anyone how the jury stands on any of 
the questions before you, numerically or otherwise, unless requested to do so by me. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 18 
I have given you the rules of law that apply to this case. I have instructed you regarding 
matters that you may consider in weighing the evidence to determine the facts. In a few minutes 
counsel will present their closing arguments to you and then you will retire to the jury room for 
your deliberations. 
Each of you has an equally important voice in the jury deliberations. Therefore, the 
attitude and conduct ofjurors at the beginning of the deliberations are important. At the outset of 
deliberations, it is rarely productive for a juror to make an emphatic expression of opinion on the 
case or to state how he or she intends to vote. When one does that at the beginning, one's sense 
of pride may be aroused and there may be reluctance to change that position, even if shown that it 
is wrong. Remember that you are not partisans or advocates, but you arc judges. For you, as for 
me, there can be no triumph except in the ascertainment and declaration of the truth. 
Consult with one another. Consider each other's views. Deliberate with the objective of 
reaching an agreement, if you can do so without disturbing your individual judgment. Each of 
you must decide this case for yourself; but you should do so only after a discussion and 
consideration of the case with your fellow jurors. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 19 
On retiring to the jury room, select one of your number as a foreman, who will preside 
over your deliberations. 
An appropriate form of verdict will be submitted to you with any instructions. Follow the 
directions on the verdict form, and answer all of the questions required of you by the instructions 
on the verdict form. 
A verdict may be reached by three-fourths of your number, or nine of you. As soon as 
nine or more of you shall have agreed upon each of the required questions in the verdict, you 
should fill it out as instructed, and have it signed. It is not necessary that the same nine agree on 
each question. If your verdict is unanimous, your foreman alone will sign it; but if nine or more, 
but less than the entire jury, agree, then those so agreeing will sign the verdict. 
As soon as you have completed and signed the verdictl, you will notify the bailiff, who 
will then return you into open court. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADAByt(AT~p~~NSON 
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an 
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G. 
Case No. CV OC 0723232MAILE, IV, and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE 
husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs / Counter-Defendants, 
vs. 
CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, f/k/a VERDICT 
CONNIE TAYLOR, an individual; DALLAN 
TAYLOR, an individual; R. JOHN 
TAYLOR, an individual; CLARK AND 
FEENEY, a partnership; PAUL T. CLARK, 
an individual; THEODORE L. JOHNSON 
REVOCABLE TRUST, an Idaho revocable 
trust; JOHN DOES I - JOHN DOES X; AND 
ALL PERSONS IN POSSESSION OR 
CLAIMING ANY RIGHT TO 
POSSESSION. 
Defendants / Counterc1aimants. 
We, the Jury, answer the special interrogatories as follows:
 
Question No. 1: Did the Counter-Defendants commit an abuse of process?
 
Answer to Question No. 1:: Yes [ ~ No[_]
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Question No.2: Did the Counter-Defendants intentionally interfere with a prospective economic
 
advantage?
 
Answer to Question No.2: Yes [v1 No [_]
 
If you answered "Yes" to either or both of questions 1 and 2, answer Question No.3.
 
Question No.3: What is the total amount of damage sustained by the Counterclaimants as a
 
result of the conduct of the Counter-Defendants?
 
Answer to Question No. .3: We assess Counterclaimants' damages as follows: 
, 
.,JL-~.£Z}'~..:......Ioe~~.L~ 1/ z 
-M;;. 
DATED this ~-£;:;--. day of February 2011. 
~R~.f}v ')l. 
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A.M. P.M. 
FEB 11 2011 
Christ T. Troupis, ISB # 4549 
TROUPIS LAW OFFICE CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
By ELYSHIA HOLMES 1299 E. Iron Eagle, Ste 130 DEPUTY 
PO Box 2408 
Eagle, Idaho 83616 
Telephone: 208/938-5584 
Facsimile: 208/938-5482 
Email: ctroupis@troupislaw.com 
Co-Counsel for Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an 
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G. Case No. CV-OC 07-23232 
MAILE, IV. and COLLEEN BIRCH­
MAILE, husband and wife, PLAINTIFFS/COUNTER­
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR 
Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants, JUDGMENT NOT 
WITHSTANDING THE VERDICT 
v. 
CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, f/k/a 
CONNIE TAYLOR, an individual; DALLAN 
TAYLOR, an individual; R. JOHN 
TAYLOR, an individual; CLARK and 
FEENEY, a partnership; PAUL T. CLARK, 
an individual; THEODORE L. JOHNSON 
REVOCABLE TRUST, an Idaho revocable 
trust; JOHN DOES I -JOHN DOES X; AND 
ALL PERSONS IN POSSESSION OR 
CLAIMING ANY RIGHT TO 
POSSESSION. 
Defendants/Counter-Claimants. 
COMES NOW the Plaintiffs/Counter-defendant by and through their undersigned co­
counsel of record, Christ Troupis, and moves this Honorable Court for an entry of a Judgment 
Not Withstanding the Verdict, relating to the jury verdict which was returned on February 4, 
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·- itJf-""FI"""LE~  -
 
-
 
 i al;.
 i al;.
-
-
2011. 
The requested reli(~f is based upon the grounds that Counter-Claimants, R. John Taylor 
and Dallan Taylor, individually should be stricken from any Judgment as the court in its 
comments on the directed verdict motion indicated that said individuals were acting on behalf of 
the trust as trustees and not as individuals. That in addition, the counter-claimants failed to 
provide any evidence beyond the allegation that the mere filing of the perjury complaint was an 
abuse of process and that the counter-claimants failed to demonstrate that there was any 
independent wrongful interference which could have given rise to any claim for any inference 
with a prospective business advantage. The Counter Claimants failed as a matter of law to 
provide evidence to support the jury's verdict and failed to demonstrate that the mere filing of a 
Complaint and the filing of a lis pendens gave rise to an abuse of process claim and/or the failed 
to provide proof of an interference to a prospective economic expectancy as a matter of law 
and/or failed to prove that litigation privilege did not apply to all counter-defendants. 
This Motion is made pursuant to I.R.C.P. Rule 50 (a)(b), and is further made based upon 
the record and file contained herein, and the Memorandum Brief in Support of the Motion, filed 
concurrently herewith. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs/Counter-defendants requests this Honorable Court enter its 
Judgment Not Withstanding the Verdict. 
ORAL ARGUMENT is requested upon the motion. 
DATED this 11 th day of February, 2011. 
~J-o _ 
CHRIST T. TR~o-counsel for 
Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants 
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O IS, Co-counsel 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on this 11 th day of February, 2011, I caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing (1) PLAINTIFFS/COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR 
JUDGMENT NOT WITHSTANDING THE VERDICT, together with (2) MEMORANDUM 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NOT WITHSTANDING THE 
VERDICT to be delivered, addressed as follows: 
I 
i Connie W. Taylor i ( ) U. S. Mail l, 
I Henderson Law Finn 
! 900 Washington St. Suite 1020 
I (X) 
! ( ) 
Facsimile Transmission 
Hand Delivery 
I 
i 
. Vancouver, Washington 98660 I ( ) Overnight Delivery 
Facsimile: (360) 693-2911 
Thomas G. Maile, IV. ( ) u. S. Mail 
380 W. State Street (X) Facsimile Transmission 
.• Eagle, Idaho 83616 ( ) Hand Delivery 
. Facsimile: (208) 939-1001 ( ) Overnight Delivery 
--'-----------------~ 
~=---
Co-counsel for Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants 
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Christ T. Troupis, ISB # 4549 NO. lto Q FILI~D 
A.M.__--'-'D.L...-I'.M _TROUPIS LAW OFFICE 
1299 E. Iron Eagle, Ste 130 FEB 1 'I 2011PO Box 2408 
Eagle, Idaho 83616 CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
Telephone: 208/938-5584 By ELYSHIA HOLMES 
DEPUTYFacsimile: 208/938-5482 
Email: ctroupis@troupislaw.com 
Co-Counsel for Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUJ'JTY OF ADA 
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an 
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G. Case No. CV-OC 07-23232 
MAILE, IV. and COLLEEN BIRCH­
MAILE, husband and wife, MEMORANDUM BRIEF IN SUPPORT 
OF COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' 
Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants, MOTION FOR J.N.O.V. 
v. 
CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, flkla 
CONNIE TAYLOR, an individual; DALLAN 
TAYLOR, an individual; R. JOHN 
TAYLOR, an individual; CLARK and 
FEENEY, a partnership; PAUL T. CLARK, 
an individual; THEODORE L. JOHNSON 
REVOCABLE TRUST, em Idaho revocable 
trust; JOHN DOES I -JOHN DOES X; AND 
ALL PERSONS IN POSSESSION OR 
CLAIMING ANY RIGHT TO 
POSSESSION. 
Defendants/Counter-Claimants. 
COMES NOW the Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants by and through their undersigned 
counsel of record, Christ Troupis, and provides this Honorable Court with the following 
MEMORANDUM BRIE."' IN SUPPORT OF COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR 
J.N.O.V. - Pg 1 
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memorandum brief in support ofPlaintiffs/Counter-Defendants' Motion for Judgement Not 
Withstanding the Verdict, as follows. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
When an appellate court reviews a motion for J.N.O.V. under LR.C.P. 50(b), the motion 
is treated as a delayed motion for a directed verdict and the same standard for both is applied. 
Quick v. Crane, 111 Idaho 759, 763, 727 P.2d 1187, 1191 (1986). When ruling on a motion for 
J.N.O.V. the trial court must determine whether there is substantial evidence to support the jury's 
verdict. Lanham v. Idaho Power Co., 130 Idaho 486, 495,943 P.2d 912,921 (1997). "Upon a 
motion for J.N.O.V. the moving party, admits the truth of all the adverse evidence and all 
inferences that can be drawn legitimately from it." ld. (citations omitted). It is not a question of 
no evidence on the side of the non-moving party, but rather, whether there is substantial evidence 
upon which ajury could find for the non-moving party. Quick, III Idaho at 763, 727 P.2d at 
1191. 
LEGAL ARGUMENT 
1. The Verdict entered by the Jury was improper based upon the counter·· 
claimants' lack ofproOfon any individual claim ofthe Taylor Brothers & the Trust. 
A motion for a judgment not withstanding the verdict is found under Rule 50(b) LR.C.P. 
Rule 50(b). Motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict 
A motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict shall be served not later than 
fourteen (14) days after entry of the judgment and may be made whether or not 
the party moved for a directed verdict; or if a verdict was not returned a motion 
for judgment notwithstanding the verdict shall be served not later than fourteen 
(14) days after discharge of the jury. 
In determining whether a motion for a judgment not withstanding the verdict ... should 
have been granted, an appellate court applies the same standard as the court that originally 
MEMORANDUM BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR 
J.N.O.V. -Pg. 2 
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passed on the motion." Vendelin v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 140 Idaho 416, 430,95 P.3d 34, 48 
(2004). An appellate court exercises free review and does not defer to the findings of the trial 
court. When doing so, the court determines whether there was sufficient evidence to justify 
submitting the claim to the jury, viewing as true all adverse evidence and drawing every 
legitimate inference in favor of the party opposing the motion for a directed verdict. A directed 
verdict is proper only where the evidence is so clear that all reasonable minds would reach only 
one conclusion-that the moving party should prevail." Gillingham Constr., Inc. v. Newby-
Wiggins Constr., Inc., 136 Idaho 887, 892,42 P.3d 680, 685 (2002). 
1. The counter-claimants' have failed to demonstrate that R. John Taylor and/or Dallan 
Taylor incurred any damages. The evidence submitted to the jury related only to damages 
claimed by the Theodore 1,. Johnson Revocable Trust. Counterclaimants admitted to the Court 
that there were no individual claims by the Taylor brothers. However, the jury was never so 
informed. 
2. The claims of the Theodore 1,. Johnson Revocable Trust likewise must fail and a 
judgment not withstanding the verdict must be entered as a result of failure to provide proof of 
the two claims presented by the counter-claimants. 
The Court determined that the Counterclaimants could not state a claim for the actions of 
the Counterdefendants in the first lawsuit, concluded in January, 2009. The notice of lis pendens 
in that lawsuit was in place until August 3, 2009, a month after the release of the notice of lis 
pendens in the "perjury lawsuit." Counterclaimants did not present any evidence of damages 
sustained by the trust solely by reason of the notice oflis pendens filed in the "perjury lawsuit." 
In fact, R. John Taylor testified that because of the Notice of Lis Pendens filed properly in the 
MEMORANDUM BRIEF' IN SUPPORT OF COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR 
J.N.O.V. - Pg 3 
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first lawsuit that the property could not be marketed, and that the addition of another Notice of 
Lis Pendens in the 'perjury complaint' did not alter that fact. He testified that "0 is 0". 
The remaining claim was that the filing and prosecution of the perjury complaint was an 
abuse of process and resulted in intentional interference. As noted above, there was no proof that 
any damage resulted from the perjury complaint. Damages are an essential element of the tort of 
intentional interference. There was likewise no testimony and no expert opinion that the 
maintenance of the lis pendens in the first case until August 3,2009, when it was removed and 
replaced with a Vendee's Lien, was wrongful. As a result, there was no evidence submitted that 
supported a verdict on the intentional interference claim because there was no proof of any 
damage resulting from wrongful conduct. 
With respect to the filing and prosecution of the perjury complaint, there was substantial 
evidence that Mailes filed the perjury complaint to protect their economic interests, and included 
in that complaint a claim to quiet title to the real property. A notice of lis pendens could properly 
be filed with the perjury complaint, given the nature of its claims. As we have previously argued, 
the decision in Carter v. Carter, 143 Idaho 373, 146 p.3d 639 (2006) established the right of a 
party to institute legal action to protect her economic interests, even if it resulted in interference 
with an economic expectancy of another. An abuse of process claim requires proof that the 
Defendants filed process not proper in the course of the proceedings. The fact that this Court 
dismissed the perjury complaint does not alter the fact that the Notice of Lis Pendens was 
properly filed in conjunction with the Complaint seeking to quiet title to the real property. There 
had been no demonstration that the counter defendant's did anything wrong beyond resorting to 
MEMORANDUM BRIEli' IN SUPPORT OF COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR 
J.N.O.V. pg.4 
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the legal process in an attempt to set aside an earlier Judgment and/or advancing a complaint 
seeking damages. 
The Court in Badell v. Beeks, 115 Idaho 101, 104, 765 P.2d 126, 129 (Idaho 1988), 
dismissed an abuse of process claim, noting: "Even assuming, arguendo, that a factual issue 
exists with regard to an ulterior, improper purpose, there is no evidence of subsequent misuse of 
process after it was lawfully issued." Idaho courts have not extensively discussed the fact that 
the "improper" element of the tort of abuse of process requires a subsequent wrongful act, but 
the Court in Badell, supra, cited the decision in Bickel v. Mackie, 447 F.Supp. 1376, 1382 
(N.D.Iowa 1978) for this proposition. In that case, the Court stated: 
"Abuse of process, ... , is the intentional use of legal process for an improper purpose 
incompatible with the lawful function of the process by one with an ulterior motive in 
doing so, ... The improper use which is the essence of the tort is ordinarily an attempt to 
secure from another some collateral advantage not properly includable in the process 
itself, and is, in Prosser's words, fa form ofextortion' in which a lawfully used process is 
perverted to an unlawful use. (Citation)." 
In clarifying the often confused and confusing nature of "abuse of process'" the court 
continued: 
"Malicious use of process. The fundamental distinction between malicious use ,md 
malicious abuse of process is that the first is an employment of process for its ostensible 
purpose, although without probable cause, whereas the second is employment ofprocess 
for a purpose not contemplated by law. Another distinction is that, in case of malicious 
use, it must be shov.'ll that the action in which the process was used has terminated 
favorably to plaintiff in the suit at bar, whereas this is unnecessary in an action for 
malicious abuse." 72 C.J.S. Process s 119, p. 1188. 
Prosser states: 
Abuse of process differs from malicious prosecution in that the gist of the tort is not 
commencing an action or causing process to issue without justification, but misusing, or 
misapplying process: justified in itself for an end other than that which it was designed to 
accomplish. 
Prosser, Law of Torts, 4th Ed. s 121 (1972) 
Abuse of process requires an improper purpose which "usually takes the form of coercion 
to obtain a collateral advantage, not properly involved in the proceeding itself ... "Id. at 
857." 
MEMORANDUM BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR 
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As courts have dedared in many other jurisdictions, an abuse of process requires more 
than the mere filing of a lawsuit. Seidner v. 1551 Greenfield Owners Assn. (1980) 108 Cal. 
App.3d 895 at p. 904. See also, Tellefsen v. Key System Transit Lines 198 Cal. App.2d 611, 
615, 17 Cal. Rptr. 919 (1961), which held that the mere filing of an appeal does not qualify as an 
abuse of process (Tellefsen, supra, 198 Cal. App.2d at pp. 615- 616 some definite act or threat 
not authorized by the process, or aimed at an object not legitimate in the use of the process, is 
required before a party can sue for abuse ofprocess). Oren Royal Oaks Venture v. Greenberg, 
Bernhard, Weiss & Karma, Inc. (1986) 42 Cal.3d 1157,1169; Friedman v. Stadum (1985) 171 
Cal.App.3d 775, 779-780; Drasin v. Jacoby & Meyers (1984) 150 Cal.App.3d 481, 485; Seidner 
v. 1551 Greenfield Owners Assn. (1980) 108 Cal.App.3d 895, 904-905; Christensen v. Younger 
(1975) 47 Cal.App.3d 613, 617.) S & I Investments v. Payless Flea Market, Inc., 35 Fla. L. 
Weekly D1308, 36 So.3d 909 (Fla. App. 4 Dist. 2010) 
A process is not abused unless there is a definite act or threat beyond the scope of the 
process. As a result, the mere filing of a complaint, regardless of the motive, cannot serve as the 
basis for an abuse of process cause of action. Abraham v. Lancaster Community Hospital (1990) 
217 Cal. App.3d 796, 826. The overwhelming majority of states, that the mere filing of the 
complaint is insufficient to establish the tort of abuse of process. Laxalt v. McClatchy, 622 F. 
Supp. 737, 752 (D. Nev.1985). 
In this case, there was no proof that subsequent to the filing of the perjury complaint and 
lis pendens associated with it, that there was any subsequent misuse of process by the Mailes. 
Thus, there was no basis in law or fact supporting the jury's verdict on the abuse of process 
claim. 
MEMORANDUM BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR 
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Likewise, there was no proof that Mailes did anything "independently wrongful" that 
supported the jury's verdict on the intentional interference claim. As the Court noted in Highland 
Enterprises, Inc. v. Barker, 133 Idaho 330, 338,986 p.2d 996, 1004 (1999), that tort re:quires 
proof that "(4) the interference was wrongful by some measure beyond the fact of the 
interference itself (i.e. that the defendant interfered for an improper purpose or improper 
means)." 
There was a complete lack of evidence from the counter-claimants that the lis pendens in 
either case were independently wrongful. There can be no damages connected to any 'Nfongful 
act stemming from the lis pendens. No one opined the filing of the lis pendens were fi'ivolous or 
wrongful. The record contains that the perjury complaint sought a quiet title action and a 
constructive trust, both of which allow as a matter of law the filing of a lis pendens. 
No one testified on behalf of the counter-claimants that the lis pendens before Judge Wilper was 
wrongful or improper, in light of the fact that the counter-claimant trust continues to owe 
$400,00.00 to the counter-defendants. 
There was no testimony by the counter-claimants to show that the lis pendens in Judge 
Wilper's case remained of record for any improper time or purpose. The Lis Pendens was 
released in August 2009, but no expert or lay opinion indicated the Judge Wilper's lis p,endens 
was a wrongful act after January 30, 2009. 
The issue of whether or not the actions complained of are or are not "wrongful" in this 
context was for the court to determine in defining the issues, and would normally have been 
included in the instructions. The issue for the jury to determine is whether or not the alle:ged 
MEMORANDUM BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR 
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tortfeasor acted in the manner alleged. As a matter of law there was no proof that the actions of 
the counter-defendants were independently wrongful. There was no showing of the same nor 
could any inference be drawn. 
2. The Verdict entered by the Jury was improper based upon the Litigation 
Privilege underlying theflling ofthe perjury complaint 
Although this Court rejected Counterdefendants Motion in Limine with respect to the 
application of the litigation privilege to this case, the evidence presented by the Counterclaimants 
and their argument to the jury throughout the case was directed at Tom Maile's actions as an 
attorney, representing Berkshire Investments, LLC and Colleen Maile. R. John Taylor testified 
that he did not think that Colleen Maile did anything wrong. That testimony was not recanted or 
amended. Dr. Lewis' expe11 opinion was not that no reasonable person would have filed the 
complaint, but that "no reasonable attorney" would have done so. Thus, the case ofTaylor v. 
McNichols, 36130, 36131 (IDSCCI) (2010), is on point and applicable to the facts in this case. 
Based on that ruling, this Court should have determined that the litigation privilege applies to the 
present action. The filing of the perjury complaint and notice oflis pendens was subject to a 
litigation privilege, does not justify the jury verdict and the same should be set aside. 
CONCLUSION 
The Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants respectively request the Court to enter its Judgment 
Not Withstanding the Verdict. 
DATED this 11 th day of February, 2011. 
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Pursuant to Rule 54(d)(5) and Rule 54(e)(1) of the Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure, defendants Connie Wright Taylor, fka Connie Taylor, Clark and Feeney, and Paul T. 
Clark, hereby claim costs and attorney fees incurred in this action brought by plaintiffs. To the 
best of defendants' knowledge and belief, the items claimed herein are correct, and the costs 
claimed are in compliance with this rule. 
Defendants seek attorney fees pursuant to said rules and as provided in Idaho 
Code Sections 12-121 and 12-123 on the ground that the lawsuit was brought frivolously in an 
attempt to merely harass or maliciously injure these defendants and their clients and was not 
supported in fact or warranted under existing law and could not be supported by a good faith 
argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law. This memorandum is also 
based upon the Affidavit ofMark S. Prusynski, setting forth the costs and attorney fees incurred 
herein. 
In Cole v. Kunzler, 115 Idaho 552, 768 P.2d 815 (Ct. App. 1989), the Idaho Court 
of Appeals affirmed an award of attorney fees on the basis that the plaintiffs case was pursued 
unreasonably or frivolously. The plaintiff had filed an action in Cassia County and lost. Rather 
than appeal the result, plaintiff filed another lawsuit alleging slightly different theories, but 
involving the same issues. That lawsuit was dismissed on res judicata grounds. The Court of 
Appeals affirmed the district court's determination that the second lawsuit was frivolous because 
the plaintiffs appropriate remedy would have been to appeal the first decision, rather than file a 
new action in another county and the res judicata defense was "blatantly apparent." Id at 558. 
Similarly, plaintiffs herein were engaged in litigation in Judge Wilper's court in 
which they were unsuccessful. Although they appealed, they also filed this lawsuit involving the 
same property dispute, but argued that the claims and the parties were different, because they 
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sued their opponent's attorneys. The res judicata defense was also "blatantly apparent." Yet, 
plaintiffs strenuously resisted the motion for summary judgment, by re-arguing the issues that 
they lost before Judge Wilper. They fIled a motion to reconsider the summary judgment and 
subpoenaed defendants' paralegal and defendant. 
Finally, the recent jury verdict in which the jury found that plaintiffs were liable 
for abuse of process supports, ifnot mandates, a finding that plaintiffs' pursuit of this action was 
based upon frivolous conduct. 
DATED this / l-tlday ofFebruary, 2011. 
MOFFATT, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK & 
FIELDS, CHARTERED 
BYM~;i!~m 
Attorneys for Defendants/Counterclaimants 
Connie Wright Taylor fka Connie Taylor, 
Clark and Feeney, and Paul T. Clark 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this Ilflday of February, 2011, I caused a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing MEMORANDUM OF COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES to 
be served by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Thomas G. Maile IV 
LA W OFFICES OF THOMAS G MAILE IV, P.A. 
380 W. State St. 
Eagle, ID 83616-4902 
Facsimile (208) 939-100 I 
Christ T. Troupis 
TROUPIS LAW OFFICE, PA 
P.O. Box 2408 
Eagle,ID 83616 
Facsimile (208) 938-5482 
John C. Mitchell 
CLARK & FEENEY 
1229 Main St., Suite 201 
P.O. Box 285 
Lewiston,ID 83501-0285 
Facsimile (208) 746-9160 
COlmie W. Taylor 
HENDERSON LAW 
900 Washington, Suite 1020 
Vancouver, WA 98660 
Facsimile (360) 693-2911 
({US. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
(-{US. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
(1'US. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
(--1U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
MEMORANDUM OF COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES - 4 Client: 1933150.1 002296
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Mark S. Pmsynski, ISB No. 2349 
MOFFATT, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK & 
FIELDS, CHARTERED
 
101 S. Capitol Blvd., 10th Floor
 
Post Office Box 829
 
Boise, Idaho 83701
 
Telephone (208) 345-2000
 
Facsimile (208) 385-5384
 
msp@moffatt.com
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Attorneys for Defendants/Counterclaimants 
Connie Wright Taylor fka Connie Taylor, 
Clark and Feeney, and Paul T. Clark 
NO. /j;.J.f FI~EC> 
A.M'fI ~~ __PJ,L _ 
FEB 18 2011 
CHRISTOPHEH D. RiCH, Clerk
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
 
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an 
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G. 
MAILE, IV, and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE, 
husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants, 
VS. 
CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, fka CONNIE 
TAYLOR, an individual; DALLAN 
TAYLOR, an individual; R. JOHN TAYLOR, 
an individual; CLARK and FEENEY, a 
partnership; PAUL T. CLARK, an individual; 
THEODORE L. JOHNSON REVOCABLE 
TRUST, an Idaho revocable tmst; JOHN 
DOES I-JOHN DOES X; AND ALL 
PERSONS IN POSSESSION OR CLAIMING 
ANY RIGHT TO POSSESSION, 
Defendants/Counterclaimants. 
Case No. CV-OC-0723232 
AFFIDAVIT OF MARK S. PRlJSYNSKI 
IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' 
MEMORANDUM OF COSTS AND 
ATTORNEY FEES 
AFFIDAVIT OF MARK S. PRUSYNSKI IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' 
MEMORANDUM OF COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES - 1 Client19335131 002297
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STATE OF IDAHO )
 
) ss.
 
County of Ada )
 
Mark S. Prusynski, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says: 
1. I am one of the attorneys of record for the Defendants/Counterclaimants 
Connie Wright Taylor fka Connie Taylor, Clark and Feeney, and Paul T. Clark in the above-
entitled action. 
2. I am a partner in the law firm Moffatt, Thomas, Barrett, Rock and Fields, 
Chartered, and am engaged in the general practice of law in Boise, Idaho. As such I am 
personally familiar with the facts and circumstances stated herein. I am acquainted with the 
costs and fees generally incurred by attorneys defending civil cases in Ada County. 
3. I am personally aware of the professional services rendered in this action, 
the costs incurred in preparing the defense of this case, and the amount oftime expended by 
attorneys of this firm in the defense of the claims brought by the plaintiffs as set forth in Exhibit 
A to this affidavit. The rate of $165 per hour is below the partner rates charged by attorneys in 
this area with similar experience. The rate of $130 per hour for my associate is within the range 
of hourly rates charged for associates in this area. 
4. The amount of costs expended by these defendants are $63.81 as of right 
and $214.80 in discretionary costs for a total 0[$278.61, and is attached hereto as ExhIbit B. 
5. That the computed sums for costs are set forth in the computer printouts 
attached hereto as Exhibits A and B. These costs constitute reasonable costs that were 
necessarily incurred in the preparation and prosecution of this matter, and said costs are correct 
and in compliance with Rule 54 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
AFFIDAVIT OF MARK S. PRUSYNSKI IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' 
MEMORANDUM OF COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES - 2 Client: 1933513.1 
002298
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Further your affiant sayeth naught. 
Mark . Prusynski 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this .l.7..-tftJay of February, 2011. 
la-I 'f-Zl)/(;, 
AFFIDAVIT OF MARK S. PRUSYNSKI IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' 
MEMORANDUM OF COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES - 3 Client1933513.1 
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~t f1J  
Residing at Boise, Idaho 
My Commission Expires  zt t:
 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 17.dday of February, 2011, I caused a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF MARK S. PRUSYNSKI IN SUPPORT 
OF DEFENDANTS' MICMORANDUM OF COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES to be served 
by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Thomas G. Maile IV (1us. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
LA W OFFICES OF THOMAS G MAILE IV, P.A. ( ) Hand Delivered 
380 W. State St. ( ) Overnight Mail 
Eagle, ID 83616-4902 ( ) Facsimile 
Facsimile (208) 939-1001 
Christ T. Troupis ( -rUS. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
TROUPIS LAW OFFICE, PA ( ) Hand Delivered 
P.O. Box 2408 ( ) Overnight Mail 
Eagle,ID 83616 ( ) Facsimile 
Facsimile (208) 938-5482 
John C. Mitchell ( YUS. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
CLARK & FEENEY ( ) Hand Delivered 
1229 Main St., Suite 201 ( ) Overnight Mail 
P.O. Box 285 ( ) Facsimile 
Lewiston, ID 83501-0285 
Facsimile (208) 746-9160 
Connie W. Taylor ( {'US. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
HENDERSON LA W ( ) Hand Delivered 
900 Washington, Suite 1020 ( ) Overnight Mail 
Vancouver, WA 98660 ( ) Facsimile 
Facsimile (360) 693-2911 
AFFIDAVIT OF MARK S. PRUSYNSKI IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' 
MEMORANDUM OF COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES - 4 Cient19335131 002300
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17136.0306 - Zurich - Berkshire Investments, LLC, et al v. Clark & Feeney, et al 
Date Initials Hours Amount Description 
4/25/2008 MSP 0.1 
4/25/2008 MSP 0.2 
4/25/2008 MSP 0.1 
4/25/2008 MSP 0.2 
4/28/2008 MSP 0.1 
4/29/2008 MSP 0.3 
4/29/2008 MSP I.5 
4/29;2008 MSP 1.2 
4/29/2008 MSP 0.9 
4/29/2008 MSP 0.5 
4/29/2008 MSP 0.1 
4/30/2008 MSP 1.5 
4/30/2008 MSP 0.2 
4/30/2008 MSP 0.1 
4/30/2008 MSP 0.2 
4/30/2008 MSP 0.4 
4/30/2008 MSP 08 
5/2/2008 MSP 0.3 
5/2/2008 MSP 0.2 
5/2/2008 MSP 0.2 
5/2/2008 MSP 1.4 
5/2/2008 MSP 0.1 
5/6/2008 MSP 1.2 
5/6/2008 MSP 0.5 
16.50 
33.00 
16.50 
3300 
1650 
4950 
247.50 
198.00 
148.50 
82.50 
16.50 
247.50 
33.00 
16.50 
33.00 
66.00 
132.00 
49.50 
33.00 
33.00 
231.00 
16.50 
198.00 
82.50 
Correspondence from insured regarding notice of
 
appearance;
 
Receive and review complaint;
 
Correspondence to insured regarding appearance; 
Telephone conference with G. Schmidt regarding 
answer to complaint; 
Receive and review correspondence from insured 
regarding substitution of attorney; 
Telephone conference with Christine Miller 
regarding defense strategy; 
Analyze amended complaint; 
Research regarding previous case against same 
parties; 
Telephone conference with Connie Taylor 
regarding facts;
 
Receive and review brief from insured;
 
Prepare Notice of Appearance;
 
Receive and review amended complaint with
 
exhibits;
 
Receive and review retention letter;
 
Receive and review letter from client regarding
 
disqualification;
 
Correspondence to client regarding
 
disqualification;
 
Begin preparation of answer to complaint; 
Research regarding corporate status of 
l3erksh ire; 
Prepare notice of substitution of counsel;
 
Letters to clients regarding notice of
 
substitution of counsel;
 
Receive and review response to correspondence
 
regarding notice of substitution of counsel;
 
Analyze appeal brief to deteI1uine basis for
 
possible motion to dismiss;
 
Correspondence to co-counsel regarding
 
substitution;
 
Research waiver of defenses of other action
 
pending;
 
Draft aflirrnative defenses;
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17136.0306 - Zurich - Berkshire Investments, LLC, et al v. Clark & Feeney, et al 
Date Initials Hours Amount Description 
5/6/2008 MSP 0.8 
5/6/2008 MSP 0.5 
5/712008 MSP 1.0 
5/7/2008 MSP 0.2 
5/7/2008 MSP 0.1 
517:2008 MSP 0.4 
5/8/2008 MSP 0.6 
5/8/2008 MSP 0.\ 
5/8/2008 MSP 0.3 
5/8/2008 MSP OJ 
5/8/2008 MSP 1.8 
5/8/2008 MSP 0.2 
5/9/2008 MSP 0.2 
5/9/2008 MSP 0.2 
5/9/2008 MSP 0.1 
5/13/2008 MSP 0.4 
5/13/2008 MSP 0.1 
5/13/2008 MSP 1.5 
5/13/2008 MSP 0.4 
5/13/2008 MSP 0.7 
5/14/2008 MSP 0.2 
5/14/2008 MSP 0.1 
132.00 
82.50 
16500 
3300 
16.50 
66.00 
99.00 
16.50 
49.50 
49.50 
297.00 
33.00 
33.ll0 
33.00 
16.50 
66.00 
16.50 
247.50 
66.00 
115.50 
3300 
16.50 
Continue analysis of complaint and comparison
 
to pending case;
 
Research racketeering statutes cited in
 
complaint;
 
Receive and review Suprcme Coul1 brief;
 
Correspondence to client regarding Supreme
 
Court brief and possible motion to dismiss;
 
Receive and review notice of substitution;
 
Telcphone confercnce with insured regarding
 
motion to dismiss;
 
Initial conference with claims handling
 
regarding case management;
 
Receive and review notice of intent to take
 
default;
 
Telephone conference with insurcd regarding
 
notice of intent to take default and rcsponse 
to motion to dismiss; 
Correspondence to insured regarding 
substitution of counscl;
 
Draft answer;
 
Finalize substitution of counsel;
 
Finalize answcr;
 
Corrcspondence to clicnt regarding filing
 
answer; 
Receive and rcview corrcspondence from client 
regarding notice of substitution and answeI"~ 
Receive and review co-defendant's motion to 
dismiss, affidavit and exhibits; 
Correspondence to client regarding 
co-defendant's motion to dismiss; 
Rescarch regarding dismissal of parties if 
idcntical action; 
Prepare motion to dismiss; 
List claims decided by summary judgmcntto 
compare to complaint; 
Receive and review plaintiffs motion to 
strike; 
Receive and review correspondence trom client 
regarding possible recusal of judge; 
5114/2008 MSP 0.2 3300	 Correspondence to client regarding possible 
recusal of judge and motion to dismiss; 
Page 2 01'30	 Exhibit A 002303
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17136.0306 - Zurich - Berkshire Investments, LLC, et al v. Clark & Feeney, ct al 
Date Initials Hours Amount Description 
5/21/2008 MSP 0.3 
5/29/2008 MSP 0.1 
6/12/2008 MSP 0.3 
6/24/2008 MSP 0.3 
6/24/2008 MSP 03 
6/24/2008 MSP 0.4 
6/25/2008 MSP 0.2 
6/25/2008 MSP 2.8 
6/25/2008 MSP 0.3 
6/26/2008 MSP 0.3 
7/24/2008 MSP 1.2 
7/24/2008 MSP 1.0 
7/25/2008 MSP 0.3 
7/28/2008 MSP 0.6 
7/28/2008 MSP 1.5 
7/29/2008 MSP 0.3 
7/29/2008 MSP 0.3 
7/29/2008 MSP 0.1 
7/29/2008 MSP 0.1 
7/30/2008 MSP 0.1 
7/30/2008 MSP 0.1 
7/31/2008 MSP 0.2 
7/31/2008 MSP 1.0 
49.50 
16.50 
49.50 
49.50 
49.50 
66.00 
33.00 
462.00 
49.50 
49..50 
198.00 
165.00 
49.50 
99.00 
247.50 
49.50 
49.50 
16.50 
16.50 
16.50 
16.50 
33.00 
165.00 
Receive and review amended affidavit and
 
exhibits;
 
Telephone conference with Zurich regarding case
 
management plan;
 
Prepare case management plan;
 
Conference with client regarding strategy lor
 
status conference;
 
Attend Court's status conference;
 
Analyze pleadings to prepare for status
 
conference;
 
Telephone conference with client regarding case
 
management plan;
 
Prepare case management plan;
 
Prepare budget;
 
Finalize case management plan and budget;
 
Receive and review discovery request from
 
plaintiff;
 
Receive and review earlier deposition
 
transcript of Helen Taylor;
 
Correspondence to insured regarding preparing
 
discovery responses;
 
Prepare responses to requests lor admissions;
 
Analyze pleadings from prior case to prepare
 
responses to requests for admissions;
 
Continue preparation of responses to Requests
 
lor Admissions;
 
Correspondence from insured regarding
 
deposition of Helen Taylor;
 
Receive and review correspondence from insured
 
regarding deposition (duplicate?);
 
Correspondence to insured regarding deposition
 
of Helen Taylor;
 
Receive and review correspondence from client
 
regarding depositions;
 
Correspondence to client regarding depositions;
 
Correspondence llum client regarding responses
 
to requests for admissions;
 
Continue analysis of pleadings from prior case
 
to detennine grounds for dismissal;
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17136.0306 - Zurich - Berkshire Investments, LLC, et al v. Clark & Feeney, et al 
Date Initials Hours Amount Description 
8/4/2008 MSP 0.1 
8/4/2008 MSP 0.3 
8/412008 MSP 0.1 
8/4/2008 MSP 0.1 
8/4/2008 MSP 0.2 
8/4/2008 MSP 0.1 
8/4/2008 MSP OJ 
8/S12008 MSP 0.2 
8/S12008 MSP 0.6 
8/6/2008 MSP 0.8 
8/6/2008 MSP 0.1 
8/6/2008 MSP 0.1 
8/7/2008 MSP 0.7 
8/7/1008 MSP 2.2 
8/712008 MSP 1.5 
8/7/2008 MSP 0.8 
8/7/2008 MSP OJ 
8/8/2008 MSP 0.2 
8/8/2008 MSP 0.5 
8/8/2008 MSP 0.7 
8/1112008 MSP 0.3 
8/1212008 MSP 2.S 
16.S0 
49.S0 
16S0 
16S0 
3300 
16.50 
49.S0 
33.00 
99.00 
132.00 
16.50 
16.S0 
IIS.50 
363.00 
247.50 
132.00 
49.S0 
33.00 
82.50 
115.S0 
49.50 
412.50 
Receive and review correspondence from client
 
regarding deposition;
 
Correspondence to client regarding deadlines
 
for requests for admissions and documents from
 
first case;
 
Correspondence to client regarding deposition; 
Correspondence from client regarding documents; 
Receive and review pleading index from first 
case; 
Correspondence from client regarding discovery
 
from plaintiff;
 
Correspondence to clients regarding discovery
 
from plaintiff's counsel;
 
Correspondence to client regarding pleading
 
index and key documents;
 
Receive and review deposition transcript of
 
Doug Crandall;
 
Receive and review Tom Maile's deposition
 
transcript;
 
Receive and review correspondence from client
 
regarding additional depositions;
 
Correspondence to client regarding additional
 
depositions to be taken;
 
Receive and review deposition transcript of B.
 
Harwood;
 
Receive and review deposition transcript of B.
 
Rogers;
 
Receive and review deposition transcript of B.
 
Knipe;
 
Receive and review deposition transcript of S.
 
Sherer;
 
Receive and review volume 2 of deposition
 
transcript ofT. Maile;
 
Receive and review deposition transcript of D.
 
Wishney;
 
Receive and review deposition of S. Johnson;
 
Receive and review deposition transcript of I. 
Hetherington; 
Continue preparation of responses to requests 
for admissions; 
Continue analysis of two volumes of deposition 
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17136.0306 - Zurich - Berkshire Investments, LLC, et al v. Clark & Feeney, et al 
Date Initials Hours Amount Description 
8/12/2008 MSP 0.4 
8/14/2008 MSP 1.5 
8/14/2008 MSP 0.2 
8/2 U2008 MSP 1.4 
8/21/2008 MSP 0.6 
8/21/2008 MSP 0.5 
8/22/2008 MSP 0.5 
8/22/2008 MSP 0.3 
8/25/2008 MSP 0.2 
8/26/2008 MSP 0.2 
8/27/2008 MSP 0.3 
8/27/2008 MSP 0.2 
8/29/2008 MSP 01 
8/29/2008 MSP 0.1 
9/2/2008 MSP 0.1 
9/2/2008 MSP 0.2 
9/2/2008 MSP 0.1 
9/8/2008 MSP 0.1 
9/16/2008 MSP 0.5 
9117/2008 MSP 0.2 
9117/2008 MSP 2.5 
66.00 
247.50 
3300 
23100 
9900 
82.50 
82.50 
49.50 
33.00 
33.00 
49.50 
33.00 
1650 
16.50 
16.50 
33.00 
16.50 
16.50 
82.50 
33.00 
412.50 
transcripts of T. Maile; 
Receive and review deposition transcript of II.
 
Fisher;
 
Prepare responses to requests for admissions
 
and answers to interrogatories;
 
Correspondence to client regarding responses to
 
requests for admissions and answers to
 
interrogatories;
 
Continue preparation of discovery responses;
 
Telephone conference with C. Taylor regarding
 
discovery responses;
 
Receive and review draft responses;
 
Finalize discovery responses;
 
Letters to client regarding approving and
 
signing discovery responses;
 
Correspondence to plaintiffs counsel regarding
 
Helen Taylor's deposition;
 
Correspondence to client regarding rescheduling
 
deposition of Helen Taylor;
 
Lellers to client regarding Helen Taylor's
 
depos ition;
 
Correspondence to plaintiffs counsel regarding
 
deposition of Helen Taylor;
 
Receive and review cOlTespondence from client
 
regarding deposition of Helen Taylor;
 
Correspondence to client regarding deposition 
of Helen Taylor; 
Receive and review amended notice and subpoena 
for Helen Taylor; 
Correspondence to client regarding amended 
notice and subpoena for Helen Taylor; 
Receive and review responses from client 
regarding amended notice and subpoena for Helen 
Taylor; 
Receive and review correspondence from client 
regarding deposition of Helen Taylor; 
Receive and review correspondence from 
plaintiffs counsel regarding objections to 
discovery and motion to compel; 
Correspondence to client regarding plaintiffs 
threat of motion to compel; 
Research regarding exceptions to 
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17136.0306 - Zurich - Berkshire Investments, LLC, et al v. Clark & Feeney, et al 
Date Initials Hours Amount Description 
9/18/2008 MSP 1.5 
9/18/2008 AJS 0.3 
9/22/2008 AJS 0.2 
9/22/2008 AJS 0.2 
9/22/2008 MSP 0.1 
9/22/2008 MSP 0.2 
9/22/2008 MSP 0.2 
9/22/2008 MSP 0.1 
9/22/2008 MSP 0.4 
9/22/2008 MSP 0.1 
9/23/2008 MSP 0.3 
9/23/2008 AJS 2.2 
9/2412008 MSP 0.4 
9/24/2008 MSP 0.2 
9/26/2008 MSP 0.3 
9/26/2008 MSP 0.4 
9/26/2008 MSP 0.5 
9/26/2008 AJS 1.9 
9/29/2008 AJS 1.1 
247.50 
39.00 
26.00 
26.00 
16.50 
33.00 
33.00 
16.50 
66.00 
16.50 
49.50 
286.00 
66.00 
33.00 
49.50 
66.00 
82.50 
247.00 
143.00 
attorney-client privilege to defend objections 
to discovery; 
Continue research regarding plaintiff's claims 
of an exception to attorney-client privilege; 
Conference to discuss research assignment 
regarding attorney as attesting witness and 
possible waiver of attorney-client privilege; 
Research the rules of evidence with regard to 
the attorney-as-witness exception to the 
attorney-client privilege; 
Review letter correspondence from opposing 
counsel asserting attorney-as-witness as waiver 
of the attorney-client privilege; 
Receive and review correspondence from client 
regarding discovery responses; 
Telephone conference with plaintiff regarding 
discovery responses; 
Telephone conference with client regarding 
discovery responses; 
Receive and review letter from client regarding 
res judicata; 
Research regarding res judicata; 
Correspondence to client regarding res 
judicata; 
Research regarding attorney-client privilege; 
Continue to research state law from multiple 
jurisdictions regarding scope and application 
of attorney as attesting witness exception to 
the attorney-client privilege; 
Telephone conference with client regarding 
plaintiffs threat of motion to compel; 
Receive and review brief in support of motion 
for summary judgment; 
Correspondence to plaintiff's counsel regarding 
motion to compel; 
Continue analysis of co-defendant's brief on 
res judicata; 
Research regarding res judicata; 
Continue to research state and federal law 
regarding scope and application of attorney as 
attesting witness exception to thc 
attorney-client privilege; 
Research state and federal law regarding fraud 
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17136.0306 - Zurich - Berkshire Investments, LLC, et al v. Clark & Feeney, et al 
.... 
Date Initials Hours Amount Description 
as exception to attorney-client privilege in 
preparation for drafting motion for summary 
judgment; 
9/29/2008 MSP 0.1 16.50 Receive and review letter from client regarding 
deposition; 
9/3012008 MSP 0.2 33.00 Correspondence to client regarding deposition 
and motion for protective order; 
9/30/2008 AJS 1.8 234.00 Research state and federal law regarding issue 
of res judicata, particularly with regard to 
privies of party to prior suit, in preparation 
for drafting motion for summary judgment; 
9/30/2008 AJS 0.4 52.00 Review complaints as necessary to direct 
research regarding issue of res judicata; 
9/30/2008 AJS 0.3 39.00 Continue to research state and federal case law 
regarding crime-fraud exception to 
attorney-client privilege; 
101Ii2008 AJS 0.5 6500 Continue to research Idaho and Ninth Circuit 
law regarding crime-fraud exception to the 
attorney-client privilege; 
10/1/2008 AJS 1.3 169.00 Continue research regarding application of res 
judicata, specifically with regard to parties 
and their privies; 
10/112008 AJS 0.2 26.00 Review co-defendants' summary judgment 
memorandum in preparation for drafting own 
summary judgment motion and memorandum; 
10/1/2008 MSP 2.0 330.00 Analyze first Helen Taylor deposition to 
prepare for second deposition; 
10/1/2008 MSP 0.4 66.00 Review letters from client regarding deposition 
of Helen Taylor and possible conflict; 
10/1/2008 MSP 1.2 198.00 Receive and review motion for summary judgment, 
affidavit and brief from co-defendants; 
10/1/2008 MSP 0.8 132.00 Research regarding res judicata issues for 
summary judgment; 
10/2/2008 MSP 0.4 66.00 Continue preparation of brief in support of 
motion for summary judgment; 
10/2/2008 MSP 06 99.00 Analyze complaint and decisions in prior case 
to prepare motion for summary judgment; 
10/2/2008 MSP 0.4 66.00 Telephone conference with client regarding 
deposition of Helen Taylor; 
10/2/2008 MSP 2.2 363.00 Continue analysis of prior deposition to 
prepare for deposition of Hclen Taylor; 
10/2/2008 AJS 1.4 182.00 Continue to review plaintiffs complaint in 
preparation for drafting memorandum in support 
of motion for summary judgment; 
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17136.0306 - Zurich - Berkshire Investments, LLC, et al v. Clark & Feeney, et al 
Date Initials Hours Amount Description 
10/2/2008 AJS 0.4 
10/212008 AJS 1.4 
10/2/2008 AJS 0.8 
10/3/2008 AJS 0.8 
10/3/2008 AJS 0.3 
\0/3/2008 AJS 0.3 
10/3/2008 AJS 2.1 
10/312008 MSP 0.4 
10/3/2008 MSP 0.2 
10/3/2008 MSP 2.6 
10/3/2008 MSP 0.3 
\0/5/2008 AJS 2.5 
10/6/2008 AJS 2.6 
10/6/2008 AJS 0.3 
10/6/2008 MSP 0.5 
10/6/2008 MSP 0.3 
101712008 MSP 0.9 
101712008 AJS 0.5 
52.00 
182.00 
\04.00 
104.00 
39.00 
39.00 
273.00 
66.00 
33.00 
429.00 
49.50 
325.00 
338.00 
3900 
82.50 
49.50 
148.50 
65.00 
Review Idaho Supreme Court case Taylor v. Maile
 
to further develop case understanding and
 
strategy in preparation for drafting memorandum
 
in sUppOl1 of summary judgment;
 
Review pleadings regarding prior summary 
judgment proceedings in this matter; 
Continue research of case law regarding 
attorney as in privity with client for purposes 
of res judicata; 
Outline memorandum in support of motion for 
summary judgment; 
Review case law research and case file as 
necessary to completc memorandum in sUpp0l1 of 
motion for summary judgment; 
Review case law research and case file as 
necessary to complete outline memorandum in 
support of motion for summary judgment; 
Draft memorandum in support of motion for 
summary judgment; 
Conference with client regarding Helen Taylor 
deposition; 
Conference with Helen and DaHan Taylor 
regarding deposition; 
Attend deposition of Helen Taylor; 
Conference with client regarding motion for 
summary judgment and analysis of plaintiff's 
strategy; 
Continue to draft memorandum in support of 
motion for sUffilnary judgment in preparation for 
review by supervising attorney; 
Revise and edit memorandum in support of motion 
for summary judgment; 
Review complaint for additional facts relating 
to plaintiffs' claims as necessary to complete 
revisions to memorandum in support of summaty 
judgment; 
Revise brief in support of motion for summary 
judgment; 
Receive and review amended motion for 
appointment of trustees; 
Receive and review redraft of brief in support 
of motion for summary judgment; 
Continue to review plaintiffs' complaint as 
necessary to complete revisions to memorandum 
in support of motion for summary judgment; 
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Dale Initials Hours 
101712008 AJS B 
10/8/2008 MSP 3.3 
10/8/2008 MSP 0.7 
10/8/2008 MSP 0.6 
10/8/2008 MSP 0.4 
10/9/2008 MSP 1.2 
10/9/2008 MSP l.5 
10/9/2008 MSP 0.2 
10/10/2008 MSP 3.3 
IOII 0/2008 AJS 1.4 
10/14/2008 AJS 0.3 
10/20;2008 AJS 0.9 
10/20;2008 MSP 1.0 
10/20/2008 MSP 0.2 
10/20;2008 MSP 0.2 
10/22;2008 MSP 1.2 
10/22/2008 MSP 0.4 
10/22/2008 MSP 2.4 
Amount 
37700 
544.50 
115.50 
9900 
6600 
198.00 
247.50 
33.00 
544.50 
182.00 
39.00 
117.00 
165.00 
33.00 
33.00 
198.00 
66.00 
396.00 
Description 
Continue to revise and edit memorandum in 
support of motion for summary judgment to 
include additional references to plaintiffs' 
complaint and revise and edit generally; 
Revise motion for summary judgment; 
Analyze brief filed by co-defendants; 
Research regarding dismissal while other action 
is on appeal for brief; 
Analyze claims made in complaint for brief; 
Finalize brief and motion for summary judgment; 
Receive and review plaintifrs response to 
motion to dismiss with affidavits and exhibits; 
Correspondence to client regarding briefing in 
previous case; 
Receive and review reply brief in opposition to 
motion for summary judgment, supplemental memo 
regarding motion for summary judgment and brief 
in support of motion to reconsider; 
Research and review case law from state and 
federal jurisdictions and secondary sourccs 
regarding dismissal offraud-based claims by 
doctrine of res judicata in preparation for 
drafting reply brief in support of motion for 
summary judgment; 
Continue to research and review case law 
discussing application of res judicata to fraud 
based claims derived from prior litigation in 
preparation for drafting reply brief in support 
of motion for sumlnary judgment~ 
Research Idaho and other jurisdiction case law 
regarding application ofres judicata to 
independent actions based on fraud in 
preparation for drafting reply memorandum in 
support of summary judgment; 
Receive and review motion to compel, brief and 
affidavit; 
Letters to clients regarding motion to compel, 
brief and affidavit; 
Receive and review motion to continue motion 
for summary judgment; 
Analyze plaintiffs brief in support of motion 
to compel; 
Conference with client regarding plaintiffs 
brief in support of motion to compel; 
Research regarding attorney-client privilege 
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17136.0306 - Zurich - Berkshire Investments, LLC, et al v. Clark & Feeney, et al 
Date Initials Hours 
10/23/2008 MSP 3.5 
10/23/2008 MSP 0.2 
10/23/2008 MSP 0.5 
10/23/2008 MSP 1.3 
10/23/2008 AJS 0.2 
10/23/2008 AJS 1.1 
10/23/2008 AJS 0.4 
10/23/2008 AJS 0.3 
10/24/2008 AJS 0.2 
10/24/2008 AJS 0.6 
10/24/2008 AJS 1.7 
10/24/2008 MSP 0.2 
10/24/2008 MSP 0.2 
10/24/2008 MSP 1.5 
10/27/2008 MSP 0.3 
10/27/2008 MSP 0.2 
Amount 
577.50 
3300 
8250 
214.50 
26.00 
143.00 
52.00 
39.00 
26.00 
78.00 
221.00 
3300 
3300 
247.50 
49.50 
33.00 
Description 
and exceptions for fraud claim; 
Research regarding elements offraud for motion 
for summary judgment and motion to compel; 
Correspondence to client regarding plaintiffs 
arguments on motion to compel; 
Outline issues for objection to motion to 
compel; 
Review plaintiffs brief regarding motion for 
summary judgment; 
Research Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure to 
determine when response to motion to compel 
and/or motion for continuance due; 
Research Idaho and Ninth Circuit case law 
regarding crime/fraud exception to 
attorney-client privilege in preparation for 
responding to opposing counsel's motion to 
compel and/or in support of our motion for 
summary judgment; 
Review plaintiffs' summary judgment and motion 
to compel briefing in preparation for 
responding to same; 
Review secondary sources regarding crime-fraud 
exception to attorney-client privilege; 
Review correspondence from client regarding 
prior probate proceedings and statements made 
regarding the status of beneficiaries; 
Research state and federal case law regarding 
the reliance element of fraud with respect to 
an attorney's potential reliance on statements 
made by opposing counsel~ 
Continue to research state and federal case law 
on issue of whether allegation regarding status 
as beneficiary is a legal conclusion and not a 
material fact for purposes of evaluating 
plaintiffs' fraud claim; 
Review correspondence from client regarding 
amended pleadings; 
Review amended petition for appointment of 
beneficiary; 
Outline issues for response to plaintiffs 
motion to compel and reply brief regarding 
motion for summary judgment; 
Correspondence to plaintiff's attorney 
regarding vacating hearings; 
Correspondence to client regarding vacating 
hearings; 
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17136.0306 - Zurich - Berkshire Investments, LLC, et al v. Clark & Feeney, et al 
Date Initials Hours Amount Description 
10/27/2008 MSP 0.1 16.50 Review correspondence from client regarding 
vacating hearings; 
10/27/2008 MSP 0.2 33.00 Correspondence to client regarding motion to 
compel and vacating hearing regarding motions 
for summary judgment; 
10/27/2008 MSP 0.4 66.00 Outline brief regarding motion to compel; 
10/27/2008 AJS 0.7 91.00 Review plaintitTs' motion to compel briefing in 
preparation for drafting response brief; 
10/27/2008 AJS 0.2 26.00 Analyze issues regarding content of plaintiffs' 
motion to compel briefing response brief; 
10/28/2008 MSP 0.1 16.50 Review correspondence from plaintiffs attorney 
regarding postponing hearings; 
10/29/2008 MSP 0.1 16.50 Receive and review notices of vacating motion 
for summary judgment hearing; 
10/29/2008 MSP 0.1 16.50 Prepare notice to vacate our motion for summary 
judgment hearing; 
10/29/2008 MSP 0.1 16.50 Receive and review notice of vacating motion to 
compel hearing; 
11/6.'2008 MSP 0.4 66.00 Receive and review research regarding response 
to motion to compel; 
1111 8/2008 MSP 0.3 49.50 Conference with client regarding postponement 
of hearing on motion for summary judgment; 
11/18/2008 MSP OJ 49.50 Analyze pleadings regarding correction to case 
management plan; 
11121/2008 MSP 0.8 13200 Conference with client regarding outcome of 
Idaho Supreme Court argument; 
12/1/2008 MSP 0.2 3300 Receive and review correspondence from client 
regarding motion for summary jUdgment; 
1211 /2008 MSP 0.2 3300 Correspondence to client regarding motion for 
summary judgment; 
1211/2008 MSP 2.8 46200 Research cases on res judicata for motion for 
summary judgment; 
12/2/2008 MSP 2J 37950 Continue research regarding fraud exception to 
attorney-client privilege and elements of fraud 
claim; 
12.'2/2008 MSP 0.6 9900 Continue research regarding res judicata; 
12/3/2008 MSP 0.3 49.50 Correspondence to client regarding motion for 
summary judgment and motion to compel; 
12/4/2008 MSP 1.8 297.00 Analyze plaintiffs brief in opposition to 
motion for summary judgment; 
12/5/2008 MSP 1.6 264.00 Continue analysis of briefs on motion to compel 
and motion for summary judgment; 
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17136.0306 - Zurich - Berkshire Investments, LLC, et al v. Clark & Feeney, et al 
Date Initials Ilours Amount Description 
12/8/2008 MSP 0.8 
12/15/2008 MSP 0.2 
12/24/2008 MSP 1.0 
12/24/2008 MSP 0.5 
12/24/2008 MSP 0.6 
1/2/2009 MSP 0.9 
1/8/2009 MSP 2.2 
1/8/2009 MSP 0.3 
1/8/2009 MSP 0.1 
1/12/2009 MSP 0.1 
1112/2009 MSP 0.1 
1114/2009 MSP 0.1 
1/19/2009 MSP 0.1 
1/19/2009 MSP 0.3 
2/2/2009 MSP 0.2 
2/3/2009 MSP 0.4 
2/3/2009 MSP 0.2 
2/3/2009 MSP 0.2 
2/3/2009 MSP 0.1 
2/5/2009 MSP 2.2 
132.00 
33.00 
165.00 
82.50 
99.00 
148.50 
363.00 
49.50 
16.50 
16.50 
16.50 
16.50 
16.50 
49.50 
33.00 
66.00 
33.00 
33.00 
16.50 
363.00 
Continue research regarding motion for summary 
judgment; 
Telephone conference with client regarding 
motion for summary judgment; 
Receive and review recent decision on standing 
to sue lawyers; 
Research regarding recent decision on standing 
to sue lawyers; 
Letters to client regarding results of research 
regarding standing to sue lawyers; 
Research regarding allegations of fraud on 
court as defense to rcs judicata claim; 
Receive and review plaintitl's motion for stay, 
affidavit, exhibits and supplemental 
memorandum; 
Correspondence to client regarding response to 
motion for stay; 
Receive and review response regarding motion to 
stay; 
Correspondence from client regarding motion to 
stay; 
Correspondence to plaintiff's counsel regarding 
motion to stay; 
Receive and review notice of non-opposition to 
motion to stay; 
Receive and review correspondence from 
plaintifl's counsel regarding motion to stay; 
Prepare notice of non-opposition to motion for 
stay; 
Receive and review Supreme Court opinion in 
Taylor v. Maile; 
Continue analysis of Supreme Court decision; 
Telephone conference with client regarding 
Supreme Court decision; 
Correspondence to client regarding summary 
judgment strategy; 
Receive and review response from client 
regarding summary judgment strategy; 
Analyze prior motion for summary judgment 
briefing and pleadings regarding motion to lift 
stay and obtain hearing on motion for summary 
judgment; 
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Date Initials Hours Amount Description 
2/5/2009 MSP 0.4 
2/5/2009 MSP 0.2 
2/6/2009 MSP 0.2 
2110/2009 MSP 0.2 
2110/2009 MSP 0.3 
2/13/2009 MSP 0.9 
2/13/2009 MSP 2.7 
2/17/2009 MSP 0.2 
2/18/2009 MSP 0.2 
2/18/2009 MSP 0.3 
2/23/2009 MSP 0.1 
2/23/2009 MSP 0.1 
3/2/2009 MSP 0.1 
3/3/2009 MSP 0.2 
3/3/2009 MSP 0.1 
3/5/2009 MSP 0.1 
3/5/2009 MSP 0.2 
3/6/2009 MSP 0.2 
3111/2009 MSP 0.1 
3/18/2009 MSP 1.8 
3/18/2009 MSP 0.1 
66.00 
33.00 
33.00 
33.00 
49.50 
148.50 
445.50 
33.00 
33.00 
49.50 
16.50 
16.50 
16.50 
33.00 
16.50 
16.50 
33.00 
33.00 
16.50 
297.00 
16.50 
Correspondence to client regarding strategy for 
summary judgment motion; 
Receive and review response from client 
regarding strategy for summary judgment motion; 
Receive and review affidavit of C. Taylor 
regarding recent case in support of summary 
judgment motion; 
Receive and review letters from client 
regarding possible dismissal; 
Correspondence to client regarding possible 
dismissal; 
Receive and review supplemental memorandum 
regarding Supreme Court Opinion; 
Receive and review affidavit in support of 
supplemental memo and attachments to motion for 
summary judgment; 
Receive and review correspondence from client 
regarding hearing on motion for summary 
judgment and counterclaim; 
Receive and review answers and counterclaim; 
Correspondence to Zurich regarding 
counterclaim; 
Receive and review correspondence from client 
regarding hearing on motion for summary 
judgment; 
Correspondence to client regarding hearing on 
motion for summalY judgment; 
Telephone conference wilh client regarding 
counterclaim; 
Correspondence to insured regarding 
counterclaim and answer to complaint; 
Correspondence from insured regarding 
counterclaim and amending answer; 
Correspondence to insured regarding answer to 
complaint; 
Receive and review plaintiffs reply to amended 
answer and counterclaim; 
Receive and review counterclaim; 
Finalize amended complaint; 
Receive and review plaintiff's motion for 
summary judgment, brief and affidavit; 
Correspondence to client regarding response to 
motion for partial summary judgment; 
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Date Initials Hours Amount Description 
3/18/2009 MSP 0.1 
3/1812009 MSP 0.1 
4/2/2009 MSP 0.1 
4/8/2009 LCH 0.6 
4/13/2009 MSP 0.2 
4/13/2009 MSP 0.5 
4/13/2009 MSP 0.3 
4/14/2009 MSP 0.7 
4/14/2009 MSP 0.5 
4/14/2009 MSP 1.4 
4/14/2009 MSP 1.0 
4/14/2009 MSP 1.8 
4/15/2009 MSP 1.4 
4/15/2009 MSP 0.5 
4/15/2009 MSP 03 
4/16/2009 MSP 0.2 
4/17/2009 MSP 1.6 
4/20/2009 MSP 15 
4/20/2009 MSP 2.8 
4/20/2009 MSP 1.2 
16.50 
16.50 
16.50 
99.00 
33.00 
82.50 
49.50 
115.50 
82.50 
231.00 
165.00 
297.00 
231.00 
82.50 
49.50 
33.00 
264.00 
247.50 
462.00 
198.00 
Receive and review correspondence from client 
regarding hearing on summary judgment motions; 
Correspondence to client regarding hearings on 
summary judgment motions; 
Correspondence to client regarding response 
brief; 
Review pleadings regarding joinder to objection 
to summary judgment; 
Receive and review correspondence from client 
regarding reply briefs; 
Receive and review defendants' reply brief; 
Receive and review plaintiffs' reply brief 
regarding counterclaim; 
Receive and review plaintiffs' supplemental 
reply brief regarding summary judgment motion; 
Receive and review plaintiffs' reply brief 
regarding counterclaim; 
Review plaintiffs' two other supplemental 
briefs, five affidavits and brief in opposition 
to summary judgment motion to prepare our reply 
brief; 
Research regarding res judicata for our reply 
brief; 
Draft reply brief in support of summary 
judgment motion; 
Revise and finalize reply brief in support of 
summary judgment motion; 
Receive and review plaintiffs reply brief and 
motion to strike regarding counterclaim; 
Correspondence to insured regarding strategy 
for handling and argument on summary judgment 
motion; 
Receive and review correspondence from insured 
regarding strategy for hearing; 
Prepare argument for summary judgment motion 
hearing; 
Analyze pleadings from prior case to locate 
statements to be used as res judicata for 
summary judgment motion; 
Analyze plaintiffs' motion to compel and brief; 
Draft response brief to motion to compel; 
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17136.0306 - Zurich - Berkshire Investments, LLC, et al v. Clark & Feeney, et al 
Date Initials Hours Amount Description 
4/2 Jl2009 MSP 5.2 
4/21/2009 MSP 0.1 
4/22/2009 MSP 3.2 
4/22/2009 MSP 1.5 
4/22/2009 MSP 2.3 
4/22/2009 MSP 0.2 
4/29/2009 MSP 0.2 
4/29/2009 MSP 1.5 
51112009 MSP 2.3 
5/19/2009 MSP 0.2 
6/1/2009 MSP 0.1 
6/1/2009 MSP 0.1 
6/1/2009 MSP 0.5 
717/2009 MSP 0.8 
717/2009 MSP 0.3 
717/2009 MSP 0.7 
7/8/2009 MSP 0.1 
7/9/2009 MSP 0.3 
7/13/2009 MSP 0.1 
7/13/2009 MSP 0.2 
858.00 
16.50 
528.00 
247.50 
379.50 
3300 
33.00 
247.50 
379.50 
3300 
16.50 
16.50 
82.50 
132.00 
49.50 
115.50 
16.50 
49.50 
16.50 
3300 
Analyze trial transcript filed by plaintiffs 
and Supreme Court brief to identify issues 
previously litigated; 
Correspondence to client regarding strategy for 
hearing; 
Analyze Supreme Court briefs to obtain proof of 
claims barred by res judicata; 
Continue preparation for argument of three 
motions for summary judgment; 
Attend hearing on motions for summary judgment
 
and motion to compel;
 
Conference with client regarding hearing on 
motions for summary judgment; 
Correspondence to client regarding hearings on 
motions for summary judgment; 
Research cases cited by plaintiffs at the 
hearings on motions for summary judgment; 
Attend hearing on plaintiffs motion to dismiss 
counterclaim; 
Receive and review Judge Wilper's order denying 
payment ofjudgment and interest; 
Receive and review correspondence from client 
regarding decision on motion for summary 
judgment; 
Correspondence to client regarding decision on 
motion for summary judgment; 
Research regarding case alleging fraud on the 
court; 
Receive and review memorandum decision on 
summary judgment; 
Letters to clients regarding memorandum 
decision received regarding summary judgment: 
Analyze issues regarding certifying decision as 
final and dismissal of counterclaim; 
Receive and review correspondence from client 
regarding the Court's memorandum decision on 
our motion for summary judgment; 
Receive and review settlement offer and 
proposed satisfaction of judgment; 
Receive and review correspondence from insured 
regarding settlement; 
Correspondence to insured regarding settlement 
amount; 
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17136.0306 - Zurich - Berkshire Investments, LLC, et al v. Clark & Feeney, et al 
Date Initials Hours Amount Description 
7/13/2009 MSP 0.1 
7/14/2009 MSP 1.2 
7/14/2009 MSP 0.2 
7/14/2009 MSP 0.1 
7/14/2009 MSP 0.1 
7/15/2009 MSP 0.1 
7/15/2009 MSP 0.9 
7/15/2009 MSP 0.2 
7/15/2009 MSP 0.2 
7/16/2009 MSP 0.1 
7/16/2009 MSP 1.2 
7/16/2009 MSP 0.2 
7/16/2009 MSP 0.1 
7/21/2009 MSP 0.1 
7/21/2009 MSP 0.1 
7/22/2009 MSP 0.4 
7/24/2009 MSP 0.1 
7/27/2009 MSP 0.1 
7/28/2009 MSP 0.1 
8/3/2009 MSP 0.1 
16.50 
198.00 
33.00 
16.50 
16.50 
16.50 
148.50 
33.00 
33.00 
16.50 
198.00 
33.00 
16.50 
16.50 
16.50 
66.00 
1650 
16.50 
16.50 
16.50 
Receive and review correspondence from insured 
regarding settlement and Bar complaint against 
Maile. 
Receive and review plaintiffs motion to 
certify order as final and for permissive 
appeal, affidavit and brief in support of 
motion; 
Correspondence to insured regarding plaintiffs' 
motion for permissive appeal and certified 
order as final; 
Receive and review correspondence from insured 
regarding settlement; 
Receive and review correspondence from insured 
to plaintiff regarding settlement; 
Receive and review proposed judgment and order; 
Telephone conference with insured regarding 
costs and fees, permissive appeal and strategy 
for response to motion for permissive appeal; 
Receive and review notice of scheduling 
conference; 
Correspondence to insured regarding strategy 
for response to motion for pennissive appeal; 
Receive and review notice of hearing on motion 
for pennissive appeal; 
Research regarding which costs should be 
requested after partial summary judgment; 
Correspondence to insured regarding request for 
costs~ 
Receive and review correspondence from insured 
regarding settlement offer; 
Receive and review correspondence from 
plaintiffs counsel regarding settlement; 
Receive and review supplemental affidavit 
regarding certification for appeal; 
Receive and review plaintiffs first and second 
set of discovery to Connie Taylor; 
Correspondence to client regarding discovery 
responses; 
Receive and review correspondence from client 
regarding discovery responses; 
Receive and review correspondence from client 
regarding settlement; 
Receive and review correspondence from 
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Date Initials Hours Amount Description 
8/3/2009 MSP 0.1 
8/3/2009 MSP 0.2 
8/3/2009 MSP 0.1 
8/5/2009 MSP 0.1 
8/5/2009 MSP 0.2 
8/5/2009 MSP 0.1 
8/5/2009 MSP 0.1 
8/12/2009 MSP 0.2 
8/14/2009 MSP 0.3 
8/17/2009 MSP 0.1 
8/17/2009 MSP 0.3 
8/2112009 MSP 0.1 
8/21/2009 MSP 0.1 
8/28/2009 MSP 0.2 
8/3112009 MSP 0.3 
9/4/2009 MSP 0.1 
9/4/2009 MSP 0.1 
9/9/2009 MSP 0.6 
9/9/2009 MSP 1.3 
9/9/2009 MSP 0.3 
16.50 
33.00 
16.50 
16.50 
33.00 
16.50 
16.50 
33.00 
49.50 
16.50 
49.50 
16.50 
16.50 
33.00 
49.50 
16.50 
16.50 
99.00 
214.50 
49.50 
co-counsel to plaintiffs counsel regarding 
proposed litigation plan; 
Receive and review amended motion for 
certification for appeal; 
Receive and review correspondence from 
plaintiffs counsel regarding lis pendens; 
Receive and review notice of lien; 
Receive and review correspondence from client 
regarding litigation strategy; 
Correspondence to client regarding 
certification for appeal and withdrawal from 
case; 
Correspondence from client regarding 
certification for appeal and withdrawal from 
case; 
Correspondence to client responding to client's 
response regarding certification for appeal; 
Receive and review second supplemental 
affidavit regarding pennissive appeal; 
Attend status conference with Judge, 
plaintiffs counsel and counsel for 
co-defendant; 
Receive and review correspondence from client 
regarding pennissive appeal; 
Correspondence to client regarding pcnnissive 
appeal; 
Receive and review notice of non-opposition to 
certificate for appeal; 
Receive and review order governing proceedings; 
Receive and review discovery responses to 
plaintiff; 
Receive and review responses to plaintiffs 
discovery regarding counterclaim; 
Receive and review correspondence from 
plaintiff regarding non-opposition to motion to 
certify; 
Correspondence to plaintiff regarding our 
position concerning his motion to certify; 
Analyze pleadings regarding motion to certify 
appeal; 
Attend hearing on motion to certify appeal; 
Correspondence to client regarding appeal; 
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Date Initials Hours 
9/15/2009 MSP 0.1 
9/16/2009 MSP 0.2 
10/1/2009 MSP 0.3 
10/1/2009 MSP 0.1 
10/2/2009 MSP 0.3 
101212009 MSP 0.1 
10/5/2009 MSP 0.1 
10/5/2009 MSP 0.2 
10/6/2009 MSP 1.2 
10/6/2009 MSP 0.5 
10/6/2009 MSP 0.2 
10/9/2009 MSP 0.1 
10/912009 MSP 0.1 
11/10/2009 MSP 0.1 
11/10/2009 MSP 0.3 
11/11/2009 MSP 0.1 
11/11/2009 MSP 0.2 
11/16/2009 MSP 0.1 
11/17/2009 MSP 0.1 
11/1712009 MSP 0.3 
11/17/2009 MSP 0.1 
Amount 
16.50 
33.00 
49.50 
16.50 
49.50 
16.50 
16.50 
33.00 
198.00 
82.50 
33.00 
16.50 
16.50 
16.50 
49.50 
16.50 
33.00 
16.50 
16.50 
49.50 
16.50 
Description 
Receive and review proposed order certifying 
appeal; 
Conference with client regarding proposed order 
granting motion to appeal; 
Receive and review signed order authorizing 
appeal; 
Correspondence to client regarding authorizing 
appeal; 
Research regarding new Idaho Supreme Court 
decision on res judicata; 
Correspondence to client regarding new Idaho 
Supreme Court decision on res judicata; 
Receive and review correspondence from client 
regarding interlocutory appeal; 
Correspondence to client regarding 
interlocutory appeal; 
Receive and review plaintiffs motion for 
permissive appeal with brief and affidavit and 
relevant pleadings; 
Research regarding applicable appellate rules; 
Correspondence to insured regarding plaintiffs 
brief regarding pennissive appeal and 
applicable IlJles; 
Receive and review notice of non-opposition to 
appeal; 
Receive and review notice from court regarding 
handling ofpennissive appeal; 
Receive and review order denying pennissive 
appeal; 
Correspondence to client regarding order 
denying pennissive appeal; 
Receive and review correspondence from client 
regarding withdrawing; 
Correspondence to client regarding probable 
date of final judgment; 
Receive and review offer ofjudgment; 
Receive and review scheduling order; 
Correspondence to client regarding stipulation 
to withdraw or substitute counsel; 
Receive and review response from client 
regarding stipulation to withdraw or substitute 
counsel; 
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Date Initials Ilours Amount Description 
11/17/2009 MSP 0.2 33.00 Draft notice of substitution of counsel; 
12/3/2009 MSP 0.2 33.00 Receive and review motion to reconsider; 
12/3/2009 MSP 0.4 66.00 Letters to insured regarding renewed motion to 
reconsider; 
12/17/2009 MSP 0.\ 16.50 Receive and review notice of appearance of 
counsel; 
12/17/2009 MSP 0.3 49.50 Correspondence to Zurich regarding request for 
reconsideration, scheduling conference and 
withdrawal; 
12/17/2009 MSP 0.1 16.50 Receive and review notice of scheduling 
conference; 
12/17/2009 MSP 0.1 16.50 Receive and review correspondence from 
plaintiffs counsel regarding new attorney; 
12121/2009 MSP 0.4 66.00 Receive and review objection to renewed motion 
to certify with affidavit; 
12/22/2009 MSP 0.1 16.50 Receive and review correspondence from insured 
regarding court's scheduling conference; 
12/22/2009 MSP 0.2 33.00 Analyze court's scheduling order; 
12/22/2009 MSP 0.1 16.50 Correspondence to co-defendant regarding 
court's scheduling order; 
12/22/2009 MSP 0.3 49.50 Receive and review proposed stipulation 
regarding scheduling order; 
12/22/2009 MSP 0.2 33.00 Receive and review leiters from insured 
regarding proposed stipulation regarding 
scheduling order; 
12/23/2009 MSP 0.1 16.50 Receive and review correspondence from insured 
regarding scheduling stipulation; 
12/28/2009 MSP 0.1 16.50 Receive and review correspondence from client 
regarding revised stipulation; 
12/29/2009 MSP 0.1 16.50 Correspondence to insured regarding stipulation 
for trial; 
12/29/2009 MSP 0.2 33.00 Receive and review revised stipulation for 
trial; 
12/30/2009 MSP 0.2 33.00 Receive and review revised stipulation for 
scheduling and correspondence from other 
counsel regarding vacating scheduling 
conference; 
1/5/2010 MSP 0.2 33.00 Correspondence to client regarding status 
conference and hearing on second motion to 
certify for appeal; 
1/6/2010 MSP 0.3 49.50 Receive and review court's scheduling order; 
1/6/2010 MSP 0.2 33.00 Correspondence to client regarding court's 
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Date Initials Hours Amount Description 
11712010 MSP 0.3 
117/2010 MSP 0.2 
1112/2010 MSP 0.1 
1112/2010 MSP 0.2 
1/12/2010 MSP 1.0 
1112/2010 MSP 0.1 
1/25/2010 MSP 0.1 
1/27/2010 MSP 0.5 
1/27/20 I0 MSP 0.3 
1127/2010 MSP 1.0 
1/27/2010 MSP 0.5 
1/27/2010 MSP 0.2 
2/12/2010 MSP 0.1 
2/12/2010 MSP 0.1 
2112/2010 MSP 0.1 
2117/2010 MSP 0.1 
2/25/20 I0 MSP 0.1 
2/25/2010 MSP 0.1 
2/26/20 I0 MSP 0.2 
2/26/2010 MSP 0.1 
9/30/20 I0 MSP 1.2 
49.50 
33.00 
16.50 
33.00 
165.00 
16.50 
16.50 
82.50 
49.50 
165.00 
82.50 
33.00 
16.50 
16.50 
16.50 
16.50 
16.50 
16.50 
33.00 
16.50 
198.00 
scheduling order; 
Receive and review brief in support of renewed 
motion to certifY for appeal; 
Receive and review supplemental affidavit 
regarding renewed motion to certify for appeal; 
Receive and review correspondence from client 
regarding response to renewed motion to cel1ify 
for appeal; 
Correspondence to client regarding renewed 
motion to certifY for appeal;
 
Analyze prior pleadings and orders to prepare
 
for hearing on renewed motion to certifY for
 
appeal;
 
Receive and review motion to disqualifY judgc;
 
Receive and review correspondence from counscl
 
for co-defendant regarding attending hearing by
 
telcphone;
 
Review pleadings on renewed motion to certify
 
case for appeal;
 
Telephone conference with client regarding
 
hearing on motion to certify case for appeal;
 
Attend hearing on motion to certifY case for
 
appeal (no charge for travel);
 
Letters to clients regarding status following
 
hearing on motion to certify case for appeal;
 
Correspondence to Zurich regarding denial of
 
motion, substitution of counsel and settlement;
 
Correspondence to client regarding substitution
 
of counsel;
 
Receive and review response from client
 
regarding substitution of counsel;
 
Receive and review notice of substitution; 
Receive and review order of disqualification; 
Receive and review corrcspondencc II·om client 
regarding substitution of counsel; 
Correspondence to client regarding substitution 
of counsel; 
Correspondence to co-counsel regarding 
substitution of counsel and mediation; 
Correspondence to client regarding substitution 
of counsel and mediation; 
Receive and review motion to reconsider bricf 
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17136.0306 - Zurich - Berkshire Investments, LLC, et al v. Clark & Feeney, ct al 
Date Initials Hours Amount Description 
9/30/2010 MSP 1.0 
9/30/2010 MSP 0.7 
9/3012010 MSP 0.3 
10/1/2010 MSP 0.2 
10/1/2010 MSP 0.1 
10/1/2010 MSP 2.8 
10/1/2010 MSP 0.2 
10/4/2010 MSP 0.5 
1015/2010 MSP 0.4 
10/5/2010 MSP 0.1 
10/5/2010 MSP 1.0 
10/6/2010 MSP 4.5 
10/6/2010 MSP 1.5 
101712010 MSP 0.5 
101712010 MSP 5.4 
10/11/20 I0 MSP 0.8 
165.00 
115.50 
49.50 
33.00 
16.50 
462.00 
33.00 
82.50 
66.00 
16.50 
165.00 
742.50 
247.50 
82.50 
891.00 
132.00 
in support and affidavits; 
Research recent case used as basis for motion 
to reconsider; 
Analyze order on motion for summary judgment 
that plaintiff is asking court to reconsider; 
Letters to clients regarding plaintin's motion 
to reconsider; 
Receive and review correspondence ITom insured 
regarding brief on motion to reconsider; 
Correspondence to insured regarding motion to 
reconsider; 
Analyze briefs in support of motion for summary 
judgment to prepare brief in opposition to 
motion to recons ider; 
Correspondence to insured regarding briefing 
strategy; 
Continue analysis of briefs on motion for 
summary judgment to respond to motion to 
reconsider; 
Letters to insured regarding notice of 
substitution of counsel; 
Receive and review response from insured 
regarding substitution of counsel; 
Analyze summary judgment decision to prepare 
brief in opposition to motion to reconsider; 
Research regarding res judicata Rule 60(b) 
motions and fraud claims to prepare brief in 
opposition to motion to reconsider summary 
judgment; (approved by claims examiner) 
Analyze court's order and plaintiffs motion to 
reconsider to prepare response to plaintiffs 
motion; 
Outline memorandum in opposition to motion to 
reconsider; 
Further draft memorandum in opposition to 
motion to reconsider, argument, sections (I) 
TAYLOR V. MCNICHOLS does not affect the 
analysis of this court's summary decision, (II) 
TAYLOR V. MCNICHOLS supports this court's 
decision and (III) recent cases provide 
additional support for the court's memorandum 
decision and order; 
Edit and finalize memorandum in opposition to 
motion to reconsider including preparation of 
conclusion section; 
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Date Initials Hours 
10/12/2010 MSP 0.5 
10/13/2010 MSP 0.3 
10/18/2010 MSP 0.5 
10/1912010 MSP 0.5 
10/19/2010 MSP 2.5 
10/20/2010 MSP 02 
10/20/20 I0 MSP 0.3 
10/21/20 I0 MSP 0.3 
10/21/2010 MSP 0.8 
10/21/20 I0 MSP 1.2 
10/2112010 MSP 1.2 
10/22/20 I0 MSP 4.0 
10/26/2010 MSP 0.5 
10/26/2010 MSP 0.1 
10/26/2010 MSP 0.3 
10/26/2010 MSP 03 
10/28/2010 MSP 1.5 
10/28/2010 MSP 0.5 
1012812010 MSP 0.8 
10/2912010 MSP 1.0 
Amount 
82.50 
49.50 
82.50 
82.50 
412.50 
33.00 
49.50 
49.50 
132.00 
198.00 
198.00 
660.00 
82.50 
16.50 
49.50 
49.50 
247.50 
8250 
132.00 
165.00 
Description 
Correspondence with insured regarding motion to
 
reconsider and counterclaim for attorney fees;
 
Letters to insured regarding memorandum in
 
opposition to motion to reconsider and argument
 
for hearing;
 
Prepare argument for hearing on motion to 
reconsider; 
Letters to insured regarding issues for 
argument on motion to reconsider; 
Research regarding citations on judge's order 
that is subject of motion to reconsider; 
Receive and review plaintiffs reply brief 
regarding motion to reconsider; 
Continue analysis of Supreme Court decision 
relied upon by plaintiff in motion to 
reconsider; 
Continue analysis of plaintiffs reply brief 
regarding motion to reconsider; 
Letters to insured regarding additional summary 
judgment strategy for argument on motion to 
reconsider; 
Continue research regarding authorities cited 
by judge for motion to reconsider; 
Analyze plaintiffs briefs to prepare for 
hearing on motion to reconsider; 
Draft argument for hearing on motion to 
reconsider; 
COlTespondence to client regarding Illotion to 
reconsider and brief; 
Receive and review plaintiffs correction to 
reply brief; 
Correspondence to insured regarding corrections 
received from plaintiff as to reply brief; 
Continue preparation of argument for motion to 
reconsider; 
Analyze briefs to prepare for argument on 
motion to reconsider; 
Research regarding case relied upon by 
plaintiff for motion to reconsider; 
Continue drafting notes for argument on motion 
to reconsider; 
Continue drafting of argument for hearing on 
motion to reconsider; 
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Date Initials Hours Amount Description 
10/29/2010 MSP 1.2 
10/29/2010 MSP 0.3 
10/29/2010 MSP 0.5 
111112010 MSP 0.1 
11/1/2010 MSP 0.1 
11/2/2010 MSP 1.2 
111212010 MSP 0.2 
11/3/2010 MSP 0.3 
11/3/20 I0 MSP 0.1 
11/3/2010 MSP 0.2 
11/3/2010 MSP 0.6 
11/3/2010 MSP 1.8 
11/3/2010 MSP 0.1 
11/4/2010 MSP 1.0 
11/4/2010 MSP 0.6 
1114/2010 MSP 0.7 
11/4/2010 MSP 0.1 
11/4/2010 MSP 0.5 
11/5/2010 MSP 0.3 
198.00 
49.50 
82.50 
16.50 
16.50 
198.00 
33.00 
49.50 
16.50 
33.00 
99.00 
297.00 
16.50 
165.00 
99.00 
115.50 
16.50 
82.50 
49.50 
Attend hearing on motion to reconsider; (no 
travel time) 
Correspondence to clients regarding ruling on 
motion to reconsider; 
Receive and review motion to amend reply to 
counterclaim, affidavit in support of motion 
and proposes amended reply; 
Receive and review correspondence from client 
regarding motion to reconsider; 
Receive and review correspondence from insured 
regarding motions filed last week; 
Receive and review motion to amend reply to 
counterclaim, affidavit, brief and proposed 
reply; 
Correspondence to insured regarding receipt of 
motion to amend reply to counterclaim, 
affidavit, brief and proposed reply; 
Correspondence to clients regarding plaintiffs 
attempt to obtain finn's files; 
Receive and review correspondence from insured 
regarding protective order; 
Receive and review correspondence from insured 
regarding possible summary judgment motion; 
Correspondence to insured regarding strategy 
for summary judgment motion, motion in limine 
and motion to amend; 
Analyze past discovery J-cqucsts and motion to 
compel to see if issues of discovery of finn 
files were addressed; 
Correspondence to insured regarding whether 
past discovery requests and motion to compel 
addressed discovery issues; 
Continue analysis of prior discovery and motion 
to compel to detennine basis for protective 
order; 
Correspondence to insureds regarding protective 
order; 
Correspondence to Zurich regarding need for 
protective order and continued defenses; 
Receive and review correspondence from insured 
regarding protective order for Reed Taylor; 
Research regarding protective order; 
Analyze Reed Taylor's deposition notice duces 
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17136.0306 - Zurich - Berkshire Investments, LLC, et al v. Clark & Feeney, et al 
Date Initials Hours 
11/5/2010 MSP 1.2 
11/5/20 I0 MSP 0.2 
11/8/2010 MSP 1.2 
11/8/2010 MSP 1.5 
11/8/2010 MSP 0.1 
11/8/2010 MSP 0.1 
11/9/2010 MSP 0.1 
11/9/2010 MSP 0.2 
11/9/2010 MSP 0.2 
11/9/2010 MSP 0.2 
11110/2010 MSP 0.4 
11/10/2010 MSP 0.1 
11/10/2010 MSP 0.1 
11/1012010 MSP 0.1 
11/1012010 MSP 0.2 
11110/2010 MSP 0.1 
11/l1/2010 MSP 0.1 
11116/2010 MSP 0.2 
11/16/2010 MSP 0.2 
Amount 
198.00 
33.00 
198.00 
247.50 
16.50 
16.50 
16.50 
33.00 
33.00 
33.00 
66.00 
16.50 
16.50 
16.50 
33.00 
16.50 
16.50 
33.00 
33.00 
Description 
tecum for requests for privileged infonnation; 
Analyze motion to compel and prior responses to 
prepare motion for protective order; 
Correspondence to insured regarding strategy 
for motion for protective order; 
Draft motion for protective order; 
Draft affidavit in support of motion for 
protective order; 
Correspondence to insured regarding hearing on 
protective order and opposition to motion to 
amend; 
Receive and review response from insured 
regarding hearing on protective order and 
motion to amend; 
Revise affidavit in support of motion for 
protective order; 
Receive and review letters from insured 
regarding subpoenas and witness fees; 
Return correspondence to insured regarding 
subpoena and witness fees; 
Receive and review correspondence from insured 
regarding conversation with plaintiffs counsel 
regarding dismissal of counterclaim; 
Correspondence to insured regarding strategy 
for hearing on motion to amend and protective 
order and dismissal of counterclaim; 
Receive and review return correspondence from 
insured regarding counterclailn; 
Correspondence to insured regarding dismissal 
of counterclaim and claim for fees; 
Receive and review response from insured 
regarding dismissal of counterclaim and claim 
for fees; 
Correspondence to insured regarding plaintit1's 
attorney's strategy for hearing; 
Receive and review response from insured 
regarding plaintiffs attorney's strategy for 
hearing; 
Receive and review correspondence from insured 
regarding dismissal of counterclaim; 
Receive and review draft stipulation to dismiss 
counterclaim; 
Correspondence to insured regarding draft 
stipUlation to dismiss counterclaim: 
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Date Initials Hours 
11117/2010 MSP 0.5 
11/17/2010 MSP 0.1 
11/18/2010 MSP 1.I 
11/18/2010 MSP 0.2 
11/18/2010 MSP 0.2 
11/18/2010 MSP 0.5 
11/19/2010 MSP 0.5 
11119/2010 MSP 0.3 
11/19/2010 MSP 1.1 
11119/2010 MSP 0.4 
11/22/2010 MSP 1.8 
11123/2010 MSP 4.2 
11123120 I0 MSP 1.9 
11/24/2010 MSP 2.2 
11/24/2010 MSP 0.8 
11/24/20 I0 MSP 0.1 
11/29/2010 MSP 0.2 
1l/29/2010 MSP 1.8 
11/29/2010 MSP 0.8 
11/30/2010 MSP 1.0 
Amount 
82.50 
16.50 
181.50 
33.00 
33.00 
82.50 
82.50 
49.50 
181.50 
66.00 
297.00 
693.00 
313.50 
363.00 
132.00 
16.50 
33.00 
297.00 
132.00 
165.00 
Description 
Letters to insured regarding obtaining 
signatures on stipulation to dismiss 
counterclaim; 
Receive and review signed stipulation to 
dismiss counterclaim from insured; 
Receive and review plaintiffs brief in 
opposition to motion for protective order; 
Correspondence to plaintiffs counsel regarding 
his opposition to motion for protective order 
and stipulation to dismiss counterclaim; 
Correspondence to insured regarding plaintiffs 
arguments against protective order; 
Receive and review plaintiffs witness 
designation; 
Conference with insured regarding testimony of 
attorneys as witnesses; 
Correspondence to Zurich regarding motion for 
protective order and plaintiffs response; 
Continue analysis of plaintift's brief in 
opposition to protective order; 
Outline argument for response to plaintiffs 
brief in opposition to protective order; 
Research and draft reply brief regarding motion 
for protective order; 
Draft reply brief regarding motion for 
protective order; 
Research regarding exceptions to attorney 
client privilege; 
Finalize reply brief regarding motion for 
protective order; 
Receive and review plaintiffs reply brief 
regarding amended reply to counterclaim; 
Receive and review correspondence from insured 
regarding joinder in opposition to motion to 
dismiss; 
Correspondence to insured regarding response to 
motion to dismiss; 
Analyze reply brief and prior correspondence 
regarding response to motion to dismiss; 
Draft joinder in opposition to motion to amend 
and to dismiss; 
Draft argument for motion for protective order; 
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Date Initials Hours Amount Description 
11/30/2010 MSP 1.1 
11/30/2010 MSP 0.4 
11/30/2010 MSP 1.8 
11/30/2010 MSP 1.5 
12/1/2010 MSP 0.2 
12/1/20 10 MSP 0.1 
12/112010 MSP 0.2 
1211/2010 MSP 0.8 
121112010 MSP 0.2 
12/1/2010 MSP 0.1 
12/1/2010 MSP 1.5 
12/1120 I0 MSP 0.2 
12/2/2010 MSP 0.2 
12/2/2010 MSP 0.1 
12/2/2010 MSP 0.1 
12/3/2010 MSP 0.1 
12/6120 I0 MSP 0.1 
12/6/2010 MSP 1.5 
12/6/2010 MSP 0.1 
12/6/20 I0 MSP 0.2 
12/6/2010 MSP 0.1 
J81.50 
66.00 
297.00 
247.50 
33.00 
16.50 
33.00 
132.00 
33.00 
16.50 
247.50 
33.00 
33.00 
16.50 
16.50 
16.50 
16.50 
247.50 
16.50 
33.00 
16.50 
Attend hearing on motion to amend reply to 
counterclaim, motion to dismiss and motion for 
protective order; 
Correspondence to clients regarding protective 
order; 
Receive and review prior deposition of Reed 
Taylor; 
Receive and review prior duces tecum request 
and compare to present one for Reed Taylor; 
Correspondence to insured regarding possible 
protective order or motion to quash; 
Receive and review correspondence from insured
 
regarding witnesses at trial;
 
Correspondence to insured regarding witnesses 
at trial; 
Research regarding ethical rules regarding 
attorney testifYing at trial; 
Correspondence to insured regarding research 
regarding attorney testifYing at trial; 
Receive and review correspondence from insured 
regarding testimony at trial; 
Research regarding possible protective order or 
motion to quash; 
Receive and review subpoenas of attorneys for 
trial; 
Finalize motion to dismiss attorneys' 
counterclaim; 
Receive and review stipulation to dismiss; 
Correspondence to insured regarding dismissal 
of attorneys' counterclaim; 
Receive and review correspondence from insured 
to Plaintiffs attorney regarding deposition; 
Letter to client regarding review of subpoena 
and production of documents for deposition; 
Analyze prior R. Taylor and H. Taylor 
depositions for discussion of privileged 
documents; 
Receive and review letter from client regarding 
R. Taylor deposition; 
Letters to client regarding representation at 
deposition and privilege log; 
Receive and review response from client; 
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Date Initials Hours Amount Description 
12/6/20 to MSP 0.2 
12/15/20 to MSP 0.4 
12/16/2010 MSP 0.9 
12/16/2010 MSP OJ 
12/16/2010 MSP 0.1 
12122/2010 MSP 0.1 
12/22/2010 MSP 0.1 
12127/2010 MSP 0.5 
12/27/2010 MSP 0.1 
12/28/20 I0 MSP 0.3 
12128/20 I0 MSP 0.1 
12/2812010 MSP 0.5 
12/3012010 MSP 0.3 
12/30/2010 MSP 0.5 
12/3012010 MSP 0.8 
1/3/2011 MSP 0.3 
1/3/20 II MSP 0.4 
1/3/20 II MSP 1.2 
1/3120 II MSP 0.2 
33.00 
66.00 
148.50 
49.50 
16.50 
16.50 
16.50 
82.50 
16.50 
49.50 
16.50 
8250 
49.50 
82.50 
J32.00 
49.50 
66.00 
198.00 
33.00 
Receive and review Property Agreement; 
Correspondence to client regarding issues and 
strategy concerning Reed Taylor's deposition; 
Conference with client in defense of Reed 
Taylor deposition and strategy for objections; 
Draft proposed protection order; 
Correspondence to other counsel regarding 
approval of proposed protection order; 
Receive and review correspondence from insured 
regarding deposition of defendant's expert; 
Correspondence to plaintiff regarding 
deposition of Reed Taylor and subpoena; 
Receive and review correspondence from 
plaintiffs counsel regarding cancellation of 
Reed Taylor deposition; 
Receive and review correspondence from insured 
regarding cancellation of Reed Taylor 
deposition; 
Correspondence to client regarding cancellation 
of deposition and representation issues for 
trial; 
Correspondence to insured regarding 
representation at trial; 
Receive and review draft motion in limine; 
Receive and review defendant's supplemental 
discovery responses and expert witness 
disclosure; 
Receive and review defendant's motion in limine 
and brief in support; 
Conference with insured regarding expert 
witness disclosures; 
Receive and review plaintiffs motion in limine 
and brief regarding damages; 
Receive and review plaintiffs Motion in Limine 
re Relevance of Prior Allegations; 
Receive and review Plaintitl's Motion to 
Exclude Experts & Lay Testimony Re: Claims 
Against Counter-Defendants; 
Receive and review plaintiffs Motion in Limine 
re Idaho State Bar Complaint; 
1/3/2011 MSP 1.0 165.00	 Receive and review plaintiffs motion regarding 
testimony of four witnesses; 
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Date Initials Hours Amount Descri ption 
1/4/2011 MSP 12 
1/5/20 II MSP 1.8 
1/5/20 II MSP 0.3 
1/6/2011 MSP 0.1 
1/6/20 II MSP 0.2 
1/6/2011 MSP 0.5 
1/6/2011 MSP 0.2 
1/6/20 II MSP 0.2 
1/7/2011 MSP 0.1 
1/7/20\1 MSP 0.1 
1/7/2011 MSP OJ 
1/7/20 II MSP 0.4 
1/7/2011 MSP 2.8 
1/10/2011 MSP 0.3 
1/10/20 II MSP 1.2 
1110/2011 MSP 0.2 
1/10/20 II MSP 0.1 
1/10/20 II MSP 0.7 
1110/2011 MSP 1.0 
1/10/2011 MSP OJ 
1110/2011 MSP 1.5 
198.00 
297.00 
49.50 
16.50 
33.00 
82.50 
33.00 
33.00 
16.50 
16.50 
49.50 
66.00 
462.00 
49.50 
198.00 
33.00 
16.50 
115.50 
]65.00 
49.50 
247.50 
Research regarding permissible expert testimony 
for trial in response to motion in lim ine; 
Continue research regarding permissible 
testimony of experts; 
Letters to insured regarding research on 
permissible testimony of experts; 
Receive and review correspondence from insured 
regarding pre-trial conference; 
Correspondence to insured regarding strategy 
for pretrial conference and attendance at trial; 
Receive and review proposed jury instructions 
and special verdict; 
Receive and review witness and exhibit list; 
Receive and review affidavit regarding 
replacement witness; 
Receive and review correspondence from opposing 
counsel regarding pretrial conference; 
Receive and review correspondence from client 
regarding witnesses at trial; 
Correspondence to Zurich regarding defense of 
insured if called as a witness; 
Conference with insured regarding being called 
as a witness; 
Research regarding motion in limine to prohibit 
calling adverse attorney as witness; 
Receive and review insured's final witness 
list; 
Receive and review response to motion in limine 
by counterdefendants; 
Correspondence to client regarding defending 
insured at trial; 
Receive and review correspondence from insured 
regarding defense at trial; 
Attend pretrial conference; 
Conference with insured regarding reply brief 
on motion in limine, jury instructions and 
trial strategy; 
Correspondence to client regarding pretrial 
conference; 
Begin draft of reply brief regarding testimony 
of counsel; 
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17136.0306 - Zurich - Berkshire Investments, LLC, et al v. Clark & Feeney, et al 
Date Initials Hours Amount Description 
1/11/2011 MSP 0.6 
1/11/2011 MSP 0.3 
1/11/2011 MSP 0.1 
1/11/2011 MSP 0.4 
1/11/20 II MSP 3.8 
1/12/20 II MSP 1.1 
1/13/2011 MSP 0.1 
1/13/2011 MSP 0.2 
1/14/2011 MSP 0.3 
1114/2011 MSP 0.2 
1/17/2011 MSP 0.3 
1/17/2011 MSP 0.4 
1/17/2011 MSP 0.7 
\/17/2011 MSP 0.9 
1/18/2011 MSP 0.3 
99.00 
49.50 
16.50 
66.00 
627.00 
181.50 
16.50 
33.00 
49.50 
33.00 
49.50 
66.00 
115.50 
148.50 
49.50 
Receive and review opposing party's proposed 
jury instructions; 
Conference with insured regarding opposing 
party's proposed jury instructions; 
Receive and review jury instruction chart 
from insured; 
Receive and review reply brief regarding motion 
in limine; 
Continue draft of reply brief regarding motion 
in limine on counsel's testimony at trial; 
Continue drafting of brief in support of motion 
in limine to preclude Connie Taylor's 
testimony; 
Conference with client regarding brief on 
motion in limine; 
Receive and review revised jury instructions; 
Conference with insured regarding Berkshire's 
proposed exhibits; 
Correspondence from insured regarding 
admissibility of bar counsel investigation; 
Telephone conference with opposing counsel 
regarding stipulation to agree not to call 
client as witness; 
Conference with client regarding conference 
with opposing counsel regarding stipulation to 
not call client as a witness at trial; 
Receive and review correspondence from opposing 
counsel with exhibit list regarding proposed 
stipulation; 
Telephone conferences with client regarding 
plaintiff's exhibit list and foundation for 
exhibits; 
Telephone conference with client regarding 
proposed stipulation on motion in limine; 
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17136.0306 - Zurich - Berkshire Investments, LLC, et al v. Clark & Feeney, et al 
Date Initials Hours Amount Description 
1/1812011 MSP 0.5 82.50 Prepare arguments on motion in limine to 
preclude client's testimony; 
1/18/2011 MSP 0.8 132.00 Attend hearing on motion in limine; 
1118/2011 MSP 0.3 49.50 Correspondence to client regarding hearing on 
motion in limine and withdrawal from case; 
1119/20 II MSP 02 33.00 Conference with insured regarding withdrawal 
from case; 
1/20/2011 MSP 0.2 33.00 Receive and review supplemental brief regarding 
motion in limine; 
1/21120 II MSP 0.1 16.50 Receive and review judge's order on motion in 
limine; 
1/21/2011 MSP 0.1 16.50 Receive and review correspondence from insured 
regarding judge's order on motion in limine; 
1126/201 I MSP 0.1 16.50 Receive and review pretrial memorandum; 
1126/201 I MSP 0.1 16.50 Receive and review Berkshire's memo in support 
of motion to preclude attomey from testifying; 
1/27/2011 MSP 0.1 16.50 Receive and review correspondence from court 
requiring attendance at trial; 
1/31/2011 MSP 0.4 66.00 Attend court regarding removal of attomeys 
from caption, jury instructions and verdict; 
1/31/2011 MSP 0.4 66.00 Travel to and retum from court regarding 
removal of attomeys from caption, jury 
instructions and verdict; 
217/20 II MSP 0.2 33.00 Correspondence to insured regarding special 
verdict from abuse or process case; 
217/20 I I MSP 0.2 3300 Receive and review correspondence from insured 
regarding special verdict frOltl abuse of process 
case and collection of attorney fees from 
plaintiffs; 
217/2011 MSP 0.3 49.50 Correspondence to Zurich regarding potential 
recovery of attorney fees; 
2/8/2011 MSP 0.3 49.50 Telephone conference with claim handler 
regarding expected judgment, post-trial issues 
and request for costs and fees; 
2/8/20 II MSP 0.1 \6.50 Correspondence to insured regarding verdict and 
judgment; 
349.8 56,502.50 TOTALS 
Attomeys 
Associate 
Pal1ner 
Pal1ner 
Initials 
AJS 
LCH 
MSP 
Hours 
34.7 
0.6 
314.5 
Rate Amount 
130 4,511.00 
165 99.00 
165 51,892.50 
TOTAL 349.8 56,502.50 
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17136.0306 - Berkshire Investments, LLC et al v Clark & Feeney, et al 
Date Amount Description 
5/7/2008 0.20 2 Photocopies 
5/7/2008 0.10 1 Photocopies 
5/7/2008 4.60 Long distance telephone call to LEWISTON, ID 
5/8/2008 0.80 8 Photocopies 
5/8/2008 1.10 11 Photocopies 
5/9/2008 0.70 7 Photocopies 
5/9/2008 1.50 15 Photocopies 
5/9/2008 0.70 7 Photocopies 
5/9/2008 0.10 1 Photocopies 
5/14/2008 0.30 3 Photocopies 
5/19/2008 6.40 64 Photocopies 
5120/2008 0.20 2 Photocopies 
5/20/2008 0.20 2 Photocopies 
5/20/2008 0.20 2 Photocopies 
6/24/2008 2.00 Long distance telephone call to LEWISTON, ID 
8/4/2008 0.20 2 photocopies 
8/4/2008 0.10 1 photocopies 
8/6/2008 2.60 26 Photocopies 
8/6/2008 6.60 66 Photocopies 
8/6/2008 0.10 1 photocopies 
8/6/2008 2.20 22 Photocopies 
8/6/2008 2.00 20 Photocopies 
8/6/2008 1.90 19 Photocopies 
8/6/2008 3.20 32 Photocopies 
8/6/2008 0.30 3 photocopies 
8/6/2008 0.40 4 photocopies 
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17136.0306 - Berkshire Investments, LLC et al v Clark & Feeney, et al 
Date Amount Description 
8/6/2008 0.30 3 photocopies 
8/6/2008 0.20 2 photocopies 
8/612008 0.80 8 photocopies 
8/6/2008 1.00 10 photocopies 
8/6/2008 1.00 10 photocopies 
8/6/2008 0.80 8 photocopies 
8/6/2008 0.40 4 photocopies 
8/6/2008 1.60 16 Photocopies 
8/6/2008 1.70 17 Photocopies 
8/6/2008 2.90 29 Photocopies 
8/6/2008 5.60 56 Photocopies 
8/2l/2008 0.20 Long distance telephone call to Lewiston, Idaho 
8/22/2008 3.00 30 Photocopies 
8/2212008 0.30 3 photocopies 
8/22/2008 0.20 2 photocopies 
8/25/2008 0040 4 photocopies 
8/27/2008 0.30 3 photocopies 
9/17/2008 0.60 6 photocopies 
9/22/2008 0040 Long distance telephone call to Lewiston, Idaho 
9/24/2008 2040 Long distance telephone call to Lewiston, Idaho 
9/26/2008 0.60 6 photocopies 
9/3012008 4.80 48 Photocopies 
9/3012008 0.60 6 photocopies 
9/30/2008 1.20 12 Photocopies 
9/30/2008 1.50 15 Photocopies 
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17136.0306 - Berkshire Investments, LLC et al v Clark & Feeney, et al 
Date Amount Description 
10/1/2008 0.50 5 photocopies 
10/1/2008 0.30 3 photocopies 
10/1/2008 2.20 22 photocopies 
10/1/2008 0.20 2 photocopies 
10/1/2008 0.90 9 photocopies 
10/1/2008 0.80 8 photocopies 
10/1/2008 0.90 9 photocopies 
10/112008 0.60 6 photocopies 
10/1/2008 0.80 8 photocopies 
10/1/2008 0.50 5 photocopies 
10/2/2008 OAO Long distance telephone can to LEWISTON, ID 
10/212008 1.50 15 photocopies 
10/3/2008 0.70 7 photocopies 
1017/2008 1.10 11 photocopies 
101712008 1.10 11 photocopies 
1017/2008 1.20 12 photocopies 
10/9/2008 3.40 34 photocopies 
10/9/2008 3AO 34 photocopies 
10/9/2008 0.30 3 photocopies 
1011012008 OAO 4 photocopies 
10/1 0/2008 0.80 8 photocopies 
10/10/2008 2.00 20 photocopies 
10/10/2008 0.10 1 photocopy 
10/ I0/2008 1.30 13 photocopies 
10/10/2008 63.81 VENDOR: Burnham Habel & Associates - copy of 
deposition transcript ofH. Taylor taken 10/03/08 
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17136.0306 - Berkshire Investments, LLC et al v Clark & Feeney, et al 
Date Amount Description 
10129/2008 0.90 9 photocopies 
10/29/2008 0.30 3 photocopies 
10/29/2008 0.10 1 photocopy 
11/4/2008 1.20 12 photocopies 
11/7/2008 0.10 1 photocopy 
12/4/2008 0.20 2 photocopies 
1/12/2009 0.10 1 photocopy 
1/19/2009 0.30 3 photocopies 
2/18/2009 0.10 1 photocopy 
3/3/2009 1.20 12 photocopies 
3/3/2009 0.30 3 photocopies 
3/12/2009 2.80 28 photocopies 
4/8/2009 0.30 3 photocopies 
4/9/2009 0.60 6 photocopies 
4/9/2009 0.80 8 photocopies 
4/13/2009 3.90 39 photocopies 
4/15/2009 0.80 8 photocopies 
4/20/2009 0.60 6 photocopies 
4/20/2009 0.90 9 photocopies 
5/1/2009 0.20 2 photocopies 
7/14/2009 0.20 2 photocopies 
7/1412009 0.10 1 photocopy 
7/14/2009 0.20 2 photocopies 
7/15/2009 0.10 1 photocopy 
7/15/2009 0.10 1 photocopy 
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17136.0306 - Berkshire Investments, LLC et al v Clark & Feeney, et al 
Date Amount Description 
7/15/2009 9.60 Telephone call to LEWISTON, ID 
7116/2009 0.20 2 photocopies 
7116/2009 0.20 2 photocopies 
7/20/2009 0.10 1 photocopy 
7/21/2009 0.20 2 photocopies 
7/22/2009 0.20 2 photocopies 
7/22/2009 0.10 1 photocopy 
7/22/2009 0.10 1 photocopy 
7/22/2009 0.20 2 photocopies 
7/28/2009 0.10 1 photocopy 
7/28/2009 0.20 2 photocopies 
7/30/2009 0.10 1 photocopy 
8/3/2009 0.10 1 photocopy 
8/3/2009 0.20 2 photocopies 
8/3/2009 0.20 2 photocopies 
8/4/2009 0.10 1 photocopy 
8/4/2009 0.20 2 photocopies 
8/12/2009 0.20 2 photocopies 
8/20/2009 0.10 1 photocopy 
8/20/2009 0.50 5 photocopies 
8/2112009 0.10 1 photocopy 
8/28/2009 1.70 17 photocopies 
8/31/2009 0.10 1 photocopy 
8/31/2009 0.10 1 photocopy 
8/31/2009 0.20 2 photocopies 
8/31/2009 0.20 2 photocopies 
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Date Amount Description 
9/4/2009 0.10 1 photocopy 
9/15/2009 0.20 2 photocopies 
10/1/2009 0.10 1 photocopy 
10/6/2009 0.10 1 photocopy 
10/6/2009 0.20 2 additional photocopies 
10/612009 0.20 2 additional photocopies 
101712009 0.10 1 photocopy 
10/912009 0.10 1 photocopy 
10/19/2009 0.10 1 photocopy 
11/10/2009 0.10 1 photocopy 
11/16/2009 0.10 1 photocopy 
11/17/2009 0.10 1 photocopy 
11/1712009 0.10 1 additional photocopy 
11/17/2009 0.10 1 additional photocopy 
11/17/2009 1.20 12 additional photocopies 
11/1712009 1.20 12 additional photocopies 
11/1812009 0.40 4 photocopies 
11/18/2009 0.10 1 additional photocopy 
12/3/2009 0.20 2 photocopies 
12/3/2009 0.10 1 additional photocopy 
12/3/2009 0.10 1 additional photocopy 
12/16/2009 0.10 1 photocopy 
12/17/2009 0.10 I photocopy 
1212112009 0.10 1 photocopy 
] 2/22/2009 0.10 1 photocopy 
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Date Amount Description 
12/22/2009 0.10 1 additional photocopy 
12/31/2009 0.10 1 photocopy 
12/31/2009 0.20 2 additional photocopies 
12/31/2009 0.20 2 additional photocopies 
1/6/2010 0.10 1 photocopy 
1/7/2010 0.20 2 photocopies 
1/7/2010 0.20 2 additional photocopies 
4/27/2010 3.20 32 photocopies 
4/27/2010 2.80 28 additional photocopies 
9/3012010 1.20 12 photocopies 
9/30/2010 0.30 3 additional photocopies 
9/30/2010 0.20 2 additional photocopies 
9/30/2010 7.00 70 additional photocopies 
9/30/2010 0.30 3 additional photocopies 
10/5/2010 0.30 3 photocopies 
10/8/2010 0.10 1 photocopy 
10/12/20 I0 3.30 33 photocopies 
10/12/2010 0.10 1 additional photocopy 
10/29/2010 1.70 17 photocopies 
11/2/2010 2.00 20 photocopies 
11/2/2010 1.80 18 photocopies 
11/9/2010 3.60 36 photocopies 
11/9/2010 5.70 57 photocopies 
11/9/2010 3.10 31 photocopies 
11/9/2010 1.10 11 photocopies 
11/912010 0.90 9 photocopies 
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-17136.0306 - Berkshire Investments, LLC et al v Clark & Feeney, et al 
Date Amount Description 
11118/2010 0.10 1 photocopy 
11118/2010 7.80 78 photocopies 
11/18/2010 3.90 39 photocopies 
1112412010 2.10 21 photocopies 
1112912010 lAO 14 photocopies 
1112912010 0.10 1 photocopy 
11/29/2010 0.20 2 photocopies 
11129/2010 0.60 6 photocopies 
11/29/2010 0.20 2 photocopies 
] 1/2912010 0.30 3 photocopies 
1211120]0 2.20 22 photocopies 
121112010 0.30 3 photocopies 
12/1/2010 0.30 3 photocopies 
12/2/2010 0.60 6 photopies 
12/2/2010 0.10 1 photocopy 
12/2/2010 0.50 5 photocopies 
12/912010 0.20 2 photocopies 
12113/2010 1.00 10 photocopies 
1211612010 1.00 10 photocopies 
12/17/2010 0.20 2 photocopies 
12/22/2010 0.20 2 photocopies 
12/2712010 0.20 2 photocopies 
115/2011 2.70 27 photocopies 
1/6/2011 0.10 1 photocopy 
1/6/20]1 0.30 3 photocopies 
Page8of9 Exhibit B 
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17136.0306 - Berkshire Investments, LLC et al v Clark & Feeney, et al 
Date Amount Description
 
1/6/2011 0.30 3 photocopies
 
1/612011 0.20 2 photocopies
 
1/6/2011 0.30 3 photocopies
 
1/612011 0.40 4 photocopies
 
1/6/2011 0.30 3 photocopies
 
1/6/2011 0.20 2 photocopies
 
1/6/2011 0.10 1 photocopy
 
1/612011 0.10 1 photocopy
 
1/6/2011 0.10 1 photocopy
 
1/612011 0.30 3 photocopies
 
1/6/2011 0.10 1 photocopy
 
1/6/2011 0.10 1 photocopy
 
1/10/2011 0.30 3 photocopies 
1110/2011 2.10 21 photocopies 
1/11/2011 1.70 17 photocopies 
111312011 2.90 29 photocopies 
1/17/2011 0.20 Telephone call to LEWISTON, ID 
1/17/2011 0.20 Telephone call to LEWISTON, ID 
111812011 0.40 4 photocopies 
1118/2011 2.00 Telephone call to LEWISTON, ID 
1/20/2011 1.50 15 photocopies 
1/26/2011 0.60 6 photocopies 
278.61 TOTAL 
Page 9 0[9 Exhibit B 
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THOMAS G. MAILE, IV. 
Attorney at Law 
380 West State Street 
Eagle, Idaho 83616 
Telephone: (208) 939-1000 
Idaho State Bar No. 2378 
Co-Counsel for Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants 
FEB 1B2011 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
 
By STEPHANIE VIDAK
 
DEPLTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
 
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an 
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G. 
MAILE, IV. and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE, 
husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants, 
v. 
CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, f/kla 
CONNIE TAYLOR, an individual; DALLAN 
TAYLOR, an individual; R. JOHN 
TAYLOR, an individual; CLARK and 
FEENEY, a partnership; PAUL T. CLARK, 
an individual; THEODORE L. JOHNSON 
REVOCABLE TRUST, an Idaho revocable 
trust; JOHN DOES I -JOHN DOES X; AND 
ALL PERSONS IN POSSESSION OR 
CLAIMING ANY RIGHT TO 
POSSESSION. 
Defendants/Counter-Claimants. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss: 
County of Ada ) 
Case No. CV-OC-0723232 
AFFIDAVIT OF THOMAS G. 
MAILE, IV. RE: OFFER OF' 
JUDGMENT 
THOMAS G. MAILE, IV., being duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says: 
1. Your Affiant is the co-counsel of record for Counter-Defendants in the above captioned 
AFFIDAVIT OF THOMAS G. MAILE, IV. RE: OFFER OF JUDGMENT - Pg 1 
002342
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matter. That the information and facts set forth herein are based upon your affiant's 
personal knowledge and/or observations and can testify as to the truth of the matters 
asserted herein if called upon as a witness at the trial of this matter. 
2.	 That attached hereto as Exhibit "A" is a true and correct copy of the Offer of Judgment 
dated November 16, 2009 together with the fax transmittal confirmation sheet. The Offer 
of Judgment was served as indicated on the 16th day of November, 2009. 
3.	 That attached hereto as Exhibit "B" is a true and correct copy of the Motion to Dismiss 
Counterclaim of Clark and Feeney Defendants which states that any and all claims of 
Clark and Feeney are derivative of Counter-Claimants damages. 
4.	 That attached hereto as Exhibit "c" is a true and correct copy of the Stipulation to 
Dismiss Counterclaim of Clark and Feeney Defendants. 
DATED this ~ day ofFebruary, 2011. 
~IV" 
Co-counsel for Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants 
\ 0.. SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me, a Notary Public in and for said State, this 
~ day ofFebruary, 2011. 
1\1·rN1t> M~~~~~	 _ 
Notary Public for Idaho 
Residing at Boise, Idaho MICHELE C. MATTSON ~ 
Notary Public My Commission Expires August 4,2016
State of Idaho 
AFFIDAVIT OF THOMAS G. MAILE, IV. RE: OFFER OF JUDGMENT - Pg 2 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
 
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on this 122 day ofFebruary, 2011, I caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF THOMAS G. MAILE, IV. RE: OFFER OF JUDGMENT 
to be delivered, addressed as follows: 
Connie W. Taylor & Paul Henderson 
Henderson Law Finn 
900 Washington St. Suite 1020 
Vancouver, Washington 98660 
Facsimile: (360) 693-2911 
Mark Stephen Prusynski
 
PO Box 829
 
Boise, ID 83701
 
Phone: (208) 345-2000
 
Facsimile: (208) 385-5384
 
Christ T. Troupis
 
TROUPIS LAW OFFICE
 
1299 E. Iron Eagle, Ste 130
 
PO Box 2408
 
Eagle, Idaho 83616
 
Facsimile: (208) 938-5482
 
() U. S. Mail 
(X) Facsimile Transmission 
() Hand Delivery 
() Overnight Delivery 
() U. S. Mail 
(X) Facsimile Transmission 
() Hand Delivery 
() Overnight Delivery 
() u. S. Mail 
() Facsimile Transmission 
(X) Hand Delivery 
() Overnight Delivery 
THOMAS G. MAILE, IV.,
 
Co-counsel for Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants
 
AFFIDAVIT OF THOMAS G. MAILE, IV. RE: OFFER OF JUDGMENT - P:g 3 
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THOMAS G. MAILE, IV 
Attorney at Law 
380 West State Street 
Eagle, Idaho 83616 
Telephone: (208) 939-1000 
Idaho State Bar No. 2378 
Pro Se and counsel for Berkshire Investments and Colleen Birch-Maile 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an 
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G. 
MAILE, IV. and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE, 
husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants, 
v. 
CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, flk/a 
CONNIE TAYLOR, an individual; DALLAN 
TAYLOR, an individual; R. JOHN 
TAYLOR, an individual; CLARK and 
FEENEY, a partnership; PAUL T. CLARK, 
an individual; THEODORE L. JOHNSON 
REVOCABLE TRUST, an Idaho revocable 
trust; JOHN DOES I -JOHN DOES X; AND 
ALL PERSONS IN POSSESSION OR 
CLAIMING ANY RIGHT TO 
POSSESSION. 
Defendants/Counter-claimants. 
Case No. CV-OC-0723232 
OFFER OF JUDGMENT 
TO:	 THE DEFENDANTS/COUNTER-CLAIMANTS ABOVE NAMED, THEIR 
ATTORNEYS OF RECORD, CONNIE TAYLOR and MARK PRUSYNSKI AND 
THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT 
Pursuant to Rule 68 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants 
002346
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herein, by and through their attorney of record, Thomas G. Maile, IV, hereby offer to allow 
Judgment to be taken against them in the principal amount of FIFTY FIVE THOUSAND 
DOLLARS ($55,000.00) for the claims relating to the counter-claims of Defendants/Counter-
Claimants, which sum includes payment for all claims against said Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants 
including any and all attomeys fees and costs which could be ordered relating to the complaint in 
the pending action pursued by Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants. Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants do 
not waive their right to ultimately appeal the current dismissal of their complaint in the above 
captioned matter. 
This Offer of Judgment is made for the purpose specified in Rule 68 of the Idaho Rules of 
Civil Procedure and is not to be construed as either an admission that Defendants/Counter-
Claimants herein have a lawful claim against Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants. 
DATED this ffiay of November, 2009. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the I&' day ofNovember, 2009, I served the 
foregoing(1) OFFER OF JUDGMENT by having a true and complete copy personally delivered, 
by facsimile and/or by depositing the same in the United States Mail, postage prepaid thereon, 
and addressed as follows: 
002347
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Mark Stephen Prusynski 
PO Box 829 
Boise, ID 83701 
Phone: (208) 345-2000 
Fax: (208) 385-5384 
Connie W. Taylor 
CLARK and FEENEY 
P.O. Drawer 785 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
Facsimile: (208) 746-9160 
() U. S. Mail 
(X) Facsimile Transmission 
() Hand Delivery 
() Overnight Delivery 
() u. S. Mail 
(X) Facsimile Transmission 
() Hand Delivery 
() Overnight Delivery 
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TRANS~·lISSIOH VERIF I CATIOt,j REPORT 
TIME 11/15/2009 09:37 
NAME THm.·IAS f··1A I LE 
FAX 120:393':HOOl 
TEL 120:393~11 000 
SER.# 000H5J4:34204 
DATE,TIME 11/15 09:37 
FAX NO./NAME 3:355384 
DURATION 00:0[1:45 
PAGE(S) 03 ­
RESULT 0[( 
fvl0DE STANDARD 
ECM 
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12/02/2010 15:55 FAX 2083855~84 1 MOFFATT THOMAS I4J 002/004
"\
-' 
Mill'k S. Prusyllski, ISB No. 2349 
MOFF/\TT, TIlOMAS, HA1~IU~TI', I{()el( & 
FJELDS, Cl !.i\RTERED 
J01 S. Capitol Blvd., 10th Floor 
Post ()fficG Box S2() 
Boise, Idaho 8370 [ 
Tl:lcphonc (20S) 345-2000 
Facsirnile (208) 31)5-5384 
msp@)JlloJEtll.cOlll 
17136.03()() 
Allorncys rl)l' Ddt:ndants Conlli(~ Wright Taylor' Ib 
Connie Taylor, Clark and Feeney, and Palll 'I'. Clark 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF TIlE FOURTH JUDICIAL D[STRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAlIO. IN AND ]:0/\ Tl./E COUNT'( (JF ADA 
Br~:RKSJlIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an 
luaho limited liability. ann TJIOMAS G. 
MAILE, IV, and C:OLLl?EN BIRCH·MAILE, 
Il\lsbnnd and wi fl\ 
Plain[iffs, 
VS. 
CONNIE WRICJIlT TAYLOR, fka C01\TNIE 
'fAYLOR, an individual; DAI.I.AN 
TAYLOR. an individual:; R. .I01-IN 'fA YLOR, 
an individual; CLAI,K and FEENEY. n 
partnership; PAl)!. T. CLARK,;1I1 individual; 
TIIEODORE L J()IINSON REVOCABLE 
TRUST, all Idaho r\Cyocablc trusl; JOHN 
DOES I-JOHN DOES X; AND ALl. 
PERSONS IN P()SSESSION OR CLAIMING 
ANY RIGHT TO POSSESSION, 
[kf'cndants. 
CaSG No. C'Y -()('-072323 2 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
COUNTERCLAIM OF CLARK AND 
FEENEV DEFENDANTS 
MOTION TO DiSMISS COLJN'fERCLAIM OF CLARK AND 
lIEENEY DEFENDANTS - 1 eli"'ll: lIlb'Hk)(j.l 
002352
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12/02/2010 1555 FAX 2083855~84 1 MOFFi',TT THOMAS I4J 003/004 
.....:) 
Come now the defendants, Clark and Feeney, Connie Taylor. ami Paul '1'110111-1S 
CI~lrk (the "Clark and Feeney Defendants") by and through their coullSel, Mark S. Prusynski. and 
pursuanllo I.R.C.P. 41(a)(2), and move for an order O]'vo]ulltary dismissnl of"the Clnrk Jnd 
Fcen<.:y Defendants' counterclaims in the above malLer, wilh and witllout fees or costs. 
This motion is matlc on the grounJs and Jor the reasons Ul~ll the Clark Hnd Feeney 
DefemIanls' claims arc del'ivativc of 01(: clai tnS of lhe Olher ddcndanls, nnd Ow on ly dn.mages 
unjque 10 the Clark and f\:cncy [kfclldanLs nrc their rC(~S for defending lhe claims of the 
plainlin: which can Iw ~ldequately addressed in a post-trial motion to the courl pursuant to 
l.R.C,J), 54(d)( 1). 
[kfcn(\;mls do not intend to l'<.~qucst oral argument or 10 file a briel. 
DATED this 2nd day orrkccmbcr, 2010. 
MOFFA'fT. TIIOMAS, 13/\ RRFTr, Ih)Ci:( ('\t., 
FII~LDS, ()IAR'I'FRr:o 
8y~1~~~-~-
Allorm.:ys fiJr Dr..:kndallts Connie Wright 
Taylor Ika Connie Taylor. Clark ,emu 
Fecncy, WId Paul 'I', Clark 
MOTION TO nlSI\HSS COlJNTERCI ,AIM OF (:LAR.K AND 
FEENEY IlEFENf);\NTS - 2 C/...",11/1';:lO,)(11 
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i(; ,
lH;i ns , ll
li t , , ofvolul1 c
ll t
l1l ti :.u1 011 Ul1 [' I CL.JIlCY
nd t r  111( d r s ol
i .  ll anl a /l c~ s t
t ;ldeCJl1atel
(, e l ,
f])ccc e ,
B/
IFL , C IA ' r:J)
OY 1 e~  
tt rne <Jf l
"
all
U
12/02/2010 15:55 FAX 208385£~q~ 1 MOFFATT THOMAS III 004/004 
......,) 
CERrIFI(.'ATE OF SERVICE 
I II EIU:B Y CER'ITFY thaI on thi:,; 21lt! Jay of December, 2010, I CallHed a true 
and correcl copy of the foregoing MOTION TO DJSM ISS COUNTERCLAIM OF CLARK 
AND FEENEY DEFENDANTS to be served by the l11elhod indicall:;d below, and addressed 10 
the following: 
Thomas G. Maile IV ( ) U,S, Mail, Postage Prepaid 
LAW OFFICES OF THOMAS G MAlLE IV, P.A. ( ) Hand Delivered 
3S0 W. Stnh~ St. () Ovcmight Mail 
r;'lgk. II) 83(l!h-4(}02 (x) Facsimik; 
Facsimile (20R) 939-1001 
Christ T. Troupis ( ) U,S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
'rR(ll!pIS LAW OrFIC'!::, PA ( ) rfand Delivered 
1',0, Box 240S ( ) Ovcmight Mnil 
Eagk,ID 8361 (i (x) Facsimile 
Facsimile (208) 938-5482 
John C. Mitchell ( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
('LARK & FEENEY ( ) Hand [)divcl'cd 
1229 Main S1.. Suite 201 ( ) ()vt~rnjght Mail 
P,O. 130x 2S5 (x) Facsimile 
Lewiston, If) 83501-0285 
Facsimile (208) 74(i-i)160 
C'onni\: W, T'ayhl!­ ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
IIFNDERSON LA W ) Ibncl Dclivclwl 
900 Washington, Suite 1020 ( ) Overnight M,lil 
Vancollv~r. WA CJS(i(iO (xl Facsimile 
Fn~~simiJc (3()O) (;93-2911 
MOTION T(l DISMISS COUNTERCLAIM OF CLARK AND 
FEENEY IlICFENDANTS - 3 
002354
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12/02/2010 17:29 FAX 208385'~~4 2 MOFFATT THOM~,S ~ 002/005 
17/02/2010 15:~9 l101AS ~1AILE 
M:lrl<, S F'rus'yl1:>ki. I::;H No, 2349 
MOl"J,,,n. THOM.\I';, BARRJ:n"I. R()< 'I-: & 
FIEU)~" CIIM,TcREn 
)01 S. Cllpil\.,l Blvd, rOlh F/POI 
i>o~l Office B~)x ~29 
Bl;li~e. 1Ibho 837(H 
'r\:1L.11hN~l: (2WI) :\45·2000 
FUC$irnile (208) 3S5·~:l~4 
til sp(a,ln1() (f;.t\I, r:l"111l 
17 J30.0306 
Al!C1!.1lCY::: (Qf Dcl'cndi1!llS Cmlllic Wri!)hl. 'I'llylor Ik;l 
Connie T:.aylQr. 1,,".Ii:lrl; ~md Fc~IlOY. :I.IU\ Palll T, C)'lrk 
IN THE OIS'I'J~ I(T COURT OF Tll P. FOUWI'I"I ,1tID/CIA.L I,)ISTI{lCl 
OF rHF: sTAT[ or rDAHO. IN ANI) rOR TilE COONTY 01" AD,!\ 
13ERKSIlIll,f, INVESTMENTS. L1..C. '\I.l 
1(l:Ihl1 limiteo li,lhlJity, mld THOMAS G. 
MAILE. IV. ;md COLLEr.;N umCH·MAI.U:" 
hllsbal\U imd wi 1'(;. 
\"....
CONNT(£ W RlCtTf '1'.0\ V LOR. tka CON'NlE 
T.i\Y1..0tt :.1 1' lndividlltll; DAJ..LAN 
T/\Y.l.OR. lIl"I irlUl\lidllal: R, JOHN TAYLOR, 
Illl mdividtlnJ: CL/I11,K Bnt! H~J;NI':'Y.:,I 
p'lr(tIl.ll':;h;~I; 1'001!L T, CLARK••Oi jrtdi~'idll:\l: 
THI~OI)()RS L JO,HNSON REVOCJ\I.1L.lS 
"'1~UST, 110 ldllh'II'I~v(H:ablt: llUSl; JOHN 
nOES 1·.IOr'IN DOES X; AND AU. 
PERSONS IN I'(")S~ESSION OrtC'LAIMING 
AN"{ rUCHT TO rOSSESS10N. 
Dt~fmdllnt:;, 
STWlJI.A1'JON TO OISMISS 
COllNTERCI,i\TM 01' CLARK ANI) 
"I;:I\,NJ~V ORF'ltNDAN'I'S 
~llPtJLt\TWN TO Ol$MISS COUi\:TlmCl.AJM Of'CL/\RK ANn 
JiF.F.NEY l>f.FENIlANTS. I 
002356
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12/02/2010 17: 29 FAX 20838:5 r \ MOFFA TT THOM,o,S @ 003/005
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2 
-'1~/02/?810 15:49 1?ARg?cJlI1AII t I '0 I to. V I V ''1, y... I 111\ o. - ~. '.;,: .;:, ~ ..' ::.' v' . ~ ,\ , THOMAS MAILE 
Birch.Made:. by ~111(J IhrOllgh their CIHtMd Chrisl 'r, Trnuflis. 4\11<1 (3I.:rkshj,.r~ IJly\;t.lrn t;:nls, LU,::. 
I.A'N (WFlCES or 
THOMAS (i MM,;,).:: IV, ?t\. 
STH'Ul.AHON TO Im:;Ml~S C:OUNTf~n.CI,ArM Of CLARK ANI) 
n;":NIW DEFENlMNTS • '2 
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Altom!;;), rClt Ph'inrjfi~~, Berk~:llir", InvL:stmc·Il!.~ 
ilnd en) ken Birch-!'''1,lite 
.{.... 
DATED Uli; }()~_" d;,y ()fNov(;mbcr. Jmn. 
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DATEl) chit; iJ...- d~lY of Nowmber, 20 J0,
 
'DATED titlr. _ tillY ofNovember. 2010. 
M(')FI:AIT, TI"OMAS, t>1\n.l'tETT, !\OCY- & 
Frtil.03, CHARTER.IW 
OY..~__ ..... --',_­
Mark S. Pnl:{ynski .' Of th~ Firm 
Atlomcys fol' De(cndl)1'!t5 Connie Wrigh l. 
T:lylor tka Cormie T(lylOl, Clark and 
FC~I1CY. and l)oul T. ClllTk 
$TU'ULATION TO IHSM{SS COUNTERCLAIM OF CLARK ANI) 
F'~ENEY Dli:n;:NDAN'l'S • 3 
002358
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:'2/ 1jL!2tilO 1 'J' ..j q 12qEl'33':l1001I 'I to' r: v I..... I , I V U " .; h .~' THOWIS W\ lI.E 
DATED thi.;. __..__._ <!:.lY uI'No\'cmhel', 10l(). 
B Y.•_.. . .. ·_••,,"o·"'...· ...~_· .•--_._. 
CI)'I1nit: Wright'!';lY)!)/'
 
Allt'lI'Il~YS fcw .1ohl1 'I':Jylrll', l)alli:Hl Iii yinI'
 
and lht~ 'I'lll.;o(lon:: J<il\l1S(l1l Trust
 
D/\TED thi~; It';::'~lillr (11" NO"'l~mbcr, 20 r0 
,.._'.'\, .... -.. .. 
MOF'IWrT. TJrOM/\S. B!\ 1~1~1:'rr. l{o<,:K & 
PIL'U):), CII/\lrn~!Hm 
'/ ,/-;.'1 1 1l1"''/' ,B'!.~~L~~.:::L__.. .-<£:2~'7./.A' '.,. __..-_ 
M~lrk .t" l'ruSyll:iki " Of'tllt' rirm 
A.llorn.;;.ys fill' D~lcn("'I'h C~lnl1ic Wrig.ht 
'raylol' fk,a CU!lnic T:'lylm", O:lrk and 
FCl.:t\.;:y, :md Palll "1', Clar!, 
STlf'ULt\TfON TO D1~MISS COtJN'I'ERCI.ATM OF (LAfU' ANI) 
r.KF.:NI·;YDTr,FE~J)ANTS - ~~ 
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THOMAS G. MAILE, N. FEB 18 2011 
Attorney at Law 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, CieiK380 West State Street By STEPf-IANiE VIDAK 
DEPUTYEagle, Idaho 83616 
Telephone: (208) 939-1000 
Idaho State Bar No. 2378 
Co-Counsel for Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an 
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G. Case No. CV-OC 07-23232 
MAILE, N. and COLLEEN BIRCH­
MAILE, husband and wife, PLAINTIFFS/COUNTER­
DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM 
Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants, OF COSTS 
v. 
CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, f/k/a 
CONNIE l'AYLOR, an individual; DALLAN 
TAYLOR, an individual; R. JOHN 
l'AYLOR, an individual; CLARK and 
FEENEY, a partnership; PAUL T. CLARK, 
an individual; THEODORE L. JOHNSON 
REVOCABLE TRUST, an Idaho revocable 
trust; JOHN DOES I -JOHN DOES X; AND 
ALL PERSONS IN POSSESSION OR 
CLAIMING ANY RIGHT TO 
POSSESSION. 
Defendants/Counter-Claimants. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
County ofAda ) 
THOMAS G. MAILE, N., being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says: 
1. That I am co-counsel for the above-referenced Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants and 
PLAINTIFFS/COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM OF COSTS - Pgl 
002360
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make this Affidavit pursuant to Rules 54 & 68, of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. To the 
best of my knowledge the items stated herein are correct and the costs claimed are in compliance 
with Rule 54 (d). 
2. The costs incurred by the Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants, relative to the claims 
filed by the counter-claimants in this action are itemized in Exhibit "A" attached hereto and by 
reference incorporated herein. Relative to the costs which were incurred the same are Sl~t forth in 
Exhibit "A" a total cost bill of $2,174.01 for costs, of which $164.00 are mandatory costs which 
have already been paid or which are due and owing to the providers for their fees, (mandatory 
costs are marked with "M" to denote mandatory costs pursuant to LR.C.P. Rule 54). The costs 
are reasonable and were necessary to the defense of this matter and the discretionary costs 
should be awarded to the Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants as the same were necessary for the 
proper preparation for the various motions and/or the ultimate trial. 
3. Relative to the discretionary costs, your affiant states that the various costs were 
undertaken for the benefit of the Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants in the defense of the claims 
advanced by the counter-claimants. Mr. Chaffin was retained during the period of time the 
counter-claimants were making a claim for money damages in excess of a $1,000,000.00, and he 
was retained to dispute the claims regarding the alleged loss of value associated with thl~ real 
property. Had not those claims been advanced by the counter-claimants his fees would not have 
been incurred which amount to $600.00. The copy charges, binder charges for exhibits were 
necessarily incurred given the scope of the claims of the counter-claimants and the same are 
reasonable. 
The Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants' claim for cost is made pursuant to LR.C.P. Rules 54 
PLAINTIFFS/COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM OF COSTS AND 
ATTORNEY'S FEES - Pg 2 
002361
I.
 
I.
& 68. In addition the Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants incorporate by reference their 
Memorandum in Support of Counter-defendants' Motion for Costs and Opposition to Counter-
claimants' Motion for Costs and Attorneys Fees (Rule 68) as if set forth in full herein. 
WHEREFORE, your affiant requests this Court to award the Plaintiffs/Counter-
Defendants their costs as set forth in this Memorandum and the accompanying Memorandum of 
Christ Troupis regarding additional costs filed herein. 
DATED this \~ day of February, 2011. 
~~--------
Co-Counsel for Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
County of Ada) 
10.. SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me, a Notary Public in and for said State, this 
JJL day of February, 2011. 
MICHelE C. MATTSO:)
Notary Public ~ ~C\tIDOO,--__ 
State of Idaho Notary Public for 
Residing at Boise, Idaho 
My Commission Expires: August 4,2016 
PLAINTIFFS/COUNTER-UEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM OF COSTS AND 
ATTORNEY'S FEES - Pg 3 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on this lf6 day of February, 2011, I caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing PLAINTIFFS/COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM OF 
COSTS AND ATTORNEY'S FEES to be delivered, addressed as follows: 
Connie W. Taylor & Paul Henderson () u. S. Mail 
Henderson Law Finn (X) Facsimile Transmission 
900 Washington S1. Suite 1020 () Hand Delivery 
Vancouver, Washington 98660 () Overnight Delivery 
Facsimile: (360) 693-2911 
Mark Stephen Prusynski () u. S. Mail 
PO Box 829 (X) Facsimile Transmission 
Boise, ID 83701 () Hand Delivery 
Phone: (208) 345-2000 () Overnight Delivery 
Facsimile: (208) 385-5384 
Christ T. Troupis () u. S. Mail 
TROUPIS LAW OFFICE (X) Facsimile Transmission 
1299 E. Iron Eagle, Ste 130 () Hand Delivery 
PO Box 2408 () Overnight Delivery 
Eagle, Idaho 83616 
Facsimile: (208) 938-5482 
PLAINTIFFS/COUNTER-J)EFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM OF COSTS AND 
ATTORNEY'S FEES - Pg 4 
002363
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Co-Counsel for P1aintiffs/Counter-
Defendants 
2/10/2011 Law Offices of Thomas G. Maile 
12:02 PM Slip Listing Page 
Selection Criteria 
Slip.Date 11/16/2009 - 3/23/2012 
Slip.Classification Open 
Acco.Selection Include: Berkshire Inv/C&F 
Slip.Transaction Ty 2-2 
Rate Info - identifies rate source and level 
Slip 10 
Dates and Time 
Posting Status 
Description 
27887 EXP 
12/24/2009 
WIP 
Maurice Chaffin real estate market analysis 
28952 EXP 
11/1/2010 
WIP 
Sheriffs fee for service of process on 
depositions 
28953 EXP 
11/1/2010 
WIP 
Witness fee for Reed Taylor 
28954 EXP 
11/1/2010 
WIP 
Witness fee for Tamara Crane 
29201 EXP 
12/31/2010 
WIP 
Postage for mailing Pleadings associated 
with motions in limine. 
29208 EXP 
1/10/2011 
WIP 
Certified copy from Secretary of 
State-Tamara Crane record. 
29209 EXP 
1/10/2011 
WIP 
Postage for mailing jury instructions and 
pre-trial matter. 
Units 
DNB Time 
Est. Time 
Variance 
1
 
Mickey 
$Sheriffs fee 
Berkshire Inv/C&F 
Mickey 
$witness fee 
Berkshire Inv/C&F 
Mickey 
$witness fee 
Berkshire Inv/C&F 
Mickey 
$postage 
Berkshire Inv/C&F 
Mickey 
$exhibit fee 
Berkshire Inv/C&F 
Mickey 
$postage 
Berkshire Inv/C&F 
300.00 
Rate 
Rate Info 
Bill Status 
300.00 
Slip Value 
_ 
120.00 120.00/T) 
22.00 22.00fY\ 
22.00 22.00m 
10.95 10.95 
10.00 10.00 
11.10 11.10 
002364
 
 
.123/
ID User 
Activity 
Account 
--=D::...;:e;..=s""cr:.;.Jip=-:t:..=;io.:...;.n ___________ Reference ________  
Mickey 
$expert service 
Berkshire Inv/C&F 
 
/(
__ ._. • I_....._~...I ..I!"...I~.._-....-_...-, 
_.. 
.....' 
2/10/2011 
12:02 PM 
Law Offices of Thomas G. Maile 
Slip Listing Page 2 
Slip 10 
Dates and Time 
Posting Status 
Description 
29245 EXP 
1/12/2011 
WIP 
Binders, index sheets and labels for exhibit 
binders. 
User 
Activity 
Account 
Reference 
Mickey 
$exhibit fee 
Berkshire Inv/C&F 
Units 
ONB Time 
Est. Time 
Variance 
1 
Rate 
Rate Info 
Bill Status 
217.96 
Slip Value 
217.96 
29275 EXP 
1/31/2011 
WIP 
Copy charges related to trial preparation, 
exhibits, jury instructions, pleadings 
(12/1/2010 thru 01/31/12011). 
Mickey 
$copies 
Berkshire Inv/C&F 
5800 0.20 1160.00 
29306 EXP 
2/3/2011 
WIP 
Maurice Chaffin real estate market analysis 
and preparation for trial testimony 
Mickey 
$expert service 
Berkshire Inv/C&F 
300.00 300.00 
Grand Total 
Billable 
Unbillable 
Total 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
2174.01 
0.00 
2174.01 
002365
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THOMAS G. MAILE, IV. 
Attorney at Law 
380 West State Street 
Eagle, Idaho 83616 
Telephone: (208) 939-1000 
Idaho State Bar No. 2378 
Co-Counsel for Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants 
NO. Of. 1}rFILI~13A.M'----{;;f-4- of _ IM. _ 
FEB 18 2011 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
 
By STEPHANIE VIDAK
 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
 
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an 
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G. 
MAILE, IV. and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE, 
husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants, 
v. 
CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, f/k/a 
CONNIE TAYLOR, an individual; DALLAN 
TAYLOR, an individual; R. JOHN 
TAYLOR, an individual; CLARK and 
FEENEY, a partnership; PAUL T. CLARK, 
an individual; THEODORE L. JOHNSON 
REVOCABLE TRUST, an Idaho revocable 
trust; JOHN DOES I ~JOHN DOES X; AND 
ALL PERSONS IN POSSESSION OR 
CLAIMING ANY RIGHT TO 
POSSESSION. 
Defendants/Counter-Claimants. 
Case No. CV-OC-0723232 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' 
MOTION FOR COSTS AN]) 
OPPOSITION TO COUNTER­
CLAIMANTS' MOTION FOR 
COSTS AND ATTORNEYS FEES 
The counter-defendants by and through their undersigned co-counsel of record, and 
provides this Memorandum Brief in support of their Motion for Costs and in opposition to 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR COSTS 
AND OPPOSITION TO COUNTER-CLAIMANTS' MOTION FOR COSTS ANn 
ATTORNEYS FEES- Pg 1 
002366
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1 
counter-claimants' motion for costs and attorneys fees: 
LEGAL ARGUMENT 
The Counter-defendants Properly Served an Offer of Judgment Which thE: Counter­
claimants Failed to Meet. 
The counter-defendants' offer ofjudgment is annexed to the Affidavit ofThomas G. 
Maile IV., re: Offer of Judgment, filed concurrently herewith. The affects of the service of an 
offer ofjudgment are set forth in Rule 68 of the I.R.C.P., which provides: 
Rule 68. Offer of Judgment 
(a) At any time more than 14 days before the trial begins, a party defending 
against a claim may serve upon the adverse party an offer to allow judgment to be 
taken against the defending party for the money or property or to the effect 
specified in the offer, which offer ofjudgment shall be deemed to include all 
claims recoverable, including any attorneys fees awardable under Rule 54(e)(1), 
and any costs awardable under Rule 54(d)(1), which have accrued up to the date 
of the offer of judgment. The offer ofjudgment shall not be filed with the court, 
except as stated herein. Ifwithin 14 days after the service of the offer the offeree 
serves written notice that the offer is accepted, either party may then file the offi~r 
and notice of acceptance together with proof of service thereof, and thereupon the 
judgment shall be entered for the amount ofthe offer without costs. 
If the adjusted award obtained by the offeree is less than the offer, then: 
(i) the offeree must pay those costs of the offeror as allowed under Rule 54(d)( 1), 
incurred after the making of the offer; 
(ii) the offeror must pay those costs of the offeree, as allowed under Rule 54(d)(1), 
incurred before the making of the offer; and 
(iii) the offeror shall not be liable for costs and attorney fees awardable under 
Rules 54(d)(1) and 54(e)(1) of the offeree incurred after the making of the offer. 
If the adjusted award obtained by the offeree is more than the offer, the offeror 
must pay those costs, as allowed under Rule 54(d)(1), incurred by the offeree both 
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before and after th~: making of the offer. 
After a comparison of the offer and the adjusted award, in appropriate cases, th~: 
district court shall order an amount which either the offeror or the offeree must 
ultimately pay separate and apart from the amount owed under the verdict. A total 
judgment shall be entered taking into account both the verdict and the involved 
costs. 
A defendant who has made an offer ofjudgment should not lose the benefits of Rule 68 
merely because the defendant has completely prevailed. A defendant should at least receive the 
benefit of the Rule 68(b)(i) provision making an award of allowable post-offer costs incurred by 
the defendant mandatory rather than discretionary as would otherwise be the case under I.R.c.P. 
54(d)(l). A defendant could be penalized for being "too successful" by losing the mandatory 
entitlement ofI.R.C.P. 68(b)(i). Stewart v. McKamin, 141 Idaho 930, 120 P.3d 748 (Idaho App. 
2005). 
In the present matter the offer ofjudgment was served on the counter-claimants on 
November 16, 2009. The amount of $55,000.00 was offered to all of the counter-claimants. The 
counter-claimant Clark & Feeney has admitted that its claims are derivative of the claims 
advanced by the Taylor Brothers. Clark & Feeney entered into a contingent fee agreement with 
the Taylor Brothers to recover 1/3 of the property or money obtained. The admission by Clark & 
Feeney in its motion to dismiss dated December 2, 2010 that its claims are derivative is a judicial 
admission. To be a judicial admission a statement must be a deliberate, clear, and unequivocal 
statement of a party about a concrete fact within that party's knowledge. Strouse, 129 Idaho at 
619, 930 P.2d at 1364 (et. App. 1997). A judicial admission is a statement made by a party or 
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attorney, in the course ofjudicial proceedings, for the purpose, or with the effect, of dispensing 
with the need for proofby the opposing party of some fact. Sun Valley Potato Growers, Inc. v. 
Texas Refinery Corp., 139 Idaho 761, 765, 86 P.3d 475, 479 (2004). 
The offer ofjudgment was a combined offer ofjudgment to all counter-claimants. The 
case of Wiese v. Dedhia, 354 N.J. Super. 256, 806 A.2d 826 (N.J. Super. A.D. 2002) provides: 
Although there is no known requirement that plaintiffs settle their claims 
individually, a defendant may still gain the benefits of the offer-of-judgment rul(~ 
by responding to the joint offer ofplaintiffs. Contrary to the trial court's intimation 
in this case, a defendant does not lose the right to settle part of the case and 
therefore limit its exposure when a joint offer is presented. Rather, a defendant 
may make an offer to each claimant individually to allow judgment to be taken 
against it, irrespective of a claimant's offer. R. 4:58-1, -3. In any event, there 
appears to be no greater difficulty in evaluating a joint offer representing the total 
value ofplaintiffs' claims where one is largely derivative of the other than when 
separately presented. 
We discern no prejudice to defendant by the rule's application to the joint 
offer tendered by plaintiffs in this case. Consistent with its policy and purpose, we 
conclude that R. 4:58-1 authorizes spousal plaintiffs with interrelated claims and 
no real or apparent conflict of interest to submit a joint offer ofjudgment for 
resolution of the entire case. 
The principle has equal application to the present offer ofjudgment. Clark & Feeney's 
claims on their counter-claim were derivative of the Taylor Brothers' claims. In a similar fact 
pattern the case of Short v. Petty, 213 Ariz. 103, 139 P .3d 621 (Ariz. App. Div. 1 2006) dealt 
with a joint offer ofjudgment to multiple parties. The Short, case held: 
the policy of this State is to avoid, rather than promote, litigation. A blanket 
prohibition against joint offers puts a burden on the offeror--whether plaintiff or 
defendant--that cuts against this policy. When given a choice, we should construe 
the rules, whether common law or statutory, consistent with this policy. 
The counter-defendants properly served an offer ofjudgment which the counter-claimants 
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failed to accept and the jury award failed to meet the dollar amount of the offer ofjudgment. 
Pursuant to Rule 68 the counter-defendants are entitled to their costs as prevailing parties 
consistent with Rule 68 for costs since November, 16,2009. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons above cited the counter-defendants are entitled to their costs as of 
November 16, 2009 to the present. The counter-claimants are only allowed their costs prior to 
November 16,2009 relating to their claims set forth in their counter-claims. 
ORAL ARGUMENT is requested upon the motion.
 
DATED this \ 0 day of February, 2011.
 
~&fIV"Co-Counsel for Plaintiffs/Counter­
Defendants 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on this \~ day of February, 2011, I caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' 
MOTION FOR COSTS AND OPPOSITION TO COUNTER-CLAIMANTS' MOTION FOR 
COSTS AND ATTORNEYS FEES, to be delivered, addressed as follows: 
Connie W. Taylor & Paul Henderson 
Henderson Law Firm 
900 Washington St. Suite 1020 
Vancouver, Washington 98660 
Facsimile: (360) 693-2911 
Mark Stephen Prusynski 
PO Box 829 
Boise, ID 83701 
Phone: (208) 345-2000 
Facsimile: (208) 385-5384 
Christ T. Troupis 
TROUPIS LAW OFFICE 
1299 E. Iron Eagle, Ste 130 
PO Box 2408 
Eagle, Idaho 83616 
Facsimile: (208) 938-5482 
() 
(X) 
() 
() 
() 
(X) 
() 
() 
() 
(X) 
() 
() 
U. S. Mail 
Facsimile Transmission 
Hand Delivery 
Overnight Delivery 
u. S. Mail 
Facsimile Transmission 
Hand Delivery 
Overnight Delivery 
U. S. Mail 
Facsimile Transmission 
Hand Delivery 
Overnight Delivery 
~N., 
Co-Counsel for Plaintiffs/Counter­
Defendants 
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Christ T. Troupis, ISB # 4549 
TROUPIS LAW OFFICE 
1299 E. Iron Eagle, Ste 130 
PO Box 2408 
Eagle, Idaho 83616 
Telephone: 208/938-5584 
Facsimile: 208/938-5482 
Email: ctroupis@troupislaw.com 
Co-Counsel for Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants 
, ,
:J 
c: ,:: 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
 
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an 
I, Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G. 
, MAILE, IV. and COLLEEN BIRCH­
MAILE, husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants, 
v. 
, CONNIE WRIGHT l'AYLOR, f/k/a 
! CONNIE TAYLOR, an individual; DALLAN 
'ITAYLOR, an individual; R. JOHN 
! l'AYLOR, an individual; CLARK and 
, FEENEY, a partnership; PAUL T. CLARK, 
an individual; THEODORE L. JOHNSON 
REVOCABLE TRUST, an Idaho revocable 
trust; JOHN DOES I -JOI-IN DOES X; AND 
ALL PERSONS IN POSSESSION OR 
CLAIMING ANY RIGHT TO 
POSSESSION. 
Defendants/Counter-Claimants. 
Case No. CV-OC-0723232 
OBJECTION TO MOTION FOR 
COSTS AND ATTORNEY'S FEES 
COMES NOW, the Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants, by and through their attorney of 
record, Thomas G. Maile, IV., and enters an objection to the application for attorney fees and 
costs and moves this Honorable Court pursuant to I.R.C.P. Rule 54(d)(6), for an entry of it's 
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Order denying the costs and attorney's fees as set forth in the Memorandum of Attomeys Fees 
and Costs submitted by the Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants, Clark & Feeney, Connie Taylor and 
Paul T. Clark, upon the grounds and for the reasons that there exists no basis in law or in fact for 
such an award, the amounts claimed are unreasonable and not allowed by rules of this Court. 
The appropriate standard for a court to detennine an award of attorneys fees is set forth in 
I.R.C.P. Rule 54(e)(3) which states: 
That, in the event the court grants attorney fees in a civil action, it must consid'er 
the following factors in detennining the amount of such fees: 
(A) The time and labor required. 
(B) The novelty and difficulty of the questions. 
(C) The skill requisite to perfonn the legal service properly and the experience 
and ability of the attorney in the particular field of law. 
(D) The prevailing charges for like work. 
(E) Whether the fee is fixed or contingent. 
(F) The time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances of the 
case. 
(G) The amount involved and the results obtained. 
(H) The undesirability of the case. 
(I) The nature and length of the professional relationship with the client. 
(1) Awards in similar cases. 
(K) The reasonable cost of automated legal research. 
The recent case of Sun Valley Potato Growers, Inc. v. Texas Refinery Corp., 139 Id. 761, 
765,86 P.3d 475,482 (2004), has explained, that the "reasonableness" of an attorney fc;:e award 
is based on the trial court's consideration of the factors in I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3) citing, Irwin Rogers 
Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Murphy, 122 Id. 270, 277,833 P.2d 128, 135 (Ct. App. 1992). The factors of 
Rule 54(e)(3) include: time and labor; difficulty; skill required; prevailing charges; fixed or 
contingent fee; time limitations; amount and result; undesirability of the case; relationship with 
the client; awards in similar cases; costs of automated research; and any other factors. The 
Defendants/counter-claimants' attorneys fees were unreasonably incurred. 
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That additional reasons for said objections are set forth in the Plaintiffs/Counter-
Defendants' Memorandum Brief in Opposition to Motion for Costs and Attorneys Fees and the 
Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants Memorandum in Support of Counter-Defendants' Motion for 
Costs and Opposition to Counter-claimants' Motion for Costs and Attorneys Fees filed herein 
and made a part hereof as if set forth in full herein. 
Hearing upon this objection is requested. Oral argument is requested. 
,.J 
DATED thisJ-5 _day of February, 2011. 
~~0 
CHRIST T. TRO-twrr Co-counsel for 
Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on this ~ day of February, 2011, I caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing (1) OBJECTION TO COUNTER-CLAIMANT'S MEMORANDUM OF 
COSTS AND ATTORNEYS' FEES and (2) MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF COUNTER­
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR COSTS AND OPPOSITION TO COUNTER-CLAIMANTS' 
MOTION FOR COSTS AND ATTORNEYS FEES to be delivered, addressed as follows: 
Connie W. Taylor & Paul Henderson 
Henderson Law Firm 
900 Washington St. Suite 1020 
Vancouver, Washington 98660 
Facsimile: (360) 693-2911 
Mark Stephen Prusynski 
PO Box 829 
Boise, ID 83701 
Phone: (208) 345-2000 
Facsimile: (208) 385-5384 
Thomas G. Maile, IV. 
380 W. State Street 
Eagle, Idaho 83616 
Facsimile: (208) 939-1001 
() 
(X) 
() 
() 
() 
(X) 
() 
() 
() 
(X) 
() 
() 
U. S. Mail 
Facsimile Transmission 
Hand Delivery 
Overnight Delivery 
u. S. Mail 
Facsimile Transmission 
Hand Delivery 
Overnight Delivery 
U. S. Mail 
Facsimile Transmission 
Hand Delivery 
Overnight Delivery 
Co-Counsel for Plaintiffs/Counter­
Defendants 
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Christ T. Troupis, ISB # 4549 
TROUPIS LAW OFFICE C.l 
1299 E. Iron Eagle, Ste 130 
PO Box 2408 
Eagle, Idaho 83616 
Telephone: 208/938-5584 
Facsimile: 208/938-5482 
Email: ctroupis@troupislaw.com 
Co-Counsel for Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF' THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
~ 
I BERKSIDRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an 
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G. Case No. CV-OC-0723232
 
MAILE, IV. and COLLEEN BIRCH­

MAILE, husband and wife,
 AFFIDAVIT OF CHRIST TROUPIS ' 
RE: MEMORANDUM OF COSTS 
Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants, 
v. 
CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, flkJa 
CONNIE TAYLOR, an individual; 
DALLAN TAYLOR, an individual; R. 
JOHN TAYLOR, an individual; CLARK 
and FEENEY, a partnership; PAUL T. 
CLARK. an individual; THEODORE L. 
JOHNSON REVOCABLE TRUST, an 
Idaho revocable trust; JOHN DOES I ­
JOHN DOES X; AND ALL PERSONS IN 
POSSESSION OR CLAIMING ANY 
I RIGHT TO POSSESSION. 
I 
Defendants/Counter-Claimants.
'----------------_---1--------------------­
State of Idaho ) 
) ss. 
County of Ada ) 
Christ Troupis, being first duly sworn, deposes and states: 
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1.	 I am the attorney for the PlaintiffsiCounterdefendants in this action. Each of the 
matters set forth herein are known to me ofmy own personal knowledge and if 
sworn as a witness in this matter, I could testify competently thereto. This Affidavit 
is submitted in support ofPlaintiffs/Counterdefendants' Motion for Costs. 
2.	 On November 16,2009, Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants served an offer of 
judgment on all Defendants/Counterclaimants in the amount of$55,000. The 
jury verdict in this case was $28,437.36. Because this verdict was substantially 
less than the offer ofjudgment, the Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants are the 
prevailing parties on the Counterclaimants' claims. 
3.	 The Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants incurred and paid costs for John Runft's expert 
witness testimony in the sum of$13,789.33 as shown on the attached invoices. 
4.	 Expert witness fees are allowed as a mandatory allowable cost in the amount of 
$2,000. The additional amount should be allowed in this case as a discretionary 
cost because Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants were required to incur substantial 
additional cost for expert testimony as a direct result of the Counterc1aimants' 
complex, general, unspecified and overly broad claims. A significant amount of 
work was done by John Runft in preparation to testify on ethical issues that 
related to claims made against Thomas Maile as an attorney, that were 
subsequently dropped by the Counterclaimants. These discretionary costs were 
necessary because Counterdefendants did not know until trial the specific claims 
that Counterclaimants intended to pursue. 
AFFIDAVIT OF CHRIST TROUPIS RE: MEMORANDUM OF COSTS - Pg 2 
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Dated: February 23,2011 
Christ T. Troupis 
State of Idaho 
County ofAda) 
) 
) ss. 
Subscribed and sworn to before me, a Notary Public in and for the State of Idaho 
and County ofAda on this day ofFebruary, 2011. 
_tJjLJ{)j \/ LOcdJ/\'fV'L10 
Notary Public t 
My commission expires: 101Z0\Le 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on this 24th day of February, 2011, I caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing Affidavit of Christ Troupis re: Memorandum of Costs to be delivered, 
addressed as follows: 
r--­
U. S. Mail 
i Henderson Law Firm 
'I Connie W. Taylor 
Facsimile Transmission 
Hand Delivery 
i Vancouver, Washington 98660 
I 900 Washington S1. Suite 1020 
Overnight Delivery
 
Facsimile: (360) 693-2911
 
Mark Stephen Prusynski ( ) U. S. Mail
 
POBox 829 ~ Facsimile Transmission
 
Boise, ID 83701 ( ) Hand Delivery
 
Phone: (208) 345-2000 Overnight Delivery
 I ( ) 
Facsimile: (208) 385-5384 ! 
" Thomas G. Maile, IV. i () U. S. Mail 
i 380 W. State Street I () Facsimile Transmission 
I Eagle, Idaho 83616 I ~ Hand Delivery ;~acsimile: (208) 939-1 00_1 ~_~I_u_~vernight Delivery ~ 
~~~--/ 
CHRISTT. TR~,
 
Co-counsel for Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants
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Runft & Steele Law Offices 
1020 W. Main Street
 
Suite 400
 
Boise, ID 83702
 
Ph: 208-333-8506 Fax: 208-343-3246
 
www.runftsteele.com 
Christ Troupis July 30,2010 
PO Box 2408 
Eagle, Idaho 
83616 
Attention: 
File #: 
Inv #: 
00410-0002 
6264 
RE: Expert Witness - Maile Matters 
DATE	 DESCRIPTION HOURS AMOUNT LAWYER 
Jun-04-10	 Telephone call from Christ Troupis message 0.10 0.00 JLR 
re: possible expert witness testimony re: Rule 
11 issues on behalf of Tom Maile (no charge). 
Jun-06-lO	 E-mail to Christ Troupis re: possible expert 0.10 0.00 JLR 
testimony re: Rule 11 (no charge). 
Jun-07-10	 E-mail from Christ Troupis re: meeting re: 0.10 0.00 JLR 
expert testimony (no charge). 
Jun-08-l0	 E-mail to Christ Troupis (no charge). 0.10 0.00 JLR 
Jun-09-10	 E-mail from Christ Troupis (no charge). 0.10 0.00 JLR 
Juu-12-l0	 E-mail exch,mge with Christ Troupis with 0.20 0.00 JLR 
plans for proceeding with expert testimony, 
documents, etc. (no charge) 
Jul-01-10	 Telephone call from Christ Troupis re: 0.10 0.00 JLR 
meeting and documents requested (no charge). 
Jul-02-10	 Meeting with Christ Troupis re: case and 1.50 487.50 JLR 
issues, nature of testimony needed, review of 
documents, files furnished. 
Jul-06-lO	 Review of notes, review of Taylor v. Maile 3.50 1,137.50 JLR 
files, tlrst case, Supreme Court Decision, 
assignments by trustees, second case, 
consolidated Supreme Court decisions on 
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Invoice #: 6264 Page 2 July 30, 2010 
"..... 
remand, related facts, review of cases cited,
 
and review of Rule 11 issues arising from case.
 
JuI-08-IO 
Jul-I 0-1 0 
Review of notes, review of Berkshire v. Taylor 
file and related facts, cases cited, relate to 
Taylor cases. 
Further review of case files and cases cited as 
relate to Rule 11(a)(l); research Rule 11 cases 
re: standards, possible distinction between 
standards for threshold motions as 
distinguished from standards on merits of case 
brought, including Code of Conduct cases. 
2.80 
5.00 
910.00 
1,625.00 
JLR 
JLR 
Jul-20-IO Further research re: Rule 11 standards. 1.20 390.00 JLR 
JuI-24-IO 
Jul-28-IO 
Research re: standards for expert testimony, 
preparation, proof of expertise by a lawyer on 
special area of the law. 
Review of file and notes preparatory to 
meeting; meeting with Christ Troupis re: case 
and re: initial strategy. 
2.00 
1.30 
650.00 
422.50 
JLR 
JLR 
Totals 18.10 $5,622.50 
Total Fee & Disbursements 
Trust Transferred at Billing 
Interest Accrued 
$5,622.50 
5,000.00 
$0.00 
Balance Now Due $622.50 
PAYMENT DETAILS 
Jul-30-IO Payment for invoice: 6264 $5,000.00 
Total Payments $5,000.00 
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Invoice #: 6264 Page 3 July 30, 2010 
,'...... TRUST STATEMENT 
Disbursements Receipts 
Jul-29-10
 
Jul-30-10
 
Received From: Troupis Law Office PA 
Retainer 
Paid To: Runft & Steele Law Offices 
Payment for invoice: 6264 
Total Trust 
Trust Balance 
5,000.00 
5,000.00 
$5,000.00 $5,000.00 
$0.00 
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Runft & Steele Law Offices 
1020 W. Main Street
 
Suite 400
 
Boise, ID 83702
 
Ph: 208-333-8506 Fax: 208-343-3246 
www.runftsteele.com 
Christ Troupis September 16,2010 
PO Box 2408 
Eagle, Idaho 
83616 
File #: 00410-0002 
Attention: Inv #: 6317 
RE: Expert Witness - Maile Matters 
DATE DESCRIPTION HOURS AMOUNT LAWYER 
Jul-26-10 Telephone call with Christ Troupis re: 
progress with analysis of issues and Rule 11 
ramifications - ready for meeting before going 
further. 
0.30 97.50 JLR 
Jul-29-10 Prepare for mtg; meeting with Christ Troupis 
review facts of case, issues, theory of defense, 
Discussed strategy of separating rhe threshold 
issues from the merits under rule 11, in order 
to give appropriatre weight to each element 
and avoid a creshendoing effect of allegations. 
1.50 487.50 JLR 
Aug-24-10 E-mail to Troupis re: status of legal 
preparation and follow through on strategy. 
0.20 65.00 JLR 
Totals 2.00 $650.00 
Total Fee & Disbursements $650.00 
Previous Balance 622.50 
Interest Accrued $3.68 
Balance Now Due $6,276.18 
The minimum retainer balance for the matter is $5,000.00 
002383
 
 
 
Invoice #: 6317 Page 2 September 16, 2010 
PLEASE RE:t'ft1T IN TRUST ....., $5,000.00 
to maintain your minimum trust retainer balance 
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1020 W. Main Street
 
Suite 400
 
Boise, ID 83702
 
Ph: 208-333-8506 Fax: 208-343-3246
 
www.runftsteele.com 
Christ Troupis October 11,2010 
PO Box 2408 
Eagle, Idaho 
File #: 00410-0002 
Attention: Inv #: 6350 
RE: Expert Witness - Maile Matters 
DATE	 DESCRIPTION HOURS AMOUNT LAWYER 
Sep-17-10	 Telephone call with Christ Troupis re: status 0.20 60.00 JLR 
of matter and plans going forward. 
Totals	 0.20 $60.00 
Total Fee & Disbursements	 $60.00 
Previous Balance 1,272.50 
Interest Accrued $8.83 
$6,341.33Balance Now Due 
The minimum retainer balance for the matter is $5,000.00 
PLEASE REMIT IN TRUST	 $5,000.00 
to maintain your minimum trust retainer balance 
002385
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Runft & Steele Law Offices 
1020 W. Main Street 
Suite 400 
Boise, ID 83702 
Ph: 208-333-8506 Fax: 208-343-3246 
www.runftsteele.com 
Christ Troupis January 6, 2011 
PO Box 2408 
Eagle, Idaho 
83616 
File #: 00410-0002 
Attention: Inv #: 6491 
RE: Expert Witness - Maile Matters 
Total Fee & Disbursements $0.00 
Previous Balance 910.00 
Interest Accrued $0.00 
Previous Payments 910.00 
Balance Now Due $5,000.00 
The minimum retainer balance for the matter is $5,000.00 
PLEASE REMIT IN TRUST $5,000.00 
to maintain your minimum trust retainer balance 
PAYMENT DETAILS 
Jan-03-ll ROA $910.00 
Total Payments $910.00 
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Runft & Steele Law Offices 
1020 W. Main Street 
Suite 400 
Boise, ill 83702 
Ph:208-333-8506 Fax:208-343-3246 
www.runftsteele.com 
Chlist Troupis 
PO Box 2408 
Eagle} Idaho 
83616 
February 9, 2011 
Attention: 
File #: 
Iny #: 
00410-0002 
6502 
RE: ExpertWitnes~- Maile Matters 
FINAL BILL 
DATE DESCRIPTION HOURS AMOUNT LAWYER 
Jan-17-11 Receipt and review ofmodified cert of expelt 
from Christ Troupis; telephone conference 
with Christ Troupis re: status of litigation, 
narrowing the issues of litigation and possible 
testimony following the dropping of 
professional malpractice claims as reflected in 
revised cert; outlined revised areas to review 
per cert. 
0.70 245.00 JLR 
Jan-l 8-11 E-mail fi:om Christ Troupis re: deposition 
schedule. etc. 
0.20 70.00 JLR 
Jan-19-ll Telephone call with Christ Troupis re: 
deposition. 
0.30 105.00 JLR 
Jan-20-l1 Receipt and review of e-mail from Christ 
Troupis outlining testimony; compare to 
previous revised celt. 
0.30 105.00 JLR 
Jan-21-11 Review of pleadings, file, briefs and 
memorandum from Christ Troupis; Meeting 
with Christ Troupis and Mr. and Mrs. Tom 
Maile re: deposition, review ofrecord, issues, 
and proposed testimony and legal opinions to 
be offered. 
4.80 1,680.00 JLR 
Jan-24-l1 Review of files, notes, briefs, certain cases in 6.50 2,275.00 JLR 
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Invoice #: 6502 
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Page 2 
'...,1. 
February 9,2011 
preparation for deposition; e-mail from Christ 
Troupis re: deposition time change; testified in 
deposition; post deposition meeting with 
Christ Troupis and review deposition 
testimony, and strategy. 
Jan-26-11 Review of deposition notes against recall of 
deposition re: issues and scope of testimony; 
telephone call with Christ Troupis re: above 
and re: trial timing, etc 
0.80 . 280.00 JLR 
Feb-02-11 Review file and notes from my deposition and 
focus on Disclaimer Agreement and timing of 
peljury complaint, review Scott's Abridgment 
on Trusts re: analysis of distinctions between 
proprietmy interests trustees and beneficiaries; 
telephone call with Chris Troupis re: status at 
trial and re: issues for testimony; further 
preparation for testimony next day; meeting 
with Christ Troupis and review of Prof. Lewis' 
testimony and my proposed testimony - issues 
- facts; explained my further trust analysis of 
reserved interest of the Taylors in the 
Disclaimer Agreement as being only first 
interpreted by Sup. Ct. in Taylor IT to the effect 
that the reserved interest was that of a trustee. 
not a beneficial interest; ergo Taylors reserved 
nothing as "beneficiaries" and had no interest 
to proceed on as beneficiaries. The status of 
this reserved interest was not clear until the 
Ruling in Taylor II; ergo Mailes could not be 
held to have knowledge sufficient to bring an. 
action until the ruling in Taylor 11; further 
preparation for testimony. 
4.50 1,575.00 JLR 
Feb-03-Il Final preparations and review ofpleadings for 
testimony; attendance at court and testimony 
as expert witness. 
4.00 1,400.00 JLR 
Totals 22.10 $7,735.00 
DISBURSEMENTS 
Feb-03-li Parking for Court Appearance 3.00 
Totals $3.00 
Total Fee & Disbursements $7,738.00 
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Invoice #: 6502 Page 3 February 9,2011 
..... .....­
Retainers Applied 
Interest Accrued 
Balance Now Due 
PAYMENT DETAILS 
Jan-24-11
 
Jan-25-11
 
retainer 
Expert Deposition Fee 
Total Payments 
1,450.00 
$0.00 
$6,288.00 
$750.00 
$700.00 
$1,450.00
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Invoice #: 6502 Page 4 February 9,2011 
TRUST STATEMENT 
Disbursements Receipts 
Jan-24-11 
Jan-27-11 
Received From: Troupis Law Office PA 
Retainer 
Received From: Troupis Law Office PA 
Retainer - Void 
750.00 
-750.00 
Total Trust $0.00 $0.00 
Trust Balance $0.00 
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Christ T. Troupis, ISB # 4549 
TROUPIS LAW OFFICE 
1299 E. Iron Eagle, Ste 130 
PO Box 2408 
Eagle, Idaho 83616 
Telephone: 208/938-5584 
Facsimilasfsafe: 208/938-5482 
Email: ctroupis@troupislaw.com 
Co-counsel for Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants 
l ; ~ .~'.' 
L'r.. f ; 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
 
,----------­
! BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an
 
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G.
 
MAILE, IV. and COLLEEN BIRCH­

MAILE, husband and wife,
 
Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants, 
v. 
CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, flkla 
CONNIE TAYLOR, an individual; DALLAN 
TAYLOR, an individual; R. JOHN 
TAYLOR, an individual; CLARK and 
FEENEY, a partnership; PAUL T. CLARK, 
an individual; THEODORE L. JOHNSON 
REVOCABLE TRUST, an Idaho revocable 
trust; JOHN DOES I -JOHN DOES X; AND 
ALL PERSONS IN POSSESSION OR 
CLAIMING ANY RIGHT TO 
POSSESSION. 
Defendants/Counter-Claimants. 
Case No. CV-OC-0723232 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' 
MOTION FOR COSTS ANID 
OPPOSITION TO COUNTER­
CLAIMANTS CLARK ANn 
FEENEY/CONNIE TAYLORS' 
MOTION FOR COSTS ANn 
ATTORNEYS FEES AND COSTS 
The counter-defendants by and through their undersigned co-counsel of record, and 
provides this Memorandum Brief in support of their Motion for Costs and in opposition to 
counter-claimants' motion for costs and attorneys fees: 
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THE ESSENTIAL FACTS
 
1.	 Defendant Connie Taylor drafted a letter to Bart Harwood on April 14, 2004 which 
stated, "The Taylors are not willing to give up theft rights as beneficiaries of the trust 
unless Beth will affirm her prior factual statements in the form of an affidavit ,md agree 
to cooperate in the action against Mr. Maile. If we aren't able to reach an agreement on 
that, they will seek a full accounting of the trust and a copy of the trust and estate tax 
returns". (Affidavit of Thomas Maile Part One deposition of Beth Rogers Exhibit "B" 
referencing deposition exhibit 39). 
2.	 In response to the motion before Judge Wilper, the Taylors filed their verified petition in 
the probate court on November 12,2004, requesting the probate court to appoint them as 
trustees of the Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust. The petition was executed by R. 
John Taylor as a verification of the facts contained in the petition. Page 2 of the verified 
petition states under oath, "the petitioner's 88-year-old mother, Helen Taylor,. is the sole 
rellUlining benefICiary ofthis trust by virtue ofthe terms ofa Disclaimer, Release and 
Indemnity Agreement." (Affidavit of Thomas Maile Part Two Exhibit "I") (emphasis 
added). 
3.	 At the probate hearing Mr. R. John Taylor was sworn under oath and provided testimony 
before the Honorable Judge Beiter on May 2, 2005 and testified: page 14, In 4: 
Q. Will you explain to the court just briefly why it is that you want to serve? 
A. "Well, primarily, to pursue the claim for the trust. We have always thought it was a 
valid claim because I think that, for the benefit -- my mother is the beneficiary of the 
trust, and we expect that we will eventually win on this claim." During that same hearing 
Mr. Clark provided in his closing argument before Judge Beiter on June 5, 2005 
provided: page 17, In 12: 
MR. CLARK: "Yes. Just briefly, Judge. It seems to me that, based upon, first, the 
agreement of the beneficiaries -- they have all indicated that the Taylors should serve as 
co-trustees. The Taylors, pursuant to that same agreement, have a guarantee in the 
disclaimer. So they have some interest in the proceeding. Their mother stands to gain 
and, thereby, they have an interest in the proceeding." 
(Affidavit of Thomas Maile Part One transcript of probate court hearing Exhibit "A"). 
4.	 The deposition of Reed Taylor provided the following testimony under oath: 
Q. Through this lawsuit, if the jury ultimately finds in favor of the plaintiffs in this 
matter, is your mother going to get anything? Do any of the proceeds from any Judgment 
that's entered in this lawsuit - A. She will probably get it all. 
Q. My question is: In that first lawsuit, although you are a named plaintiff, if that were 
to -- if the Supreme Court were to reverse the Summary Judgment that was entered, and it 
goes to trial and you prevail, ifI'm understanding what you've told me -- all right? -­
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR COSTS 
AND OPPOSITION TO COUNTER-CLAIMANTS' MOTION FOR COSTS AND 
ATTORNEYS FEES AND COSTS- Pg 2 
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quote, your understanding is you don't get anything; everything goes to your mother? 
A. My intent is -- I'm not going to say exactly how it's going to be disbursed. My intent 
would be for my mother. 
Q. In the second lawsuit, the one with the Trust, who gets the money if you prevail? 
A. Well, like I said, as far as, uh -- I haven't talked to, specifically, the ones that are out 
of town. As far as John and I are concerned, uh, we're doing it for our mother, so ... 
Q. SO you and your brothers are not going to get anything? 
A. We're not looking for money out of it, if that's where you're going (pages 132, 133, 
134, of the deposition of Reed J. Taylor, taken on January 31, 2005 (Affidavit of Thomas 
Maile Part One transcript of probate court hearing Exhibit "A"). 
5. The deposition of Dallan Taylor provided the following testimony under oath: 
Q. What was the purpose, then, of you executing the signature page on Exhibit 24 that
 
relate to the "Disclaimer, Release & Indemnity Agreement"? Could you just explain to
 
me, in your own words, what Exhibit 25 accomplishes?
 
A. We are the disclaimer of all interests. It is being signed by -- 1, dash, 2, dash, 1 by
 
Fishers, which disclaims all the interest in the Trust in favor of their mother, Helen (sic)
 
Fisher, so that they will distribute the money in the Trust to Hazel Fisher. 1.2, dash, 2,
 
Seeley, is so the money, uh -- the children are released (inaudible) ­
THE COURT REPORTER: I'm sorry. "The children are released" what? Spt::ak up.
 
THE WITNESS: -- their interest in the Trust so that the money can be distributed to
 
Joyce Seeley. And Taylor, all children are disclaiming interest in favor of their mother,
 
Helen Taylor, so that she can get the remainder of her assets in the Trust.
 
(pages 74, 75 of the deposition of Dallan Taylor, taken on September 9,2004 (Affidavit
 
ofThomas Maile Part One)
 
6. The deposition of John Taylor provided the following testimony under oath: 
Q. Exhibit 26 of Beth Rogers' deposition, that's the Complaint and Demand for Jury 
Trial. That's signed by your brother and your wife; is that correct. 
A. Yes. 
Q. And did you have a chance to review that document? 
A. I did. 
Q. Before it was actually filed? 
A. I did. 
Q. Did you concur in the language of the Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And what is it that the plaintiffs want out of this litigation; what is it they seek? 
A. We want the difference in -- well, the difference in the value of the property and the 
amount that it was sold for. And we believe that is $6 to $800,000. 
Q. Okay. You've also sued for damages. Is that the damage claim that you're wanting? 
A. Yes, essentially. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR COSTS 
AND OPPOSITION TO COUNTER-CLAIMANTS' MOTION FOR COSTS ANI) 
ATTORNEYS FEES AND COSTS- Pg 3 
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Q. Is that you want out of this lawsuit? 
A. 6- to 800,000. Yes. 
Q. Anything else you want out of this litigation? 
A. We would -- we would like to see that, uh -- uh, punitive damages are added to that. 
Q. Now, there is an allegation that you want a recision of the contract? 
A. As an alternative. Yes. 
Q. But you want the money first? 
A. It would be easier. It goes to my mom.
 
Pages 81-82 of the deposition ofR. John Taylor, taken on December 14, 2004 (Affidavit
 
of Christ Troupis filed December 31, 2010)
 
7.	 On March 9, 2006, the Verified Amended Complaint was filed by the Taylors" and 
prepared by the co-defendant attorneys. Page 1 of the Verified Amended Complaint 
states under oath, "Reed and R. John Taylor are residents ofNez Perce County, Idaho; 
Dallan Taylor is a resident of Ada County Idaho. All ofthe plaintiffs are resilrlual 
beneficiaries ofthe Theodore L. Johnson Trust." (The verified amended complaint is 
annexed to Amended complaint and Demand for Jury Trial as Exhibit "B") (emphasis 
added). 
8.	 The district court entered the "Judgment on BenefICiaries' Claim" on June 7, 2006 (The 
Judgment is annexed to Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial as Exhibit "C") 
(emphasis added). 
LEGAL ARGUMENT 
1. The Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants Claims were based upon their reasonable 
interpretation of the facts and law. 
a.	 Mailes presented evidence that Taylors, as officers of the Court:, 
perpetrated a fraud on the Court. 
Connie Taylor and her husband John Taylor at all relevant times were licensed Idaho 
attorneys and as such were officers of the court. Vol 12 Moore's Federal Practice § 60-21 (4)(b) 
provides: 
One of the distinguishing facts in the leading Hazel-Atlas case was the 
participation of a lawyer for one of the party's in the creation as well as the 
presentation of the fraudulent evidence relied on by the Patent Office and the 
Third Circuit. As a result, subsequent courts have stated that the participation of 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR COSTS 
AND OPPOSITION TO COUNTER-CLAIMANTS' MOTION FOR COSTS AND 
ATTORNEYS FEES AND COSTS- Pg 4 
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an officer of the court in the fraud is either an essential element of fraud on the: 
court contributing to the subversion of the adjudication process or an alternative 
basis for finding fraud on court. 
The Sixth circuit has quoted, with approval, a definition of fraud on the court that 
consists of five elements: (l) conduct on the part of an officer of the court; (2) that 
is directed to the "judicial machinery" itself; (3) that is intentionally false, wilfully 
blind to the truth, or is in reckless disregard of truth or falsity; (4) that is a positive 
avennent or is a concealment when one is under a duty to disclose; and (5) that 
deceives the court. Thus, misconduct of an officer of the court is an essential 
element of fraud on the court; but there is fraud on the court only if this 
misconduct precludes proper adjudication by the court. 
The Ninth Circuit apparently treats misconduct by an officer of the court as an 
alternative basis for finding fraud on the court; an alternative to the definition 
involving subversion of the adjudication process. as discussed in [a], above. The 
Ninth Circuit has quoted Moore's for the proposition that fraud on the court is a 
"species of fraud which does or attempt to, defile the court itself or is a fraud 
perpetrated by officers of the court" (emphasis added) 
The Fourth Circuit: has agreed. 
"Although perjury of a witness will not suffice, the "involvement of an attorney, 
as an officer of the court, in a scheme to suborn penury should certainly be 
considered fraud on the court" 
As has the Second Circuit and the Sixth Circuit: 
"Since attorneys are officers of the court, their conduct, if dishonest, would 
constitute fraud on the court. 
The factual record is overwhelming. The Taylors made a prima facie case against 
themselves based entirely upon their own testimony and verified pleadings. The recent case of 
NC-DSH, Inc. v. Garner, 218 P.3d 853 (Nev. 2009) states: 
The most widely accepted definition, which we adopt, holds that the concept 
embrace[s] only that species of fraud which does, or attempts to, subvert the 
integrity of the court itself, or is a fraud perpetrated by officers of the court so that 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' 
MOTION FOR COSTS AND OPPOSITION TO COUNTER-CLAIMANTS' 
MOTION FOR COSTS AND ATTORNEYS FEES AND COSTS- Pg 5 
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the judicial machinery cannot perform in the usual manner its impartial task of 
adjudging cases ... and relief should be denied in the absence of such conduct. 
In addition to his duties to his clients, a lawyer also owes a duty of" loyalty to the 
court, as an officer thereof, [that] demands integrity and honest dealing with the 
court. And when he departs from that standard in the conduct of a case he 
perpetrates fraud upon the court." [W]e lawyers, judges, and practitioners alike 
are very ... concemed about how our profession is perceived. We're very proud of 
what we believe is an honorable profession and we're very concemed when 
something like this happens. It hurts us all. It really does. 
b.	 Mailes presented evidence that they suffered damages solely as a result of 
Taylors' fraud on the Court and entry of the Judgment on Beneficiaries' 
Claims. 
Mailes were denied the right before Judge Wilper to apply equitable principles of quasi 
estoppel involving the claims to title and possession between the trust and the plaintiffs. Judge 
Wilper refused to allow any further proceedings involving title or possession as he reasoned that 
the "Judgment on Beneficiaries' Claims" resulted in a constructive trust being imposed on the 
property. That ruling was based upon the misrepresentations made that the Taylor Brothers were 
still beneficiaries of the trust. The truth was they were not. The plaintiffs were denied the right to 
address the equitable principles between the trust and themselves. "Fraud on the court" is a 
claim that exists to protect the integrity of the judicial process, and therefore a claim for fraud on 
the court cannot be time-barred. See 12, Moore's Federal Practice § 60.21 [4][g] & n. 52 (3d 
ed.2009) (citing Lockwood v. Bowles, 46 F.R.D. 625, 634 (D.D.C.1969)). 
c.	 The perjury complaint alleged claims that ifproperly brought under Rule 
60(b), were not barred by res judicata. 
This Court ultimately determined that Mailes' perjury claims were barred by res judicata 
and could not be brought under Rule 60(b). But the issue presented in this motion is not resolved 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF COUNTER-DEFENDANTS'
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solely by reference to this Court's subsequent order. The issue is whether Mailes, at the time they 
filed and pursued the complaint, could reasonably believe that their claims were not barred by res 
judicata. The evidence presented at trial establishes that Mailes had reasonable grounds in fact 
and law to make these claims, whether ultimately successful or not. 
Mailes advanced their claims for the sole purpose of imposing liability on the Taylors for 
their fraudulent misconduct. Mailes sought the equitable aid of the court to set aside the 
Judgment on Beneficiaries' Claims. 
Mailes advanced both claims for equity and damages. As established during the course 
of the jury trial, Idaho has no reported cases regarding the affects of a "fraud upon the court" 
based upon alleged criminal conduct on the part of "officers of the court". Counterclaimants' 
expert, Craig Lewis, testified that Connie Taylor and her client and then husband, R. John Taylor 
were at all relevant times "officers of the court". 
Craig Lewis primary opinion was that it was unreasonable for Mailes to file the perjury 
complaint because a reasonable attorney would know that it was barred by res judicata. His 
reasoning for that opinion was that the perjury complaint did not qualify as an independent 
action under Rule 60(b). He said it did not qualify because the perjury complaint did not attempt 
to set aside the judgment obtained by fraud. However, as John Runft testified, the perjury 
complaint did qualify as an independent action under Rule 60(b) because it sought to quiet title 
against the fraudulently obtained judgment. 
Mr. Lewis' admitted that the Taylors acted as "officers of the Court" and acknowledged 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR COSTS 
AND OPPOSITION TO COUNTER-CLAIMANTS' MOTION FOR COSTS AND 
ATTORNEYS FEES AND COSTS- Pg 7 
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that an action under Rule 60(b) can properly be brought for fraud on the Court perpetrated by an 
officer of the Court. Given these admissions, and the facts established at trial, it was not 
unreasonable for Mailes to file the perjury complaint. 
As stated in State Alarm, Inc., v. Riley Industrial Services (No. 92760 Court of Appeals 
of Ohio, Eighth District), "where the motion involves a misrepresentation made by an officer of 
the court, e.g., an attorney, which misrepresentation perpetrates a fraud upon the court, the 
motion is properly brought pursuant to Civ. R. 60(B)(5)." As is further stated in Okros v. 
Angelo Iafrate Construction Company (No. 07-1455 United States Court ofAppeals, Sixth 
Circuit), "Thus, counsel is entitled to rely on opposing counsel to be forthright, and is not 
obligated to ferret out the truth of opposing counsel's statements or satisfy due diligence in 
protecting against an opposing counsel's hoax". The status as "officers of the court" provides 
that misconduct on their part amounts to a "fraud upon the court" regardless of the action and/or 
non-action on the other party litigants. 
A fraud on the court by an officer of the court provides for an independent action in 
equity. People v. Zajic, 88 Ill. App.3d 477, 410 N.E.2d 626 (1980). Whenever any officer of the 
court commits fraud during a proceeding in the court, he/she is engaged in "fraud upon the 
court". In Bulloch v. United States, 763 F.2d 1115, 1121 (10th Cir. 1985). "Fraud upon the court" 
has been defined by the 7th Circuit Court of Appeals to "embrace that species of fraud which 
does, or attempts to, defile the court itself, or is a fraud perpetrated by officers ofthe court so that 
the judicial machinery can not perform in the usual manner its impartial task of adjudging cases 
MEMORANDUM IN SlJPPORT OF COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR COSTS 
AND OPPOSITION TO COUNTER-CLAIMANTS' MOTION FOR COSTS AND 
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that are presented for adjudication." Kenner v. C.IR., 387 F.3d 689 (1968); 7 Moore's Federal 
Practice, 2d ed., p. 512, ,-r 60.23. A decision produced by fraud upon the court is not in essence a 
decision at all, and never becomes final. 
John Taylor testified that he signed a petition under oath verifying that his mother, Helen 
Taylor, was the sole beneficiary of the trust by virtue of the Disclaimer Agreement terms. He 
admitted that he testified to this fact at the probate court hearing. Mr. Taylor also admitted that 
he could not present any evidence to show that Judge Wilper was ever apprised of his prior 
admissions under oath that Helen Taylor was the sole remaining beneficiary of the trust. Tom 
Maile testified that these facts were never presented to Judge Wilper prior to entry of the 
Judgment on Beneficiaries' Claims. 
A "fraud upon the court" makes void the orders and judgments of that court null and 
void. An attempt to commit "fraud upon the court" vitiates the entire proceeding. The People of 
the State ofIllinois v. Fred E. Sterling, 357 Ill. 354; 192 N.E. 229 (1934). The maxim that fraud 
vitiates every transaction into which it enters applies to judgments as well as to contra.cts and 
other transactions. Allen F Moore v. Stanley F Sievers, 336 Ill. 316; 168 N.E. 259 (1929), In re 
Village ofWillowbrook, 37 Ill. App.2d 393 (1962). 
As stated in Campbell v. Kildew, 141 Idaho 640, 115 P.3d 731 (Idaho 2005), fraud upon 
the court "is more than mere interparty misconduct. It is a "tampering with administration of 
justice" which suggests "a wrong against the institutions set up to protect and safeguard the 
public". In Campbell, the parties informed the Court that they had resolved a dispute in 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR COSTS 
AND OPPOSITION TO COUNTER-CLAIMANTS' MOTION FOR COSTS MID 
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arbitration and wanted a judgment entered on the arbitration decision. They didn't tell the Court 
that the arbitration was a hoax engineered by the parties to obtain a decision that could be 
presented to the Court as a valid arbitration award. As in the present case, Campbell involved a 
party who had stated one set of facts before one tribunal and a different set of facts to a second 
tribunal, as well as concealment of the true facts from the second tribunal. The Taylor Brothers 
signed a verified amended complaint in January 2006 that was completely opposite to their 
sworn testimony in prior proceedings, prior depositions, and a prior verified pleading. The co­
defendants' actions as "officers of the court" constituted a good faith argument that their action 
was in fact a "fraud upon the court" that warranted the equitable powers of the court to set aside 
the Judgment on Beneficiaries' Claims. 
Further support that the plaintiffs were justified in bringing their amended complaint is 
found in the case ofTaylor v. McNichols, 36130, 36131 (lDSCCI) (2010). 
The Taylor, supra, decision provides: 
As in cases for legal malpractice based on conduct occurring during the courSt:: of 
a trial, in order to bring a malicious prosecution claim there must be damages ,md 
it must be determined that the suit was groundless, neither ofwhich is possible 
prior to resolution of the case. 
Therefore, we conclude that a cause ofaction against one party's opponent's 
attorney in litigation, based on conduct the attorney committed in the course of 
that litigation, may not be properly instituted prior to the resolution of that 
litigation, even where the allegedly aggrieved party believes that the attorney in 
question has been acting outside the legitimate scope of representation and solely 
for his own benefit. Under this same reasoning, the allegations of aiding and 
abetting in the commission of tortious acts, although marginally pled, must await 
resolution of the Underlying Case. Until the Underlying Case is resolved a court 
cannot determine whether any tortious act was committed, let alone acts 
constituting the aiding and abetting of those alleged tortious acts. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR COSTS 
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The Taylor, supra, decision, clearly provides law that res judicata does not apply to the 
present matter when there are allegations of fraud and/or criminal behavior in obtaining a 
judgment. There could be no cause of action ripe for judicial determination until the underlying 
case was resolved and the plaintiffs sustained damages. In the present case, the plaintiffs 
sustained damages directly related to the tortious conduct of the defendants when the I~ourt 
entered its "Judgment on Beneficiaries' Claims". As Mr. Runft testified the actions of the 
plaintiffs was reasonable in not filing an action until the plaintiffs sustained damages. 
The plaintiffs' legal theories were justified and were properly made under existing law 
and/or were made for a good faith extension of new law relating to an independent action to set 
aside a judgment, negligence, negligence per se, abuse of process, tortious interferenoe with 
prospective business advance and Idaho Racketeering violations. 
d.	 Attorneys fees should not be awarded because the expert testimony 
establishes the fact that Mailes had support in law and fact for their 
claims. 
An award of attorney fees under Idaho Code §§, 12-121 & 12-123, is not a matter of 
right to the prevailing party, but is appropriate only when the court, in its discretion, is left with 
the abiding belief that the case was brought, pursued, or defended frivolously, unreasonably, or 
without foundation, see generally, Nampa & Meridian Irrigation Dist. v. Washington Fed. 
Savings, 135 Id. 518, 20 P.3d 702 (2001). When a district court trial judge, decides whether the 
case was brought, pursued, or defended frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation, the 
entire course of the litigation should be taken into account. If there is a legitimate, triable issue 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' 
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of fact, attorney fees may not be awarded under I.C. § 12-121 even though the losing party has 
asserted factual or legal claims that are frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation. Although 
an award of attorney fees under the statute is discretionary, the award must be supported by 
findings, and those findings, in turn, must be supported by the record. Wait v. Leavell Cattle, 
Inc., 136 Id. 792, 41 P.3d 220 (2002). 
An action is not deemed to have been brought frivolously simply because it ultimately 
fails. Edwards v. Donart, 116 Idaho 687, 688, 778 P.2d 809,810 (1989). Idaho appellate law has 
held that in deciding whether an award of attorney's fees is proper, "the sole question is whether 
the losing party's position is so plainly fallacious as to be deemed frivolous, unreasonable or 
without foundation." Sun Valley Shopping Or., Inc. v. Idaho Power Co., 119 Idaho 87, 92, 803 
P.2d 993,998 (1991), quoting Severson v. Hermann, 116 Idaho 497, 777 P.2d 269 (1989). A 
mis-perception by a party of the law is not, by itself, unreasonable conduct. Automobile Club Ins. 
Co. v. Jackson, 124 Idaho 874, 865 P.2d 965 (Idaho 1993), Wing v. Amalgamated Sugar Co., 
106 Idaho 905, 911,684 P.2d 307, 313 (Ct. App.1984), overruled on other grounds by NBC 
Leasing Co. v. R & T Farms, Inc., 112 Idaho 500, 733 P.2d 721 (1987). 
The motions for attorney fees and costs pursuant to I.C. §§, 12-121 & 12-123, should 
therefore be denied. 
2. The Motion for Attorneys Fees and Costs Should Be Denied as Th.~re Were 
Multiple Claims Between the Parties and the Action Was Not Unreasonable Nor 
Undertaken for an Improper Purpose. 
The Court in Magic Valley Radiology Associates, P.A. v. Professional Business Services, 
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Inc., 119 Idaho 558, 808 P.2d 1303 (1991) stated that where there are multiple claims and 
multiple defenses, it is not appropriate to segregate those claims or defenses for the purpose of 
awarding attorney fees under I.C. § 12-121. As the Court stated: 
Where as in this case there are multiple claims and multiple defenses, it is not 
appropriate to segregate those claims and defenses to determine which were or 
were not frivolously defended or pursued. The total defense of a party's 
proceedings must be unreasonable or frivolous. 
In Turner v. Willis, 116 Idaho 682, 778 P.2d 804 (1989), this Court stated: 
The frivolity and unreasonableness of a defense is not to be examined only in the 
context of trial proceedings. The entire course of the litigation will be taken into 
account. Id. 116 Idaho at 685, 778 P.2d at 807. 
The competing claims of the parties had significant overlap with the issues of daim 
preclusion and issue preclusion. All claims had elements involving the interpretation of the law 
regarding res judicata and the application of the doctrine on their respective claims. At trial, the 
expert testimony was conflicting as to whether the Mailes' claims were reasonably pursued. 
Notably, Mr. Lewis admitted he did not understand trust law and therefore could not testify as to 
whether the Supreme Court's ruling on Taylor's standing related to their position as Trustees, or 
their claimed position as Beneficiaries of the Trust. John Runft testified as an attorney with 45 
years experience in complex trust law that Taylor's standing was predicated solely on their 
position as Trustees who had a right to prosecute the Trust 'chose in action.' His testimony was 
unrebutted. 
Additionally, Mr. Lewis failed to examine the Maile's perjury complaint closely enough 
to see that it contained a claim for equitable relief from the Taylor's judgment. His opinion that 
the perjury complaint didn't qualify as an independent action under Rule 60(b) was therefore 
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suspect, and properly challenged by John Runft. 
The Mailes presented a proper and logical argument supporting their allegations of "fraud 
upon the court." The merits ofthe Mailes' factual claims were not seriously challeng~:d by 
Taylors at trial. Instead, Taylors relied solely upon the fact that the claims were barred by res 
judicata and that therefore Mailes were not entitled to have them tried on the merits. 
3. The motion for attorneys fees should be denied because Clark & Feeney 
voluntarily dismissed their Counterclaim, but seek fees for prosecuting it. 
The itemized attorneys fees submitted by Mark Prusynski includes services rendered on 
all of the parties' claims both in defense and in prosecution of Clark & Feeney's counter-claim. 
Central to the issue was res judicata on both sides ofthe parties' respective claims. Clark & 
Feeney had to demonstrate that the plaintiffs' claims were pursued for an improper purpose for 
them to pursue their counter-claim. Clark & Feeney ultimately dismissed their countt:r-claim 
shortly before trial, with each party bearing their own costs and attorneys fees. However, now 
Clark & Feeney are attempting to recover attorneys fees undoubtedly incurred relating to their 
counter-claim. 
The jury verdict on abuse ofprocess does not warrant a conclusion that the underlying 
perjury case was brought without foundation or factual or legal merit. The jury did not have 
benefit of all facts surrounding the perjury case, as the counter-defendants' proof was limited by 
the various orders involving the motions in limine. 
Clark & Feeney request attorneys fees based upon the jury's findings alone as supporting 
a right to attorney fees pursuant to I.C. §§, 12-121 & 12-123. Such is not the case. The case of 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR COSTS 
AND OPPOSITION TO COUNTER-CLAIMANTS' MOTION FOR COSTS AND 
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Technical Computer Servs., Inc. v. Buckley, 844 P.2d 1249 (Colo. Ct. App.1992) recognized the 
" general rule" that" a claimant in a malicious prosecution or abuse ofprocess action Gan recover 
attorney fees incurred in defending against the prior wrongful litigation" but cannot recover 
attorney fees incurred in bringing the malicious prosecution or abuse ofprocess action itself, and 
applying the same rule where" the abuse of process claim is brought as a counterclaim to 
wrongful litigation rather than as a later separate action. Sternberg v. Johnston, 582 F.3d 1114 
(9th Cir. 2009) see also C. McCormick, Damages § 66 (1935); see also 54 C.J.S. Malicious 
Prosecution § 97 (1987); A1illennium Equity Holdings, LLC v. Mahlowitz, 925 N.E.2d 513, 456 
Mass. 627 (2010). The jury findings have no bearing upon the application of an award of 
attorney fees and costs pursuant to I.C. §§, 12-121 & 12-123, and the request for attorneys fees 
and costs should be denied. 
4.	 Clark & Feeney's claim for attorneys fees, if predicated solely upon the jury's 
verdict, should have been brought in that trial. Their voluntary dismissal bars 
their claim. 
Taylors submitted the Trust billing for attorneys fees as an element of their claimed 
damages in their counterclaim, and the jury considered that billing in rendering its verdict. Clark 
& Feeney elected not to present their attorneys' fee claim to the jury by voluntarily dismissing 
their Counterclaim. By voluntarily dismissing their Counterclaims, Clark & Feeney are not 
prevailing parties in the lawsuit. Mailes prevailed on Clark & Feeney's counterclaims. 
Additionally, this Court in ruling upon the counter-defendants' motion for directed 
verdict during the trial indicated that there could be no abuse of process prior to January 2009 
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since the appellate court did not rule upon the appeal until that date. After the Supreme Court 
issued its ruling all that was litigated before this court was the legal effect of res judicata. The 
arguments addressed in opposition to res judicata are set forth above and do not demonstrate any 
unreasonable action justifying the imposition of attorneys fee. There is nothing in the record to 
demonstrate the actions of the plaintiffs before January 2009 or after warrant the imposition of 
attorneys fees under I.C. §§, 12-121 & 12-123. The motion for attorneys fees and costs should 
be denied. 
3. The Request for Attorneys Fees and Costs should be denied based upon Rule 
68 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
The Mailes properly served their offer ofjudgment on the defendants on November 16, 
2009. The effect of service ofan Offer of Judgment is set forth in Rule 68 ofI.R.C.P. 
In the present matter the offer ofjudgment was served on the counter-claimants on 
November 16,2009. The amount of $55,000.00 was offered as to all of the counter-claimants' 
claims. Counter-claimant Clark & Feeney has admitted that its claims were derivative of the 
claims advanced by the Taylor Brothers. Clark & Feeney obtained a stipulation for dismissal of 
their counter-claim with all parties agreeing to a dismissal with all parties agreeing to bear their 
own costs and attorneys fees. Clark & Feeney is not the prevailing party and cannot now argue 
for its costs and attorneys fees. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons above cited the motion for costs and attorneys has no basis under I.C. §§, 
12-121 & 12-123. The motion for attorneys fees and costs should be denied. 
DATED this 23 rd day of February, 2011. 
8t~/~ 
CHRIST T. TRO~=IS=,-C-o--c-o-un-s-e--l-fo-r-
Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
 
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an 
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G. 
MAILE, IV, and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE 
husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants, 
vs. 
CONNIE WRIGHT l'AYLOR, f/k1a 
CONNIE l'AYLOR, an individual; 
DALLAN TAYLOR, an individual; R. JOHN 
TAYLOR, an individual; CLARK and 
FEENEY, a partnership; PAUL T. CLARK, 
an individual, THEODORI~ L. JOHNSON 
REVOCABLE TRUST, an Idaho revocable 
trust; JOHN DOES 1 - JOHN DOES X; and 
ALL PERSONS IN POSSESSION OR 
CLAIMAING ANY RIGHT TO 
POSSESSION 
Defendants/Counter-claimants. 
Case No. CV OC 0723232 
JUDGMENT 
The claims of Thomas G. Maile, IV, Colleen Birch-Maile, and Berkshire Investments, 
LLC were dismissed in their entirety by Judgment dated July 16, 2009. The counterclaims of 
JUDGMENT 
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The Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust, by and through its trustees Dallan Taylor and R. John 
Taylor came before the court for a jury trial on January 31, 2011 and continued through February 
4,2011. 
Based upon the special verdict returned by the jury on February 4, 2011, the Court now 
enters the following Judgment. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that The Theodore L. 
Johnson Revocable Trust, by and through its trustees Dallan Taylor and R. John Taylor, are 
awarded Judgment against Thomas G. Maile IV, Colleen Birch-Maile, and Berkshire 
Investments, LLC, in the sum of $28,437.36, as determined by the jury, together with such 
interest and costs as are provided by law. 
DATED this {),2 day of February, 2011. 
JUDGMENT 
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p..da Goun\'J CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on thea~ay of February, 2011 I caused to be served a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed 
to the following: 
Thomas G. Maile, IV 
380 West State Street 
Eagle, ID 83616 
Mr. Christ Troupis 
Attorney at Law 
PO Box 2408 
Eagle, ID 83616 
Mark Prusynski 
MOFFATT THOMAS 
101 S Capitol Blvd., 10th Floor 
PO Box 829 
Boise, ID 83701 
Connie Taylor and Paul Henderson 
HENDERSON LAW FIRM, PLLC 
900 Washington, Suite 1020 
Vancouver WA 98660 
U.S. Mail 
Hand Delivered 
Overnight Mail 
Telecopy (FAX) (208) 939-1001 
u.s. Mail 
Hand Delivered 
Overnight Mail 
Telecopy (FAX) (208) 938-5482 
u.s. Mail 
Hand Delivered 
Overnight Mail 
Telecopy (FAX) (208) 385-5384 
u.s. Mail 
Hand Delivered 
Overnight Mail 
Telecopy (FAX) (208) 385-5384 
JUDGMENT 
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CONNIE W. TAYLOR 
HENDERSON LAW FIRM, PLLC 
900 Washington Street, Suite 1020 
Vancouver, WA 98660 
360.699.1530 
ISBA No. 4837 
Attorneys for Counter-defendants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO l IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LtC, an 
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G. 
MAILE, IV, and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE 
husband and wife, 
Plajntjffs/Counter~Defendanl~, 
vs. 
CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, et al. 
Defendants/Counter-claimants. 
Case No. CV OC 0723232 
OBJECTION TO MAILES' 
MEMORANDUM OF COSTS 
The Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust, by and through its trustees DaHan Taylor and 
R. John Ta.ylor, pursuant to l.R.C.P. 54(d)(6) file this objection to the Mailes' mem01'2Lndum of 
costs. 
1. The Mailes' request for costs pursuant to l.R.C.P. 68 js premature. 
The Mailes arc seeking an award of costs solely because the jury's verdict on the Johnson 
Trust's counterclaims did not exceed the $55,000 offer of judgment dated November 16,2009. 
The problem with this position is that the jury verdict related solely to the counterclaims, while 
OBJECTION TO MAILES' 
MEMO OF COSTS 
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their offer also included "any and all attorneys fees and costs which could be ordered r,elating to 
the complaint in the pending action pursued by Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants." 
The Johnson Trust's attorney fees in defending against the Mailes' Complaint were an 
element of damage which was a.ddressed in the trial, but the issue of fees owing to the Clark and 
Feeney defendants (which alone exceed the amount of the offer of judgment) was reserved by 
agreement of all the parties] and remains to be decided. The merits of that claim will be 
addressed by counsel for the Clark and Feeney defendants, Mark Prusynski. 
Because T.R.C.P. 68 requires that the court take any costs and fees into aC:COl.mt in 
detennining whether the "adjusted award" exceed5 the offer, a ruling on the Clark and Feeney 
Defendants' requests for costs and fees for its defense of the Mailes' claims is a prerequisite to 
detennining whether the cost-shifting mechanis.rt1 of Rule 68 applies in this case. 
II. The Mailes' offer of ,judgment was invalid because it did not l"eso)ve all claims 
The offer of judgment submitted by the Mailes was invalid because it proposed to settle only 
the countercl.a.ims and the issue of fees and costs on the dismissal of the Mailes' Complaint, but 
reserved the Mailes' right to appeal the dismissal of their complaint. 
The reservation of the light to appeal renders the offer of judgment invalid, as it does not 
comply with the clear language of I.R.C.P. 68, which states that an offer of judgment "shall be 
deemed to include all claims recoverable .... which have accnled up to the date of the offer of 
judgment." 
The purpose of the rule allowing an offer of judgment is to encourage settlement, promote 
the efficient resolution of the entire case, and avoid litigation. In recognition of this purpose, the 
majority of courts which have looked at this issue have held that an offer ofjudgment which fails 
to resolve the entire ca.se in ineffective. See, for example, the following cases: 
1.	 Progressive Corp. v. Peter ex rei. Peter, 195 P.3d 1083 (Alaska 2008). Automobile 
insurer's offer of judgment in action brought by insured seeking UIM benefits was not 
valid because it did not include every claim and would not have ended the entire 
litigation. 
I Stipulation to Dismiss Counterclaim ofGlark and Feeney Defendants, Novembe:r 30, 
2010. 
OBJECTION TO MAILES' 
MEMO OF COSTS 
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2.	 Frenandes v. Portwine, 56 P.3d 1 (Alaska 2002). The Alaska Supreme Court held that 
the defendant's offer of judgment was not sufficient under Alaska R. Civ. P. 68 where it 
only addressed the legal claim against it but did not propose a resolution of a claim for 
injunctive relief. Given that Rule 68's goal is to encourage settlement, the C01.1rt found 
that it would have served little purpose for the plaintiffs to have accepted the de:fendant's 
offer on the damages claim without also settling the injunction claims. Both :Iegal and 
equitable claims were based on the same set of facts, and settling only the legal claims 
would not have avoided litigation. 
3.	 In Jones v. City ofNorwalk, 25 Conn. L. Rptr. 106 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1999), the court 
held that a plaintiffs offer of judgment to resolve only one claim of her complaint was 
invalid. Relying on Blakeslee Arpaia Chapman. Inc. v. Ed Constructors, Inc., 239 Conn 
708, 687 A.2d 506 (1997), the court stated that an offer of judgment is an offer to settle 
the entire case, including claims both known and unknown, and both certain and 
uncertain. No mention is made in the statute to partial judgments, such as would result 
from an offer to take judgment on a particular count or one of severa.l causes of action. 
The court consequently determined that the plaintiffs offer was invalid since it was 
framed in a manner that did 1'IOt operate to settle her entire claim against this defendant. 
4.	 Gionfriddo v. Avis, 192 Conn. 301,472 A.3d 316 (1984), held that an offer of judgment 
must be an offer to settle the case on all counts because the statute's purpose of 
encouraging settlements would be eroded by piecemeal offers ofjudgment. 
5.	 Tn Bayley Products, Inc. v. Cole" 720 So.2d 550 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 4th Dist. 1998), the 
court held that an offer ofjudgment was insufficient where it would not have resolved all 
claims if accepted. The defendant filed a four---<:ount counterclaim, and the plaintiff 
extended an offer of judgment that was limited to two of these counts. The court found 
that this offer did not comply with the offer ofjudgment statute, which does not authorize 
offers that, if accepted, would resolve less than all claims. 
Because the offer which was made by the MaiIes did not, by its very terms, propose to be a 
final settlement all outstanding claims, it is invalid and the Mailes are not entitled to claim 
reimbursement for costs incurred after the date of the offer. 
OBJECTION TO MAILES' 
MEMO OF COSTS 
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III. The Manes' offe.l" of judgment is invalid because it failed to apportion the amount 
offered to each of the Defcndants/Counterciaimants. 
The Mailes' offer of judgment stated a single lump sum offered to alii of the 
Defendants/Counterclaimants. This also renders the offer invalid, as it is not sufficiently 
definite to allow anyone party to evaluate his, her, or its respective claim, 
To trigger the application of an offer of judgment statute, courts across the nation have 
uniformly recognized that the offer In\.lst be sufficiently definite to allow each offeree to weigh 
the risks and benefits of the offer against the judgment that may be obtained. See, for ,example, 
Yeiser v. Ferrellgas, Inc., 214 P,3d 458 (Colo. App. 2008); Mews v. Beaster, 694 N.W.2d 476 
(Wis. Ct. App. 2005); Haddock v. Woodland Park Homes, Inc., 90 P.3d 594 (Okla. Civ. App. 
Div. I, 2004) (unapportioned offer to multiple plaintiffs prevents each plaintiff from evaluating 
the settlement offer against the value of his or her claim and would lead to confusion.) 
Lump sum offers to multiple parties have been held to be invalid as "offers of judgment" in 
many states. Offers to multiple plaintiffs are only valid if they expressly apportion the payment 
to each .individual and are not conditioned on acceptance by all of them. Nelson v. Pearson Ford 
Co.) 112 CaLRptr.3d 607 (CaI.App.4.Dist.,2010). This rule applies even if one party's alleged 
liability was purely vicarious. Lamb v. Matetzschk, 906 So.2d 1027 (Fla. 2005). A joint offer 
which is conditioned on the mutual acceptance of all the joint offerces is inV;llid and 
unenforceable because it prevents each offeree from independently evaluating or settling his or 
her respective claim. Attorneys' Title Ins. Fund, Inc. v. Gorka, 36 So.3 646 (Fla. 2010). 
A statutory settlement offer made to multiple parties is valid only if it is e~xpressly 
apportioned among them and not conditioned on acceptance by all of them; a single, lump sum 
offer to multiple plaintiffs which requires them to agree to apportionment among themselves is 
not valid, and a lump sum offer by a plaintiff to multiple defendants may be invalid for the same 
reasons. Westamerica Bank v. MBG Industries, [nc.. 70 Ca1.Rptr.3d 125 (Cal.App.5.Dist. 2007), 
Burch v, Children's Hospital of Orange County Thrift Stores. [nc., J35 Cal.Rptr.2d 404 
(Cal.App.4.Dist.)2003). 
The Mailes' offer of judgment was directed to all of the Defendants/Counterclc:.imaints, 
and offered a single lump sum to all which was to apply not only to the counterclaims, but also to 
OBJECTION TO MAILES' 
MEMO OF COSTS 
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the claims for costs and fees stemm,ing from Lhe defense of the Maile claims, The failure to 
apportion the offer amongst the various defendants renders the offer invalid under Rule 68. 
IV. The costs requested should be disallowed. 
Even if the Mailes were entitled to an award of costs, the items of cost they are 
requesting are not allowable under the JUles. The determination of costs is left to the sound 
discretion of the district court. Idaho Department of Health and Welfare v. Sout~fork Lumber 
Co., 123 Idaho 146, 149, 845 P.2d 5(4) 567 (1993). 
1. Costs as a matter of right: Mailes claim as "mandatory" only three items - $120 for 
sheriff's fee for service of process on depositions, and $22 witness fees for Reed Taylor and 
Tamara Crane. Under Rule 54(d)(1)©(3), witness fees are allowed only for a witness who 
testifies at a deposition or in the trial of an action. Because the Mailes vacated the depositions 
of both Reed Taylor and Tamara Crane, these costs should not be allowed. 
2. Discretionary costs: Mailes ask that they be awarded $2,010.01 as discretionary 
costs under Rul.e 54(d)(1)(D), which grants a court the discretion to award "necessary and 
exceptional costs reasonably incurred, and should in the interest ofjustice be assessed against the 
adverse party." Id.. 
The applicability of that rule to cases in which there was a Rule 68 offer of judgment was 
discussed in Stewart v. McKarnin, 141 IdahO 930, 120 P.3d 748 (el. App. 2005). In that case, 
the Idaho Court of Appeals held that cven in cases involving an offer of judgment, an ~lward of 
discretionary costs must still be based upon specitlc findings that the requested costs were 
necessary, exceptional, and reasonably incurred. The district court, "in ruling upon objeetions to 
such discretionary costs contained in the memorandum of costs, shall make express findings as 
to why such specific item of discretionary cost should or should not be allowed." I.R.c.P. 
54(d)(1)(D); Sr.ewart, id.. See also Masters v. Dr::wey, ]09 Idaho 576, 580, 709 P.2d 149, 153 
(Ct.App. 1985) (holding that the district court should explicitly state which costs are recoverable 
under Rule 68 and Rule 54(d)(I)(D), together with a statement of reasons supporting the award 
of any discretionary costs under Rule 54(d)(1)(D». 
None of the items of discretionary cost which the Mailes have requested meet the 
requirements of Rule 54(d)(l)(D). 
OBJECTION TO MAILES' 
MEMO OF COSTS 
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a.	 $600 for Maur.ice Chaffin should not be allowed; there is nothing eXI~eptional 
about hiring a potential expert witness who does not end up testifying at trial. More 
importantly. the Counter-defe.lldants' witness disclosure2 did not even disclose a 
"Maurice Chaffin" as a potential expert witness. 
b. $22.05 in postage is not exceptionaL 
c.	 $10.00 for obtaining a certified copy of Tamara Crane's notary certificate is not 
exceptiona.l and was not necessary. The certificate was not admitted into ~~vidence, 
and this expense was paid on January 10, 2011, well after the issuance of this Court's 
protection order relating to any testimony by Tamara Crane. 
d.	 $217.96 for binders, index sheets and labels for exhibit binders, plus $1,160 for 
copying exhibits, jury instructions, and pleadings is not an exceptional exp(~nse, nor 
was it even remotely necessal)'. In spite of this Court's very clear rulings in limine, 
virtually all of the requested instructions and proposed exhibits were a blatant attempt 
to have a trial on the MaBes' claims which were dismissed. Few, if any, of the 
requested instructions were actually given, and very few of the proposed exhibits 
were even offered, let alone admitted into evidence. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, the Counterclaimants respectfully request that this Court 
enter an order specifically disallowing the costs requested in Thomas Maile's Memorandum of 
Costs dated February 18,2011. 
DATED this 211d day of March, 2011. 
2 Certification to Opposing Counsel of Expert and Lay Witnesses dated Novembe:r 18, 
2010. 
OBJECTION TO MAILI3S' 
MEMO OF COSTS 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that 011 the 2nd day of March, 2011 I caused to be served a true 
and correct copy ofthe foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed to the 
following: 
Thomas G. Maile, TV	 U.S, Mail
 
Hand Delivered
 380 West State Street 
Overnight Mail Eagle, ID 83616 FAX (208) .939·/00! 
Mr. Christ Troupis	 U.S. Mail 
Attorney at Law	 Hand Delivered 
PO Box 2408	 Overnight Mail 
Eagle, ID 83616	 FAX (208) 938·5482 
Mark Prusynski	 U.S. Mail 
Hand DeliveredMOFFATT THOMAS Ovemight Mail101 S Capitol Blvd., 10th Floor FAX (208) 38$-538.1
PO Box 829 -.e~Boise, ID 83701 
Connie Taylor 
Attorney tor Counterc1aimall 
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By SUSAN MASSEY
 
DEPUTY
 
CONNIE W. TAYLOR
 
HENDERSON LAW FIRM, PLLC
 
900 Washington Street. Suite 1020
 
Vancouver. WA 98660
 
360.699.1530
 
ISBA No. 4837
 
Attorneys for Counter-defendants
 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an 
Idaho limited liability. and THOMAS G. 
MAILE. IV, and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE 
husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants, 
V$. 
CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, et al. 
Defendants/Counter-claimants. 
Case No. CV OC 0723232 
SUPPLEMENTAL OBJECTION TO 
MAILES' MEMORANDUM OF COSTS 
The Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust, by and through its trustees Dallan Taylor and 
R. John Taylor, pursuant to I.R.c.P. 54(d)(6) file this SUPPLEMENTAL objection to the costs 
addressed in the Troupis Affidavits dated February 23, 2011 and March 1, 2011. The arguments 
that the Mailes are not entitled to any costs at all, which are contained in the Objection to Mailes' 
Memorandum of Costs, are incorporated by reference. 
1.	 The costs requested in the Troupis affidavits should be di~allowed. 
The determination of costs is left to the sound discretion of the district court. Idaho 
SUPPLEMENTAL OBJECTION TO 
MAILES'MEMO OF COSTS 
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Department ofHealth and Welfare v. SoutJ1jork Lumher Co., 123 Iclaho 146, 149, 845 P.2d 564, 
567 (1993). 
1. Costs as a matter of right: Troupis claims $145 for service of process on witnesses 
for the trial, and $125 for witness fees. Under Rule 54(d)(1)(©)(3), witness fees an~ allowed 
only for a witness who testifies at a deposition or in the trial of an action. Troupis acknowledges 
that none of the witnesses were called to testify; these costs should not be allowed. The amount 
of $2,000 for expert witness fees for John Runft should not be allowed, as the MaiJes were not 
the prevailing party and the offer of judgment was ineffective for the reasons discussed in the 
prior brieftng. 
2. Discretionary costs: Troupis seeks an award of additional expert witness fees for 
John Runft in the amount of $11,789.33 as discretionary costs under Rule 54(d)(I)(D), which 
grants a court the discretion to award "necessary and exceptional costs reasonably incurred, and 
should in the interest ofjustice be assessed against the adverse party," 
Troupis' affidavit statements which support this request have no merit. Contrary to the 
assertions raised by Mr. Troupis, the counterclaims were not "complex, general, unspecified and 
overly broad," and the ethical issues were not "subsequently dropped by the Counterclaimants," 
but were precluded by the Courts order in limine. 
Expert witness fees must be reasonable. The amount of Mr. Runft's fees is unrc;:asonable 
and excessive, particularly in light of his quality of his testimony at the trial, which was 
confusing, circuitous, and tortured, at best. About the only thing Mr. Runft said that made any 
sense at all was his unequivocal statement that none of the assertions raised by the MaBes in their 
Complaint would have had any impact whatsoever on the fact that the contract to purchase Ted 
Johnson's farm was void ab initio. 
A review of the expert disclosure on Mr. Runft shows that the overwhelming m,tiority of 
his anticipated testimony was an effort to have a trial on the dismissed claims of the: Mailes, 
which this Court long before the trial date made abundantly clear would not be allowed. 
Mr. Runft's fees were not exceptional costs reasonably incurred, and it would not servc 
the interest ofjustice for those costs to be assessed against the Johnson Trust. 
SUPPLEMENTAL OBJECTION TO 
MAILES'MEMO OF COSTS 
2 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, the Counterclaimants respectfully request that this Court 
enter an order specifically disallowing the costs requested in Christ Troupis' affidavits dated 
February 23 and March 1, 2011. 
oATED this 2nd day of March, 2011. 
" LAW FIRM, PLLC 
----..-+_--------' 
By:	 ~ Conn c Wright Taylor, Attomc s for 
Counterclaimants 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 2nd day of March, 2011 I caused to be served a tme 
and correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and address,~d to the 
following: 
Thomas G. Maile, IV	 U.S, Mail
 
Hand Delivered
380 West State Street Overnight MailEagle, ID 83616 FAX (208) 939·J001 
Mr. Christ Troupis U.S. Mail
 
Attorney at Law Hand Delivered
 
PO Box 2408 Overnight Mail
 
Eagle,ID 83616 FAX (208) 938-5482
 
Mark Pmsynski	 U.S. Mail 
Hand Delivered MOFFAIT THOMAS Overnight Mail101 S Capitol Blvd., 10th Floor FAX (208) 385-5384 PO Box 829
 
Boise, ID 83701
 
Sl/PPLEMENTAL OBJECTION TO 
MAlLES'MEMO OF COSTS 
3 
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MAR 0320\\ 
Christ T. Troupis, ISB # 4.a County Clerk 
TROUPIS LAW OFFICE 
1299 E. Iron Eagle, Ste 130 
PO Box 2408 
Eagle, Idaho 83616 
Telephone: 208/938-5584 
Facsimile: 208/938-5482 
Email: ctroupis@troupislaw.com 
Co-counsel for Plaintiffs/Counter-defendants 
~OM'- q~r8"'/"'-"7.:FIL;;;;EO~----
n" _P.M _ 
MJ~R 03 2011 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
 
By LARA AMES
 
OEPUTY
 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT Olr THE
 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
 
I;ERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an 
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G. 
MAILE, IV. and COLLEEN BIRCH­
MAILE, husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants, 
v. 
CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, fIkIa 
CONNIE TAYLOR, an individual; 
DALLAN TAYLOR, an individual; R. 
JOHN TAYLOR, an individual; CLARK 
and FEENEY, a partnership; PAUL T. 
CLARK, an individual; THEODORE L. 
JOHNSON REVOCABLE TRUST, an 
Idaho revocable trust; JOHN DOES I ­
JOHN DOES X; AND ALL PERSONS IN 
POSSESSION OR CLAIMING ANY 
RIGHT TO POSSESSION. 
Defendants/Counter-Claimants.
'--­
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
COUNTY OF ADA ) 
Case No. CV-OC-0723232 
SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT OF 
CHRIST TROUPIS RE: 
MEMORANDUM OF COSTS 
I 
,J-------­ ~
 
Christ T. Troupis, being duly sworn on oath, deposes and states: 
Supplemental Affidavit of Christ Troupis Re Memorandum of Costs 1 
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I. I am the attorney for the Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants in this action. Each of the 
matters set forth herein are known to me ofmy own personal knowledge and if 
sworn as a witness in this matter, I could testify competently thereto. This 
Supplemental Affidavit is submitted in support ofPlaintiffs/Counterdefendants' 
Motion for Costs. 
2.	 Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants incurred costs for service of subpoenas on 
witnesses for the trial ofthis action, and witness fees for those witnesses. The 
subpoena costs are allowable as a mandatory cost, and the witness fees should be 
allowed as a discretionary cost. 
3.	 Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants incurred the sum of $145.00 for service of
 
subpoenas on witnesses for the trial of this action.
 
4.	 Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants incurred the sum of $125.00 for witness fees for the 
subpoenaed witnesses for the trial of this action. 
5.	 These costs were necessarily incurred because at the time that the witnesses were 
subpoenaed, Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants did not know the nature and extent of 
the evidence that would be presented at trial by Defendants/Counterc1aimants 
and were required to compel the attendance of witnesses to rebut potential 
testimony. The Court's subsequent limine rulings resulted in these witnesses not 
being called to testify, which could not have been anticipated by 
Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants. 
Dated:·March 1,2011 
Christ T. Troupis ,. 
Supplemental Affidavit of Christ Troupis Re Memorandum of Costs 2 
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State of Idaho ) 
) ss. 
County ofAda ) 
Subscribed and sworn to before me, a Notary Public in and for the State of Idaho 
and County ofAda on this 1st day ofMarch, 2011. 
"'"'''''''' ~"\l'" VAN"~', Y1~J1lWM~Notary Publi {ii~~" 
My commission expires: i0\1.0\ U\ ...., ~; ) § 
~:-~ .0 0 ~ ~ ~J;;..---....'" ~ ~ ~"'; Cf OF \O~"" 
11111.11"'\' CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on this 1st day ofMarch, 2011, I caused a true and Icorrect 
copy of the foregoing Supplemental Affidavit of Christ Troupis re: Memorandum of Costs to be 
delivered via facsimile as follows: 
i Connie W. Taylor ------~i-(-)--U-.-S-.M-a-il---­
. Henderson Law Firm I (X) Facsimile Transmission 
I 900 Washington St. Suite 1020 I () Hand Delivery 
I Vancouver, Washington 98660 Overnight Delivery I. () 
I Facsimile: (360) 693-2911 
I 
i Mark Stephen Prusynski ( U. S. Mail I ) 
PO Box 829 I (X) Facsimile Transmission 
., Boise, ID 83701 Hand Delivery 
Phone: (208) 345-2000 I i ~ Overnight Delivery 
I 
I Facsimile: (208) 385-5384 
I 
I 
I ( )i Thomas G. Maile, IV. U. S. Mail 
I, I(X)380 W. State Street Facsimile Transmission 
Eagle, Idaho 83616 Hand Delivery I 
I Facsimile: (208) 939-1001 Overnight Delivery 
___ JH .~J 
CHRIST T. TROUPI , 
Co-counsel for Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants 
Supplemental Affidavit of Christ Troupis Re Memorandum of Costs 3 
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) ( ) i Connie W. Taylor 
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U. S. Mail 
I 
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EXlllBIT A 
12/1/2010 Witness Fee Bart Harwood $25.00 
12/112010 Witness Fee Beth Rogers $25.00 
12/112010 Witness Fee Phillip 1. Collaer $25.00 
12/1/2010 Witness Fee Tim Williams $25.00 
12/1/2010 Witness Fee Bradford Knipe $25.00 
1/18/2010 Service of Subpoena Knipe $45.00 
1118/2010 Service of Subpoena Rogers $25.00 
1/18/2010 Service of Subpoena Collaer $25.00 
1118/2010 Service of Subpoena Williams $25.00 
1/18/2010 Service of Subpoena Harwood $25.00 
Total $270.00 
Supplemental Affidavit ofChrist Troupis Re Memorandum of Costs 4 002424
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RECEIVED 
MAR 07 2011 
Arl::l r-ountv Clerk 
CONNlFW. TAYLOR 
HENDERSON LAW FIRM, PLLC 
900 Washington Street, Suite 1020 
Vancouver, WA 98660 
360.699.1530 
ISBA No. 4837 
Attorneys for Counter-defendants 
CHRISTOPHEH D. RICH, Clerk
 
Bv eARLY LATIMORE
 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
 
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an 
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G. 
MAILE, IV, and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE 
husband and wife, 
Counterclaimants/Counter-Counter­
defendants, 
vs. 
CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, f/k/a 
CONNIE TAYLOR, an individual; 
DALLAN TAYLOR, an individual; R. JOHN 
l'AYLOR, an individual; CLARK and 
FEENEY, a partnership; PAUL 1'. CLARK, 
an individual, THEODORE L. JOHNSON 
REVOCABLE TRUST, an Idaho revocable 
trust; JOHN DOES 1 - JOHN DOES X; and 
ALL PERSONS IN POSSESSION OR 
CLAIMAING ANY RIGHT TO 
POSSESSION 
Counter-defendants/Counter­
claimants. 
COUNTERCLAIMANTS' 
MEMORANDUM OF COSTS 
Case No. CV OC 0723232 
COUNTERCLAIMANTS' 
MEMORANDUM OF COSTS 
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The Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust, and its trustees Dallan Taylor and R. John 
Taylor, by and through their attorney of record, CONNIE W. TAYLOR of the Henderson Law 
Firm, PLLC, make this Memorandum of Costs incurred in this matter. 
1. THE JOHNSON TRUST IS THE PREVAILING PARTY 
The Johnson Trust submits that when this Court considers all of the claims, including the 
claim for fees of the Clark and Feeney defendants, it will be apparent that the Johnson Trust is 
the prevailing party and is thus entitled to an award of costs. The Trust specifically incorporates 
herein the argument relating to the Maile Offer of Judgment set forth in its Objection to Mailes' 
Memorandum of Costs dated March 2,2011. 
A prevailing party in an action is entitled to certain costs as a matter of right and may, in 
some cases, also be awarded discretionary costs and attorney fees. Idaho R. Civ. P. 54(d)(l). A 
determination on prevailing parties is committed to the discretion of the trial court. Eighteen 
Mile Ranch, LLC v. Nord Excavating & Paving, Inc., 141 Idaho 716, 718-19, 117 P.3d 130, 132­
33 (2005). Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(l )(B) guides courts' inquiries on the prevailing 
party question. Id. at 719, 117 P.3d at 133. That rule provides: 
In determining which party to an action is a prevailing party and entitled to costs, the trial 
court shall in its sound discretion consider the final judgment or result of the action in 
relation to the relief sought by the respective parties. The trial court in its sound 
discretion may determine that a party to an action prevailed in part and did not prevail in 
part, and upon so finding may apportion the costs between and among the parties in a fair 
and equitable manner after considering all of the issues and claims involved in the action 
and the resultant judgment or judgments obtained. 
Idaho R. Civ. P. 54(d)(l)(B). In determining which party prevailed where there are claims and 
counterclaims between opposing parties, the court determines who prevailed "in the action" ; that 
COUNTERCLAIMANTS' 
MEMORANDUM OF COSTS 
2 
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is, the prevailing party question is examined and determined from an overall view, not a claim­
by-claim analysis. Shore v. Peterson, 146 Idaho 903, 915, 204 P.3d 1114, 1126 (2009), citing 
Eighteen Mile, 141 Idaho at 719, l17P.3dat 133. 
In identifying the prevailing party, the analysis requires nothing more than noting the 
fact that the Mailes have not prevailed on a single matter. All of their claims were dismissed on 
summary judgment, and a judgment was entered against them on the counterclaims. They may 
claim that they prevailed in part at the trial on the counterclaims because of the amount of the 
jurors' verdict, but that argument fails for two separate reasons. First, the Counterclaimants' 
pleadings never sought a specific amount, but rather sought only such damages "as may be 
proved at trial." Second, the ruling on the period for which damages were available was not 
made until the jury instruction conference at the end of trial, by which time the 
Counterclaimants' witnesses had all testified. 
The Mailes' attempt to shift costs by way of an offer ofjudgment was ineffective because 
that offer (a) did not comply with the requirements of Rule 68 that it "include all claims 
recoverable .... which have accrued up to the date of the offer of judgment," and (b) was not 
sufficiently definite because it did not apportion the offer amongst the multiple parties to whom 
it was offered. 
II. COSTS 
The Johnson Trust requests an award of both costs as a matter of right (as set forth 
below) and discretionary costs. Invoices supporting these costs are attached as Exhibit A to this 
memorandum. 
COUNTERCLAIMANTS' 
MEMORANDUM OF COSTS 
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Rule 54(d)(l )(D) grants a court the discretion to award "necessary and exceptional costs 
reasonably incurred, and should in the interest of justice be assessed against the adverse party." 
The discretionary cost requested is $1,000 in additional expert fees for D. Craig Lewis which 
were incurred after the close of court on February 2 (5 hours non-court time @ $150 an hour) 
and for testifying on February 3 (1 hour @ $250 an hour). The Court will recall that the 
Mailes' attorney's cross examination of this witness consisted of over 45 minutes of nothing 
more than slapping case after case after case on the Elmo and asking whether Professor Lewis 
agreed with the highlighted references, with no effort made to tie any of those references in to 
the facts of this case. As the clock neared 2 p.m., the Court inquired ofMr. Troupis how long he 
would be with the witness. Mr. Troupis looked at the clock and said "two minutes." At that 
point, Mr. Maile audibly told his attorney that he needed to make the witness stay overnight, at 
which point Mr. Troupis recanted his statement that he could finish with the witness that day. It 
was necessary for the Johnson Trust to pay the additional charges to keep the witness available, 
and exceptional for an opposing party to demand that an expert be kept over when his own 
attorney had indicated he could finish with the witness in two minutes. The interest of justice 
requires that the Mailes be ordered to pay the additional expenses incurred. 
Costs as a matter of Right 
1.	 Expert witness fees for an expert who testifies at a $ 3,400.00 
deposition or trial. 
D. Craig Lewis 2,000.00 
Bob DeBolt 700.00 
John Runft 700.00 
$ 568.87 
COUNTERCLAIMANTS' 
MEMORANDUM OF COSTS 
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2. Charges for reporting and transcribing of 
depositions and Charges for one (1) copy of any 
deposition taken by any of the parties to the 
action in preparation for trial. 
John Runft (01/24111) 568.87 
3. Travel expenses IRCP 54(d)(l)©(4) 
Craig Lewis, 999 miles @ $.30 per mile 
John Taylor, 300 miles @ $.30 per mile 
299.70 
90.00 
$ 
$ 
389.70 
4,385.57 
DISCRETIONARY COSTS: $ 1,000.00 
The Johnson Trust also requests an award of $1 ,000 in additional 
fees for their expert witness, D. Craig Lewis, as a discretionary 
cost. 
Total Requested Costs $ 5,385.57 
DATED this 2nd day of March, 2011. 
COUNTERCLAIMANTS' 
MEMORANDUM OF COSTS 
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STATE OF WASHINGTON ) 
) ss. 
County of Clark ) 
~~\)-
Connie W. Taylor T 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this ~day of March, 2011. 
r f,. r r~t\Ct\R ~ L \j ,\~ 
Notary Public in and for the State 
oJ Washington, residing (~t 
WV'C(1Ht'{j l U: . 
My commission expires:_ \\ 
COUNTERCLAIMANTS' 
MEMORANDUM OF COSTS 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVI~ (/j ~ 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the ~ day of February, 2011 I caused to be served a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed 
to the following: 
Thomas G. Maile, IV
 
380 West State Street
 
Eagle, ID 83616
 
Mr. Christ Troupis
 
Attorney at Law
 
PO Box 2408
 
Eagle, ID 83616
 
Mark Prusynski 
MOFFATT THOMAS 
101 S Capitol Blvd., 10th Floor 
PO Box 829 
Boise, ID 83701 
U.S. Mail 
Hand Delivered 
Overnight Mail 
Telecopy (FAX) (208) 939-1001 
U.S. Mail 
Hand Delivered 
Overnight Mail 
Telecopy (FAX) (208) 938-5482 
U.S. Mail 
Hand Delivered 
Overnight Mail 
Telecopy (FAX) (208) 385-5384 
~ 
Co nie Taylor
 
Attorney for Counterclai
 
COUNTERCLAIMANTS' 
MEMORANDUM OF COSTS 
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February 7, 2011 
Connie W. Taylor 
Henderson Law Firm 
900 Washington St., Suite 1020 
Vancouver WA 98660 
Re: Maile v. Taylor 
FOR SERVICES RENDERED during the period January 26 - February 3, 2011, including: 
1/26 - 1/30 Review case materials, Runft deposition, charts in preparation for trial 
testimony; email Ms. Taylor 
4.2 hrs @ $ 150 hr. $ 630.00 
2/1 Travel; confer w/ counsel and client 10 hrs. @ $150 hr. $1500.00 
2/2 Court time; testimony 5 hrs. @ $250 hr. $ 1250.00 
Non-court time 5 hrs. @ $150 hr. $ 750.00 
2/3 Court time; 1 hr. @ $ 250 hr. $ 250.00 
Non-·court time 8 hrs. @ $150 hr. $ 1200.00 
TOTAL $ 5,580.00 
EXPENSES 
Airport shuttle Casa Grande/ Sky Harbor/ Casa Grande, tips $ 130.00 
Hotel ~~ 
Thrifty car rental $ 108.14 
002433
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Hotel 
Meals - 3 lunches, 1 dinner $ 47.00 
TOTAL EXPENSES $574.08 
BALANCE DUE $ 6154.08 
7SG- e 
D. Craig L~ ""--....---77 
002434
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Gmail - Fairfield Estates Tim/" Charges	 Page I of2 
connie taylor <conniewtaylor@gmail.com> 
Fairfield Estates Time Charges 
2 messages 
Bob Debolt <bdebolt@live.com>	 Mon, Feb 7, 2011 at 10:42 AM 
To: connie taylor <conniewtaylor@gmail.com> 
Hi Connie- I hope you received a favorable ruling on the Fairfield Estates lawsuit. Per your
 
instruction I kept track of my time on this case and submit the following:
 
12/8/10 Review email from Connie Taylor and CMA on Fairfield Estates prepan3d by Connie 
Shananhan 1 hour 
1/18/11 Meet w/ Connie Taylor in my office, Eagle Idaho
 
1 hour
 
1/18/11 Prepare brief work history and qualifications
 
.5 hour
 
2/01/11 Review CMA & MLS records prior to testimony 
2.5 hour 
2/02/11 Travel time & waiting @ Courthouse
 
1 hour
 
2/03/11	 Travel & testify
 
lJ1Qur
 
Total
 
7 hours
 
I hope my testimony was helpful
 
Thank you
 
Bob DeBolt 
Associate Broker / Eagle Sales Manager
 
Coldwell Banker Tomlinson Group
 
https://mail.google.com/maill?ui=2&ik=Odf6c6a99a&view=pt&search=mbox&th=12eO16f2... 2/7/2011 
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",-& M COURT REPORTING SERVICE, INC~ 
FED ID. NO. 82-0298125 
-MM·,
... "'.. 
"Excellence in Court Reporting Since 1970" 
Billed to:	 Billed: 1/28/2011 
Connie W. Taylor
 
Henderson Law Firm, PLLC
 
900 Washington Street, Ste. 1020
 
Vancouver, WA 98660
 
Job # (26510B4) Invoice # 36917B5 Claim # 
Case: Berkshire Investments v. Taylor 
Witness: John L. Runft
 
Date: 1/24/2011 2:36:00 PM
 
Charges: 
Transcript Fee 0&1 Expert 4-Day $5.90 81 $477.90 
Attendance Fee - One-Half Day $65.00 1 $65.00 
Exhibits Attached to Transcript $0.25 98 $24.50 
Copy to deponent due to trial. $0.00 i $0.00 
6% sales tax $1.47 1 $1.47 
Sub Total $568.87 
Payments $0.00 
Balance Due $568.87 
We appreciate your business! 
(Return this section with check)	 Billed to: Connie W. Taylor 
Invoice # 36917B5 
Billed: 1/28/2011 
Amount Due: $568.87 
SOUTHERN OFFICE	 NORTHERN OFFICE 
421 W. Franklin Street	 816 E. Shelman Aw, Ste. 7 
P.O. Box 2636	 Boise, ID 83701-2636 Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814-4921 
208-345-9611 208-345-8800 (fax) 208-765-1700 208-765-8097 (fax) 
1-800-234-9611 1-800-879-1700 
email m-and-m@qwestoffice.net email csmith@mmcourt.com 
/' 
Remit Payment M	 Remit Payment [] 002436
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Driving Directions from CaSe "rande, Arizona to Boise, Idaho	 Page 1 of3 
~. 
There's 3 Ilew MeJpOuest _. corne try it out! 
Sorry' When printing directly from the browser your directions or map may not pnnt 
correctly. For best results, try clicking the Printer-Friendly button. MAPQ\JEST 
~	 Starting Location ~ Ending Location 
Casa Grande, AZ Boise,ID 
Total Travel Estimate: 15 hours 48 minutes I 999.10 miles Fuel Cost: Calculate 
LJlrectiorlS \'\iicl' help1ful hints. 
the nevI" 
mapquest 
http://classic.mapquest.com/maps?lc=Casa+Grande&ls=AZ&ly=US&11=32.879398&lg... 2/22/2011 
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THOMAS G. MAILE, N. 
Attorney at Law 
380 West State Street 
Eagle, Idaho 83616 
Telephone: (208) 939-1000 
Idaho State Bar No. 2378 
P.M _:.:_....2.....:s~B'-_FH.iIO .. 
MAR 07 20111 
CHRISTOPHER O. RICH Clerk
 
By JAMIE RANDAL.L •
 
DEPUTY 
Pro Se and counsel for Berkshire Investments and Colleen Birch-Maile 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an 
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G. 
MAILE, N. and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE, 
husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, f/k/a 
CONNIE TAYLOR, an individual; DALLAN 
TAYLOR, an individual; R. JOHN 
TAYLOR, an individual; CLARK and 
FEENEY, a partnership; PAUL T. CLARK, 
an individual; THEODORE L. JOHNSON 
REVOCABLE TRUST, an Idaho revocable 
trust; JOHN DOES I -JOHN DOES X; AND 
ALL PERSONS IN POSSESSION OR 
CLAIMING ANY RIGHT TO 
POSSESSION. 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-OC 07-23232 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
TO:	 THE DEFENDANTSIRESPONDENTS ABOVE NAMED, THEIR ATTORNEY OF 
RECORD, CONNIE TAYLOR and MARK PRUSYNSKI AND THE CLERK OF 
THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the attorney above named, Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
Berkshire Investments, LLC, Thomas G. Maile, IV. and Colleen Birch-Maile, by and through 
002438
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Thomas G. Maile, IV., attorney for the Plaintiffs, hereinafter referred to as "Appellants", appeal 
against the above-named Respondents to the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho, from the 
Memorandum Decision and Order entered on July 2,2009 and the resulting Judgment 
Dismissing Plaintiff's Claims entered on July 20, 2009, and the Judgment entered on February 
28, 2011 entered in the above-entitled action by Honorable Richard D. Greenwood. 
1. Appellants have a right to appeal to the Idaho Appellate Court, from the District 
Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the State ofIdaho, In and For the County of Ada, and the 
Memorandum Decision and Order entered on July 2, 2009 and the resulting Judgment 
Dismissing Plaintiff's Claims entered on July 20, 2009, and the Judgment entered on F,~bruary 
28, 2011 are appealable Orders and/or Judgments under and pursuant to Rule 11 of the I.A.R., in 
that there was a Judgment Dismissing Plaintiffs' Claims and Order Denying Plaintiffs' Motion 
for Summary Judgment entered on July 20, 2009 as well as the Judgment entered on February 
28, 2011 on the Counter-Claimants' Claims. 
2. That the parties have a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme COUl1, and the 
judgment and/or orders described in paragraph 1 above are an appealable orders and/or 
judgments under and pursuant to Rule 11(a)(2) l.A.R. That pursuant to the Idaho Appellate 
Rules, jurisdiction is proper for the appeal. 
3. That no order been entered sealing all or any portion of the record. 
4. A preliminary statement of the issues on appeal which the Appellants intend to 
assert in the appeal, are as follows: 
a.	 Was the District Court correct in entering the Order dismissing the Plaintiffs/Appellants' 
Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial pursuant to the Defendants/Respondents' Motion 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - Pg 2z ~"","b"IJIF,,,"m"\·,I"\"'''';"p",,,I.,,,",,,,,,<,,,,poJ 
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to Dismiss/Motion for Summary Judgment? 
b. Was the District Court correct in denying the Plaintiffs/Appellants' Motion to Reconsider 
to allow the claims of the Plaintiffs/Appellants to continue to trial? 
c. Was the District Court correct in denying the Plaintiffs/Appellants' affirmative defense of 
litigation privilege which would have barred the counter-claims of the 
Defendants/Respondents? 
d. Was the District Court correct in denying the Plaintiffs/Appellants' Motion to Dismiss 
filed 11/02/2010 as the counter-claimants failed to allege conduct against the counter­
defendants which would be an exception to the litigation privilege afforded the counter­
defendants? 
e. Was the District Court correct in denying the Plaintiffs/Appellants' claims as set forth in 
their Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial? 
f. Was the District Court correct in denying the Plaintiffs/Appellants' claims to set aside the 
"Judgment based upon Beneficiaries' Claims" in the consolidated case Taylor v. Maile et. 
aI, filed in the Fourth Judicial District ofthe State ofIdaho, County of Ada, case number 
CV OC 04-00473D, based upon "fraud upon the court" and/or fraud upon the court by 
"officers of the court"? 
g. Was the District Court correct in dismissing the Plaintiffs/Appellants' claims based upon 
the criminal conduct of the co-defendants in obtaining "Judgment based upon 
Beneficiaries' Claims"? 
h. Was the District Court correct in dismissing the Plaintiffs/Appellants' claims based upon 
the fraudulent misrepresentations committed by the co-defendants in obtaining "Judgment 
002440
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based upon Beneficiaries' Claims"? 
I.	 Was the District Court correct in denying the Plaintiffs/Appellants' claims as set forth in 
their Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial based upon res judicata? 
J.	 Did the Co-Defendants/Respondents commit criminal activity and/or fraudulent 
misrepresentations that amounted to a "fraud upon the court" committed by the "officers 
of the court" that should have resulted in setting aside the "Judgment on Beneficiaries' 
Claims" ? 
k.	 Did the "fraud upon the court" committed by the "officers of the court" vitiate all 
subsequent legal actions? 
1.	 Was the Judgment entered on February 28,2011 supported by substantial, sufficient and 
competent evidence? 
m.	 Was the verdict finding an abuse of process and tortious interference with prospective 
business advantage supported by substantial, sufficient and competent evidence? 
n.	 Can the filing of a complaint give rise to a finding of an abuse of process and tortious 
interference with prospective business advantage? 
o.	 Was the verdict finding an abuse ofprocess and tortious interference with prospective 
business advantage improper as respondents failed to provide any evidence contradicting 
the lis pendens were properly filed? 
Is a reporter's transcript requested? Yes. The following transcript is requested, and the 
Appellants request the same to be made a part of the appeal as existing transcripts, to wit: 
a. (1) 10/29/2010 Hearing result for Motion held on 10/29/2010 11 :30 ANI[: District 
Court Hearing Held Court Reporter: Leslie Anderson Number ofTranscript Pages for this 
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hearing estimated: less than 50 pages; 
(2) 11/30/2010 Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled held on 11/30/2010 11 :30 
AM: District Court Hearing Held Court Reporter: Leslie Anderson Number ofTranscript Pages 
for this hearing estimated: less than 50 pages; 
(3) 0111812011 Hearing result for Motion in Limine held on 01/18/2011 03:00 
PM: District Court Hearing Held Court Reporter: Leslie Anderson Number ofTranscript Pages 
for this hearing estimated: less than 100 pages; 
(4) 02/0212011 Transcript for Jury Trial held on 02/0212011 09:00 AM: District 
Court Hearing Held Court Reporter: Fran Morris Number ofTranscript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: less than 300 pages; 
(5) 02/03/2011 Transcript for Jury Trial held on 02/0312011 09:00 AM: District 
Court Hearing Held Court Reporter: Fran Morris Number ofTranscript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: less than 300 pages; 
(6) 02/0312011 Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 02/04/2011 09:00 AM) 4th day of 
trial; 
(7) 02/0412011 Transcript for Jury Trial held on 02/04/2011 09:00 AM: District 
Court Hearing Held Court Reporter: Tiffany Fisher Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: less than 600 pages; 
b. The transcript is requested in standard format and not compressed. 
c. That the estimated fee for the preparation of the transcript has been paid. 
That the Appellants have paid the estimated costs of the clerk's record. 
5. The Appellants request the following documents to be included in the clerk's 
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record as electronic pdf files and not as hard copies:
 
PLEADINGS ASSOCIATED WITH ADA COUNTY CASE NO. CV OC 07-23232
 
1 12/31/2007 Complaint; 
2 03/25/2008 Amended Complaint; 
3 05/08/2008 Answer C Taylor for Taylor, Taylor and Johnson Trust; 
4 05/12/2008 Motion to Dismiss; 
5 05/12/2008 Affidavit In Support Of Motion to Dismiss; 
6 05/13/2008 Answer of Connie Wright Taylor, Clark and Feeney and Paul T Clark 
to Amend Complaint (Prusynski for Connie, Clark & Feeney & Paul); 
7 05/13/2008 Motion to Strike Motion to Dismiss and/or consider same as Motion 
for Summary Judgment; 
8 05/19/2008 Amended Affidavit in Support fo Motion to Dismiss; 
9 10103/2008 Amended Motion to Dismiss and/or for Summary Judgment and 
Sanctions; 
10 10/03/2008 Second Affidavit in Support of Motion to Dismiss; 
11 10/0312008 Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss and/or for Summary 
Judgment and Sanctions; 
12 10/0812008 Statement of Facts in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment 
and Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions; 
13 10/08/2008 Affidavit of Thomas Maile Part One; 
14 10/08/2008 Affidavit ofThomas Maile Part Two; 
15 10/08/2008 Memorandum Brief in Opposition to Motion Dismiss/Summary 
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Judgment and Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions; 
16 10/09/2008 Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment; 
17 10/09/2008 Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment; 
18 10/20/2008 Affidavit of Thomas G Maile, IV; 
19 10120/2008 Affidavit in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel/Motion for 
Attorney Fees and Costs; 
20 1012012008 Memorandum Brief in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion to 
Compel/Motion for Attorneys Fees and Costs; 
21 10123/2008 Motion to Continue All Summary Judgment and Motion to Dismiss 
Hearings Set for 11/6/08; 
22 10/2312008 Affidavit In Support Of Motion to Continue Summary Judgment 
Hearing Filed by Defendants Connie Wright Taylor, Clark and Feeney, and Paul T 
Clark; 
23 10/23/2008 Memorandum Brief in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment 
Filed and In Support of Motion to Continue Hearings; 
24 01/08/2009 Motion to Stay Proceedings Until Idaho Supreme Court Provides a 
Decision in Companion Case and or Set Matter For Jury Trial; 
25 01/0812009 Affidavit In Support Of Motion to Stay Proceedings Until Idaho 
Supreme Court Provides a Decision in Companion Case and or Set Matter For 
Jury Trial; 
26 01/08/2009 Affidavit of Tom Maile Part Three; 
27 01108/2009 Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Dispositive MOlions; 
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28 01114/2009 Notice ofNon-Opposition to Motion for Stay; 
29 01120/2009 Notice ofNon Opposition to Motion for Stay; 
30 02/09/2009 Affidavit in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment; 
31 02/12/2009 Supplemental Memorandum Brief in Response to Supreme Court; 
32 02/12/2009 Affidavit of Thomas Maile Part Four; 
33 02/13/2009 Motion for Order Removing Lis Pendens; 
34 02/17/2009 Amended Answer and Counterclaim (Taylor for John and DaHan 
Taylor and Johnson Trust); 
35 03110/2009 Reply to Amended Answer ofJohn Taylor DaHan Taylor and John 
Trust and Counterclaim; 
36 03/13/2009 Amended Answer and Counterclaim; 
37 03117/2009 Reply to Amended Answer of Connie Taylor, Clark and Feeney and 
Paul T. Clark and Counterclaim; 
38 03/17/2009 Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment Re: Defendant's 
Counterclaim; 
39 03/17/2009 Affidavit ofThomas G. Maile IV; 
40 03117/2009 Memorandum Briefin Support of Motion for Summary Judgment; 
41 04/03/2009 Supplemental Affidavit of Connie W Taylor in Support ofMotion for 
Summary Judgment; 
42 04/06/2009 Affidavit ofThomas Maile Part Five; 
43 04/06/2009 Supplemental Memorandum Brief in Opposition to Motion for 
Summary Judgment Filed by Defendants and in Response to Supplemental 
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Affidavit of Connie W Taylor in Support ofMotion for Summary Judgment; 
44 04/08/2009 Affidavit of Helen Taylor; 
45 04/08/2009 Second Supplemental Affidavit of Connie W Taylor in Support of 
Motion for Summary Judgment; 
46 04/08/2009 Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment on 
Counterclaims; 
47 04/08/2009 Affidavit in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment on 
Counterclaims; 
48 04/08/2009 Third Supplemental Affidavit in Support ofMotion for Summary 
Judgment; 
49 04/08/2009 Joinder 04/1312009 Reply to Opposition to Motion for Summary 
Judgment; 
50 04/14/2009 Reply Memorandum Brief in Support of Motion for Summary 
Judgment Relating to the Defendants Counter-Claim & in Opposition to 
Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment; 
51 04/15/2009 Reply Brief in Support ofMotion for Summary Judgment; 
52 04/20/2009 Response To Plaintiffs Motion to Compel; 
53 04/20/2009 Response to Motion to Compel; 
54 05/01/2009 Plaintiffs Request to Take Judicial Notice ofPleadings; 
55 07/02/2009 Memorandum Decision & Order; 
56 07/13/2009 Motion for Certification; 
57 07/13/2009 Memorandum Brief in Support of Motion; 
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58 07/13/2009 Affidavit in Support of Motion; 
59 07/20/2009 Order Denying Plaintiffs Summary Judgment; 
60 07/20/2009 Judgment Dismissing Plaintiffs Claims only; 
61 07/21/2009 Affidavit in Support of Motion for Certification to Memorandum; 
62 08/03/2009 Amended Motion Re: Judgment Dismissing Plaintiffs Claims/Motion 
for Permissive Appeal; 
63 08/13/2009 Second Supplemental Affidavit in Support of Amended Motion for 
Certification; 
64 08/21/2009 Notice of Non Opposition to Motion; 
65 09/28/2009 Order re: Motion for Certification / Motion for Permissive Appeal; 
66 12/03/2009 Renewed Motion for Certification Pursuant to I.R.C.P. Rule 54(b) re 
Judgment Entered July 20,2009; 
67 12/03/2009 Affidavit In Support Of Motion; 
68 12/21/2009 Objection to Renewed Motion for Certification; 
69 12/21/2009 Affidavit of Connie W Taylor; 
70 01/08/2010 Memorandum Brief in Support of Renewed Motion for Certification 
Pursuant to lR.C.P. Rule 54(B) RE: Judgment Entered July 20, 2009; 
71 01/08/20] 0 Supplemental Affidavit in Support of Renewed Motion for 
Certification Pursuant to lR.C.P. Rule 54(B) RE: Judgment Entered July 20, 
2009; 
72 03/03/2010 Plaintiffs' Motion For Summary Judgment on Defendants' 
Counterclaim; 
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73 03/0312010 Memorandum in Support of Motion; 
74 03/0312010 Affidavit In Support Of Motion; 
75 04/2712010 Affidavit of Mark Prusynski; 
76 04/2912010 Supplemental Memorandum in Opposition to 2nd Motion for 
Summary Judgment on Counterclaims; 
77 04/2912010 Affidavit ofR. John Taylor in Opposition to Second Motion for 
Summary Judgment on the Defendant's Counterclaims; 
78 0412912010 Affidavit of Counsel in Opposition to Second Motion for Summary 
Judgment; 
79 0412912010 Memorandum in Opposition to Second Motion for Summary 
Judgment; 
80 05/04/2010 Motion to Strike; 
81 05/04/2010 Affidavit of Chris Troupis in Support of Motion to Strike; 
82 05/0412010 Reply Memorandum Brief in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for 
Summary Judgment and in Opposition to Counter-Claimants Motion to Amend 
the Counter-Claim; 
83 0612312010 Order Denying Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment on the 
Defendants' Counterclaims; 
84 06123/2010 Order Granting Motion for Leave to Amend Counterclaims; 
85 06/28/2010 Amended Counterclaim; 
86 08/04/2010 Reply to Amended Counterclaim; 
87 09/29/20 10 Motion to Reconsider; 
002448
88	 09/29/2010 Affidavit of Christ Troupis in Support of Motion; 
89	 09/29/2010 Memorandum Briefin Support of Motion; 
90	 10113/2010 Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Reconsider; 
91	 10/2112010 Reply Memorandum Brief in Support of Motion to Reconsider; 
92	 10/26/2010 Correction to Reply Memorandum Brief in Support of Motion to 
Reconsider; 
93 10/29/2010 Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants' Motion to Reply to Counterclaim 
and Demand for Jury Trial; 
94 10/29/2010 Affidavit of Christ Troupis in Support of Plaintiffs/Counter-
Defendants' Motion to Reply to Counterclaim and Demand for Jury Trial; 
95	 11102/2010 Motion to Dismiss; 
96	 11102/2010 Memorandum in Support; 
97 11122/2010 Objection to Counter-Defendant's Motion for Leave to Amend Reply 
to Counterclaims; 
98 11122/2010 Affidavit in Opposition; 
99 11/22/2010 Memorandum in Opposition; 
100 11/24/2010 Reply Memorandum Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss &/or 
Motion in Limine RE: Litigation Privilege; 
101	 11129/2010 Joinder in Co Defendants Opposition to Motion to Dismiss and or 
Motion in Limine and Objection to Motion for Leave to Amend Reply to 
Counterclaims; 
102	 12/02/2010 Stipulation to Dismiss Counterclaim of Clark and Feeney 
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Defendants; 
103	 12/06/2010 Motion to Dismiss Counterclaim of Clark and Feeney Defendants; 
104	 01/03/2011 Motion for Limited Admission; 
105	 01/03/2011 Motion in Limine With Supporting Authority; 
106 0110312011 Motion to Exclude Expert & Lay Testimony RE: Claims Against 
Counter-Defendant; 
107 01103/2011 Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants' Memorandum Briefin Support of 
Motion to Exclude Expert & Lay Testimony RE: Claims Against 
Counter-Defendants; 
108 01103/2011 Motion in Limine RE: Testimony Concerning Helen Taylor; 
109 01/03/2011 Memorandum Briefin Support of motion in Limine RE: Testimony 
concerning Helen Taylor; 
110 01103/2011 Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants' Motion to Exclude Testimony of Bob 
Debolt; 
111 01103/2011 Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants' Memorandum Brief in Support of 
Motion to Exclude Testimony of Bob Debolt; 
112	 01/03/2011 Motion in Limine RE: Idaho State Bar Complaint; 
113	 01103/2011 Memorandum Brief in Support of Motion in Limine RE: Idaho State 
Bar Complaint; 
114	 01/03/2011 Motion in Limine RE: Damages; 
115	 01103/2011 Memorandum in Support of Counter-Defendants' Motion in Limine 
RE: Damages; 
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116	 01103/2011 Motion in Limine RE: Relevance ofPrior Al1egations~ 
117	 01103/2011 Memorandum Briefin Support ofMotion in Limine RE: Rdevance 
of Prior Allegations~ 
118	 01103/2011 Affidavit of Christ Troupis in Support of Motions in Limine~ 
119 01110/2011 Affidavit In Support Of Motion to Exclude Testimony of Sam 
Langston, Bob Debolt; 
120 0111 0/2011 Requested Jury Instructions~ 
121 0111012011 Counter-Defendants' Requested Jury Instructions and Proposed 
Special Verdict Form; 
122 01110/2011 Memorandum in Opposition to Counter-Claimants' Motion in Limine 
and Supplemental Motion in Limines; 
123 0111112011 Memorandum Opposing Counterdefendants' Motion In Limines; 
124 01112/2011 Affidavit of Christ Troupis in Support of Motion in Limines:: 
125 0111212011 Reply Memorandum Brief in Support ofMotions in Limine~ 
126 01114/2011 BriefIn Support Of Motion In Limine To Preclude Connie Taylors 
Testimony; 
127	 0112012011 Supplemental Affidavit of Christ Troupis; 
128	 01/2112011 Summary Order Re Motions in Limine~ 
129	 01/21/2011 Order for limited Admission~ 
130 0112612011 Motion and Memo in Support ofMotion to Prohibit Counter-· 
claimants from Calling Thomas Maile as a Witness; 
131 02/01/2011 Counter-defendants' Motion and Memorandum in Support of Motion 
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to Prohibit Counter-claimants from Introducing or Referring to November 2006 
Order, C-C Exhibit 11 and 2005 Purchase and Land Sale Agreement, C-C Exhibit 
5, or the Issues Raised Therein 
132 02/0112011 Motion and Memorandum in Support of Motion to Prohibit From 
Referring to Order
 
133 02/04/2011 Jury Instructions.
 
134 02/0412011 Verdict Form.
 
135 02/11/2011 Motion for Judgment not Withstanding the Verdict.
 
136 02/11/2011 Memorandum Brief in Support of Motion.
 
137 02/28/2011 Judgment.
 
That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to Rule 20 LA.R. 
DATED this 1 day ofMarch, 2011. 
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Co-Counsel 0 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 7day of March, 2011, I caused to be delivered a 
true and correct co y of the NOTICE OF AP"PltAL, to be delivered, addressed as follows: 
Connie W. Taylor & Paul Henderson 
Henderson Law Firm 
900 Washington St. Suite 1020 
Vancouver, Washington 98660 
Facsimile: (360) 693-2911 
Mark Stephen Prusynski 
PO Box 829 
Boise, 10 83701 
Phone: (208) 345-2000 
Facsimile: (208) 385-5384 
Christ T. Troupis 
TROUPIS LAW OFFICE 
1299 E. Iron Eagle, Ste 130 
PO Box 2408 
Eagle, Idaho 83616 
Facsimile: (208) 938-5482 
Leslie Anderson, Court Reporter 
Ada County Courthouse 
200 W. Front Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Fran Morris, Court Reporter 
Ada County Courthouse 
200 W. Front Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Tiffany Fisher, Court Reporter 
Tucker & Associates, LLC 
PO Box 1625 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
(X) U. S. Mail 
() Facsimile Transmission 
() Hand Delivery 
() Overnight Delivery 
(X) U. S. Mail 
() Facsimile Transmission 
() Hand Delivery 
() Overnight Delivery 
() U. S. Mail 
() Facsimile Transmission 
(X) Hand Delivery 
() Overnight Delivery 
() U. S. Mail 
() Facsimile Transmission 
(X) Hand Delivery 
() Overnight Delivery 
() U. S. Mail 
() Facsimile Transmission 
(X) Hand Delivery 
() Overnight Delivery 
(X) U. S. Mail 
() Facsimile Transmission 
() Hand Delivery 
() Overnight Delivery 
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Christ T. Troupis, ISB # 4549 
TROUPIS LAW OFFICE 
1299 E. Iron Eagle, Ste 130 
PO Box 2408 
Eagle, Idaho 83616 
Telephone: 208/938-5584 
Facsimile: 208/938-5482 
Email: ctroupis@troupislaw.com 
........ NO·"'7'7tr'?it-FILED
 
A.M....::::..lY..Ll--_P.M.__­
MAR 10 2011 
CHRISTOPHEB D. RICH, Clerk 
By ABBY GARDEN 
DEPUTY 
Co-counsel for Plaintiffs/Counter-defendants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF' THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
ERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an 
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G. 
MAILE, IV. and COLLEEN BIRCH­~ 
I MAILE, husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants, 
v. 
CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, fIkIa 
CONNIE TAYLOR, an individual; 
DALLAN TAYLOR, an individual; R. 
JOHN TAYLOR, an individual; CLARK 
and FEENEY, a partnership; PAUL T. 
CLARK, an individual; THEODORE L. 
JOHNSON REVOCABLE TRUST, an 
Idaho revocable trust; JOHN DOES I ­
JOHN DOES X; AND ALL PERSONS IN 
POSSESSION OR CLAIMING ANY 
RIGHT TO POSSESSION. 
Defendants/Counter-Claimants. 
------ ~-
I 
i 
Case No. CV-OC-0723232 
SECOND SUPPLEMENTAl~ i 
I 
AFFIDAVIT OF CHRIST TROUPIS : 
RE: MEMORANDUM OF COSTS I 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
COUNTY OF ADA ) 
Christ T. Troupis, being duly sworn on oath, deposes and states: 
Second Supplemental Affidavit of Christ Troupis Re Memorandum ofCosts 1 
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1.	 I am the attorney for the Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants in this action. Each of the 
matters set forth herein are known to me ofmy own personal knowledge and if 
sworn as a witness in this matter, I could testify competently thereto. This Second 
Supplemental Affidavit is submitted in support ofPlaintiffs/Counterdefendants' 
Motion for Costs. 
2.	 Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants incurred costs for the transcript ofthe deposition of 
John Runft taken by the Counterc1aimants, in the sum of$196.40, and the sum of 
$369.60 for a transcript of the opening statements of counsel in the trial ofthis 
action. These costs are accurately set out on Exhibit A hereto, and should be 
allowed as mandatory costs. 
Dated: March 9, 2011 
State ofldaho ) 
) ss. 
County of Ada ) 
U1.JWjl..Dft£~
 
Notary Public 
My commission expires: lOt2D1 U 
Second Supplemental Affidavit of Christ Troupis Re Memorandum of Costs 2 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
 
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on this 9th day of March, 2011, I caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing Second Supplemental Affidavit of Christ Troupis re: Memorandum of 
Costs to be delivered via facsimile as follows: 
~--------------I 
I Connie W. Taylor 
Henderson Law Finn 
900 Washington S1. Suite 1020 
Vancouver, Washington 98660 
Facsimile: (360) 693-2911 
I 
, Mark Stephen Prusynski 
PO Box 829 
Boise, ID 83701 
Phone: (208) 345-2000 
Facsimile: (208) 385-5384 
Thomas G. Maile, IV. 
, 380 W. State Street 
I Eagle, Idaho 83616
 
Facsimile: (208) 939-1001
 
I ( )
 
I (X)
 
. ( ) 
( ) 
( ) 
(X) 
( ) 
( ) 
( ) 
(X) 
( ) 
I ( ) 
u. S. Mail I 
Facsimile Transmission 
Hand Delivery 
Overnight Delivery I 
I 
I 
U. S. Mail I 
Facsimile Transmission I 
Hand Delivery 
Overnight Delivery 
u. S. Mail 
Facsimile Transmission 
Hand Delivery 
Overnight Delivery 
Co-counsel for Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants 
Second Supplemental Affidavit of Christ Troupis Re Memorandum of Costs 3 
002456
 
 
 ) U
 
i t  )
)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
---'----
 
EXIDBITA 
2/112011 M&M Court Reporting - Transcript 
Deposition of John Runft 
$196.40 
2/112011 Frances Morris, CSR - Transcript 
Of Opening Statements at Trial 
$369.60 
Total $566.00 
Second Supplemental Affidavit of Christ Troupis Re Memorandum of Costs 4 002457
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111
 
---
No.~THOMAS G. MAILE, N. A.M. t:lLE. ___ 
Attorney at Law PM ­
380 West State Street MAR 112011 ­
Eagle, Idaho 83616 
CHRISTOPHER 0Telephone: (208) 939-1000 By STEPHANIE~/CH, Clerk 
Idaho State Bar No. 2378 DEPUTY IDAK 
Co-Counsel for Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an 
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G. 
MAILE, N. and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE, 
husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants, 
v. 
CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, flkla 
CONNIE TAYLOR, an individual; DALLAN 
TAYLOR, an individual; R. JOHN 
TAYLOR, an individual; CLARK and 
FEENEY, a partnership; PAUL T. CLARK, 
an individual; THEODORE L. JOHNSON 
REVOCABLE TRUST, an Idaho revocable 
trust; JOHN DOES I -JOHN DOES X; AND 
ALL PERSONS IN POSSESSION OR 
CLAIMING ANY RIGHT TO 
POSSESSION. 
Defendants/Counter-Claimants. 
Case No. CV-OC-0723232 
OBJECTION TO MOTION FOR 
COSTS BY TAYLORS AND TRUST 
COMES NOW, the Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants, by and through their co-counsel, 
Thomas G. Maile, N., and enters an objection to the application for costs and moves this 
Honorable Court pursuant to I.R.C.P. Rule 54(d)(6), for an entry ofit's Order denying the costs 
as set forth in the Memorandum of Costs submitted by the Taylors andlor The Theodore L. 
OBJECTION TO MOTION FOR COSTS - Pg 1 
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Johnson Revocable Trust, upon the grounds and for the reasons that there exists no basis in law 
or in fact for such an award, the amounts claimed are not allowed by the appropriate Idaho Rules 
of Civil Procedure. 
Idaho Law provides ample authority for the court to deny any request for costs by the 
Counter-claimants, The Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust, Dallan Taylor and R. John 
Taylor. Rule 68 of the I.R.C.P., which provides: 
Rule 68. Offer of Judgment 
(a) At any time more than 14 days before the trial begins, a party defending 
against a claim may serve upon the adverse party an offer to allow judgment to be 
taken against the defending party for the money or property or to the effect 
specified in the offer, which offer ofjudgment shall be deemed to include all 
claims recoverable, including any attorneys fees awardable under Rule 54(e)(I), 
and any costs awardable under Rule 54(d)(1), which have accrued up to the date­
of the offer ofjudgment.... 
If the adjusted award obtained by the offeree is less than the offer, then: 
(I) the offeree must pay those costs of the offeror as allowed under Rule 54(d)( 1), 
incurred after the making of the offer; 
(ii) the offeror must pay those costs of the offeree, as allowed under Rule 54(d)(l), 
incurred before the making of the offer; and 
(iii) the offeror shall not be liable for costs and attorney fees awardable under 
Rules 54(d)(1) and 54(e)(I) of the offeree incurred after the making of the offer. 
In the present matter the offer ofjudgment was served on the counter-claimants on 
November 16,2009. The amount of$55,000.00 was offered to all of the counter-claima.nts. The 
jury provided a verdict considerably below the offered amount. 
The appropriate standard for a court to determine an award of costs are set forth in 
LR.c.P. Rule 54(d)(1 ) which states: 
Rule 54(d)(1). Costs - Items allowed 
OBJECTION TO MOTION FOR COSTS - Pg 2 
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(A) Parties Entitled to Costs. Except when otherwise limited by these rules, costs 
shall be allowed as a matter of right to the prevailing party or parties, unless 
otherwise ordered by the court. 
(B) Prevailing Party. In determining which party to an action is a prevailing party 
and entitled to costs, the trial court shall in its sound discretion consider the 
finaljudgment or result ofthe action in relation to the reliefsought by the 
respective parties. The trial court in its sound discretion may determine that a 
party to an action prevailed in part and did not prevail in part, and upon so finding 
may apportion the costs between and among the parties in a fair and equitable 
manner after considering all of the issues and claims involved in the action and 
the resultant judgment or judgments obtained. 
(C) Costs as a Matter of Right. When costs are awarded to a party, such party shall 
be entitled to the following costs, actually paid, as a matter of right: 
1. Court filing fees. 
2. Actual fees for service of any pleading or document in the action whether 
served by a public officer or other person. 
3. Witness fees of$20.00 per day for each day in which a witness, other than a 
party or expert, testifies at a deposition or in the trial of an action. 
4. Travel expenses of witnesses who travel by private transportation, other than a 
party, who testify in the trial of an action, computed at the rate of $.30 per mile, 
one way, from the place of residence, whether it be within or without the state of 
Idaho; travel expenses of witnesses who travel other than by private 
transportation, other than a party, computed as the actual travel expenses of the 
witness not to exceed $.30 per mile, one way, from the place of residence of the 
witness, whether it be within or without the state of Idaho. 
8. Reasonable expert witness fees for an expert who testifies at a deposition or at a 
trial of an action not to exceed the sum of$2,000 for each expert witness for all 
appearances. 
9. Charges for reporting and transcribing of a deposition taken in preparation for 
trial of an action, whether or not read into evidence in the trial of an action. 
10. Charges for one (1) copy ofany deposition taken by any of the parties to the 
action in preparation for trial of the action. 
Notwithstanding the determination that a particular party is entitled to costs as a 
matter of right under this subparagraph (C) in an action, the trial court in its sound 
OBJECTION TO MOTION FOR COSTS - Pg 3 
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discretion may, upon proper objection, disallow any of the above described costs 
upon a finding that said costs were not reasonably incurred; were incurred for the 
purpose of harassment; were incurred in bad faith; or were incurred for the 
purpose of increasing the costs to any other party. The mere fact that a deposition 
is not used in the trial of an action, either as evidence read into the record or for 
the purposes of impeachment, shall not indicate that the taking of such deposition 
was not reasonable, or that a copy of a deposition was not reasonably obtained, or 
that the cost of the deposition should otherwise be disallowed, so long as its 
taking was reasonable in the preparation for trial in the action. 
(D) Discretionary Costs. Additional items of cost not enumerated in, or in an 
amount in excess of that listed in subparagraph (C), may be allowed upon a 
showing that said costs were necessary and exceptional costs reasonably incurred, 
and should in the interest ofjustice be assessed against the adverse party. The trial 
court, in ruling upon objections to such discretionary costs contained in the 
memorandum of costs, shall make express findings as to why such specific item 
of discretionary cost should or should not be allowed. In the absence of any 
objection to such an item of discretionary costs, the court may disallow on its own 
motion any such items of discretionary costs and shall make express findings 
supporting such disallowance. (Emphasis added) 
The Counter-defendants made their offer ofjudgment and the jury verdict did not come 
close to the amount offered. The Counter-defendants have previously provided their 
Memorandum Brief regarding the effects of the offer ofjudgment in the current matter and 
incorporate the same herein as an additional authority for their objections to the present 
Memorandum of Costs. 
The case ofPolk v. Larrabee, 135 Idaho 303, 17 P.3d 247 (Idaho 2000), provides 
authority that the offer ofjudgment is one of the considerations to be taken into account in 
determining who was the prevailing party. Additionally, the Counter-claimants were seeking in 
excess of One Million Dollars in damages and received a verdict for $28,000.00. The counter-
defendants were the prevailing parties. However, if the court determines otherwise, the 
following is provided as a basis for the objection to the proposed costs. The counter-claimants 
have improperly requested the following costs and the same should be denied: 
OBJECTION TO MOTION FOR COSTS - Pg 4 
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1.	 Graig Lewis' expenses for airport shuttle, tips, hotel, rental car are not authorized by Rule 
54 and no showing has been made that those expenses were necessary and an exceptional 
costs reasonably incurred as discretionary costs. 
2.	 Graig Lewis' time billed is combined with travel time and preparation time which makes 
it impossible to access what time is attributable to what activity some of which is not 
authorized by Rule 54. Furthermore no showing has been made that it was necessary and 
an exceptional costs reasonably incurred as discretionary costs. 
3.	 Graig Lewis' non court time is not authorized by Rule 54 and no showing has heen made 
that it was necessary and an exceptional costs reasonably incurred as discretionary costs. 
4.	 Graig Lewis' 999 miles are not supported by affidavit or other verified pleading and 
appears to be included in his billing at an hourly rate are not authorized by Rule 54 and 
furthermore no showing has been made that the expense was necessary and an 
exceptional costs reasonably incurred as discretionary costs. 
5.	 Bob DeBolt' time billed for travel and waiting of2/2/11 is not authorized by Rule 54 and 
no showing has been made that it was a necessary and an exceptional costs reasonably 
incurred as discretionary costs. 
6.	 Bob DeBolt' time billed for testimony is combined with travel of2/3/11 which makes it 
impossible to access what time is attributable to what activity. Travel time is not 
authorized by Rule 54 and no showing has been made that such time was necessary and 
an exceptional costs reasonably incurred as discretionary costs. 
7.	 John Taylor's travel expenses (not allowed as a party). 
That additional reasons for said objections are set forth in the Plaintiffs/Counter-
OBJECTION TO MOTION FOR COSTS - Pg 5 
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Defendants' Memorandum Brief in Opposition to Motion for Costs and Attorneys Fees and the 
Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants Memorandum in Support of Counter-Defendants' Motion for 
Costs and Opposition to Counter-claimants' Motion for Costs and Attorneys Fees filed herein 
and made a part hereof as if set forth in full herein. 
Hearing upon objection is requested. Oral argument is requested. 
DATED this P----day of March, 2011. 
THOMAS G. MAILE, IV., 
Co-counsel for Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants 
OBJECTION TO MOTION FOR COSTS - Pg 6 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on this ~y of March, 2011, I caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing (1) OBJECTION TO MOTION FOR COSTS to be delivered, addressed as 
follows: 
Connie W. Taylor & Paul Henderson 
Henderson Law Firm 
900 Washington S1. Suite l020 
Vancouver, Washington 98660 
Facsimile: (360) 693-2911 
Mark Stephen Prusynski
 
PO Box 829
 
Boise, ID 83701
 
Phone: (208) 345-2000
 
Facsimile: (208) 385-5384
 
Christ T. Troupis
 
TROUPIS LAW OFFICE
 
1299 E. Iron Eagle, Ste 130
 
PO Box 2408
 
Eagle, Idaho 83616
 
Facsimile: (208) 938-5482
 
() u. S. Mail 
(X) Facsimile Transmission 
() Hand Delivery 
() Overnight Delivery 
() u. S. Mail 
(X) Facsimile Transmission 
() Hand Delivery 
() Overnight Delivery 
() u. S. Mail 
(X) Facsimile Transmission 
() Hand Delivery 
() Overnight Delivery 
.... 
THOMAS G. MAILE, IV.,
 
Co-counsel for Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants
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THOMAS G. MAILE, IV. 
Attorney at Law 
380 West State Street 
Eagle, Idaho 83616 
Telephone: (208) 939-1000 
Idaho State Bar No. 2378 
Co-Counsel for Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants 
:. frlq~i;.~.
MAR 11 2011 
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By STEPHANIE VIDAK
 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
 
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an 
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G. 
MAILE, IV. and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE, 
husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants, 
v. 
CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, f/lc/a 
CONNIE TAYLOR, an individual; DALLAN 
TAYLOR, an individual; R. JOHN 
TAYLOR, an individual; CLARK and 
FEENEY, a partnership; PAUL T. CLARK, 
an individual; THEODORE L. JOHNSON 
REVOCABLE TRUST, an Idaho revocable 
trust; JOHN DOES I -JOHN DOES X; AND 
ALL PERSONS IN POSSESSION OR 
CLAIMING ANY RIGHT TO 
POSSESSION. 
Defendants/Counter-Claimants. 
Case No. CV-OC-0723232 
REPLY MEMORANDUM IN 
SUPPORT OF COUNTER­
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR 
COSTS AND REPLY TO 
OBJECTION TO MAILES' 
MEMORANDUM OF COSTS. 
The counter-defend,mts by and through their undersigned co-counsel of record, and 
provides this Reply Memorandum Brief in support of their Motion for Costs and in reply to 
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counter-claimants' Objection to Mailes' Memorandum of Costs: 
LEGAL ARGUMENT 
1	 The Counter-defendants properly tendered an offer of judgment on the counter­
claimants' claims regardless of the status of the counter-defendants' claims set forth 
in their complaint. 
The counter-claimants content that counter-defendants' offer ofjudgment was improper 
since it did not resolve all claims. Such an argument is misplaced. The authorities cited by the 
counter-claimants relate to cases involving multiple count complaints compromising the claims 
of the offeree. The counter-defendants did not limit their offer ofjudgment on any particular 
claim. At the time of the offer the counter-claimants advanced three (3) theories of relief. 
Sometime after the offer the counter-claimants withdrew the count relating to slander of title. 
The offer ofjudgment was directed entirely to the claims of the counter-claimants. 
Rule 68 of the LR.C.P., does not require that the offeror agree to dismiss their claims. 
The offer was made relating solely to the entire claims ofthe counter-claimants. The argument 
that the offer ofjudgment must resolve the entire case is a misreading of the Rule. The Rule is 
directed solely to the advancing party's claims. The affects of the service of an offer of 
judgment are set forth in Rule 68 of the LR.C.P., which provides: 
Rule 68. Offer of Judgment 
(a) At any time more than 14 days before the trial begins, a party defending 
against a claim may serve upon the adverse party an offer to allow judgment 
to be taken against the defending party for the money or property or to the 
effect specified in the offer, .... 
There is nothing in the Rule that requires a counter-defendant to abandon his or her 
REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR 
COSTS AND REPLY TO OBJECTION TO MAILES' MEMORANDUM OF COSTS- Pg 
2 
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claims in making an offer ofjudgment on a counter-claim. In fact Rule 68 only provides that a 
"party defending against a claim" and not a party defending against a claim and/or adv~mcing a 
claim. The Rule does not require a dismissal of a claim as a pre-requisite to a valid oUer of 
judgment by a "party defending against a claim" whether as a defendant or a counter-defendant. 
The offer ofjudgment was proper. 
2 The Counter-defendants properly tendered an offer of judgment on the counter­
claimants' claims. 
The Taylor Brothers as counter-claimants approved and signed the stipulation for 
dismissal of their co-counter-claimants' claims against the counter-defendants. The Taylor 
Brothers and their counsel Connie Taylor agreed to the dismissal ofthe counter-claim advanced 
by Clark & Feeney and Connie Taylor. The Taylor Brothers did so knowing that there was an 
offer ofjudgment which was served more than one year earlier. The Taylor Brothers did so 
knowing that Clark & Feeney and Connie Taylor admitted in their motion to dismiss that the 
claims were derivative. 
The Taylor Brothers now complain that the offer ofjudgment was invalid because it was 
made collectively to the counter-claimants as a whole. They knew ofthe existence ofthe offer of 
judgment when they agreed to the dismissal of their co-counterclaimants' action in December 
2010. The Taylor Brothers waived their argument by agreeing to dismiss claims that were 
derivative in nature to their claims. 
A stipulated dismissal with prejudice, entered before trial, acts as a final judgment just as 
if the parties had proceeded to trial. See Kawai Farms, Inc. v. Longstreet, 121 Idaho 610, 613-14, 
REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR 
COSTS AND REPLY TO OBJECTION TO MAILES' MEMORANDUM OF COSTS- Pg 
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826 P.2d 1322, 1325-26 (1992). Collateral issues that do not go to the merits of an action, 
including requests for costs and attorney fees, can be determined by the district court after 
termination or dismissal of the action. Inland Group ofCompanies, Inc. v. Obendorff, 131 Idaho 
473,475,959 P.2d 454, 456 (1998); see also Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 
394 (1990) (final judgment does not eliminate a court's jurisdiction to hear collateral issues). 
Straub v. Smith, No. 31955 (lDCCA). 
The amount awarded by the jury was far less than the offer ofjudgment. The dismissal of 
the Clark & Feeney, Connie Taylor claims by stipulation bars the Taylor Brothers from asserting 
any alleged defects in the offer ofjudgment. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons above cited the counter-defendants are entitled to their costs as of 
November 16, 2009 through the present. The counter-claimants are only allowed their costs prior 
to November 16, 2009 relating to their claims set forth in their counter-claims. 
ORAL ARGUMENT is requested upon the motion. 
DATED thisLtrday of March, 2011. ~E'N'
Co-Counsel for Plaintiffs/Counter­
Defendants 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on thi.l () day of March, 2011, I caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF COUNTER­
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR COSTS AND REPLY TO OBJECTION TO MAILES' 
MEMORANDUM OF COSTS, to be delivered, addressed as follows: 
Connie W. Taylor & Paul Henderson () U. S. Mail 
Henderson Law Finn (X) Facsimile Transmission 
900 Washington St. Suite 1020 () Hand Delivery 
Vancouver, Washington 98660 () Overnight Delivery 
Facsimile: (360) 693-2911 
Mark Stephen Prusynski () u. S. Mail 
PO Box 829 (X) Facsimile Transmission 
Boise, ID 83701 () Hand Delivery 
Phone: (208) 345-2000 () Overnight Delivery 
Facsimile: (208) 385-5384 
Christ T. Troupis () U. S. Mail 
TROUPIS LAW OFFICE (X) Facsimile Transmission 
1299 E. Iron Eagle, Ste 130 () Hand Delivery 
PO Box 2408 () Overnight Delivery 
Eagle, Idaho 83616 
Facsimile: (208) 938-5482 
THOMAS G. AIL, N., 
Co-Counsel for ntiffs/Counter-
Defendants 
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Mark S. Prusynski, ISB No. 2349 
MOFFATT, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK & 
FIELDS, CHARTERED 
101 S. Capitol Blvd., 10th Floor 
Post Office Box 829 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone (208) 345-2000 
Facsimile (208) 385-5384 
msp@moffatt.com 
17136.0306 
Attomeys for Defendants/Counterclaimants 
Connie Wright Taylor fka Connie Taylor, 
Clark and Feeney, and Paul T. Clark 
MAR I 1 2011 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Cieri< 
By PATRICIAA. DWONCH 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
 
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an 
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G. 
MAILE, IV, and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE, 
husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants, 
YS. 
CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, fka COJ\Jl'fIE 
TAYLOR, an individual; DALLAN 
TAYLOR, an individual; R. JOHN TAYLOR, 
an individual; CLARK and FEENEY, a 
partnership; PAUL T. CLARK, an individual; 
THEODORE L. JOHNSON REVOCABLE 
TRUST, an Idaho revocable trust; JOHN 
DOES I-JOHN DOES X; AND ALL 
PERSONS IN POSSESSION OR CLAIMING 
ANY RIGHT TO POSSESSION, 
Defendants/Counterclaimants. 
Case No. CV-OC-0723232 
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Defendants, Connie Wright Taylor fka Connie Taylor, Clark and Feen,;:y, and 
Paul T. Clark, filed a Memorandum of Costs and Fees, to which plaintiffs objected. In their 
objection, dated February 18,2011, plaintiffs argue that the attorney fees incurred by the lawyers 
are derivative of the fees incurred by the Taylors in defending themselves and pursuing their 
counterclaim. 
In their objection of February 24,2011, plaintiffs argue that their claims of fraud 
on the court, damages and perjury were not pursued frivolously, unreasonably, or without 
foundation. Plaintiffs memorandum goes on to reargue its claims that it lost, and also argues 
that the Court was incorrect in granting defendants' summary judgment and denying plaintiffs' 
motion to reconsider the summary judgment. Plaintiffs assert that they had a reasonable basis for 
bringing an independent action against the attorneys in an attempt to set aside the "Judgment on 
Beneficiaries' Claims" that had been entered by Judge Wilper. 
Plaintiffs' argument is reminiscent of the argument made by the plainti ff in Burns 
1'. Baldwin, 138 Idaho 480, 65 P.3d 502 (2003). Mr. Bums had also attempted to collaterally 
attack a California judgment on the basis that it was void and rendered without jurisdiction. The 
fact that "Bums is a lawyer" was noted by the Supreme Court. 138 Idaho at 483. Burns' attempt 
to void the judgment was rejected by the district court on the basis that the original judgment was 
res judicata. The court awarded attorney fees under Idaho Code Section 12-121. The Supreme 
Court affirmed the attorney fee award, citing Cole v. Kunzler, 115 Idaho 552, 768 P.2d 815 (Ct. 
App. 1989), the case cited by the undersigned counsel in the Memorandum of Costs and Fees in 
this case. 
REPLY BRIEF RE MEMORANDUM OF COSTS AND 
ATTORNEY FEES - 2 Client: 1971 058 1 
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Mr. Maile is also an attorney. Mr. Maile also should know that his claims were 
barred by res judicata. His inability to explain with any type of cogent argument why this 
lawsuit against the attorneys who represented the Taylors raised any new issues from those that 
were tried to Judge Wilper, justifies a finding that the case was brought without foundation. 
Mr. Maile's repetition of the same claims that were rejected by Judge Wilper supports a finding 
that this lawsuit was brought frivolously and unreasonably. His subpoenas of Connie Taylor and 
her paralegal support a finding that the claim was brought to harass the attorneys and distract 
them from their representation of their clients. Mr. Maile's repeated litigation of the same issues, 
the jury's verdict of abuse of process and the Burns v. Baldwin and Cole v. Kunzler cases all 
support an award of attorney fees under Idaho Code Section 12-121. 
At the end of their February 24 memorandum, plaintiffs claim that the attorney 
fees that are being claimed are somehow barred by the prosecution of the counterclaim for abuse 
of process. This argument is not supported by the facts or logic. The undersigned counsel 
defended the claims against the attorneys and withdrew from the case after the summary 
judgment was entered. The summary judgment decision deferred a decision on costs and fees 
until the conclusion of the case. The undersigned counsel was forced to reappear in the case 
when plaintiffs filed a motion to reconsider the summary judgment and again when plaintiffs 
subpoenaed Clark and Feeney's paralegal. Connie Taylor and Clark and Feeney dismissed their 
counterclaim, so no fees were incurred in pursuit of their counterclaim against the plaintiffs. 
Finally, plaintiffs argue that the attorneys were not the prevailing party because 
plaintiffs made an offer ofjudgment in excess of the jury verdict. This argument is copied from 
plaintiffs' memorandum in support of their costs and fees. The offer of judgment was made 
November 16, 2009. Summary judgment had been granted July 16,2009, reserving costs and 
REPLY BRIEF RE MEMORANDUM OF COSTS AND 
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fees to the conclusion of the case. Clearly, Connie Taylor, Clark and Feeney and Paul T. Clark 
prevailed on all claims against them. The offer of judgment of $55,000 specifically included all 
the counterclaims and "any and all attorney fees and costs which could be ordered relating to the 
complaint in the pending action ...." The offer of judgment, made after the claims had been 
dismissed, could not transfornl the losers into the prevailing parties. Plaintiffs clearly lost their 
claims against the attorneys before they made the offer ofjudgment. The Court should exercise 
its discretion and award attorney fees under Idaho Code Section 12-121. The award of attorney 
fees should be added to the $28,000 judgment on the counterclaim and considered along with the 
summary judgment against the plaintiffs in determining that plaintiffs were clearly not the 
prevailing parties in this case. 
DATED this ;!.PCday of March, 2011. 
MOFFATT, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK & 
FIELDS, CHARTERED 
~~"1. / /(/ /.
By ~ ./ "7" 
Mark . Prusynski - Of the irm 
Attorneys for Defendants/Counterclaimants 
Connie Wright Taylor fka Connie Taylor, 
Clark and Feeney, and Paul T. Clark 
REPLY BRIEF RE MEMORANDUM OF COSTS AND 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this -l!.dday of March, 2011, I caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing REPLY BRIEF RE MEMORANDUM OF COSTS AND 
ATTORNEY FEES to be served by the method indicated below, and addressed to the 
following: 
Thomas G. Maile IV ( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
LA W OFFICES OF THOMAS G MAILE IV, P.A. ( ) Hand Delivered 
380 W. State St. ( ) Overnight Mail 
Eagle, ID 83616-4902 ( l'Facsimile 
Facsimile (208) 939-1001 
Christ T. Troupis ( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
TROUPIS LAW OFFICE, PA ( ) Hand Delivered 
P.O. Box 2408 
Eagle,ID 83616 
( ) Overnight Mail(1Facsimile 
Facsimile (208) 938-5482 
John C. Mitchell ( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
CLARK & FEENEY ( ) Hand Delivered 
1229 Main St., Suite 201 ( ) Overnight Mail 
P.O. Box 285 ( Jlfacsimile 
Lewiston,ID 83501-0285 
Facsimile (208) 746-9160 
Connie W. Taylor ( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
HENDERSON LAW ( ) Hand Delivered 
900 Washington, Suite 1020 ( ) Overnight Mail 
Vancouver, WA 98660 (;f Facsimile 
Facsimile (360) 693 -2911 
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Christ T. Troupis, ISB # 4549 
TROUPIS LAW OFFICE 
1299 E. Iron Eagle, Ste 130 
PO Box 2408 
Eagle, Idaho 83616 
Telephone: 208/938-5584 
Facsimile: 208/938-5482 
Email: ctroupis@troupislaw.com 
Co-counsel for Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
 
~ERKSHlRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an 
· Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G. 
MAILE, IV. and COLLEEN BIRCH­
• MAILE, husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants, 
Iv. 
I CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, f/k/a 
CONNIE TAYLOR, an individual; DALLAN 
· TAYLOR, an individual; R. JOHN 
! TAYLOR, an individual; CLARK and 
FEENEY, a partnership; PAUL T. CLARK, 
an individual; THEODORE L. JOHNSON 
• REVOCABLE TRUST, an Idaho revocable 
I trust; JOHN DOES I -JOHN DOES X; AND 
! ALL PERSONS IN POSSESSION OR 
I 
CLAIMING ANY RIGHT TO
 
POSSESSION.
 
, 
I Defendants/Counter-Claimants. 
Case No. CV-OC-0723232 
REPLY MEMORANDUM IN 
SUPPORT OF COUNTER­
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR 
COSTS AND OPPOSITION TO 
COUNTER-CLAIMANTS' 
MOTION FOR COSTS ANI> 
ATTORNEYS FEES AND COSTS 
Counter-defendants, by and through their undersigned co-counsel of record, provides this 
Reply Memorandum in support of their Motion for Costs and in opposition to counter-claimants' 
motion for costs and attorneys fees: 
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LEGAL ARGUMENT 
1. The Plaintiffs/Counter-defendants advanced proper legal argumellits which 
were supported by the facts and law. 
Counter-claimants, Connie Taylor, and Clark & Feeney are requesting costs and 
attorneys fees under I. C. § 12-121 because this Court found that Plaintiffs' claims were barred by 
res judicata. However, the evidence presented at the trial on the Taylor claims proved that the 
Mailes had facts and legal argument supporting their claims. Even though the Court n~jected 
those claims, they were not pursued frivolously 
Counterdefendants asserted a claim properly raised under I.R.C.P. Rule 60(b) to set aside 
the prior judgment, as well as a claim for damages, predicated upon facts that supported their 
claim that Taylors engaged in criminal behavior and/or fraud in obtaining the judgment. Claims 
brought under I.R.C.P. 60(b) are not barred by res judicata because they are one of thE: 
recognized "avenues ... for attacking a judgment." Waller v. State, Dept. o/Health and Welfare, 
146 Idaho 234,192 P.3d ]058 (Idaho 2008), Davis v. Parrish, ]3] Idaho 595, 599, 96] P.2d 
1] 98, ]202 (1998). The fact that this Court disagreed with Plaintiffs/Counter-defendants' 
argument and authority does not render them frivolous. 
Plaintiffs also advanced the argument that they did not suffer any damages until the entry 
of the "Judgment on Beneficiaries' Claims" and that as a result, res judicata did not apply to bar 
their lawsuit. Claim preclusion does not arise if a valid cause of action could not have been 
brought because it was not ripe for adjudication during the prior action. Idaho First Nat!' Bank 
v. Bliss Valley Foodr;, Inc., 12] Idaho 266, 283-84,824 P.2d 841,858-59 (1991). In Reis v. Cox, 
]04 Idaho 434, 438,660 P.2d 46 (1982), the Court stated: 
REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' MOTION 
FOR COSTS AND OPPOSITION TO COUNTER-CLAIMANTS' MOTION FOR COSTS 
AND ATTORNEYS FEES AND COSTS - Pg 2 
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The time when a cause of action accrues may be a question of law or a question of 
fact, depending upon whether any disputed issues of material fact exist. Where 
there is no dispute over any issue of material fact regarding when the cause of 
action accrues, the question is one of law for determination by the court. 
The date that a cause of action accrues may be a question of fact or law. Jemmet v. 
McDonald, 136 Idaho 277, 279, 32 P.3d 669, 671 (2001). Although this Court disagreed with 
Plaintiffs, their argument that a cause of action had not accrued because they had not yet 
sustained damages was a legitimate argument, and not frivolous. 
Finally there was nothing frivolous concerning the Plaintiffs/Counter-defendants' motion 
to reconsider the Court's Order regarding the entry of Summary Judgment based upon newly 
developed case law in Taylor v. McNichols, 36130, 36131 (IDSCCI) (2010). The Taylor, supra, 
decision states: 
Therefore, we conclude that a cause of action against one party's opponent's 
attorney in litigation, based on conduct the attorney committed in the course of 
that litigation, may not be properly instituted prior to the resolution of that 
litigation, even where the allegedly aggrieved party believes that the attorney in 
question has been acting outside the legitimate scope of representation and solely 
for his own benefit. Under this same reasoning, the allegations of aiding and 
abetting in the commission of tortious acts, although marginally pled, must await 
resolution of the underlying case. Until the underlying case is resolved a court 
cannot detennine whether any tortious act was committed, let alone acts 
constituting the aiding and abetting of those alleged tortious acts. 
The plaintiffs/counter-defendants advanced reasoned factual and legal arguments in light 
of the Taylor, supra, decision. The Taylor decision certainly does not make the application of 
res judicata blatantly apparent in the present case. 
If litigants an: required to await the conclusion of an underlying case before bringing a 
suit against an opposing lawyer relating to the commission of criminal behavior and/or fraud 
REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF COUNTER-DEFENDANTS' 
MOTION FOR COSTS AND OPPOSITION TO COUNTER-CLAIMANTS' 
MOTION FOR COSTS AND ATTORNEYS FEES AND COSTS - Pg 3 
002477
 
l
 
 
 
 
won't all such suits be subject to res judicata? Clearly the Idaho Supreme Court could not have 
intended that result in its Taylor decision. Based upon these facts, and the arguments and law 
previously submitted, Defendant/Counter-claimants' motion for costs and attorneys fees should 
be denied. 
DATED this 11h day of March, 2011. 
~'12 
CHRIST T. TROU~-----
Co-counsel for Counter-Defendants 
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copy of the foregoing (1) REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF COUNTER­
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR COSTS AND OPPOSITION TO COUNTER-CLAIMANTS' 
MOTION FOR COSTS AND ATTORNEYS FEES AND COSTS, to be delivered, addressed as 
follows: 
~ ~onnie W. Taylor ( ) U. S. Mail 
Henderson Law Finn (i.) Facsimile Transmission I ! I 
· 900 Washington S1:. Suite 1020 ; ( ) Hand Delivery 
I Vancouver, Washington 98660 ( ) Overnight Delivery I i 
· Facsimile: (360) 693-2911 
Mark Stephen Prusynski : ( ) U. S. Mail 
PO Box 829 (;g,) Facsimile Transmission 
Boise, ID 83701 ( ) Hand Delivery 
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· 380 W. State Street ( ) Facsimile Transmission 
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NO. 
FILED ::?~A.M. ,--__P.M..a-~ 
MAR 16 2011 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk 
CONNIE W. TAYLOR 
By ABBY W\RDEf\I 
G!Of'UTY 
HENDERSON LAW FIRM, PLLC 
900 Washington Street. Suite 1020 
Vancouver, WA 98660 
360.699.1530 
ISBA No. 4837 
Attorneys for Counter-defendants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
 
BERKSHIRE n~VESTMENTS, LLC, an, 
Idaho limited li~lbility, and THOMAS G. 
MAILE, IV, and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE 
husband and wife" 
Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants, 
vs. 
CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, et a1 
Defendants/Counter-claiman.ts. 
Case No. CV OC 0723232 
SECOND SUPPLEMENTAL OBJECTION 
TO MAILES' MEMORANDUM OF 
COSTS 
The Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust, by and through its trustees Dallan Taylor and 
R. John Taylor, pursuant to LR.C.P. 54(d)(6) file this SECOND SUPPLEMENTAL objection to 
the costs addressed in the Troupis Affidavit datcd March 9, 2011. The arguments that the 
Mailes are not entitled to any costs at all, which are contained in the Objection to Mailes' 
Memorandum of Costs, are incorporated by rcference. 
SECOND SUPPLEMENTAL OBJECTION 
TO MATLES'MEMO OF COSTS 
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1.	 The costs requested in the second supplemental Troupis affidavit should be 
disallowed. 
The detennination of costs is len to the sound discretion of the district court. Idaho 
Department ofHea.lth and Welfare v. Sourlifork Lumber Co., 123 Tdaho 146, 149, 845 P.2d 564, 
567 (1993). 
Tn the Sec(md Supplemental Affidavit, Troupis claims that the cost of the transcript of 
John Runft ($196.40) and the cost of $369.60 for a transcript of opening statements are 
"mandatory costs.'" 
The cost of the John Runft deposition transcript should not be allowed, as the Mailes 
were not the prevailing party and the offcr of judgment was ineffective for the reasons discussed 
in the prior briefing. 
The cost of the transcript of the opening statements is not a mandatory cost under Rule 
54(d)(l)(C), which allows the recovery of the cost of transcribing depositions only. Therc is no 
refeTence to transcripts of any other kind. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, the Countcrclaimants respectfully request that this Court 
enter an order specifically disallowing the costs requested in Christ Troupis' affidavits datcd 
March 9, 2011. 
DATED this 15th day of March, 2011. 
SECONDSVPPLEMBNTAL OBJECTION 
TO MAILES'MEMO OF COSTS 
2 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 15th day ofMarch, 2011, I caused to be served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed to the 
following: 
Thomas G. Maile, IV	 U.S. Mail
 
I-land Delivered
380 West State Street Overnight MailEagle,ID 83616 FAX (208) 939-100] 
Mr. Christ Troupis	 U.S. Mail 
Attorney at Law	 Hand Delivered 
PO Box 2408	 Overnight Mail 
Eagle, TD 83616	 FAX (208) 938-5482 
Mark Prusynski	 U.S. Mail 
Hand DeliveredMOFFATT THOMAS Overnight Mail 101 S Capitol Blvd., lOth Floor FAX (108) 385-5384 
PO Box, 829 email 
Boise, LD 83701 
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CONNIE W. TAYLOR ~~ 
HENDERSON LAW FIRM~ PLLC 
900 Washington Street, Suite 1020 
Vancouver, WA 98660 
360.699.1530 
ISBA No. 4837 
Attorneys for Cmmter-claimants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
 
BERKSHIRE n-JVESTMENTS, LLC, an 
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G. 
MAILE, IV, and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE 
husband and wifi~. 
PlaintiffsfCounter-Defendants, 
VS. 
CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, et al 
Defendants/Counter-claimants. 
Case No. CV OC 0723232 
TAYLORS' REPLY MEMORANl[)UM 
RE: MEMORANDA OF COSTS 
The Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust, by and through its trustees Dallan Taylor and 
R. Jol1n Taylor, fll e this responsive brief relative to the parties' memoranda of costs. 
I. MAILES ARE BOUND BY THE STIPULAnON RESERVING THE ISSUE OF 
COSTS AND F.EES IN DEFENDING AGAINST THEIR CLAIMS 
In their various briefs, the Mailes have failed to acknowledge, let alone address, the fact that 
the Stipulation to Dismiss the counterclaims of the Clark and Feeney defendants specifically 
stated "The parties understand and agree that this dismissal will not preclude Clark and Feeney 
REPLY MEMORANDUM RE: 
MEMOS OF COSTS 
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from requesting that the Court award fees and costs for defending the claims of the Plaintiffs at 
the conclusion of this litigation. "I Mailes are not only ignoring that language, they are now 
claiming that the Clark and Feeney defendants are barred from seeking a detennination on that 
very issue, and that the stipulation acts as some sort of waiver by the Taylors. In essence, they 
are asking that th~:ir own Stipulation not he enforced. 
Stipulations for the settlement of litigation are regarded with favor by the courts and will be 
enforced unless good cause to the contrary is shown. Lawrence v. Hutchinson, 146 Idaho 892, 
204 P.3d 532 (Idaho App., 2009) citing Kohring v. Robertson, 137 Idaho 94, 99,44 P.3d 1149, 
1154 (2002); Young Electric Sign Co. v. Winder, 135 Idaho 804, 808, 25 P.3d 117,121 (2001). 
An agreement entered into in good faith in order to settle adverse claims is binding upon the 
parties, and absent a showing of fraud, duress or undue influence, is enforceable eith~:r at law or 
in equity. Lawrence v. Hutchinson, supra, citing Young Electric Sign Co., 135 Idaho at 808, 25 
P.3d at 121; Wflson v. Bogert, 81 Idaho 535, 542, 347 P.2d 341,345 (1959). 
The facts in this case are clearly distinguishable from those in Magic Valley Radiology 
Associates, P.A. v. ProfeSSional Businss Services, Inc. 2 In Magic Valley, the Supreme Court 
reversed an order awarding fees to the plaintiff, finding the defense was not privolotls because 
the defendant (PBS) had prevailed on its cross-claim, defended against the claim of punitive 
damages, and obtained a reversal and remand by the Supreme Court of the initial judgment. In 
this case, the Counter-defendants have not won a single issue. 
I Stipulatio!:l to Dismiss Counterclaim of Clark and Feeney Dcfcmdants dated November 30) 2010, page 2 
2 J 19 Idaho 558, 808 P.2d 1303 (1991), cited in Troul';~' February 23, 2011 Memorandum, page 12-13 
REPLY MEMORANDUM RE: 
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The Mailes must be bound to the stipulation in which they acknowledged and agreed that 
the issue of fees and costs to the Clark and Feeney defendants was being reserved. Furthermore, 
Mr. Maile acknowledges in his own briefing that under Idaho law, requests for costs and attorney 
fees can be detennined by the district court after the dismissal of an action.~ 
II. Offer of jUdgment 
The Mailes' offer ofjudgment is a prime example of the type ofpiecemeallitigatil)n Rule 68 
1S designed to prevent. The offer was not, as argued by the Mailes,4 limited to the 
Counterclaims. The offer addressed both the counterclaims and a portion of the MaBes' action, 
costs and fees, while specifi,cally reserving the right to appeal the decision dismis.sing those 
claims.5 It was not a resolution of all claims. 
There is no merit to Maj]e~' claim that the Taylors waived any argument that the offer of 
judgment was invalid by agreeing to the dismissal of the C&F defendants' counterchJlims. That 
stipulation did not mention the offer of ju.dgment, there is no rational argument that the two are 
connected, and Mailes cite no authority for this assertion. 
Because LR.C.P. 68 requires that the court take any costs and fees into account in 
determining whether the "adjusted award" exceeds the offer, a ruling on the Clark and Feeney 
Defendants' tequ~~ts for costs and fees for its defense of the Mailes' claims is a prerequisite to 
determining whether the cost-shifting mechanism of Ri.de 68 applies in this case. 
3 Maile Reply Memorandum dated March 10, 20 II, page 4 
4 March 10. 2010 Reply Mcmorandu.m, page 2 
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III.Misstatements as to trial testimony and court rulings 
In their briefu1g, the Mailes and their counsel have made statements which are not accurate. 
Although those arguments go primarily to the question of whether the Clark and Feeney 
defendants should be awarded attorney fees for theMailes.frivolous suit, they will be addressed 
in this memorand.um because counsel for Clark and Feeney was not present at the lrial and is 
thus unable to respond to those assertions. 
A.	 The MaBes, once again, fail to acknowledge, recognize, or discuss the fa::::t that the 
probate petition upon which all their arguments are based was amended well over a year 
prior to the filing of the Amended Complaint which they claim constituted a "fraud on 
the court.'~1 John Taylor testified to this amendment at the trial, and John Runft testified 
that the Mailes had not disclosed this amendment when he fonned his opinion in the case. 
Runft also testified that, under the law, the amended petition completely replaced the 
initial petition. Both Thomas and Colleen Maile were forced to admit that their briefing 
to the Idaho Supreme Court did not disclose the amendment and that they objected to the 
record incl.uding the amendment. 
S.	 The Mailes inexplicably state that John Runft's testimony (that the Taylors' standing was 
predicated solely on their position as Trustees) was unrebutted. 6 In reality, John Taylor 
testified at length as to the meaning of the Disclaimer Agreement, the intent of the parties 
who enter,ed into that agreement, and the fact that the Taylors retained their status as 
beneficiaries relating to the claim against the Mailes. In addition, Mr. Runft's tortured 
effort to twist the Disclaimer Agreement in a way that would remotely support the 
MaHes' conduct was inherently unbelievable. It required one to completely ignore the 
plain language of the agreement, which contained repeated references to the 'Taylors as 
"beneficiaries," and to read language into the S. Ct. decision in Taylor II that simply was 
not there. 
5 Maile filed a Notice of Appeal of the dismissal ofhis action, among many other issues, on M~~rch 7, 2011. 
Ii Troupis Ml:1nOrandllm dated Febmary 23, 2011, page 13 
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C.	 The Maile;:s point to John Runfi's opinions as the sole support for the "reasonableness" of 
their Complaint, yet their own attorney's affidavit7 shows that Mr. Runft was not retained 
until June of 2010, nearly two and one half years after the Complaint was filed. Neither 
of the Mailes testified that their Complaint was based on a theory that the rights the 
Taylors retained were only as trustees, rather than as beneficiaries as clearly stated in the 
Disclaimer Agreement. 
D.	 Mailes argue that "the merits of the Mailes' factual claims were not seriously challenged 
by Taylors at Trial."!! This is just blatantly false. John Taylor testified that the Taylors 
retained their rights as beneficiaries, that the initial probate petition containc:'d an error 
which was corrected in an amended petition long before the Supreme Court decision in 
Taylor I. and that he never lied to the court, committed a fraud on the court, or lengaged in 
racketeering. 
£.	 Mailes erroneously state that the court ruled that "there could be no abuse of process 
prior to January 2009 since the appellate court did not rule upon the appeali untit that 
date." In fact. this Court ru.led iliat the damages for wrongful interference CQrnmenced 
on that date. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, the Counterclaimants respectfully request that this Court 
enter an order finding that the Taylors were prevailing parties, granting the mandatory and 
discretionary costs requested by the Taylors, and specifically disaJtowing the costs requested by 
the Mailes. 
DATED this __ day of March, 2011. 
AWFIRM,PLLC 
/~-~ 
I
( 
'
/ 
Cocl,ie nght T'YIO;j,;;~~ 
Counterc1aimants L~-) 
7 Runft billing attached to Troupis Affidavit dated February 23,2011
 
8 February 23, 2011 memo ofTrol.lpts, page 14
 
REPLY MEMORANDUM RE: 
MEMOS OF COSTS 
5 
002487
 
m
2
 
,
 
,
E  '·
l
, 1
tful1
.
l
    
  
fi
is  
i  
03/22/2011 11:57 35059("' g HORENSTEI N LA\<' PAGE 07/07
..........
 
'-' 
CERTIFlCATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 2nd day of March, 2011 I caused to be served a true lind com~ct copy of 
the foregoing documemt by thc method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
Thomas G. Maile, TV U.S. Mail
 
380 West State Strel~ Hand Delivered
 
Eagle, lD 83616 Overnight Mail
 
FAX (208) 939-1001 
Mr. Christ Troupis U.S,Mail
 
Attomey at Law Hand Delivered
 
PO Box 2408 Ovemight Mail
 
Eagle, TO 83616 FAX (208) 938-5482
 
Mark Prusynski U.S. Mail
 
MOFFAIT THOMAS Hand Delivered
 
101 S Capitol Blvd., loth Floor Overnight Mail
 
PO Box 829 FAX (208) 385-5384
 
Boise, ID 83701
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. onnie Tayl.;-- I ' -\ 
Attorney for Counterclai~ ) 
REPLYMEMORANDUM RE: 
MEMOS OF COSTS 
6 
002488
 
 
 
 
a
O
 
i.  
  
 
 
 
.  
 
rn  
 
 
 
 
 
i ~J .. -. 
___ 
A.rvJ·--qW~PM. _ 
MAR 2 ~ 2011 MAR 24 2011 
Ada County C:e(;(
CHRi "./OPHEH D. RICH, Clerk 
ny LAAAAMESORIGINAL 
DEPUTY 
Mark S. Prusynski, ISB No. 2349 
MOFFATT, THOMAS, BARRETT, Roc 1<. & 
FIELDS, CHP,RTERED 
101 S. Capitol Blvd., 10th Floor 
Post Office Box 829 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone (208) 345-2000 
Facsimile (208) 38:5-5384 
msp@moffatLcom 
17136.0306 
Attorneys for Defendants/Counterc1aimants 
Connie Wright Taylor fka Connie Taylor, 
Clark and Feeney, and Paul T. Clark 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an 
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G. 
MAILE, IV, and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE, 
husband and wife, 
Plainti ffs/Counterdefendants, 
VS. 
CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, fka CO],{]~]E 
TAYLOR, an individual; DALLAN 
TA YLOR, an individual; R. JOHN TAYLOR, 
an individual; CLARK and FEENEY, a 
partnership; PAUL T. CLARK, an individual; 
THEODORE L. JOHNSON REVOCABLE 
TRUST, an Idaho revocable trust; JOHN 
DOES I-JOHN DOES X; AND ALL 
PERSONS IN POSSESSION OR CLAIMING 
ANY RIGHT TO POSSESSION, 
Defendants/Counterclaimants. 
Case No. CV-OC-0723232 
SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT OF 
MARK S. PRUSYNSKI REGARDING 
FEES AND COSTS 
SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT OF MARK S. PRUSYNSKI 
REGARDING FEES AND COSTS - 1 Client 19837831 002489
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STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
County of Ada ) 
Mark S. Pmsynski, having been duly sworn upon oath, deposes and states as 
follows: 
1. I am the attorney of record for the attorney defendants in this lawsuit. I 
make this affidavit based upon my own personal knowledge and review of my firm's records in 
support of the Memorandum of Costs and Fees I previously filed. 
2. Up until the time that plaintiffs served their Offer of Judgment on 
November 16,2009, I had incurred $34,854.50 in fees. Up until November 16,2009, I had 
incun-ed $193.91 in costs. 
3. The remaining attorney fees and costs set forth in my original 
Memorandum of Costs and Fees were incurred after the Offer of Judgment in order to respond 
plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration of the Court's summary judgment and other issues 
concerning the defense of the attorney-defendants, as set forth in my Memorandum of Costs and 
Fees. 
Further your affiant sayeth naught. 
SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT OF MARK S. PRUSYNSKI 
REGARDING FEES AND COSTS - 2 Client: 1983783.1 002490
, ~. ------,---
_of 
·
. 1 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this~ayof March, 2011. 
NOTARY UBLIC FOR IDAHO 
Residing at Boise, Idaho 
My Commission Expires October 14, 2016 
SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT OF MARK S. PRUSYNSKI 
REGARDING FEES AND COSTS - 3 Client: 1983783.1 
002491
 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 2.;jday of March, 2011, I caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT OF MARK S. PRUSYNSKI 
REGARDING FEES AND COSTS to be served by the method indicated below, and addressed 
to the following: 
Thomas G. Maile IV 
LAW OFFICES OF THOMAS G MAILE IV, P.A. 
380 W. State St. 
Eagle, ID 83616-4902 
Facsimile (208) 939-1001 
Christ T. Troupis 
TROUPIS LAW OFFICE, PA 
P.O. Box 2408 
Eagle,ID 83616 
Facsimile (208) 938-5482 
John C. Mitchell 
CLARK & FEENEY 
1229 Main St., Suite 201 
P.O. Box 285 
Lewiston,ID 83501-0285 
Facsimile (208) 746-9160 
Connie W. Taylor 
HENDERSON LAW 
900 Washington, Suite 1020 
Vancouver, WA 98660 
Facsimile (360) 693-2911 
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( 0Facsimile 
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( -1 Facsimile 
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
(0Facsimile 
( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( )::>vernight Mail(0' Facsimile 
Mark S. rusynski 
SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT OF MARK S. PRUSYNSKI 
REGARDING FEES AND COSTS - 4 Client:19837831 002492
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THOMAS G. MAU,E, IV. 
Attol11cy at Law 
380 West State Street 
Eagle, Idaho 83616 
Telephone: (208) 939-1000 
Idaho State Bar No. 2378 
Co-counsel for Plaintiffs/CotU1ter~Defendants 
TN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an 
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G. 
MAILE, IV. and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE, 
husband and wife, 
Plaintifrs/Counter-Defendants, 
v. 
CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, f/kla. 
CONNIE TAYLOR, an lndividual; DALLAN 
TAYLOR, an individual; R. JOHN 
TAYLOR, an individual; CLARK and 
FEENEY, a partn<:t'ship; PAUL T. CLARK, 
an individual; THEODORE L. JOHNSON 
REVOCABLE TRUST, an Idaho revocable 
trust; JOHN DOES I -JOHN DOES X; AND 
ALL PERSONS TI"l POSSESSION OR 
CLAIMING ANY RIGHT TO 
POSSESSION. 
Defendants/Counter-Claimants. 
Case No. CV-OC-0723232 
MEMORANDUM BRIEFRE: 
SUPPLEMENTAl.. AFFIDAVJlT OF 
MARK S. PRUSYNSKI 
REGARDING FEES AND COSTS 
The Plaintiffs/Counter-defendants by and through their co-counsel ofrecord provide this 
Me.t:norandum BriefRe: Supplemental Affida.vit of Mark S. Prusynski Regarding Fees and Costs 
as follows. 
MEMORANDUM BRIEF RE: SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT OF MARK S. 
PRUSYNSKI REGARDING F.EES AND COSTS - Pg 1 
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-
The Plaintiffs/Counter-defendants have previously briefed and provided approprialte law 
to justify the court in concluding the claims of the plaintiffs were not frivolous thus barring the 
award ofattorney fees and costs to Clark & Feeney and Connie Taylor. However, without 
waiving such position, the Plaintiffs/Counter-defendants provide the following. 
Counter-ClaImant's, Connie Taylor, Clark and Feeney and Paul T. Clark, filed th(~ir 
Amended Answer and Counter-Claim on March 13,2009. Counsel for Plaintiffs/Counter-
Defendants served an Offer of Judgment on November 16, 2009 in the above matter in the 
amount of$S5,OOO.OO. During the time period between the filing ofthe two pleadings, Counter­
Claitnant's attorney asserts attorney fee's in the amount of$8,827.50 and costs in the amount of 
$25.50. A Judgment obtained in favor of the Ta.ylor Brothers as counter-claimants was in the 
amount of$28,437.36. 
The combination of the Judgment and fees and costs asserted for the time period prior to 
the filing of the Amended Answer and Counter-Claim is $54,632.77 which is less than the 
amount offer in the Offer ofJudgment ($55,000.00). 
Although Mark Prusynski's supplemental affidavit provides that approximately 
$34,854.50 was incurred for attorney's fees up to the date of the filing of the Offer of.ludglnent 
on November 16, 2009, the affidavit actually demonstrates that attorney's fee and costs 'Emm 
March 13,2009, (date their Amended Answer and Cotu1ter-Claim was filed), up to the date of 
the Offer of Judgtmmt was in the a1UOtll1t of$8,853.00. This is importalJt for the COtlrt's analysis 
because Clark and Feeney's counterclaim involved the same issues which related to the defense 
to the perjury complaint. Clark & Feeney has to a.dvance the argument that the application of res 
MEMORANDUM BRIEF ,RE; SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT OF MARK S. 
PRUSYNSKI REGARDING FEES AND COSTS - Pg 2 
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jUdicata. was blatantly apparent. The experts who testified at trial disagreed upon that point. The 
case of Magic VallE:!y Radiology Associates, P.A. v. Professional Business Services, Inc., 119 
Idaho 558, 808 P.2d 1303 (1991), provides that where there are multiple claims and multiple 
defenses, it is not appropriate to segregate those claims or defenses for the purpose of awarding 
attorney fees under J.C. § 12-121. 
There was a mixture of attorneys fees and costs related to prosecuting the counter claim and 
defending the petjwy complaint. all of which involved issues of res jUdicata and collateral 
estoppel, consequently the motion for costs and attorneys fees subm.itted by Clark & Feeney, and 
CODJJ.ie Taylor must be denied. 
DATED this 1fd;;,of March, 2011. 
r~unsclfor 
Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants 
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CONNIE W. TAYLOR~da. COun~ 
1 ',1··Henderson Law Firm, pLLC v- H 
900 Washington St., Suite 1020 
Vancouver WA 98660 
360.699.1530 
Fax 360.693.2911 
ISBA No. 4837 
Attorneys for Defendants John Taylor 
DaHan Taylor and the Johnson Trust 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
APH n lj 2:"',1 
.,' (, 
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an 
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G. 
MAILE, IV, and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE 
husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, Counterdefendants 
vs. 
CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, et aI. 
Defendants, Counterclaimants. 
Case No. CV OC 0723232 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO 
COUNTERDEFENDANTS' MOTION 
FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING 
THE VERDICT 
The Counterclaimants respectfully request that this Court deny the Counterdefendants' 
Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict dated February 11, 20 II. This motion is 
based on the same arguments which have been raised and rejected by this Court's denial of the 
multiple requests for summary judgment on the counterclaims. 
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In essence, the present motion is another request that this Court find the Mailes were 
entitled to dismissal of the counterclaims as a matter oflaw. If that had been the case, this Court 
would have granted the previous motions for summary judgment. 
There was substantial evidence in the record upon which the jury could properly find a 
verdict for the Johnson Trust. Schwan's Sales Enters., Inc. v. Idaho Transp. Dep't, 142 Idaho 
R26, 830, 136 P.3d 297, 301 (2006). On this motion for a J.N.O.V., the Mailes are held to admit 
the truth of all adverse evidence and every inference that may legitimately be drawn from the 
evidence.Id. 
1.	 Abuse of process and Intentional interference with prospective business 
advantage. 
A.	 Damages to Taylors as individuals 
Mailes first argue that the verdict was improper because of the lack of proof of any 
damages to DaHan and John Taylor as individuals. The verdict form itself did not distinguish 
amongst the various Counterclaimants, and the Special Verdict form submitted by counsel for 
the Mailes did not seek to differentiate among the Counterclaimants. 
This is not a basis for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, however, because the 
Judgment entered by this Court very distinctly delineated the fact that the Judgment was being 
granted solely to the Johnson Trust. The Judgment entered correctly identifies the Judgment 
creditor, and the Counterdefendants have not stated a valid basis for entry of a judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict. 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO 
MOTION FOR JUDGMENT 
NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT 
2
 
002498
X
 
 
 
 
-", 
B. Commencement of damages 
Mailes next argue "the Court determined that the Counterclaimants could not state a 
claim for the actions of the Counterdefendants in the first lawsuit, concluded in January, 2009."[ 
Their argument is not entirely clear, but if they are saying this Court ruled that no damages could 
have accrued prior to January of 2009, that is not accurate. The Court's Instruction No, 15 
placed no limitation on the commencement of damages in the abuse of process claim; the 
January 30, 2009 date applied solely to the damages on the claim for interference with a 
prospective economic advantage. 
If they attempt to argue that their conduct in the first suit cannot be considered in the 
abuse of process claim, that also is inaccurate. There was substantial evidence as to their 
conduct which occurred after January of 2009, when they were attempting to get Judge Wilper's 
judgment reversed in their second lawsuit at the same time they were trying to get Judge Wilper 
to enforce his judgment. 
Mailes next argue that that there was no testimony as to damages sustained by the Trust 
solely by reason of the lis pendens filed in the second lawsuit. Once again, the Mailes try to 
argue that the counterclaims were based solely on the filing of lis pendens, That is not, and 
never has been, accurate. The counterclaims were based on the entire range of conduct by the 
Mailes in both the Taylor v. Maile suit (after the decision in Taylor v. Maile II) and the Mailes' 
1 Memorandum Brief in Support of Counterdefendants' Motion for JNOV, page 3 
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second lawsuit.2 
There was substantial evidence that the Trust did incur damages between January 30, 
2009, when the first lawsuit was finally resolved, and August 3, 2009, when Mailes finally 
released the lis pendens in the first suit. 3 
1.	 John Taylor testified as to the value of the real property at vanous times, 
beginning at the time of the $1.8 million offer and encompassing the time Mailes 
finally released both of the lis pendens, as well as at the time of trial. He also 
testified to the Trust's inability to either sell or obtain financing for the property 
because of the lis pendens. 
2.	 Bob Debolt, realtor for Coldwell Banker, testified as to values for the property 
from 2005 through 2009, that the real estate market had taken a downturn by January 
of 2009, and that by August of 2009 it was even worse; prices had plummeted, and 
there were few buyers and even fewer banks willing to finance purchases. 
3.	 Dallan Taylor testified that the Johnson Trust incurred legal expenses 111 
defending the second suit, and also incurred over $99,000 in real property taxes 
because the Maile lawsuits prevented it from accepting the $1.8 million offer in 2006. 
4.	 John Taylor, on rebuttal, testified to the specific amount of real property taxes 
which the Trust had to pay after January of 2009. There was substantial evidence as 
2 This argument is addressed more fully below, beginning at page 11 
3 The Counterclaimants disagree with the Mailes' assertion that the lis pendens in the second suit was 
"proper," which they argue means that there was no further damages from leaving the first lis pendens in place. 
That argument is addressed at page 15, below. 
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to the damages the Johnson Trust incurred between January and August of2009. 
For purposes of this motion, the Mailes admit the truth of this evidenc(l and every 
inference that may legitimately be drawn from the evidence. It is entirely legitimate to infer that 
the Trust was damaged by both (l) incurring expenses for property taxes and (2) diminution in 
the value of the real property due to the Mailes delay in releasing the first lis pendens, as well as 
between the time they released the lis pendens in the second case in July of 2009 and the August 
3 release of the first lis pendens. 
C.	 The Mailes' conduct was not limited to filing a lis pendens or a "mere 
Complaint." 
Mailes argue that there was no evidence they had committed "wrongful conduct" to 
support the jury's verdict as to either abuse of process or intentional interference. Whether 
interference was for an improper purpose is uniformly recognized to be a question of fact. 4 
First, they argue that there was no testimony that maintaining the first lis pendens for 
over six months after the Supreme Court affirmed the lower court rulings that the Mailes had no 
right to the Johnson Trust property was "wrongful." Because this is a question of ultimate fact, 
lay testimony on that issue would have been impermissible. There was no expert testimony that 
maintaining a lis pendens long after the suit had been decided could ever be proper. There was, 
however, testimony from both John Runft and Thomas Maile that the purpose of a lis pendens is 
to notifY that there is a lawsuit pending, which leads inescapably to the conclusion that once the 
4 Gil/mor v. Family Link, LLC, 224 P.3d 741, 2010 WL 114814,647 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 2010.; Young v. 
Allstate Ins. Co., 119 Hawai'i 403, 198 P.3d 666 (2008); Awakuni v. Awana, 115 Hawai'i 126, 165 P.3d 1027 
(2007); Cascade Ambulance Service. Inc. v. City ofBellingham. 113 Wash.App. 1054, (Wash.App. Div. 1,2002). 
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Supreme Court made a final decision and the lawsuit was over, the lis pendens was no longer 
proper and failing to release it was wrongful. This is a legitimate inference, which for purpose 
of this motion must be drawn in favor of the Johnson Trust. 
The jurors were instructed5 that a party may establish that intentional interference was 
wrongful by offering proof that either (1) the defendant had an improper objective or purpose to 
harm the plaintiff; or (2) the defendant used a wrongful means to cause injury to the prospective 
business relationship. There was substantial evidence to support a legitimate inference that the 
Mailes had an improper objective or purpose to harm the Taylors and their counsel. Wrongful 
motive may be inferred from Mailes' continued attempts to get title to the property back, by any 
means, whether it be duplicative lawsuits, suits with no valid basis in fact or law, continued 
appeals of issues repeatedly argued unsuccessfully, or "disingenuous" attempts to foreclose on 
the vendee's lien while also challenging the very judgment upon which the lien is based. 
The testimony of the Mailes themselves provided substantial evidence of their improper 
objective or purpose to harm the Taylors. Both John Runft and Thomas Maile acknowledged 
that the Amended Petition filed in the probate court completely replaced the petition upon which 
all their claims were based, and the Supreme Court in Taylor II rejected every one of the Mailes' 
contentions. Nonetheless, in their trial testimony both Colleen and Thomas Maile ignored those 
facts and repeatedly called the Taylors liars, perjurers, thieves, and criminals. The jurors were 
5 Jury Instruction No. 12 
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instructed that "intent may be established by inference as well as by direct proof,,,6 and they had 
substantial evidence from which to infer that the Mailes had an improper objective to harm the 
Taylors and their counsel for disclosing Mr. Maile's untruthfulness, to seek retribution by calling 
the Taylors liars and thieves and frauds, to punish and humiliate the Taylors, to file a second 
lawsuit that had no chance of success, and to needlessly increase the cost of litigation in an effort 
to coerce the Taylors and the Johnson Trust into giving up their rights to the Johnson farm, even 
though that right had been judicially confinued. 
D. There was substantial evidence of improper use of legal process 
There was also substantial evidence that the Mailes had used the legal process primarily 
to accomplish a purpose for which it was not designed. Professor Craig Lewis testified that in 
the second suit, the Mailes were seeking to relitigate issues which either were or could have been 
litigated in the first proceeding, and that no reasonable attorney would have believed there was a 
reasonable chance that the second suit would be successful. Professor Lewis testified that no 
attorney could have reasonably believed that there was a legitimate legal basis for the second 
lawsuit, and that filing and pursuing that action is not reasonably justifiable. John Runft 
expressed the opposite opinion, and the jurors, as the sole judges of the facts, determined that 
they believed Professor Lewis. 
Professor Lewis, Mr. Runft, and even Thomas Maile agreed that it is never appropriate 
for a lawyer to sue somebody or pursue a legal theory unless there is a factual basis for it, and 
6 Jury Instruction No. 13 
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that as officers of the court, lawyers have a higher responsibility than non-lawyers to follow that 
rule. The jurors repeatedly heard testimony about the language of the Disclaimer agreement, the 
first petition in probate court, and the amended petition in the probate court; that testimony 
provided substantial evidence that the Mailes' interpretation of those documents had no basis in 
fact, or even in reality, and that there was no legitimate basis for filing the second lawsuit. The 
Mailes certainly can't be arguing that filing a complaint with no legitimate factually basis could 
ever be a proper use of the legal system. 
The ulterior, improper purpose7 or improper objective8 that underlies all of the Mailes' 
conduct was an attempt to gain title to the Johnson Farm, no matter how many comts told them 
they had no right to the property and no matter what they had to do to get it back. The Supreme 
Court's decision in Taylor v. Maile I pointed to the conflict of interest Beth Rogers had, and to 
the statute which mandated court approval prior to entering into a contract in which the trustee 
had a conflict. Maile admitted that he had never sought court approval, and his own briefing 
had raised the conflict. Their only defense to this showing that they never had a valid contract 
(which leads to the legitimate conclusion that efforts to enforce the contract or obtain the land by 
any other means was not a proper use of the legal process) was that Thomas Maile didn't know 
about the statute that required court approval. The jurors could legitimately have inferred that 
Mr. Maile was not being honest, particularly in light of the fact that he admitted Judge Wilper 
found he had not told the truth about his dealings with Ted Johnson when he testified in the 
7 Abuse of process element 
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unjust enrichment trial. Even the Mailes' own expert, John Runft, testified that nothing the 
Taylors said or did could change the fact that the contract was void. This testimony definitively 
shows that the Mailes had no legitimate legal basis to support their filing of the second 
complaint. 
Mailes again argue that the second suit could not be an abuse of the legal process because 
it was filed to protect their legitimate economic interest in the land. There was substantial 
evidence that the Mailes never had a legitimate economic interest in that land, making this case 
distinguishable from the Carter v. Carter case on which the Maile rely in their briefing on this 
motion. 
There was substantial evidence for the jury to find that the Mailes' conduct, from filing 
the second lawsuit with no legitimate basis in fact or law all the way through to th,eir efforts to 
get Judge Wilper to enforce the first judgment at the same time they were trying to get it set 
aside, were wrongful and were not proper in the course of the proceedings. Professor Lewis and 
John Runft both testified that one of the primary purposes of the civil justice system is to resolve 
disputes between people with finality, that it is never appropriate for a lawyer to sue somebody 
or pursue a legal theory unless there is a factual basis for it, and that lawyers have a higher 
responsibility than non-lawyers to follow that rule. 
There was substantial evidence to support a finding that the Mailes' second lawsuit had 
no legitimate factual basis whatsoever. John Taylor testified that the Taylors had all retained 
8 Intentional interference with prospective economic advantage element 
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their rights as beneficiaries to pursue the Maile suit, and Mr. Runft's efforts to reinterpret the 
clear language of the Disclaimer Agreement were so convoluted as to be inherently unbelievable. 
The Mailes consistently lost credibility by their failure to acknowledge, recognize, or discuss the 
fact that the probate petition upon which all their arguments are based was amended well over a 
year prior to the filing of the beneficiaries' Amended Complaint which they claim constituted a 
"fraud on the court." John Taylor testified to this amendment at the trial, and John Runft 
testified that the Mailes had not disclosed this amendment when he formed his opinion in the 
case. The jurors saw the April 18, 2005 Amended Petition,9 which contained a certificate of 
mailing to Mr. Maile. The testimony of Colleen and Thomas Maile that they didn't "figure out" 
that a fraud had been committed until December of 2007 could well have led the jury to the 
conclusion that none of their testimony should be believed. 
Runft also testified (and Thomas Maile agreed) that, under the law, the amended petition 
completely replaced the initial petition. Both Thomas and Colleen Maile admitted that their 
briefing to the Idaho Supreme Court did not disclose the amendment and that they oqjected to the 
record including the amendment. While the Mailes refused to consider the fact that the Taylors' 
first probate petition was an error, Mr. Maile claimed that "we all make mistakes" in trying to 
explain away his own appellate briefs acknowledgment of the conflicting interests amongst the 
different classes of beneficiaries to the Johnson Trust. 
When considered as a whole, with all inferences being granted to the Johnson Trust, the 
9 Counterclaimants' exhibit 4 
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testimony at trial provided substantial evidence that the Mailes simply had no factual basis for 
their claim that the Taylors had committed a fraud on the court, and no legal basis for believing it 
could be raised in an independent lawsuit. 
The Mailes put much weight on their argument that abuse of process requires more than 
the "mere filing of a complaint" citing to the 1988 case of Badell v. Beeks. That case quotes 
Dean Prosser's comment in Prosser & Keeton, Torts § 121, at 898 (1984), that "[t]here is no 
liability [for abuse of process] where the defendant has done nothing more than carry out the 
process to its authorized conclusion, even with bad intentions." 
There is considerable modem disagreement with Prosser's VIew, however, that an 
additional act is always required to make out the tort. See Harper, James & Gray, Torts § 4.9, at 
4:90-4:91 & n.21 (3d ed.1996); Dobbs, Torts § 438, at 1239-1240 (2000). These commentators 
make the point that an illegitimate purpose can often be achieved without any further act beyond 
the obtaining of the process. 2 Dan B. Dobbs, The Law of Torts § 438 (2001) ("[T]he advantage 
need not always be collateral in the sense that it would be outside the court's power to grant."); 
Harper, James, & Gray, The Law of Torts § 4.9 (stating that "the cause of action should be 
available in circumstances [other than extortion-like threats] as well, so long as intentional abuse 
of the legal system can be proved"). 
This broader view of the tort of abuse of process has been adopted by a number of states. 
See, for example, the following cases: 
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1. Abuse of process may be shown by proving that a lawsuit was "devoid of reasonable 
factual support or arguable legal basis." Adams v. Whitman, 822 N.E.2d 727, 730 (Mass.App. 
2005). 
2. When the process alleged to have been abused entailed the very filing of a lawsuit, an 
additional showing that the other party's claim was devoid of factual support or had no 
cognizable basis in law was required. Yandon v. Lowry, 126 P.3d 332, 337 (Colo.App. 2005), 
3. Use of the court system to file a baseless legal claim may constitute an abuse of 
process. Seipel v. Olympic Coast Investments, 188 P.3d 1027,1034 (Mont. 2008). 
4. An abuse of process claim can be based on the entire range of procedures incident to 
the litigation process. See, e.g., General Refractories Co. v. Fireman's Fund. Ins. Co., 337 F.3d 
297 (3rd Cir. 2003) (use of discovery proceedings, making misrepresentations to opposing 
counsel and the court and filing motions); Hopper v. D,ysdale, 524 F.Supp. 1039 (D.Mont. 
1981) (filing notice of deposition can be the basis for an abuse of process claim); Crackel v. 
Allstate Ins. Co., 92 P.3d 882 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004) (a litigant may commit abuse of process 
while merely defending an underlying action through conduct such as serving an unreasonable 
offer in bad faith, asserting bogus defenses, exercising procedural rights, engaging in misconduct 
at mandatory settlement conferences); Nienstedt v. Wetzel, 651 P.2d 876 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1982) 
(the entire range of court procedures incident to litigation, including the noticing of depositions, 
entry of defaults and the utilizations of various motions, could be the basis for an abuse of 
process claim); Food Lion, Inc. v. United Food & Commercial Workers Int'! Union, 567 S.E.2d 
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251, 253 (S.c. Ct. App. 2002) (process embraces full range of activities and procedures attendant 
to litigation including taking discovery and filing motions). 
Although the case was subsequently withdrawn, the opinion issued by the Idaho Supreme 
court in Cunningham v. Jensen lO indicates that Idaho follows the modem trend that broadens the 
definition of process to include a wide range of procedures related to the litigation process. The 
Court in Cunningham cited the case of General Refractories Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 337 
F.3d 297 (3rd Cir. 2003), which held that using a legal process primarily to harass and cause 
direct injury to an adversary (similar to what occurred here) could constitute a perversion of that 
process. Supra at p. 307. General Refractories, in tum looked to the following e:xcerpt from 
the Superior Court's opinion in Shiner v. Moriarty to illustrate this concept: 
The Shiners did not merely allege that the Moriartys' and the attorney defendants' 
intentions were impure. They alleged that the equity action, the petitions directed toward 
the confessed judgment, and the sundry motions to stay the execution on the leasehold 
during the pendency of these actions were undertaken and continued in an effort to 
harass and to cause them financial and emotional injury. These objectives are 
illegitimate in the context of any civil proceeding in Pennsylvania.... Pursuing litigation 
primarily to harass and cause injury to the adverse party is an objective not authorized 
by the equity action or the efforts to avoid the confessed judgment and constitutes a 
sufficient perversion of the process employed here to support a common law claim of 
abuse of process.... [T]he evidence presented was sufficient to permit a jury to determine 
that the Moriartys and the attorney defendants proceeded for a primary purpose of 
harassing the Shiners, and not to preserve the leasehold and avoid eviction. 
Shiner v. Moriarty, 706 A.2d 1228, 1236 (1998) (citations omitted) (emphasis added); 
Nienstedt v. Wetzel, 133 Ariz. 348,651 P.2d 876, 882 (1982) (cited in Shiner, 706 A.2d at 
1236, and Rosen, 627 A.2d at 192) stated that the purpose of "expos[ing] the injured party to 
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excessive attorney's fees and legal expenses" may support an abuse of process claim). The point 
of liability is reached when "the utilization of the procedure for the purpose for which it was 
designed becomes so lacking in justification as to lose its legitimate function as a reasonably 
justifiable litigation procedure." Nienstedt, 651 P.2d at 882. As noted above, Professor Lewis 
testified that no attorney could have reasonably believed that there was a legitimate legal basis 
for the second lawsuit, and that filing and pursuing that action is not reasonably justifiable as a 
litigation procedure. 
In this case, there was a great deal of conduct beyond "merely filing a complaint." 
Here, Mailes had filed an appeal of Judge Wilper's ruling returning the farm to the Johnson 
Trust. Rather than allowing that appeal to decide the issue, as the law requires, they instead 
initiated an entirely new action, in a new court, seeking a different ruling on their arguments as 
to why they should have been allowed to keep the property. This provides substantial evidence 
to support an inference that since the second suit had no legitimate purpose, the true primary 
purpose was to harass the Taylors and to cause them to incur excessive legal fees and expenses 
in defending against the claim. 
The Supreme Court opinion in Taylor II completely rejected the arguments which formed 
the basis of Mailes' second Complaint. Even after that decision was announced, the Mailes 
repeatedly made an improper use of the legal system by pursuing their second complaint seeking 
to set aside Judge Wilper's decision be set aside, and simultaneously filing motions with Judge 
10 ISSCR 31332, September 14, 2005 
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summary judgment in July, they filed a motion for an interlocutory appeal of the second suit, yet 
at the same time also filed another motion with Judge Wilper seeking not only to enforce the 
judgment they were (and to this day, still are) claiming was invalid, but also asking that Judge 
Wilper just give them back the land. Their improper use of the legal process was not isolated to 
filing a "mere Complaint," as they argue. 
Given the testimony which leads to a legitimate inference that pursuing the baseless 
second suit was an improper use of the legal process, it necessarily follows that the lis pendens 
filed in that suit was also improper. Maintaining a "wrongful" lis pendens when there is no 
legitimate claim to ownership of the property has been found to support claims for abuse of 
process and intentional interference. Hewitt v. Rice, 154 P.3d 408 (Colo. 2007), Broadmoor 
Apartments ofCharleston v. Horwitz, 306 S.c. 482,413 S.E.2d 9 (1991); Cok v. Cok, 558 A.2d 
205 (R.!. 1989), National City Bank v. Shortridge, 689 N.E.2d 1248 (Ind. 1977). 
As far as the question of whether the Mailes were entitled to judgment as a matter of law 
IS concerned, it is important to remember that Idaho has recognized that wrongfulness of 
intentional interference may also be shown by reason of a statute or other regulation, or a 
recognized rule of common law, or an established standard of trade or profession. 11 The filing of 
the second action, with no legitimate basis in fact or law, was a violation of !.R.C.P. 11 (a)(1 ). 
J1 Idaho First Nat'l Bank v. Bliss Valley Foods. Inc., I 2] Idaho 266, 285, X24 P.2d ~4] , 861 (1991). 
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In looking at whether the Mailes were entitled to judgment in their favor on the 
counterclaims as a matter of law, this Court should also consider the fact that the Mailes 
repeatedly violated I.R.C.P. II(a)(2). That rule provides that if a party has made application to a 
judge for issuance of an order which is denied, that party may not make any subsequent 
application to any other judge except by appeal to a higher court. The Mailes had appealed 
Judge Wilper's judgment returning the farm to the Johnson Trust, and they violated I.R.C.P. 
II(a)(2) by filing and pursuing the second lawsuit asking a difference judge for an order 
returning the property to them. They violated it again by seeking to have Judge Wilper quiet 
title (in the guise of foreclosing on a lien) months after this Court had dismissed thei.r action and 
the Supreme Court had rejected all their arguments in the first case. The Mailes were just going 
from court to court to court, trying to find a judge willing to contradict the others who had 
already ruled against them. The Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure establish the standard of the 
legal profession, and violation of those rules is evidence that interference was wrongful. 
There was substantial evidence for the jury to find that the Mailes committed a willful act 
in the use of legal process not proper in the regular course of the proceeding, that the act was 
committed for an ulterior, improper purpose, and that the Mailes either had an improper 
objective or purpose to harm the Taylors, or that the Mailes used a wrongful means to cause 
injury to the prospective business relationship. 
1. Litigation privilege 
The Counterdefendants raised the Issue of the litigation privilege in their Motion to 
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Reconsider of September 28, 2010, and again in their November 2, 2010 Motion to Dismiss 
and/or Motion in Limine re Litigation Privilege. This Court denied those motions, and has ruled 
that the privilege does not apply in this situation, and that it was not an issue that would be 
presented to the jury in any event. The Counterdefendants' requested jury instructions which 
were based on the Taylor v. McNichols decision 12 were rejected by the Court. The jury was not 
instructed on the privilege, and the verdict form did not address whether the privilege was 
applicable. This issue is not, therefore, subject to being raised by way of a motion for judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict under I.R.c.P. 50(b). 
The present motion is, in reality, just another motion to reconsider this Court's prior 
rulings dismissing the Mailes' claims and denying their repeated motions for summary judgment 
and motions to dismiss. 
The Taylor v. McNichol/ 3 decision was not a "get out ofjail free card" for every attorney 
who is a party to a lawsuit. That opinion dealt solely with the question of whether and under 
what circumstances a litigant may bring an action against his opponent's attorney. The ruling 
of the court was "the litigation privilege shall be found to protect attorneys against civil actions 
which arise as a result of their conduct or communications in the representation of a client, 
related to a judicial proceeding.,,14 The Court specifically ruled that in Idaho, "the litigation 
privilege ... only applies when ... an attorney is acting within the scope of his employment, and 
12 Counterdefendants' requested jury instructions 62, 63, 95, 96 AND 97
 
13 IDSCCI 36130, 36131, September3, 2010.
 
14 IDSCCI 36130,36131, September 3,2010, page 15. 
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not solely for his personal interests." 15 The cases discussed by the Supreme Court all dealt with 
claims against independent attorneys who were separate and distinct from their clients; none of 
the cases involved an attorney who was a party, let alone one who was representing himself. 
There was no testimony at the trial which changed the fundamental facts which support 
this Court's repeated refusals to apply the litigation privilege in this case. The testimony showed 
that Thomas Maile was never "employed" to represent a client in this case. He acted pro se in 
representing himself, his wife, and their solely-owned LLC. Colleen Maile testified that the 
LLC, Bershire Investments, was just something they put together to purchase the Johnson farm. 
There has never been any dispute as to the fact that the Mailes are the sole owners of the LLC. 
The testimony at trial established the fact that even when Mr. Maile has been acting pro 
se (on behalf of himself and his wife, as well as on behalf of their solely-owned LLC, Berkshire 
Investments), he has been acting solely for his own interests and is therefore not entitled to the 
immunity of the litigation privilege. 
There is no basis for a motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the litigation 
privilege, nor is there any basis for this Court to reconsider its prior rulings on that issue. 
15 IDSCCI 36130, 36131, September 3, 20 I 0, page 18. 
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Conclusion 
For the reasons stated herein, the Counter-c1aimaints respectfully request that this court 
deny the Counterdefendants' Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict. 
DATED this -±- day ofApril, 2011. 
HENDERSON LAW FIRM, PLLC 
By 
Connie W. Taylor, a member of the firm. 
Attorneys for Johnson Trust, John and Dallan Taylor 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO 
MOTION FOR JUDGMENT 
NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT 
19 
002515
l
 
"­
CERTIFICATKOF SERVICE 
/7 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the -; day of April, 2011 I caused to be served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed to the 
following: 
Thomas G. Maile, IV	 u.s. Mail
 
Hand Delivered
 380 West State Street 
Overnight Mail Eagle, ID 83616 Telecopy (FAX) (208) 939-1001 
Mr. Christ Troupis U.S. Mail
 
Attorney at Law Hand Delivered
 
PO Box 2408 Overnight Mail
 
Eagle, ID 83616 Telecopy (FAX) (208) 938-5482
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Mark Prusynski ~...	 u.s. Mail
 
Hand Delivered
 MOFFATT THOMAS 
Overnight Mail 101 S Capitol Blvd., 10th Floor Telecopy (FAX) (208) 385-5384 
PO Box 829 Email 
Boise, ID 83701 
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Attorneys for Defendants/Counterclaimants 
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DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
 
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an 
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G. 
MAILE, IV, and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE, 
husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants, 
YS. 
CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, fka CONNIE 
TAYLOR, an individual; DALLAN 
TAYLOR, an individual; R. JOHN TAYLOR, 
an individual; CLARK and FEENEY, a 
pmtnership; PAUL T. CLARK, an individual; 
THEODORE L. JOHNSON REVOCABLE 
TRUST, an Idaho revocable bust; JOHN 
DOES I-JOHN DOES X; AND ALL 
PERSONS IN POSSESSION OR CLAIMING 
ANY RIGHT TO POSSESSION, 
Defendants/Counterclaimants. 
Case No. CV-OC-0723232 
OBJECTION TO MOTION FOR STAY 
OF EXECUTION OF JUDGMENT 
OBJECTION TO MOTION FOR STAY OF EXECUTION 
OI<' JUDGMENT - 1 Client:2028338.1 
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COME NOW the defendants, Connie Wright Taylor, fka Connie Taylor, Clark 
and Feeney and Paul T. Clark, by and through their undersigned counsel, and object to plaintiffs' 
motion for stay of execution ofjudgment on the ground that the proposed cash deposit is 
insufficient pursuant to I.A.R. 13(b)(15). The cash deposit or supersedeas bond posted pursuant 
to that Rule "must be in the amount of the judgment or order, plus 36% of such amount." 
Nothing in the Rule states that the supersedeas bond or cash deposit need not be posted when the 
judgment includes costs and fees awarded in the district court. 
Plaintiffs' citation to Rule 16 of the Idaho Appellate Rules is misplaced. Rule 16 
merely eliminated the requirement that a cost bond had to be filed when an appeal was filed. 
The former Idaho Code Section 13-203 requiring an undertaking on appeal, also known as an 
appeal bond, was repealed. The Idaho Appellate Rules replaced this jurisdictional req uirement 
with the current procedure. See Erickson v. Amoth, 99 Idaho 907, 908, 591 P.2d 1074, 1075 
(1978). By eliminating the requirement of an undertaking on appeal for costs, however, the 
Idaho Appellate Rules did not eliminate the need for a supersedeas bond in order to stay 
execution. Rule l3(b)( 15) sets forth the procedure for obtaining a stay of execution of a money 
judgment by posting a supersedeas bond. Rule 16(b) allows parties to agree to a waiver of a 
supersedeas bond. The cash deposit proposed by plaintiffs does not meet the requirements of 
Rule l3(b)(15) and the parties herein have not agreed to waive a supersedeas bond. The rules, 
OBJECTION TO MOTION FOR STAY OF EXECUTION 
OF JUDGMENT - 2 Client 20283381 
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prior statutes, and Idaho case law do not support plaintiffs' calculation of the amount of the 
required deposit. 
DATED this :;z ~fi¥clay of April, 2011. 
MOFFATT, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK & 
FIELDS, CHARTERED 
By4 
Mark . Prusynski - Of the inn 
Attorneys for Defendants/Counterclaimants 
Connie Wright Taylor fka Connie Taylor, 
Clark and Feeney, and Paul T. Clark 
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LAW OFFICES OF THOMAS G MAILE IV, P.A. ( ) Hand Delivered 
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Eagle, ID 83616-4902 ( v(Facsimile 
Facsimile (208) 939-1001 
Christ T. Troupis ( ) US. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
TROUPIS LAW OFFICE, PA ( ) Hand Delivered 
P.O. Box 2408 ( ~Overnight Mail 
Eagle,ID 83616 (V) Facsimile 
Facsimile (208) 938-5482 
John C. Mitchell ( ) US. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
CLARK & FEENEY ( ) Hand Delivered 
1229 Main St., Suite 201 ( ) j)vernight Mail 
P.O. Box 285 ( 0'Facsimile 
Lewiston,ID 83501-0285 
Facsimile (208) 746-9160 
Connie W. Taylor ( ) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
HENDERSON LA W ( ) Hand Delivered 
900 Washington, Suite 1020 ( ) Overnight Mail 
Vancouver, WA 98660 (v(Facsimile 
Facsimile (360) 693-2911 
Mark S.tprusynski (/ 
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CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
 
By KATHY JOHNSON
 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
 
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an 
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G. 
MAILE, IV, and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE, 
husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants, 
vs. 
CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, fka CONNIE 
TAYLOR, an individual; DALLAN 
l'AYLOR, an individual; R. JOHN TAYLOR, 
an individual; CLARK and FEENEY, a 
partnership; PAUL 1'. CLARK, an individual; 
THEODORE L. JOHNSON REVOCABLE 
TRUST, an Idaho revocable trust; JOHN 
DOES I-JOHN DOES X; AND ALL 
PERSONS IN POSSESSION OR CLAIMING 
ANY RIGHT TO POSSESSION, 
Defendants/Counterclaimants. 
Case No. CV-OC-0723232 
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR 
JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING 
THE VERDICT 
Plaintiff/Counterderfendants filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the 
verdict. The Court reviewed the briefs and heard arguments of counsel on April 14,2011. The 
Court viewed the evidence presented at trial in the light most favorable to the non-moving party 
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING 
THE VERDICT - 1 Client:2017393.1 
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and, for the reasons stated at the hearing on April 14, finds that there was substantial evidence to 
support the verdict and the motion for judgment notwiths nding the verdict is denied. 
DATED this M day of , 2011. 
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING 
THE VERDICT - 2 Clienl:20173931 
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TROUPIS LAW OFFICE, PA 
P.O. Box 2408 
Eagle,ID 83616 
Facsimile (208) 938-5482 
John C. Mitchell 
CLARK & FEENEY 
1229 Main St., Suite 201 
P.O. Box 285 
Lewiston,ID 83501-0285 
Facsimile (208) 746-9160 
Connie W. Taylor 
HENDERSON LA W 
900 Washington, Suite 1020 
Vancouver, WA 98660 
Facsimile (360) 693-2911 
Mark S. Prusynski, ISB No. 2349 
MOFFATT, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK & 
FIELDS, CHARTERED 
101 S. Capitol Blvd., 10th Floor 
Post Office Box 829 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Facsimile (208) 385-5384 
'ti) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
Q() U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
~U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
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DEPUTY 
n\J THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an 
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G. 
MAILE, IV, and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE, 
husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants, 
vs. 
CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, fka CONNIE 
TAYLOR, an individual; DALLAN 
TAYLOR, an individual; R. JOHN TAYLOR, 
an individual; CLARK and FEENEY, a 
partnership; PAUL T. CLARK, an individual; 
THEODORE L. JOHNSON REVOCABLE 
TRUST, an Idaho revocable trust; JOHN 
DOES I-JOHN DOES X; AND ALL 
PERSONS IN POSSESSION OR CLAIMING 
ANY RIGHT TO POSSESSION, 
Defendants/Counterclaimants. 
Case No. CV-OC-0723232 
ORDER ON MOTIONS FOR COSTS 
AND FEES 
Defendants/Counterciaims Connie Wright Taylor, Clark and Feeney and Paul T. 
Clark (hereinafter, "the law finn") filed a memorandum of costs and attorney fees under Idaho 
Code Sections 12-121 and 12-123 and Rule 54 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, contending 
that plaintiffs filed and pursued the action frivolously. PlaintifflCounterdefendants objected to 
the law firm's memorandum of costs and fees and filed a motion for costs, contending that they 
were the prevailing party in the lawsuit, when the "adjusted award" as defined by Rule 68 of the 
ORDER ON MOTIONS FOR COSTS AND FEES - 1 Client20141491 
002524
O·- --· ;:;;c;,..--1t+F--~1-­
A.  .• __ ~:l
  
 
.........
 
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, was compared to the offer ofjudgment made by plaintiffs on 
November 16,2009. Defendants objected to plaintiffs' motion for costs. 
The Court reviewed the briefs of the parties and held a hearing on April 14,2011. 
The Court considered the factors outlined in Idaho Code Section 12-123 and Rule 54 of the 
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure and considered the history of the case and the testimony at the 
trial of the counterclaim. The Court determined that the case was brought and pursued 
frivolously, as defined by Idaho Code Section 12-123 and Rule 54 and the law firm prevailed 
overall and is entitled to the attorney fees requested, $56,502.50. The Court considered the 
factors identified in Rule 54(e)(3) in determining the amount of the fees and finds them to be 
reasonable. 
The Court also awards costs as a matter of right in the amount of $63.81 to the 
law firm, but declines to award any discretionary costs, because none of the discretionary costs 
were "exceptional" as defined by Idaho Rules and the Idaho Supreme Court. 
The Court awards costs as a matter of right in the amount of $3,295.57 to the 
counterclaimants as prevailing party, both in defending the plaintiffs' claims and in pursuing 
their counterclaim. The Court declines to award discretionary costs, because none oflhe 
discretionary costs claimed were exceptional costs. 
The Court denies plaintiffs' motion for costs, because plaintiffs were not the 
prevailing party in this action. The adjusted award as defined by Rule 68, including the costs 
and fees of defendants up to the time of the offer ofjudgment awarded by this Order and the 
verdict rendered by the jury, exceeds the offer ofjudgment. 
ORDER ON MOTIONS FOR COSTS AND FEES - 2 Client:2014149.1 
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The Judgment entered on July 20,2009, and the Judgment entered on 
February 28, 20 II, will be amended accordingly. 
DATED thisJ-J- day of April, 2011. 
ORDER ON MOTIONS FOR COSTS AND FEES - 3 Client:2014149.1 
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Mark S. Prusynski, ISB No. 2349 
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FIELDS, CHARTERED 
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Facsimile (208) 385-5384 
)<JUS. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
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DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an 
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G. 
MAILE, IV, and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE, 
husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants, 
vs. 
CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, fka CONNIE 
TAYLOR, an individual; DALLAN 
TAYLOR, an individual; R. JOHN TAYLOR, 
an individual; CLARK and FEENEY, a 
partnership; PAUL T. CLARK, an individual; 
THEODORE L. JOHNSON REVOCABLE 
TRUST, an Idaho revocable trust; JOHN 
DOES I-JOHN DOES X; AND ALL 
PERSONS IN POSSESSION OR CLAIMING 
ANY RIGHT TO POSSESSION, 
Defendants/Counterclaimants. 
Case No. CV-OC-0723232 
AMENDED JUDGMENT 
The Judgment, dated July 16, 2009, dismissing the claims ofThomas G. Maile 
IV, Colleen Birch-Maile, and Berkshire Investments, LLC, and the Judgment, dated February 28, 
2011, in favor of the Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust, by and through its trustees, Dallan 
Taylor and R. John Taylor, against Thomas G. Maile IV, Colleen Birch-Maile, and Berkshire 
Investments, LLC, are amended to reflect this Court's Order on Motions for Costs and Fees as 
follows: 
Client 20 17426 1AMENDEDJUDGMENT-l 
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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Judgment, 
dated July 16, 2009, for Connie Wright Taylor, f/k/a Connie Taylor, Clark and Feeney., and Paul 
T. Clark is amended to award $56,502.50 in attorney fees and $63.81 in costs, for a total 
judgment of $56,566.31 against Thomas G. Maile IV, Colleen Birch-Maile, and Berkshire 
Investments, LLC, together with interest as provided by law; and 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Judgment, 
dated February 28,2011, is amended to add $3,295.57 in costs for a total judgment of 
$31,732.93 in favor of the Theodore L. Johnson Revocable Trust, by and through its trustees, 
Dallan Taylor and R. John Taylor, against Thomas G. Maile IV, Colleen Birch-Maile, and 
Berkshire Investments, LLC, plus interest as provided by law. 
DATED this ~__ day Of~'2011. 
AMENDEDJUDGMENT-2 Client:20174261 
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Christ T. Troupis 
TROUPIS LAWOFFICE, PA 
P.O. Box 2408 
Eagle, ID 83616 
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John C. Mitchell 
CLARK & FEENEY 
1229 Main St., Suite 201 
P.O. Box 285 
Lewiston, ID 83501-0285 
Facsimile (208) 746-9160 
Connie W. Taylor 
HENDERSON LAW 
900 Washington, Suite 1020 
Vancouver, WA 98660 
Facsimile (360) 693-2911 
Mark S. Prusynski, ISB No. 2349 
MOFFATT, THOMAS, BARRETT, ROCK & 
FIELDS, CHARTERED 
101 S. Capitol Blvd., 10th Floor 
Post Office Box 829 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Facsimile (208) 385-5384 
K) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
( ) Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
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THOMAS G. MAILE, IV. 
Attorney at Law 
380 West State Street 
Eagle, Idaho 83616 
Telephone: (208) 939-1000 
Idaho State Bar No. 2378 
ti '.y. • 9 '')1"111'." ,:1 ,., ,: .j. ~{ I. I ,.,. v 
CHF~ t~~-'-~~):'--;­
~;, J f ),.'\.~ 
Pro Se and counsel for Berkshire Investments and Colleen Birch-Maile 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS, LLC, an 
Idaho limited liability, and THOMAS G. 
MAILE, IV. and COLLEEN BIRCH-MAILE, 
husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, fIkIa 
CONNIE TAYLOR, an individual; DALLAN 
TAYLOR, an individual; R. JOHN 
TAYLOR, an individual; CLARK and 
FEENEY, a partnership; PAUL T. CLARK, 
an individual; THEODORE L. JOHNSON 
REVOCABLE TRUST, an Idaho revocable 
trust; JOHN DOES I -JOHN DOES X; AND 
ALL PERSONS IN POSSESSION OR 
CLAIMING ANY RIGHT TO 
POSSESSION. 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-OC 07-23232 
AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL 
TO:	 THE DEFENDANTSIRESPONDENTS ABOVE NAMED, THEIR ATTORNEY OF 
RECORD, CONNIE TAYLOR and MARK PRUSYNSKI AND THE CLERK OF 
THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the attorney above named, Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
Berkshire Investments, LLC, Thomas G. Maile, N. and Colleen Birch-Maile, by and through 
002531
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Thomas G. Maile, IV., attorney for the Plaintiffs, hereinafter referred to as "Appellants"', provide 
their Supplemental Notice ofAppeal against the above-named Respondents to the Supreme Court 
of the State ofIdaho, from the Order on Motion for Costs and Fees entered May 9,200] 1, Order 
Denying Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict entered May 9,200] 1, Amended 
Judgment entered May 9,20011, in addition to the Memorandum Decision and Order entered on 
July 2,2009 and the resulting Judgment Dismissing Plaintiffs Claims entered on July 20,2009, 
and the Judgment entered on February 28,2011 entered in the above-entitled action by Honorable 
Richard D. Greenwood. That the prior Notice of Appeal filed March 7, 2011 in the above 
captioned matter is incorporated by reference as if set forth in full herein. 
1. Appellants have a right to appeal to the Idaho Appellate Court, from the District 
Court ofthe Fourth Judicial District of the State ofIdaho, In and For the County of Ada, and the 
Orders entered on May 9,2011 above referenced, in addition to the prior Orders and Judgments 
previously appealed. 
2. That the parties have a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the 
judgment and/or orders described in paragraph 1 above are an appealable orders and/or judgments 
under and pursuant to Rule 11(a)(2) LA.R. That pursuant to the Idaho Appellate Rules, 
jurisdiction is proper for the appeal. 
3. That no order been entered sealing all or any portion of the record. 
4. A supplemental preliminary statement of the issues on appeal which the Appellants 
intend to assert in the appeal, are as follows: 
Supplemental A. Was the District Court correct in entering the Order denying the 
Appellants' Motion for JNOV? 
002532
 
 
  
 
 
Supplemental B. 
Supplemental C. 
Supplemental D. 
Was the District Court correct in denying the PlaintiffslAppellants' Motion 
for costs? 
Was the District Court correct in awarding the Defendants/Counter-
Claimants Taylors and the Trust their costs? 
Was the District Court correct in awarding attorneys fees and costs to the 
Defendant/Counter-Claimants, Connie Taylor and Clark & Feeney pursuant 
to I.C. 12-123? 
Is any additional reporter's transcript requested? No.
 
That the Appellants have paid the estimated costs of the clerk's record.
 
5. The Appellants request the following documents to be included in the clerk's 
record as electronic pdf files and not as hard copies: 
SUPPLEMENTAL PLEADINGS ASSOCIATED WITH ADA COUNTY CASE NO. CV OC 07­
23232. 
Supplemental A. 02118/2011 Memorandum Of Costs And Attorney Fees: 
Supplemental B. 0211812011 Affidavit of Mark S Prusynski in Support of Defendants' 
Memorandum of Costs and Attorney Fees; 
Supplemental C. 02118/2011 Affidavit of Thomas Maile Re Offer of Judgment; 
Supplemental D. 02118/2011 Memorandum Of Costs; 
Supplemental E. 0211812011 Memorandum in Support of Counter Defendants Motion for 
Costs and Opposition to Counter Claimants Motion for Costs and. Attorneys 
Fees; 
Supplemental F. 02/25/2011 Objection to Motion for Costs and. Fees; 
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Supplemental G. 02/25/201 ] Affidavit of Christ Troupis; 
Supplemental H. 02/25/2011 Memorandum in Support of Objection: 
Supplemental I. 03/02/2011 Objection to Mailes Memorandum of Costs; 
Supplemental J. 03/02/2011 Supplemental Objection to Mailes' Memorandum of Costs: 
Supplemental K. 03/03/201 ] Supplemental Affidavit of Christ Troupis Re: Memo of Costs; 
Supplemental L. 03/07/2011 Counterclaimants' Memorandum ofCosts; 
Supplemental M. 03/10/2011 Second Supplemental Affidavit ofChrist Troupis RE memo of 
Costs; 
Supplemental N. 03/11/2011 Objection to Motion for Costs; 
Supplemental O. 03/11/2011 Reply Memorandum in Support of Counter Defendants Motion 
for Costs and Reply to Objection to Memorandum of Costs; 
Supplemental P. 03/11/2011 Reply BriefRe Memorandum of Costs and Attorney Fees; 
Supplemental Q. 03/16/2011 Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Costs and 
Opposition to Counter Claimants Motion for Costs and Fees; 
Supplemental R. 03/16/2011 Second Supplemental Objection to Memorandum of Costs; 
Supplemental S. 03/22/2011 Taylors' Reply Memorandum RE: Memoranda of Costs; 
Supplemental T. 03/24/2011 Supplemental Affidavit of Mark S Prusynski Regarding Fees 
and Costs; 
Supplemental U. 03/28/2011 Memorandum BriefRe: Supplemental Affd of Mark 
Prusynski; 
Supplemental V. 04/06/2011 Memorandum in Opposition to Counterdefendants Motion for 
Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict. 
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Supplemental w. 05/021201] Objection to Motion for Stay of Execution of Judgment. 
Supplemental x. 05/09/201] Order Denying Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the 
Verdict. 
Supplemental Y. 05/091201] Order on Motions for Costs and Fees. 
Supplemental z. 05/091201] Amended Judgment 
That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to Rule 20 LA.R. 
DATED this ~ay of May, 2011. 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this lYday of May, 2011, I caused to be delivered a true 
and correct copy of the AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL, to be delivered, addressed as follows: 
Connie W. Taylor & Paul Henderson (X) U. S. Mail 
Henderson Law Finn () Facsimile Transmission 
900 Washington St. Suite 1020 () Hand Delivery 
Vancouver, Washington 98660 () Overnight Delivery 
Facsimile: (360) 693-2911 
Mark Stephen Prusynski (X) U. S. Mail 
PO Box 829 () Facsimile Transmission 
Boise, ID 83701 () Hand Delivery 
Phone: (208) 345-2000 () Overnight Delivery 
Facsimile: (208) 385-5384 
Christ T. Troupis () U. S. Mail 
TROUPIS LAW OFFICE () Facsimile Transmission 
1299 E. Iron Eagle, Ste 130 (X) Hand Delivery 
PO Box 2408 () Overnight Delivery 
Eagle, Idaho 83616 
Facsimile: (208) 938-5482 
Leslie Anderson, Court Reporter () U. S. Mail 
Ada County Courthouse () Facsimile Transmission 
200 W. Front Street (X) Hand Delivery 
Boise, Idaho 83702 () Overnight Delivery 
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MAY 19 2011 
CHRJSTOPHER 0. RICH,Qert(
 
By BRADlEYJ. THES
 
DEPUTY
 
Stephen W. Kenyon 
Clerk of Supreme Court 
451	 W State Street 
Boise, Idaho 83720 
In re: Berkshire Investments v. Taylor, Docket No. 
Notice is hereby given that on Friday, March 25, 2011, I lodged a 
transcript of 232 pages in length for the above-referenced appeal with 
the district court clerk of Ada County in the Fourth Judicial District. 
The following files were lodged: 
Transcript of Proceedings 2-4-2011 
David Cromwell 
Tucker & Associates 
cc:	 kloertscher@idcourts.net 
PDF format of completed files emailed to Supreme Court 
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1 
To: Clerk cl"'r" the Court 
Idahc) Supreme Court 
Boise, Idaho 83720 
NO. 
A.M. BlOC>_ FILEDP.M _ 
MAY 19 2011 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH. Clerk
 
By BRADLEY J. THIE:S
 
DEPUTY
Docket No. 38599-2011 
lApp) BERKSHIRE INVESTIMENTS, LLC 
vs. 
(Res) CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR 
NOTICE OF REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT LODGl~D: 
Hearings held 10/29/10, 11/30/10, 1/18/11 
Notice is hereby given that on May 17, 2011, I 
lodged a transcript of 114 pages in length for the 
~bove-referenced appeal with the District Co~r~ Clerk of 
the County of Ada ~n the Fourth Judicial District. 
L lie Anderson, Official Reporter 
829 E. Blue Heron Street 
Meridian, Idaho 83646 
(208) 371-2006 
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Fax: 334-2616 MAY 19 2011 
CHRISTOPHER [I, RtCH.Clerk 
By BRADLEY ,J. THtES 
In the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho DEPUTY 
Berkshire Investments, et al ) Docket No. 38599 
Plaintiff-Appellant ) 
v ) 
Connie Taylor, et al ) 
Defendant-Respondent ) 
Notice of Transcript Lodged 
Notice is hereby given that on May 19,2011,
 
I lodged one (1) original and three (3) copies of transcripts 388 pages in length,
 
as listed below, for the above referenced appeal with
 
the District Court Clerk of Ada County, Fourth Judicial District.
 
TRANSCRIPTS LODGED 
Trial Day 2 - 2/2/11 
Trial Day 3 - 2/3/11 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
 
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS LLC, an Idaho limited 
liability, and THOMAS G. MAILE, IV, and COLLEEN Supreme Court Case No. 38599 
BIRCH-MAILE, husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs-Counterdefendants-Appellants, CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS 
vs. 
CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, f/kla CONNIE TAYLOR, an 
individual; DALLAN TAYLOR, an individual; R. JOHN 
TAYLOR, an individual; CLARK and FEENEY, a 
partnership; PAUL T. CLARK, an individual; THEODORE 
L. JOHNSON REVOCABLE TRUST, an Idaho revocable 
trust; JOHN DOES I-JOHN DOES X; AND ALL PERSONS 
IN POSSESSION OR CLAIMING ANY RIGHT TO 
POSSESSION, 
Defendants-Counterclaimants-Respondents. 
I, CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of 
the State of Idaho in and for the County of Ada, do hereby certify: 
That the attached list of exhibits is a true and accurate copy of the exhibits being 
forwarded to the Supreme Court on Appeal. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said 
Court this 20th day of May, 2011. 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH 
Clerk of the District Court 
--~1(1 , 
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF' ADA 
HONORABLE RICHARD GREENWOOD 
CLERK: KATHY JOHNSON 
CT REPTR: FRAN MORRIS 
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENT, ETAL, 
Plaintiffs, 
)
)
)
) 
vs. ) Case No. CVOC07.23232 
)
)CONNIE TAYLOR, ETAL,
 
) EXHIBIT LIST
 
Defendants. ) 
------.".....-..,....------,----------)
Counsel for Plaintiff: Connie Taylor/Paul Henderson 
Counsel for Defendant: Christ Troupis 
PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBITS 
1 Theodore Johns Revocable Trust Agreement 
2 Johnson Trust beneficiaries Disclaimer Agreement 
3 Petition for Appointment of trustees 11/15/04 
4 Amended Petition for apt of trustees 
6 Answer and Counterclaim dated 9/6/05 
12 Appellant's/Cross-Respondent's Reply Brief (Maile) 
14 Taylor v. Maile I Supreme Court Opinion 
15 Taylor v. Maile II Supreme Court Opinion 
16 Amended Complaint 3/25/08 
37 Email about numbers of lots for sale 
Deposition of John Runft 
DEFENDANT'S EXHIBITS 
2/2/11 
2/2/11 
2/2/11 
2/2/11 
2/2/11 
2/2/11 
2/2/11 
2/3/11 
2/2/11 
2/3/11 
Admitted 
Admitted 
Admitted 
Admitted 
Admitted 
Admitted 
Admitted 
Admitted 
Admitted 
Admitted 
110 Complaint & Demand of Jury Trial 
111 Lis Pendens filed by Connie Taylor 
112 Verified Answer & Counterclaim filed by Hoagland 
116 Order Granting Deft's Motion to Dismiss 
117 Disclaimer, Release & Indemnity Agreement 
119 Notice of Appeal 
122 Complaint & Demand for Jury Trial 
130 Transcript front page, page 14 and 17 
131 Memorandum Decision & Order 
132 Motion for Leave to file Amended Complaint 
133 MSJ on Beneficiaries' Claim 
134 Order Regarding Plaintiff's MSJ 
2/3/11 
2/3/11 
2/3/11 
2/3/11 
2/3/11 
2/3/11 
2/3/11 
2/4/11 
2/4/11 
2/4/11 
2/4/11 
2/4/11 
Admitted 
Admitted 
Admitted 
Admitted 
Admitted 
Admitted 
Admitted 
Admitted 
Admitted 
Admitted 
Admitted 
Admitted 
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138 Notice of Lis Pendens filed by Berkshire 
139 Judgment on Beneficiaries' Claim 
147 Release of Notice of Lis Pendens 
148 Notice of Vendee's Lien 
150 Release of Notice of Lis Pendens 
157 Idaho Rule 60(b) demonstrative purposes only 
159 Ticore v. Stanion II demonstrative purposes only 
160 Robinson v. Robinson demonstrative purposes only 
161 Kawai Farms v. Longstreet demonstrative purposes 
2/4/11 
2/4/11 
2/4/11 
2/4/11 
2/4/11 
2/2/11 
2/2/11 
2/2/11 
2/2/11 
Admitted 
Admitted 
Admitted 
Admitted 
Admitted 
Admitted 
Admitted 
Admitted 
Admitted 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICTOF
 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
 
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS LLC, an Idaho limited 
liability, and THOMAS G. MAILE, IV, and COLLEEN 
BIRCH-MAILE, husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs-Counterdefendants-Appellants, 
vs. 
CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, f/kJa CONNIE TAYLOR, an 
individual; DALLAN TAYLOR, an individual; R. JOHN 
TAYLOR, an individual; CLARK and FEENEY, a 
partnership; PAUL T. CLARK, an individual; THEODORE 
L. JOHNSON REVOCABLE TRUST, an Idaho revocable 
trust; JOHN DOES I-JOHN DOES X; AND ALL PERSONS 
IN POSSESSION OR CLAIMING ANY RIGHT TO 
POSSESSION, 
Defendants-Counterclaimants-Respondents. 
Supreme Court Case No. 38599
 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
 
I, CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, the undersigned authority, do hereby certify that I have 
personally served or mailed, by either United States Mail or Interdepartmental Mail, one copy of 
the following: 
CLERK'S RECORD AND REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT 
to each of the Attorneys of Record in this cause as follows: 
THOMAS G. MAILE, IV MARK S. PRUSYNSKI 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT 
EAGLE, IDAHO BOISE, IDAHO 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH
 
Clerk of the District Court
 
MAY 24 2011Date of Service: 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
 
BERKSHIRE INVESTMENTS LLC, an Idaho limited 
liability, and THOMAS G. MAILE, IV, and COLLEEN Supreme Court Case No. 38599 
BIRCH-MAILE, husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs-Counterdefendants-Appellants, CERTIFICATE TO RECORD 
vs. 
CONNIE WRIGHT TAYLOR, f/k/a CONNIE TAYLOR, an 
individual; DALLAN TAYLOR, an individual; R. JOHN 
TAYLOR, an individual; CLARK and FEENEY, a 
partnership; PAUL T. CLARK, an individual; THEODORE 
L. JOHNSON REVOCABLE TRUST, an Idaho revocable 
trust; JOHN DOES I-JOHN DOES X; AND ALL PERSONS 
IN POSSESSION OR CLAIMING ANY RIGHT TO 
POSSESSION, 
Defendants-Counterclaimants-Respondents. 
I, CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of 
the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Ada, do hereby certify that the above and foregoing 
record in the above-entitled cause was compiled and bound under my direction as, and is a true 
and correct record of the pleadings and documents that are automatically required under Rule 28 
of the Idaho Appellate Rules, as well as those requested by Counsels. 
I FURTHER CERTIFY, that the Notice of Appeal was filed in the District Court on the 
7th day of March, 2011. 
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH 
Clerk of the District Court 
By 2> 
Deputy Clerk 
CERTIFICATE TO RECORD 
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